What happened to Air France Flight 447
Discussion
Chuck328 said:
paddyhasneeds said:
Mind if I ask, were you expecting it?
Yes, it's briefed before hand in the class room, more about this in a mo..I'm just thinking of any analogy I can, I don't know, a car engine fault for example, and the fact that you can run up a diagnostic bill for a lot of time spent troubleshooting a fault, that once known, seems bloody obvious.
Simulators are also used for teaching, not just testing. There are certain elements which have to be covered in order to remain qualified, but the rest of the sim time tends to be used for instruction. It is a constantly evolving industry, with new technology always needing to be taught. Compare today's aircraft with what was being flown twenty years ago. Hugely different. Any better? Another debate.
Mattt said:
When you do Sim sessions, does it not reduce the lesson if you are pre-briefed about the incident/flight you're going to do?
I would've thought it would be more useful to retry this situation 'blind' (as you can reasonably get) and then see how people behave?
Some carriers are implementing Alternative Training Qualification Programme (ATQP) which focuses training on event based data..... in other words, the pilots don't know what to expect and are given one of a number of scenarios. It is very much a training detail.I would've thought it would be more useful to retry this situation 'blind' (as you can reasonably get) and then see how people behave?
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/british-...
This occurs once a year for crews, with the other sim check being their IR renewal (Licence Proficiency Check-LPC), which falls into the usual RTO, V1 cut, engine out approaches and AWOPS etc etc
Edited by speedyellowrs on Saturday 1st December 10:17
nightflight said:
No it's not. In normal law, if you do hold the stick back, and get near to a stall, the aircraft will automatically lower the nose in order to prevent a stall. It will do this even with the autopilot disconnected. The stall recovery in an Airbus is no different to any other aircraft. Why this guy was holding the stick back, I have no idea.
Rgr...that makes sense. CelicaGT said:
nightflight said:
No it's not. In normal law, if you do hold the stick back, and get near to a stall, the aircraft will automatically lower the nose in order to prevent a stall. It will do this even with the autopilot disconnected. The stall recovery in an Airbus is no different to any other aircraft. Why this guy was holding the stick back, I have no idea.
Rgr...that makes sense. Mojocvh said:
Despite prompting from the other seat re "law" he kept about 10 deg nose up dialed in. The fact that the other seat did not reach over and "remind" him is another of those quirky AF culture, CRM things......
Speaking of that, here's another question for Airbus pilots. What happens if the F/O pulls one way on the side-stick and the CA the other way? Does CA's input take precedence? CelicaGT said:
Mojocvh said:
Despite prompting from the other seat re "law" he kept about 10 deg nose up dialed in. The fact that the other seat did not reach over and "remind" him is another of those quirky AF culture, CRM things......
Speaking of that, here's another question for Airbus pilots. What happens if the F/O pulls one way on the side-stick and the CA the other way? Does CA's input take precedence? Airbus said:
When the PF makes a sidestick input, an electrical order is sent to the flight control computers. If the PNF makes a simultaneous sidestick input, both signals are algebraically summed and both PF and PNF green lights flash on the glareshield. This situation might occur in the case of an instinctive PNF reaction on the sidestick. If the PNF needs to take control, he must press and hold the take-over pb in order to avoid simultaneous sidestick inputs and announce, "I have control".
In the case of a SIDESTICK FAULT ECAM warning due to an electrical failure, the affected sidestick order sent to the computers is zeroed. This means that the affected sidestick has been deactivated and there is no further procedure associated with this warning.
In the case of pilot incapacitation where a sidestick input is being made, or in the case of a mechanical failure leading to a jammed sidestick, the inputs are again algebraically summed. There is no associated ECAM caution. In either of these cases, the intervening pilot must press the take-over pb to gain single sidestick authority. The pb must be depressed for at least 40 seconds to permanently deactivate the affected sidestick. However, if a sidestick has been deactivated, it may be reactivated by depressing its take-over pb.
In the case of a SIDESTICK FAULT ECAM warning due to an electrical failure, the affected sidestick order sent to the computers is zeroed. This means that the affected sidestick has been deactivated and there is no further procedure associated with this warning.
In the case of pilot incapacitation where a sidestick input is being made, or in the case of a mechanical failure leading to a jammed sidestick, the inputs are again algebraically summed. There is no associated ECAM caution. In either of these cases, the intervening pilot must press the take-over pb to gain single sidestick authority. The pb must be depressed for at least 40 seconds to permanently deactivate the affected sidestick. However, if a sidestick has been deactivated, it may be reactivated by depressing its take-over pb.
el stovey said:
CelicaGT said:
Mojocvh said:
Despite prompting from the other seat re "law" he kept about 10 deg nose up dialed in. The fact that the other seat did not reach over and "remind" him is another of those quirky AF culture, CRM things......
Speaking of that, here's another question for Airbus pilots. What happens if the F/O pulls one way on the side-stick and the CA the other way? Does CA's input take precedence? Airbus said:
When the PF makes a sidestick input, an electrical order is sent to the flight control computers. If the PNF makes a simultaneous sidestick input, both signals are algebraically summed and both PF and PNF green lights flash on the glareshield. This situation might occur in the case of an instinctive PNF reaction on the sidestick. If the PNF needs to take control, he must press and hold the take-over pb in order to avoid simultaneous sidestick inputs and announce, "I have control".
In the case of a SIDESTICK FAULT ECAM warning due to an electrical failure, the affected sidestick order sent to the computers is zeroed. This means that the affected sidestick has been deactivated and there is no further procedure associated with this warning.
In the case of pilot incapacitation where a sidestick input is being made, or in the case of a mechanical failure leading to a jammed sidestick, the inputs are again algebraically summed. There is no associated ECAM caution. In either of these cases, the intervening pilot must press the take-over pb to gain single sidestick authority. The pb must be depressed for at least 40 seconds to permanently deactivate the affected sidestick. However, if a sidestick has been deactivated, it may be reactivated by depressing its take-over pb.
In the case of a SIDESTICK FAULT ECAM warning due to an electrical failure, the affected sidestick order sent to the computers is zeroed. This means that the affected sidestick has been deactivated and there is no further procedure associated with this warning.
In the case of pilot incapacitation where a sidestick input is being made, or in the case of a mechanical failure leading to a jammed sidestick, the inputs are again algebraically summed. There is no associated ECAM caution. In either of these cases, the intervening pilot must press the take-over pb to gain single sidestick authority. The pb must be depressed for at least 40 seconds to permanently deactivate the affected sidestick. However, if a sidestick has been deactivated, it may be reactivated by depressing its take-over pb.
king ridiculous. How could any sensible engineer decide that summing the inputs was a reasonable option??Anyway, a very sobering read. My take is stupid control/warning system design from airbus, and a really major basic level f
k up by the pilots. Once they started to panic, it was game over. I suppose you could put the blame for that at air france's door. They should have been better trained. Their actions say a lot about how badly prepared they were for the situation they found themselves in, to the point where their basic flying skills didn't take over. Quite worrying really.Edited by BMWBen on Saturday 10th December 19:14
davepoth said:
Because that's what happens if two pilots do the opposite on the controls in a non FBW plane?
Equally mental surely? How does that work anyway? If the stick is mechanically connected to the control surfaces surely pushing against someones action on the other controls you'll feel the resistance?Take a Boeing 757/767 if one pilot pulls back and the other pushes forwards against the control column then one elevator will go up and one will go down.
It does take a fair bit of force to breakout the columns but that's how its always worked.
Airbus system is perfectly logical.
It does take a fair bit of force to breakout the columns but that's how its always worked.
Airbus system is perfectly logical.
Edited by AndyACB on Saturday 10th December 19:32
AndyACB said:
Take a Boeing 757/767 if one pilot pulls back and the other pushes forwards against the control column then one elevator will go up and one will go down.
If you don't design it to do this WTF are you supposed to do if you get a jam?
It does take a fair bit of force to breakout the columns but that's how its always worked.
Airbus system is perfectly logical.
I guess that makes sense. But that's not what the airbus system is doing. On an airbus that would result in... nothing, correct?If you don't design it to do this WTF are you supposed to do if you get a jam?
It does take a fair bit of force to breakout the columns but that's how its always worked.
Airbus system is perfectly logical.
Why not have a feedback/warning system that lets you know that there are conflicting inputs being given? It was one of the contributing factors here...
davepoth said:
BMWBen said:
That is fking ridiculous. How could any sensible engineer decide that summing the inputs was a reasonable option??
Because that's what happens if two pilots do the opposite on the controls in a non FBW plane?king ridiculous. How could any sensible engineer decide that summing the inputs was a reasonable option??In driving terms, you're driving towards the edge of a cliff and safety lies to the left or the right, one of you steers left, one steers right, rather than heading to safety the car goes straight on and over the cliff...
BMWBen said:
I guess that makes sense. But that's not what the airbus system is doing. On an airbus that would result in... nothing, correct?
Why not have a feedback/warning system that lets you know that there are conflicting inputs being given? It was one of the contributing factors here...
No, in the Boeing one up/one down = neutral. Airbus one stick fwd, one back = neutral. Same effect. Difference being Boeing put the effect at the flight surface, Airbus does it through computation before it gets to the surfaces.Why not have a feedback/warning system that lets you know that there are conflicting inputs being given? It was one of the contributing factors here...
There is a warning in the Airbus if the sidesticks are moved simultaneously. Also if the Captain presses his takeover button a synthetic voice announces "Priority left" and vice versa with the F/O. A small green arrow also illuminates in front of them if their buddy is still moving his stick about.
Thread drifting ever so slightly.....
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