What happened to Air France Flight 447

[pushthebutton]

Theflyer said:

I was thinking more along the lines of a sudden accident and Jenson dodging it, or anything else reflex, reaction related!

Double thinking about it now, would I rather have someone who has had 5 years raf and 2 years with an A330 or someone whos had 7 years on an a330.

Actually looking at it that way you would want the latter. The reason being that the latter has pure direct experience with the Aircraft in hand whereas the former has mix of relevant and irrelevant experience and then some training and little experience on the aircraft itself.

However then we have to look at, in the Air France situation, would the RAF pilot not have paniced and thought twice about pulling up....

Ahh I don't know now. I think I would rather have the Ex-milly but I'm less sure about it now!

I'm actually home for some time now !

I can't help thinking that your views are a little bit confused.

Do you think reflexes and reactions would have saved the AF flight? Are there any incidents you can think of in commercial aviation that would have immediately been resolved as a result of quick reflexes?

Have you seen many incidents in recurrent simulators that would require an immediate reflex action to save the day? I've been through many cycles of recurrent training and with colleagues from a variety of backgrounds and I have never seen a situation that can only be resolved by immediate reflex action. This is replicated by line flying as well and the ability to make time is what defines the good performers, not quick reflexes/reactions.

[Simpo Two]

Reflexes are nothing to do with it. The difference is that a fast jet pilot can't stop and read the instructions when something goes wrong; he has to fix it on the spot using his instinct and brains. That IMHO is the difference; whereas a commercial crew will get the Owner's Handbook. That can work of course, if the aircraft has sufficient height/time and if the crew work the problem correctly. Sadly the AF crew seem to have behaved like a bunch of gibbering idiots with no idea how to interpret the information they received or what to do about it.

[Ian Lancs]

Simpo Two said:

Reflexes are nothing to do with it. The difference is that a fast jet pilot can't stop and read the instructions when something goes wrong; he has to fix it on the spot using his instinct and brains. That IMHO is the difference; whereas a commercial crew will get the Owner's Handbook. That can work of course, if the aircraft has sufficient height/time and if the crew work the problem correctly. Sadly the AF crew seem to have behaved like a bunch of gibbering idiots with no idea how to interpret the information they received or what to do about it.

Apart from the fact fast jets pilots carry (or have electronic versions in the system) have Flight Crew Checklists which contain a rather large emergency section? Yes they may know most of the drills off by heart, but they still will go through the checklists line by line (at least thats what happens in my experience)

[pushthebutton]

Simpo Two said:

Reflexes are nothing to do with it. The difference is that a fast jet pilot can't stop and read the instructions when something goes wrong; he has to fix it on the spot using his instinct and brains. That IMHO is the difference; whereas a commercial crew will get the Owner's Handbook. That can work of course, if the aircraft has sufficient height/time and if the crew work the problem correctly. Sadly the AF crew seem to have behaved like a bunch of gibbering idiots with no idea how to interpret the information they received or what to do about it.

That's not the case really.

In any type of flying there is no time to be thinking about a situation whilst in the air. With most complex situations the time to work them through is on the ground in preparation for eventualities.

What makes you think that fast jets don't have normal and non-normal checklists? The responses will be exactly the same. Fast jets will have more memory items due to the nature of the flying, but they are checklists all the same.

Of course checklists "can work." It's one of the many ways to limit the effect of human nature on flying. It's absolutely nothing to do with height or time either. There is also limited use to instinct in aviation. A lot of the actions performed in aviation are to limit the inherent errors associated with human instinct.

A few of the posts on here are from people who have experienced, witnessed and dealt with the shortcomings of being a human in aviation. This is why they can sympathise with the situation that the AF crew found themselves in. I would hazard a guess that that is also why you cannot?!

[CelicaGT]

Simpo Two said:

Reflexes are nothing to do with it. The difference is that a fast jet pilot can't stop and read the instructions when something goes wrong; he has to fix it on the spot using his instinct and brains. That IMHO is the difference; whereas a commercial crew will get the Owner's Handbook. That can work of course, if the aircraft has sufficient height/time and if the crew work the problem correctly. Sadly the AF crew seem to have behaved like a bunch of gibbering idiots with no idea how to interpret the information they received or what to do about it.

That can work? Using the "Owner's Handbook" can work? Modern response to in-flight situations/emergencies is completely built on the principle of using the "Owner's Handbook" instead of just making up things as you go along and I'd say it's worked pretty well. Checklist usage is a fundamental part of all areas of aviation, including emergency situations. Whether it's a quick reference handbook, immediate action card, or memorized emergency items, the idea is the same, it's a checklist. Seldom is it necessary or even desirable to make a snap decision using instinct in the cockpit during an emergency.

Edited by CelicaGT on Thursday 15th December 03:54

[c7xlg]

There are two conflicting examples from the US in the last decade that makes one think about the relevance or not of military background and training to civil transport.

1) Sully with the USAir water landing after double engine failure. His 'reflex' actions and quick thinking saved everyone on board. His military service possibly helped here.

2) The AA A300 that crashed fairly soon after 9/11. Principle cause (IIRC) was excessive use of the rudder pedals to correct unstable flight which resulted in the vert-stab coming off. This was put down to the AA recovery training being formulated by ex-military pilots who were used to a very strong aircraft and being able to use lots of rudder.

Then we of cause have the BA 777 where the 'reflex' actions of the captain to pull in the flaps probably saved quite a few lives to. No military training there IIRC.

[scubadude]

c7xlg said:

Then we of cause have the BA 777 where the 'reflex' actions of the captain to pull in the flaps probably saved quite a few lives to. No military training there IIRC.

I have wondered, do different airlines have very different pilot sourcing lines and training regime?

Clearly the pilot above and Mr Sully come from a different breed, no time to think when your skimming chimney tops in Weat London and dodging ferries on the Hudson.

Between the wife and I we've been on a fair few flights, probably about 30% BA. On other airlines I've experienced go-arounds, divertions, return to terminal prior to take-off, intermediate stops, food on the ceiling turbulence and burst tyre landings.... on BA I've landed in a blizzard in Seattle where even the local airlines had refused to fly, the wife was on the last BA flight into Sydney during the dust storms last year she didn't see the ground until she left the airport, visibility was less than the distance from the windows to the ground, also into Calgary with BA with so much cross wind I had a better view out the side window of the runway than the cockpit not to mention various annoucements and warnings about weather and avoiding action which turned out to be non-events.... The same might be true for other airlines but I have limited time in some of the other "big" companies.
(FWIW SAA are IMo the worse but thats more to do with the cabin crew :-)

[Simpo Two]

pushthebutton said:

A few of the posts on here are from people who have experienced, witnessed and dealt with the shortcomings of being a human in aviation. This is why they can sympathise with the situation that the AF crew found themselves in. I would hazard a guess that that is also why you cannot?

Some people wish to defend the crew because it was dark and there was no horizon. I don't care that it was 'difficult' or 'frightening'; the point is they are supposed to be trained to deal with such things, work together and keep calm. Everything was working except the airpseed indicator - but you would know that an aircaft cannot suddenly 'stop', that the aircraft was straight and level (assuming they looked at the artifical horizon and altimeter, rather important for blind flying), that the engines were working but that they were in icing conditions which might freeze pitot heads.

Read the report and see the way the crew acted and what they did and I don't think you will find much to defend them. Consider it this way: If they were Competent then a briefly-frozen pitot head will cause an irrecoverale situation and crash. I do not think Airbus would design something where that was the case. Therefore the crew were Incompetent. Airbus seem to have unusual control arrangements but you would expect an Airbus crew to know how to work them. Instead we have the laughable situation of one pilot doing one thing, another pilot doing the opposite, and the aircraft going 'dur' and averaging them out.

As I said in my very first post, but it was probably too distilled for most to grasp, they could fly a computer (well not even that it turned out) but not an aeroplane.

So - hands up all those who think the crew were Competent...

[Theflyer]

Im sticking with the ex-military pilots being more likely to be better in a hot situation.

If you look at PIA ( Pakistan ) 90% of their pilots are ex-military cadets who have done many years with the Pakistan air force. They are probably the finest pilots I ever meet and have met.

They aren't your typical south asians, they are very skilled experienced and smooth pilots.

[CelicaGT]

scubadude said:

I have wondered, do different airlines have very different pilot sourcing lines and training regime?

Clearly the pilot above and Mr Sully come from a different breed, no time to think when your skimming chimney tops in Weat London and dodging ferries on the Hudson.

Between the wife and I we've been on a fair few flights, probably about 30% BA. On other airlines I've experienced go-arounds, divertions, return to terminal prior to take-off, intermediate stops, food on the ceiling turbulence and burst tyre landings.... on BA I've landed in a blizzard in Seattle where even the local airlines had refused to fly, the wife was on the last BA flight into Sydney during the dust storms last year she didn't see the ground until she left the airport, visibility was less than the distance from the windows to the ground, also into Calgary with BA with so much cross wind I had a better view out the side window of the runway than the cockpit not to mention various annoucements and warnings about weather and avoiding action which turned out to be non-events.... The same might be true for other airlines but I have limited time in some of the other "big" companies.
(FWIW SAA are IMo the worse but thats more to do with the cabin crew :-)

I'm not exactly sure what you're trying to say here... Are you impressed by BA or dismayed by them? Are you saying BA is 'better' or has 'better' training because when other airlines go-around, divert, & return to the terminal they press on instead?

[paddyhasneeds]

I think calling the crew incompetent is harsh tbh.

It's a cliche but none of us were there, and they sure as hell didn't want to die, they just got caught up in a bad situation that they made worse.

If they could be judged to be incompetent then the airline and every single regulation and evaluation process in the industry that let them up there in that plane needs a bloody good long hard look at itself.

[Theflyer]

paddyhasneeds said:

I think calling the crew incompetent is harsh tbh.

got caught up in a bad situation that they made worse.

[pushthebutton]

Simpo Two said:

Some people wish to defend....

So - hands up all those who think the crew were Competent...

I've read the reports and I fully understand the situation. I've experienced the fault numerous times in recurrent training and yet I can still sympathise with the crew. That seems to be the viewpoint of the majority of pilots on here. That's not just coincidence...

I wasn't really taking exception to the parts of your post regarding the actions of the crew. I tried to aim my reply at the 'pants' that came before that part regarding checklists and instinct. The last paragraph was really just intended as a sound bite. Nothing more.

I'm not saying that things could have been different on that flight. I'm just saying that your reasoning and logic is wide of the mark and I couldn't let it go.

:-)

[Theflyer]

I think we can all realistically agree that they should have followed everyone elses take on it and rerouted altogether.

They shouldn't have been in such a situation in the first place.

That is poor piloting.

[pushthebutton]

Theflyer said:

I think we can all realistically agree that they should have followed everyone elses take on it and rerouted altogether.

They shouldn't have been in such a situation in the first place.

That is poor piloting.

You'll have heard this before, but...there but for the grace of God!!

[Simpo Two]

Well I qualified the checklist part with 'CAN work' because there may not be time to go through it - at low altitude when Newton has checkmate in two moves for example. So sometimes you can read the manual and sometimes you can't - in which case there is only experience and/or instinct - like the guys who skimmed into Heathrow with feet to spare. Rather than civil vs military, I think we'd agree that experience is probably the most important thing. Quoting Sullenberger: 'One way of looking at this might be that for 42 years, I've been making small, regular deposits in this bank of experience: education and training. And on January 15 the balance was sufficient so that I could make a very large withdrawal'.

I understand that pilots will empathise with each other, but really, what kind of pilot pulls back on the stick when the stall warning sounds? And keeps it there while the warning sounds 74 times and he mushes 30,000+ feet into the sea? I could have done that!

On a different tack - and I don't think my NVG idea was picked up on - is there no radar which can scan the horizon and so provide a basic frame of reference?

[MarkK]

Simpo Two said:

Well I qualified the checklist part with 'CAN work' because there may not be time to go through it - at low altitude when Newton has checkmate in two moves for example. So sometimes you can read the manual and sometimes you can't - in which case there is only experience and/or instinct - like the guys who skimmed into Heathrow with feet to spare. Rather than civil vs military,

I'm not sure about the civil world but in the military each checklist has a number of bold items that have to be committed to memory so the crew can immediately action them in an emergency as a bare minimum to save the aircraft / crew. If the emergency is of a "slower" nature then obviously the crew can refer to the cards and also implement the non-bold items that probably aren't critical but help resolve the situation effectively.

So although it may appear that a military pilot is just reacting, he is following a checklist that has been ingrained into his memory as part of his training.

Simpo Two said:

I understand that pilots will empathise with each other, but really, what kind of pilot pulls back on the stick when the stall warning sounds? And keeps it there while the warning sounds 74 times and he mushes 30,000+ feet into the sea? I could have done that!

I think it mentions in the report that the handling pilot seems to be following the Take-off Go Around (TOGA) procedure that involved pulling back on the stick and letting the aircraft climb as quickly as possible with the anti-stall functionality keeping the AoA within limits. Obviously this is completely inappropriate for use at cruise altitude and with the FCS in alternate law the anti-stall protection was missing anyway.
But you can kind of see that with a storm more or less directly ahead and unreliable airspeed indications, a confused mind may have just instinctively decided to try and gain altitude and write off the stall warning as spurious. Not defending the pilot any more but I still think to just write him off as a crap pilot who simply doesn't know stall recovery is frankly ludicrous.

Simpo Two said:

On a different tack - and I don't think my NVG idea was picked up on - is there no radar which can scan the horizon and so provide a basic frame of reference?

I don't see what that gives you above and beyond the Primary and Standby Artificial Horizons - seems like a LOT of expense for resolving a situation that should almost never occur. In the same league as supplying all the passengers with parachutes IMHO.

[pushthebutton]

Simpo Two said:

Well I qualified the checklist part with 'CAN work' because there may not be time to go through it - at low altitude when Newton has checkmate in two moves for example. So sometimes you can read the manual and sometimes you can't - in which case there is only experience and/or instinct - like the guys who skimmed into Heathrow with feet to spare. Rather than civil vs military, I think we'd agree that experience is probably the most important thing. Quoting Sullenberger: 'One way of looking at this might be that for 42 years, I've been making small, regular deposits in this bank of experience: education and training. And on January 15 the balance was sufficient so that I could make a very large withdrawal'.

I understand that pilots will empathise with each other, but really, what kind of pilot pulls back on the stick when the stall warning sounds? And keeps it there while the warning sounds 74 times and he mushes 30,000+ feet into the sea? I could have done that!

On a different tack - and I don't think my NVG idea was picked up on - is there no radar which can scan the horizon and so provide a basic frame of reference?

Ok. The guys who made it into Heathrow called upon system knowledge and I've no doubt that PB had thought through a similar situation and decided that the next flap setting provided less drag with no appreciable loss on lift. I know that's something I have thought of previously.

Regarding Sully. He considered two other airfields before deciding on the Hudson. He had enough time to rule those out before deciding that the Hudson is better than downtown NYC. I think that's reasonable. Interestingly, had he turned towards his departure airfield immediately after the failure he would have made it. I would consider that to be a "reflex" action. I believe his actions were considered and not instinctive.

With regard to NVG, it is entirely possible to build an aircraft that will never crash. But, of course, that comes at a cost. Modern aviation is about balancing cost against safety. A 100% safe aircraft would cost £2000(?!) to fly to Edinburgh. Great, but no one would pay that.

Regarding time to action checklists. There is always time. I guess that you could argue that those aircraft that don't give you that time are fitted with ejection seats. For every other type the checklist will go a long way to preventing human error and should always be followed. There is no better way. Think of it as comparing the thoughts of an experienced pilot on the day to those of numerous experienced pilots sat in a heated office with all the time in the world!

Finally, I wish it was as simple as 'pulling bank on the stick, but I'm sure I and, I hope you, realise that that is massively over simplifying a complex situation. If only that were the case!!
I know that it seems simple sitting at home, well rested and suitably informed reading reports, but it isn't. I would love to think that I know how to respond to that situation and that I could recognise and differentiate it from a 'simple' stall. I believe that I would respond correctly, but I can also appreciate the actions of a tired crew who have been East then West then East. Haven't slept properly for 36 hours plus and when they get home always feel one sleep away from feeling fantastic, but never actually get there year after year.

Sorry for the waffle. For some reason I feel the need to defend the dead. Interestingly, when was the last death directly attributable to UK commercial aviation?

P

Edited by pushthebutton on Friday 16th December 20:46

[speedyellowrs]

NVGs would have given them a better view of the inside of a cloud.

[Simpo Two]

MarkK said:

Simpo Two said:

On a different tack - and I don't think my NVG idea was picked up on - is there no radar which can scan the horizon and so provide a basic frame of reference?

I don't see what that gives you above and beyond the Primary and Standby Artificial Horizons - seems like a LOT of expense for resolving a situation that should almost never occur. In the same league as supplying all the passengers with parachutes IMHO.

It was only that an overriding cause of the confusion and subsequent crash was the lack of orientation. The pilots can't have looked at the artificial horizon or they'd have known what attitude the craft was in. Hence - give them a backup. Or teach them how to fly on instruments of course...

pushthebutton said:

Regarding Sully. He considered two other airfields before deciding on the Hudson. He had enough time to rule those out before deciding that the Hudson is better than downtown NYC. I think that's reasonable. Interestingly, had he turned towards his departure airfield immediately after the failure he would have made it. I would consider that to be a "reflex" action. I believe his actions were considered and not instinctive.

There is of course a blur between 'considering actions very quickly' and instinct

Trying to turn and regain base at low speed after engine failure has killed many pilots; he may have been thinking of that. Or maybe by the time he had gone through some checklists the time had passed.

pushthebutton said:

With regard to NVG, it is entirely possible to build an aircraft that will never crash. But, of course, that comes at a cost. Modern aviation is about balancing cost against safety. A 100% safe aircraft would cost £2000(?!) to fly to Edinburgh. Great, but no one would pay that.

I was just thinking of a pair of NVGs in a locker in the cockpit. Why try to interpret dozens of dials and displays in the dark and under stress when you can simply look out and see? (once out of cloud of course)

pushthebutton said:

Finally, I wish it was as simple as 'pulling bank on the stick, but I'm sure I and, I hope you, realise that that is massively over simplifying a complex situation.

Of course, but ultimately all complexities boil down to simple things IMHO.

pushthebutton said:

Sorry for the waffle.

No, it's all good useful stuff

pushthebutton said:

Interestingly, when was the last death directly attributable to UK commercial aviation?

Without checking - Manchester?