The 'No to the EU' campaign Vol 2
Discussion
silent ninja said:
Your head in the sand approach never achieved anything in history. It's not a long list. The pound is tanking seriously and business has halted - these are facts. All indications are a recession. You're ignorant if you think otherwise. Wishful thinking and optimism are two entirely different things and the latter requires some sort of strategy and plan - so far both are non existent
No, your head is in the sand, this was about to happen regardless. The EU was at breaking point, the banks are insolvent in just about every country and the politicians and bankers were desperate for us not to leave as they were running a giant Ponzi scheme. They warned Cameron etc. that if we left before they had figured out how or if they could get out of it, the whole thing would collapse. They needed us in there to help take the fall when it did go bang. My only worry is it is all going to tumble before we get out. Seriously, take 10 minutes and read the following....
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-06/furious-i...
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-06/gundlach-...
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-06/its-not-b...
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ee728cb6-773e-11e0-aed6-...
This was going to happen in the next year or two regardless, thinking Brexit was the cause is exactly what they are all wanting you to think, if we are not in there to help pick up the pieces use us as a patsy. Nice to blame Brexit on the EU recession that was inevitable.
gizlaroc said:
silent ninja said:
Your head in the sand approach never achieved anything in history. It's not a long list. The pound is tanking seriously and business has halted - these are facts. All indications are a recession. You're ignorant if you think otherwise. Wishful thinking and optimism are two entirely different things and the latter requires some sort of strategy and plan - so far both are non existent
No, your head is in the sand, this was about to happen regardless. The EU was at breaking point, the banks are insolvent in just about every country and the politicians and bankers were desperate for us not to leave as they were running a giant Ponzi scheme. They warned Cameron etc. that if we left before they had figured out how or if they could get out of it, the whole thing would collapse. They needed us in there to help take the fall when it did go bang. My only worry is it is all going to tumble before we get out. Seriously, take 10 minutes and read the following....
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-06/furious-i...
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-06/gundlach-...
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-06/its-not-b...
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ee728cb6-773e-11e0-aed6-...
This was going to happen in the next year or two regardless, thinking Brexit was the cause is exactly what they are all wanting you to think, if we are not in there to help pick up the pieces use us as a patsy. Nice to blame Brexit on the EU recession that was inevitable.
Dismissing tales of unrelenting woe that are wholly unrealistic doesn't represent a head in the sand mentality, merely the capacity to discern o.t.t fantasy fiction.
Jockman said:
FT Link won't open without a subscription IIRC.
It was just explaining how the EU started to run a ponzi scheme when they could see the EU was falling apart.This was 2011 by the way..
FT said:
One of the pillars upon which the euro was established was the principle of “no bail-out”. When the sovereign debt crisis hit the eurozone this principle was ditched. As Greece, Ireland and Portugal were unable to service their unsustainable levels of debt, a mechanism was instituted to supply them with the financing necessary to service their obligations. This financing was provided, supposedly, in exchange for their implementing measures that would make their, now higher, debt burdens sustainable in the future. Yet the mode adopted to resolve the debt problems of countries in peripheral Europe is, apparently, to increase their level of debt. A case in point is the €78bn ($116bn) loan to Portugal. It is equivalent to more than 47 per cent of its gross domestic product in 2010, possibly increasing Portugal’s public debt to about 120 per cent of GDP.
It could be claimed that this mechanism is helping the countries involved since the official loans, although onerous, carry better conditions than the ones that need to be serviced. But the countries’ debts will increase (as a percentage of GDP the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are expected to be higher by the end of 2012 than at the start of the crisis). The share of debt owed to the official sector will also increase (in addition to the bond purchases by the European Central Bank, which reportedly owns 17 per cent of these countries’ bonds with a much higher percentage held as collateral).
Is this ongoing piling of debt an indication of imminent defaults? Probably, but not necessarily. An immediate default could result in major market commotion, given the high exposure of European banks to peripheral debt. Therefore, European governments are finding it more convenient to postpone the day of reckoning and continue throwing money into the peripheral countries, rather than face domestic financial disruption. Consequently, as long as European and international money (through the International Monetary Fund’s generous financing) is available, the game could go on.
It is based on the fiction that this is just a temporary liquidity problem and that the official financing helps the countries involved to make the reforms that will allow them to return to the voluntary market in normal conditions. In other words, the narrative is that the recipient countries could and would outgrow their debt. To “prove” this scenario is feasible several debt sustainability exercises are being dreamt up. But the fact is that this situation is only sustainable as long as additional amounts of money are available to continue the pretence.
Here is where this situation resembles a pyramid or a Ponzi scheme. Some of the original bondholders are being paid with the official loans that also finance the remaining primary deficits. When it turns out that countries cannot meet the austerity and structural conditions imposed on them, and therefore cannot return to the voluntary market, these loans will eventually be rolled over and enhanced by eurozone members and international organisations. This is Greece, not Chad: does anyone imagine the IMF will stop disbursing loans if performance criteria are not met? Moreover, this “public sector Ponzi scheme” is more flexible than a private one. In a private scheme, the pyramid collapses when you cannot find enough new investors willing to hand over their money so old investors can be paid. But in a public scheme such as this, the Ponzi scheme could, in theory, go on for ever. As long as it is financed with public money, the peripheral countries’ debt could continue to grow without a hypothetical limit.
But could it, really? The constraint is not financial, but political. We are starting to observe public opposition to financing this Ponzi scheme in its current form, but it could still have quite a way to go. It is apparent that, if not forced sooner by politics, the inevitable default will only be allowed to take place when the vast part of the European distressed debt is transferred from the private to the official sector. As in a pyramid scheme, it will be the last holder of the “asset” that takes the full loss. In this case, it will be the taxpayer that foots the bill, rather than the original bondholders that made the wrong investment decisions.
Is this good or bad? It all depends on how one assesses the value of the time gained. Would a bank crisis now be more damaging to the European economy than a future debt write-off? Or, alternatively, is recognising reality and accepting a debt restructuring now preferable to increasing the burden on future taxpayers? At the end, it is a political decision, but it would be refreshing if things are called by their name. Euphemisms may be useful in the short run, but one finally recognises a Ponzi scheme when it persists.
The writer was governor of Argentina’s central bank and director of the Centre for Central Banking Studies at the Bank of England. Samuel Brittan is away
But just search google for 'ponzi scheme eu' as there are some interesting articles. It could be claimed that this mechanism is helping the countries involved since the official loans, although onerous, carry better conditions than the ones that need to be serviced. But the countries’ debts will increase (as a percentage of GDP the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are expected to be higher by the end of 2012 than at the start of the crisis). The share of debt owed to the official sector will also increase (in addition to the bond purchases by the European Central Bank, which reportedly owns 17 per cent of these countries’ bonds with a much higher percentage held as collateral).
Is this ongoing piling of debt an indication of imminent defaults? Probably, but not necessarily. An immediate default could result in major market commotion, given the high exposure of European banks to peripheral debt. Therefore, European governments are finding it more convenient to postpone the day of reckoning and continue throwing money into the peripheral countries, rather than face domestic financial disruption. Consequently, as long as European and international money (through the International Monetary Fund’s generous financing) is available, the game could go on.
It is based on the fiction that this is just a temporary liquidity problem and that the official financing helps the countries involved to make the reforms that will allow them to return to the voluntary market in normal conditions. In other words, the narrative is that the recipient countries could and would outgrow their debt. To “prove” this scenario is feasible several debt sustainability exercises are being dreamt up. But the fact is that this situation is only sustainable as long as additional amounts of money are available to continue the pretence.
Here is where this situation resembles a pyramid or a Ponzi scheme. Some of the original bondholders are being paid with the official loans that also finance the remaining primary deficits. When it turns out that countries cannot meet the austerity and structural conditions imposed on them, and therefore cannot return to the voluntary market, these loans will eventually be rolled over and enhanced by eurozone members and international organisations. This is Greece, not Chad: does anyone imagine the IMF will stop disbursing loans if performance criteria are not met? Moreover, this “public sector Ponzi scheme” is more flexible than a private one. In a private scheme, the pyramid collapses when you cannot find enough new investors willing to hand over their money so old investors can be paid. But in a public scheme such as this, the Ponzi scheme could, in theory, go on for ever. As long as it is financed with public money, the peripheral countries’ debt could continue to grow without a hypothetical limit.
But could it, really? The constraint is not financial, but political. We are starting to observe public opposition to financing this Ponzi scheme in its current form, but it could still have quite a way to go. It is apparent that, if not forced sooner by politics, the inevitable default will only be allowed to take place when the vast part of the European distressed debt is transferred from the private to the official sector. As in a pyramid scheme, it will be the last holder of the “asset” that takes the full loss. In this case, it will be the taxpayer that foots the bill, rather than the original bondholders that made the wrong investment decisions.
Is this good or bad? It all depends on how one assesses the value of the time gained. Would a bank crisis now be more damaging to the European economy than a future debt write-off? Or, alternatively, is recognising reality and accepting a debt restructuring now preferable to increasing the burden on future taxpayers? At the end, it is a political decision, but it would be refreshing if things are called by their name. Euphemisms may be useful in the short run, but one finally recognises a Ponzi scheme when it persists.
The writer was governor of Argentina’s central bank and director of the Centre for Central Banking Studies at the Bank of England. Samuel Brittan is away
CrutyRammers said:
FiF said:
Is anyone else on the Leave side unhappy that May hasn't yet explicitly said that EU citizens currently resident might not retain acquired rights of residency. The Leave campaign made it quite clear that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties meant that they would have acquired rights of residence. The only ones saying they might not were certain elements of Remain.
This failure to declare the true legal position, presumably as some sort of bargaining chip, is frankly despicable by May. Even Cameron was up front about it.
Yes, her words have been pretty shady IMO. It is ironic that it should come from a remainer.This failure to declare the true legal position, presumably as some sort of bargaining chip, is frankly despicable by May. Even Cameron was up front about it.
Zod said:
CrutyRammers said:
FiF said:
Is anyone else on the Leave side unhappy that May hasn't yet explicitly said that EU citizens currently resident might not retain acquired rights of residency. The Leave campaign made it quite clear that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties meant that they would have acquired rights of residence. The only ones saying they might not were certain elements of Remain.
This failure to declare the true legal position, presumably as some sort of bargaining chip, is frankly despicable by May. Even Cameron was up front about it.
Yes, her words have been pretty shady IMO. It is ironic that it should come from a remainer.This failure to declare the true legal position, presumably as some sort of bargaining chip, is frankly despicable by May. Even Cameron was up front about it.
If anything it will force the EU into negotiations if only to protect the citizens of EU countries citizens who currently reside here.
What would happen if we gave rights of residency to those already here from other EU countries, and that right was not reciprocated to UK nationals in EU countries.
Whilst I appreciate that this is perhaps an unlikely scenario, but not beyond the realms of possibility.
boxxob said:
Zod said:
I really don't understand the fuss about this. She is merely saying that it depends on the outcome of negotiations. Giving this away upfront would be poor tactics.
Exactly. There's far too much binary-thought and absolutism shown amongst the commentary and campaigns around this whole debacle. (we'd have to find a way to punish the French and Spanish though....)
don'tbesilly said:
Zod said:
CrutyRammers said:
FiF said:
Is anyone else on the Leave side unhappy that May hasn't yet explicitly said that EU citizens currently resident might not retain acquired rights of residency. The Leave campaign made it quite clear that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties meant that they would have acquired rights of residence. The only ones saying they might not were certain elements of Remain.
This failure to declare the true legal position, presumably as some sort of bargaining chip, is frankly despicable by May. Even Cameron was up front about it.
Yes, her words have been pretty shady IMO. It is ironic that it should come from a remainer.This failure to declare the true legal position, presumably as some sort of bargaining chip, is frankly despicable by May. Even Cameron was up front about it.
If anything it will force the EU into negotiations if only to protect the citizens of EU countries citizens who currently reside here.
What would happen if we gave rights of residency to those already here from other EU countries, and that right was not reciprocated to UK nationals in EU countries.
Whilst I appreciate that this is perhaps an unlikely scenario, but not beyond the realms of possibility.
Zod said:
boxxob said:
Zod said:
I really don't understand the fuss about this. She is merely saying that it depends on the outcome of negotiations. Giving this away upfront would be poor tactics.
Exactly. There's far too much binary-thought and absolutism shown amongst the commentary and campaigns around this whole debacle. (we'd have to find a way to punish the French and Spanish though....)
gizlaroc said:
Jockman said:
FT Link won't open without a subscription IIRC.
It was just explaining how the EU started to run a ponzi scheme when they could see the EU was falling apart.This was 2011 by the way..
FT said:
One of the pillars upon which the euro was established was the principle of “no bail-out”. When the sovereign debt crisis hit the eurozone this principle was ditched. As Greece, Ireland and Portugal were unable to service their unsustainable levels of debt, a mechanism was instituted to supply them with the financing necessary to service their obligations. This financing was provided, supposedly, in exchange for their implementing measures that would make their, now higher, debt burdens sustainable in the future. Yet the mode adopted to resolve the debt problems of countries in peripheral Europe is, apparently, to increase their level of debt. A case in point is the €78bn ($116bn) loan to Portugal. It is equivalent to more than 47 per cent of its gross domestic product in 2010, possibly increasing Portugal’s public debt to about 120 per cent of GDP.
It could be claimed that this mechanism is helping the countries involved since the official loans, although onerous, carry better conditions than the ones that need to be serviced. But the countries’ debts will increase (as a percentage of GDP the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are expected to be higher by the end of 2012 than at the start of the crisis). The share of debt owed to the official sector will also increase (in addition to the bond purchases by the European Central Bank, which reportedly owns 17 per cent of these countries’ bonds with a much higher percentage held as collateral).
Is this ongoing piling of debt an indication of imminent defaults? Probably, but not necessarily. An immediate default could result in major market commotion, given the high exposure of European banks to peripheral debt. Therefore, European governments are finding it more convenient to postpone the day of reckoning and continue throwing money into the peripheral countries, rather than face domestic financial disruption. Consequently, as long as European and international money (through the International Monetary Fund’s generous financing) is available, the game could go on.
It is based on the fiction that this is just a temporary liquidity problem and that the official financing helps the countries involved to make the reforms that will allow them to return to the voluntary market in normal conditions. In other words, the narrative is that the recipient countries could and would outgrow their debt. To “prove” this scenario is feasible several debt sustainability exercises are being dreamt up. But the fact is that this situation is only sustainable as long as additional amounts of money are available to continue the pretence.
Here is where this situation resembles a pyramid or a Ponzi scheme. Some of the original bondholders are being paid with the official loans that also finance the remaining primary deficits. When it turns out that countries cannot meet the austerity and structural conditions imposed on them, and therefore cannot return to the voluntary market, these loans will eventually be rolled over and enhanced by eurozone members and international organisations. This is Greece, not Chad: does anyone imagine the IMF will stop disbursing loans if performance criteria are not met? Moreover, this “public sector Ponzi scheme” is more flexible than a private one. In a private scheme, the pyramid collapses when you cannot find enough new investors willing to hand over their money so old investors can be paid. But in a public scheme such as this, the Ponzi scheme could, in theory, go on for ever. As long as it is financed with public money, the peripheral countries’ debt could continue to grow without a hypothetical limit.
But could it, really? The constraint is not financial, but political. We are starting to observe public opposition to financing this Ponzi scheme in its current form, but it could still have quite a way to go. It is apparent that, if not forced sooner by politics, the inevitable default will only be allowed to take place when the vast part of the European distressed debt is transferred from the private to the official sector. As in a pyramid scheme, it will be the last holder of the “asset” that takes the full loss. In this case, it will be the taxpayer that foots the bill, rather than the original bondholders that made the wrong investment decisions.
Is this good or bad? It all depends on how one assesses the value of the time gained. Would a bank crisis now be more damaging to the European economy than a future debt write-off? Or, alternatively, is recognising reality and accepting a debt restructuring now preferable to increasing the burden on future taxpayers? At the end, it is a political decision, but it would be refreshing if things are called by their name. Euphemisms may be useful in the short run, but one finally recognises a Ponzi scheme when it persists.
The writer was governor of Argentina’s central bank and director of the Centre for Central Banking Studies at the Bank of England. Samuel Brittan is away
But just search google for 'ponzi scheme eu' as there are some interesting articles. It could be claimed that this mechanism is helping the countries involved since the official loans, although onerous, carry better conditions than the ones that need to be serviced. But the countries’ debts will increase (as a percentage of GDP the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are expected to be higher by the end of 2012 than at the start of the crisis). The share of debt owed to the official sector will also increase (in addition to the bond purchases by the European Central Bank, which reportedly owns 17 per cent of these countries’ bonds with a much higher percentage held as collateral).
Is this ongoing piling of debt an indication of imminent defaults? Probably, but not necessarily. An immediate default could result in major market commotion, given the high exposure of European banks to peripheral debt. Therefore, European governments are finding it more convenient to postpone the day of reckoning and continue throwing money into the peripheral countries, rather than face domestic financial disruption. Consequently, as long as European and international money (through the International Monetary Fund’s generous financing) is available, the game could go on.
It is based on the fiction that this is just a temporary liquidity problem and that the official financing helps the countries involved to make the reforms that will allow them to return to the voluntary market in normal conditions. In other words, the narrative is that the recipient countries could and would outgrow their debt. To “prove” this scenario is feasible several debt sustainability exercises are being dreamt up. But the fact is that this situation is only sustainable as long as additional amounts of money are available to continue the pretence.
Here is where this situation resembles a pyramid or a Ponzi scheme. Some of the original bondholders are being paid with the official loans that also finance the remaining primary deficits. When it turns out that countries cannot meet the austerity and structural conditions imposed on them, and therefore cannot return to the voluntary market, these loans will eventually be rolled over and enhanced by eurozone members and international organisations. This is Greece, not Chad: does anyone imagine the IMF will stop disbursing loans if performance criteria are not met? Moreover, this “public sector Ponzi scheme” is more flexible than a private one. In a private scheme, the pyramid collapses when you cannot find enough new investors willing to hand over their money so old investors can be paid. But in a public scheme such as this, the Ponzi scheme could, in theory, go on for ever. As long as it is financed with public money, the peripheral countries’ debt could continue to grow without a hypothetical limit.
But could it, really? The constraint is not financial, but political. We are starting to observe public opposition to financing this Ponzi scheme in its current form, but it could still have quite a way to go. It is apparent that, if not forced sooner by politics, the inevitable default will only be allowed to take place when the vast part of the European distressed debt is transferred from the private to the official sector. As in a pyramid scheme, it will be the last holder of the “asset” that takes the full loss. In this case, it will be the taxpayer that foots the bill, rather than the original bondholders that made the wrong investment decisions.
Is this good or bad? It all depends on how one assesses the value of the time gained. Would a bank crisis now be more damaging to the European economy than a future debt write-off? Or, alternatively, is recognising reality and accepting a debt restructuring now preferable to increasing the burden on future taxpayers? At the end, it is a political decision, but it would be refreshing if things are called by their name. Euphemisms may be useful in the short run, but one finally recognises a Ponzi scheme when it persists.
The writer was governor of Argentina’s central bank and director of the Centre for Central Banking Studies at the Bank of England. Samuel Brittan is away
I said that Merkel would sort out Schulz. 
said:
According to Die Welt, Mr Schulz has become 'persona-non grata' at the highest levels of Mrs Merkel's party due to his reaction to the Brexit vote.
CDU secretary general Peter Tauber told the German newspaper that Mr Schulz's Social Democratic Party 'stands for everything that makes people angry at Europe'.
CDU secretary general Peter Tauber told the German newspaper that Mr Schulz's Social Democratic Party 'stands for everything that makes people angry at Europe'.
gizlaroc said:
Argh not this nonsense again! 'Total derivative exposure' is not a measure of anything remotely enlightening. 99% or more of those 'exposures' offset one another. Zerohedge is retarded.don4l said:
I said that Merkel would sort out Schulz.
He's SPD, not CDU, so it's unclear to me what power she has over him. said:
According to Die Welt, Mr Schulz has become 'persona-non grata' at the highest levels of Mrs Merkel's party due to his reaction to the Brexit vote.
CDU secretary general Peter Tauber told the German newspaper that Mr Schulz's Social Democratic Party 'stands for everything that makes people angry at Europe'.
CDU secretary general Peter Tauber told the German newspaper that Mr Schulz's Social Democratic Party 'stands for everything that makes people angry at Europe'.
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