HMS Queen Elizabeth

[FourWheelDrift]

V8 Fettler said:

Stuff

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8MgkqmWogo

[MBBlat]

V8 Fettler said:

Then why do the Americans continue to spend billions on carriers that are designed to sail at over 30 knots?

For the design, the balancing element you've missed is cost.

Ah cost
Gerald R Ford $12Billion (£9 billion) in construction costs alone, another $5 billion in R&D for 1 ship
Queen Elizabeth Class £6.2 billion for 2 ships, includes R&D costs - looks quite a bargain to me in comparison

So each QEC costs 1/3 of a US carrier, does 80% of the speed, carries about 1/2 the aircraft - on a cost/benefit basis we do quite well.
Even some yanks think so http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-the-us-navy-s...

So what is it - 1 x 30 knot carrier, 0 x 35 knot carriers or 2 x 25 knot carriers?

[V8 Fettler]

MBBlat said:

V8 Fettler said:

Then why do the Americans continue to spend billions on carriers that are designed to sail at over 30 knots?

For the design, the balancing element you've missed is cost.

Ah cost
Gerald R Ford $12Billion (£9 billion) in construction costs alone, another $5 billion in R&D for 1 ship
Queen Elizabeth Class £6.2 billion for 2 ships, includes R&D costs - looks quite a bargain to me in comparison

So each QEC costs 1/3 of a US carrier, does 80% of the speed, carries about 1/2 the aircraft - on a cost/benefit basis we do quite well.
Even some yanks think so http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/why-the-us-navy-s...

So what is it - 1 x 30 knot carrier, 0 x 35 knot carriers or 2 x 25 knot carriers?

A direct comparison of the design and construction costs of nuclear vs conventional is flawed, as is setting the budget without commencing the design. By all means value engineer, but that needs to occur after various costed options for the concept design have been finalised.

How can the concept design be valid until the intended purpose of the QE is defined? Otherwise there is a risk that the continuing design and construction process will go round in expensive circles. See Ellwood's comments previously quoted.

[V8 Fettler]

tuffer said:

V8 Fettler said:

Then why do the Americans continue to spend billions on carriers that are designed to sail at over 30 knots?

For the design, the balancing element you've missed is cost.

Because building very large, very expensive Nuclear powered carriers keeps a lot of people in jobs.

There are much more cost-effective means of creating jobs.

[V8 Fettler]

SWTH said:

V8 Fettler said:

Then why do the Americans continue to spend billions on carriers that are designed to sail at over 30 knots?

For the design, the balancing element you've missed is cost.

Cost is an integral part of balancing needs and risks. It doesn't need listing as a separate part.

The balance should be cost/benefit where the benefit is the reduction in operational risk. If higher speed isn't required to reduce operational risk then higher speed shouldn't be a concept design requirement. If higher speed is required to reduce operational risk then it should be a concept design requirement, perhaps deleted during the value engineering stage, thereby increasing operational risk. Is that where we are?

If the MOD only commenced speculating about the purpose of the QE in 2012 (Ellwood's paper) then the design team has done well to reach the value engineering stage.

[SWTH]

V8 Fettler said:

The balance should be cost/benefit where the benefit is the reduction in operational risk. If higher speed isn't required to reduce operational risk then higher speed shouldn't be a concept design requirement. If higher speed is required to reduce operational risk then it should be a concept design requirement, perhaps deleted during the value engineering stage, thereby increasing operational risk. Is that where we are?

If the MOD only commenced speculating about the purpose of the QE in 2012 (Ellwood's paper) then the design team has done well to reach the value engineering stage.

Lots of 'ifs'. Do you have a source for any information that the RN ever actually wanted a 30kt carrier in the first place?

[IanH755]

Has anyone independently tested the QEC's speed to be <30kts, because I know when I was in the RAF the speeds/ranges/capabilities of equipment that was public knowledge rarely matched the actual details and the public info was usually much less than actual (although sometimes it was the other way around).

So while they may "say" it's <30kts it may well be "actually" capable of more.

[tuffer]

V8 Fettler said:

tuffer said:

V8 Fettler said:

Then why do the Americans continue to spend billions on carriers that are designed to sail at over 30 knots?

For the design, the balancing element you've missed is cost.

Because building very large, very expensive Nuclear powered carriers keeps a lot of people in jobs.

There are much more cost-effective means of creating jobs.

There are much more cost effective ways of building Aircraft Carriers.

[Shar2]

IanH755 said:

Has anyone independently tested the QEC's speed to be <30kts, because I know when I was in the RAF the speeds/ranges/capabilities of equipment that was public knowledge rarely matched the actual details and the public info was usually much less than actual (although sometimes it was the other way around).

So while they may "say" it's <30kts it may well be "actually" capable of more.

The Invincibles were certainly quite a bit faster than any info released on them. You should have seen the Dwight D Eisenhower accelarate though, that was something else for such a large ship. We were sailing along side her, (HMS Invincible), in the Med and she just took off. The Invincible was quick off the mark, but the Ike made us look positively pedestrian.

Edited by Shar2 on Monday 1st February 16:52

[donutsina911]

V8 Fettler said:

The proponents of ASDIC prior to WW2 were confident that ASDIC could be used to deal with the U-boats, they were desperately wrong ("First Happy Time"). Allied ASDIC, tactics and resource developed and the balance swung away from the U-boats ("Black May"), the balance would have swung back towards the U-boats had the Elektro boats been launched in numbers.

This has nothing to do with the thread, or the erroneous point you made about submarines struggling to find surface assets. ('the effectiveness of identifying the position of an enemy vessel at sea by noise has been been frequently overestimated for decades''). The context of our debate has been about the ability of submarines to track carriers today, not surface assets tracking submarines in WW2, as you well know. You appear to be well read in the latter and clueless in the former.

V8 Fettler said:

The threats to carriers are evolving, but military technology generally changes at a steady pace in peacetime, this is demonstrated by extended life of many vessels, aircraft and systems.

You have a different view to the Rear Admiral then. Re-read the first line of the quote I provided:

Rear Admiral Chris Parry said:

'The operational context will have altered considerably since the Queen Elizabeth class was first conceived and during its development'

Your arrogance and foolishness knows no bounds. If the words of an Admiral don't convince you, or the three examples I've already given you won't wash, take a read of 'Military Innovation in the Interwar Period' by Murray and Millet. That should do the job.

V8 Fettler said:

In terms of threats to carriers, the Gotland appears to be causing greatest concern, a sub which - in some aspects of performance - hasn't moved substantially forwards from the Elektro boats.

It appears, yet again, that you are wrong. I've given you examples of evolving threats from Chris Parry, of which submarines were but one. I've also indicated that the Swedish are an important intelligence partner and are sharing their tech with us - the Gotland is not causing concern in the slightest. You have no knowledge of the performance parameters of submarines today outside of Wikipedia because you are a civilian, but I would imagine that a quick Google will turn up some 'substantial' performance improvements in sonar tech that will enlighten you somewhat.

Again, as a Rear Admiral isn't quite cutting the mustard for you when it comes to threats, here's a quote from Capt Hendrix USN, a USN aviator, writing in a CNAS paper:

Capt Hendrix USN said:

'Platform efficiency is not the biggest challenge facing the carrier. Platform survivability is. Submarines, surface ships, aircraft, air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles and swarming small craft each pose threats to U.S. naval forces, including aircraft carriers, but no weapon has captured the imagination of American naval strategists like the DF-21D missile. Using a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) placed on a CSS-5 missile, China’s Second Artillery Division states that its doctrine will be to saturate a target with multiple warheads and multiple axis attacks, overwhelming the target’s ability to defend itself.'

The circle theory of the Lexington paper is out of date and you repeating it will not make it any more relevant.

V8 Fettler said:

The QE should be future proofed for her 50 year design life as far as reasonably practical, and without an accurate crystal ball this has to mean that the performance of the QE should substantially exceed her predecessors in all aspects. That's one reason why the overall capability of Ark (Buccs) is relevant to this thread.

Outside of the choice of F35B, as far as practical she has been. I suspect you haven't read the paper written by the Naval Architect I recommended to you - the design rationale is quite clear. To save you the trouble, here's some words from the Chief Naval Architect on the aircraft carrier project, Rob Weedon:

Chief Naval Architect said:

“We used a wind tunnel to test the final underwater hull design for the after end of the ship, the same one used to test many F1 cars. We built a model and ran smoke at speed over it to test for problems in the flow over the back of the hull and the ‘A’ frames on which the propeller shafts are fixed. Results proved we were on the right track.”

“We needed plenty of beam in order to fit in large diesel engines low in the hull, have efficient stores spaces and in order to meet the need for ship stability for operating aircraft in rougher sea states. The ships have a large flat sided parallel mid-body section which gives very good internal volume but is not designed for speed. It’s cheaper and easier to build than complex more traditional curved shapes needed for high speed but we did not need high speed for these ships

“The stern transom platform, or stern flap is an extension to the hull that increases its waterline length and modifies the flow of water leaving the hull to provide a cleaner exit. We chose to increase its depth so that it could also be used as a boat embarkation point. “The main point of this approximately ten-metre long bulbous bow is that it cancels out the huge bow wave a traditional design will develop. The bow wave is a colossal waste of energy and a major drag on the ship. This bulbous bow projects well forward of the main hull and alters the pressure field in the water at a range of speeds. “All this hugely complex design work is greatly helped by the advanced computer design facilities that we can draw on in the ACA, but we still work with more traditional methods,” he said.

Just for clarity, V8Fettler:

1) The USN rarely operates carriers at speeds in excess of 20 knots (your evidence)
2) The RN rarely operates carriers at speeds in excess of 20 knots (RN experience)
3) The design requirement was not for top speed (Chief Naval Architect)
4) No one in the RN feels short changed by a top speed of 25 knots (Expert commentary from all and sundry)

and you still feel like it's important?

V8 Fettler said:

Your link was to a land-based weapon that couldn't reach a carrier at 600 miles, although it could be deadly in the Straits of Hormuz. You've moved the goalposts.

How have I moved the goalposts V8Fettler? Revisit the link again and watch from 21 seconds in. It clearly shows a submarine launched missile. Are you being deliberately retarded? For any given 'circle' you draw, I can link to plenty more - please let me know if this is something that would help.

V8 Fettler said:

I've posted evidence to indicate that the RN was prepared to sail an RFA unescorted by surface vessels in the South Atlantic in April 1982, this RFA could have equally been a tanker to support Ark (Buccs). Do you have any evidence available to indicate that she was escorted? If there was an escort available at that time it would have been available for the Ark (Buccs).

An unarmed tanker is a very different proposition to an armed Fort Austin, as you well know.

I made no reference to an escort being available, those are your words. I said 'she was never far from a surface combatant'. In reality, Woodward used his RFAs as not only logistics enablers, but as radar clutter, hopeful that their presence in the thick of things would trick the Argentinians into thinking they were the carriers, were they to get that far into the Task Group. Regardless, Fort Austin left Ascension and within 3 days was RASing with Endurance, then a couple of days later Antrim, Plymouth, then shortly afterwards with some 42's, 21's and 22's.

V8 Fettler said:

The announcement of the forthcoming withdrawal of the Endurance certainly indicated to Argentina that the British were diminishing their political and military commitment to the Falklands, it was if the British politicos had forgetten about the islands.

Glad you agree with everyone else now.

V8 Fettler said:

The British success was - in part - due to errors by the Argentinians e.g. fusing of bombs. Ark (Buccs) would have made the (fortunate) fusing issue less relevant as Argentinian aircraft could have been engaged west of the Falklands.

'Errors' is an interesting choice of word - the fusing of bombs, was in the words of a Cdr Ward (sorry GG15G!)...

"When attacking our well armed ships with bombs at low level, the AAF had a simple choice: either fly at the correct minimum height for the effective release of bombs and stand a greater chance of being shot down, or skim the water in very low level flight and deliver the bombs from well below the required release height'

V8 Fettler said:

Typical Harrier sortie was approx 75 minutes, Bucc with 25,000lbs of fuel could be up for 6 hours or more, Gannet for somewhere near to 6 hours. Therefore the Harrier offers a potentially quicker turnaround time.

So what? Ark (RO9) would have required frequent RASing, in just the same way every other carrier conducting flying operations does. Whichever way you cut it,however you want to argue the toss about fuel usage, 5 days fuel for the air group is not enough to go to war on.

V8 Fettler said:

Hypothetical nonsense about the Falklands from V8Fettler including this gem

'The Task Force in transit was at greater risk of attack than the faster, smaller and more defensively capable Ark (Buccs)'

Sandy Woodward disagrees with you...

'...single ships are usually especially vulnerable. Groups of two or three are much more effective in weight and variety of defensive systems, particularly in subsequent counter-attack. All submarine commanders know this. As a breed, whatever their nationality or training, they are bound to prefer a single ship target.'

Anyway, as previously, hypothetical scenarios with the benefit of hindsight are an utter waste of time. The only thing that matters is what happened then and what continues to happen today. The RN used a layered defence for her carriers in 1982 and will do so with QE. I repeat - no RN commander would place a carrier in this position alone or alone with an RFA. The fact that you disagree is absolutely fine. I'll sleep well knowing you'll not be influencing our naval strategy any time soon.

V8 Fettler said:

How can you not be interested in the US approach? They have built a carrier or two over the years, typically capable of 30+ knots.

Because this thread is about the QE, a British carrier. The only relevance US carriers have to QE is 'can we operate successfully with the USN' - and the answer to that is an unequivocal yes.

V8 Fettler said:

Gotland is one of a particular type of sub, the coastal type, there are certainly others of that type and - as mentioned previously - without a crystal ball the designers of the QE cannot know who will manufacturing or operating that type of sub over the next 50 years. The Gotland would be lethal in the Persian Gulf and the coastal waters of the Gulf of Oman, to be avoided by operating at a distance.

It matters not one bit about the types of submarines in operation. The principle method of avoiding detection from submarines is being quiet. Speed makes you noisy. When will you answer my direct question on this matter? Do you not believe this to be the case?

V8 Fettler said:

You asked me to provide an example where the operation of an RN carrier has been compromised due to lack of speed, I gave you two examples, now you're moving the goalposts.

Not at all chap - you moved the goalposts in your words below:

'Historical operational issues created by the slow speed of RN carriers? RN escort carriers in WW2, too slow to evade U-boats.'

Carriers are very different beasts to DIY converted Escort Carriers - the devil is in the detail V8 Fettler.

V8 Fettler said:

My view on the importance of speed is as per the Lexington paper, I acknowledge that you have a different view, shall we leave it at that? Otherwise we'll go round in circles of differing sizes.

Probably best that you do. Continually referencing it, despite evidence to the contrary from naval experts makes you look like a plonker.

V8 Fettler said:

Is it the reference material that causes you issues?

No issues my end V8 Fettler, just correcting your ill-informed posts, that's all.

[DamienB]

Please, for the love of all that's grey and pointy, stop feeding this pointless discussion and let's get this thread to being about our nice new shiny flat top. Please.

[Europa1]

DamienB said:

Please, for the love of all that's grey and pointy, stop feeding this pointless discussion and let's get this thread to being about our nice new shiny flat top. Please.

Amen to that.

[wolfracesonic]

Do you think Donutsina911 and V8fettler are the same person, each psyche locked in an eternal struggle with the other?

[Z06George]

I'm sure it's in here somewhere but I can't find it with all this speed BS. What did they do wrong with the paint to mean it needs redoing?

[Godalmighty83]

Z06George said:

I'm sure it's in here somewhere but I can't find it with all this speed BS. What did they do wrong with the paint to mean it needs redoing?

Apparently some of the paint was contaminated with 'construction debris', possibly greases or swarf from all the grinding and welding. I have also heard anecdotally that some bits were painted before the welding had been finished on the other side so that the heat transferred through and spoiled a bit.

Ultimately rushing to get it out of the dock and make room for the big bits of PoW that were piling up.

[V8 Fettler]

donutsina911 said:

V8 Fettler said:

The proponents of ASDIC prior to WW2 were confident that ASDIC could be used to deal with the U-boats, they were desperately wrong ("First Happy Time"). Allied ASDIC, tactics and resource developed and the balance swung away from the U-boats ("Black May"), the balance would have swung back towards the U-boats had the Elektro boats been launched in numbers.

This has nothing to do with the thread, or the erroneous point you made about submarines struggling to find surface assets. ('the effectiveness of identifying the position of an enemy vessel at sea by noise has been been frequently overestimated for decades''). The context of our debate has been about the ability of submarines to track carriers today, not surface assets tracking submarines in WW2, as you well know. You appear to be well read in the latter and clueless in the former.

V8 Fettler said:

The threats to carriers are evolving, but military technology generally changes at a steady pace in peacetime, this is demonstrated by extended life of many vessels, aircraft and systems.

You have a different view to the Rear Admiral then. Re-read the first line of the quote I provided:

Rear Admiral Chris Parry said:

'The operational context will have altered considerably since the Queen Elizabeth class was first conceived and during its development'

Your arrogance and foolishness knows no bounds. If the words of an Admiral don't convince you, or the three examples I've already given you won't wash, take a read of 'Military Innovation in the Interwar Period' by Murray and Millet. That should do the job.

V8 Fettler said:

In terms of threats to carriers, the Gotland appears to be causing greatest concern, a sub which - in some aspects of performance - hasn't moved substantially forwards from the Elektro boats.

It appears, yet again, that you are wrong. I've given you examples of evolving threats from Chris Parry, of which submarines were but one. I've also indicated that the Swedish are an important intelligence partner and are sharing their tech with us - the Gotland is not causing concern in the slightest. You have no knowledge of the performance parameters of submarines today outside of Wikipedia because you are a civilian, but I would imagine that a quick Google will turn up some 'substantial' performance improvements in sonar tech that will enlighten you somewhat.

Again, as a Rear Admiral isn't quite cutting the mustard for you when it comes to threats, here's a quote from Capt Hendrix USN, a USN aviator, writing in a CNAS paper:

Capt Hendrix USN said:

'Platform efficiency is not the biggest challenge facing the carrier. Platform survivability is. Submarines, surface ships, aircraft, air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles and swarming small craft each pose threats to U.S. naval forces, including aircraft carriers, but no weapon has captured the imagination of American naval strategists like the DF-21D missile. Using a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) placed on a CSS-5 missile, China’s Second Artillery Division states that its doctrine will be to saturate a target with multiple warheads and multiple axis attacks, overwhelming the target’s ability to defend itself.'

The circle theory of the Lexington paper is out of date and you repeating it will not make it any more relevant.

V8 Fettler said:

The QE should be future proofed for her 50 year design life as far as reasonably practical, and without an accurate crystal ball this has to mean that the performance of the QE should substantially exceed her predecessors in all aspects. That's one reason why the overall capability of Ark (Buccs) is relevant to this thread.

Outside of the choice of F35B, as far as practical she has been. I suspect you haven't read the paper written by the Naval Architect I recommended to you - the design rationale is quite clear. To save you the trouble, here's some words from the Chief Naval Architect on the aircraft carrier project, Rob Weedon:

Chief Naval Architect said:

“We used a wind tunnel to test the final underwater hull design for the after end of the ship, the same one used to test many F1 cars. We built a model and ran smoke at speed over it to test for problems in the flow over the back of the hull and the ‘A’ frames on which the propeller shafts are fixed. Results proved we were on the right track.”

“We needed plenty of beam in order to fit in large diesel engines low in the hull, have efficient stores spaces and in order to meet the need for ship stability for operating aircraft in rougher sea states. The ships have a large flat sided parallel mid-body section which gives very good internal volume but is not designed for speed. It’s cheaper and easier to build than complex more traditional curved shapes needed for high speed but we did not need high speed for these ships

“The stern transom platform, or stern flap is an extension to the hull that increases its waterline length and modifies the flow of water leaving the hull to provide a cleaner exit. We chose to increase its depth so that it could also be used as a boat embarkation point. “The main point of this approximately ten-metre long bulbous bow is that it cancels out the huge bow wave a traditional design will develop. The bow wave is a colossal waste of energy and a major drag on the ship. This bulbous bow projects well forward of the main hull and alters the pressure field in the water at a range of speeds. “All this hugely complex design work is greatly helped by the advanced computer design facilities that we can draw on in the ACA, but we still work with more traditional methods,” he said.

Just for clarity, V8Fettler:

1) The USN rarely operates carriers at speeds in excess of 20 knots (your evidence)
2) The RN rarely operates carriers at speeds in excess of 20 knots (RN experience)
3) The design requirement was not for top speed (Chief Naval Architect)
4) No one in the RN feels short changed by a top speed of 25 knots (Expert commentary from all and sundry)

and you still feel like it's important?

V8 Fettler said:

Your link was to a land-based weapon that couldn't reach a carrier at 600 miles, although it could be deadly in the Straits of Hormuz. You've moved the goalposts.

How have I moved the goalposts V8Fettler? Revisit the link again and watch from 21 seconds in. It clearly shows a submarine launched missile. Are you being deliberately retarded? For any given 'circle' you draw, I can link to plenty more - please let me know if this is something that would help.

V8 Fettler said:

I've posted evidence to indicate that the RN was prepared to sail an RFA unescorted by surface vessels in the South Atlantic in April 1982, this RFA could have equally been a tanker to support Ark (Buccs). Do you have any evidence available to indicate that she was escorted? If there was an escort available at that time it would have been available for the Ark (Buccs).

An unarmed tanker is a very different proposition to an armed Fort Austin, as you well know.

I made no reference to an escort being available, those are your words. I said 'she was never far from a surface combatant'. In reality, Woodward used his RFAs as not only logistics enablers, but as radar clutter, hopeful that their presence in the thick of things would trick the Argentinians into thinking they were the carriers, were they to get that far into the Task Group. Regardless, Fort Austin left Ascension and within 3 days was RASing with Endurance, then a couple of days later Antrim, Plymouth, then shortly afterwards with some 42's, 21's and 22's.

V8 Fettler said:

The announcement of the forthcoming withdrawal of the Endurance certainly indicated to Argentina that the British were diminishing their political and military commitment to the Falklands, it was if the British politicos had forgetten about the islands.

Glad you agree with everyone else now.

V8 Fettler said:

The British success was - in part - due to errors by the Argentinians e.g. fusing of bombs. Ark (Buccs) would have made the (fortunate) fusing issue less relevant as Argentinian aircraft could have been engaged west of the Falklands.

'Errors' is an interesting choice of word - the fusing of bombs, was in the words of a Cdr Ward (sorry GG15G!)...

"When attacking our well armed ships with bombs at low level, the AAF had a simple choice: either fly at the correct minimum height for the effective release of bombs and stand a greater chance of being shot down, or skim the water in very low level flight and deliver the bombs from well below the required release height'

V8 Fettler said:

Typical Harrier sortie was approx 75 minutes, Bucc with 25,000lbs of fuel could be up for 6 hours or more, Gannet for somewhere near to 6 hours. Therefore the Harrier offers a potentially quicker turnaround time.

So what? Ark (RO9) would have required frequent RASing, in just the same way every other carrier conducting flying operations does. Whichever way you cut it,however you want to argue the toss about fuel usage, 5 days fuel for the air group is not enough to go to war on.

V8 Fettler said:

Hypothetical nonsense about the Falklands from V8Fettler including this gem

'The Task Force in transit was at greater risk of attack than the faster, smaller and more defensively capable Ark (Buccs)'

Sandy Woodward disagrees with you...

'...single ships are usually especially vulnerable. Groups of two or three are much more effective in weight and variety of defensive systems, particularly in subsequent counter-attack. All submarine commanders know this. As a breed, whatever their nationality or training, they are bound to prefer a single ship target.'

Anyway, as previously, hypothetical scenarios with the benefit of hindsight are an utter waste of time. The only thing that matters is what happened then and what continues to happen today. The RN used a layered defence for her carriers in 1982 and will do so with QE. I repeat - no RN commander would place a carrier in this position alone or alone with an RFA. The fact that you disagree is absolutely fine. I'll sleep well knowing you'll not be influencing our naval strategy any time soon.

V8 Fettler said:

How can you not be interested in the US approach? They have built a carrier or two over the years, typically capable of 30+ knots.

Because this thread is about the QE, a British carrier. The only relevance US carriers have to QE is 'can we operate successfully with the USN' - and the answer to that is an unequivocal yes.

V8 Fettler said:

Gotland is one of a particular type of sub, the coastal type, there are certainly others of that type and - as mentioned previously - without a crystal ball the designers of the QE cannot know who will manufacturing or operating that type of sub over the next 50 years. The Gotland would be lethal in the Persian Gulf and the coastal waters of the Gulf of Oman, to be avoided by operating at a distance.

It matters not one bit about the types of submarines in operation. The principle method of avoiding detection from submarines is being quiet. Speed makes you noisy. When will you answer my direct question on this matter? Do you not believe this to be the case?

V8 Fettler said:

You asked me to provide an example where the operation of an RN carrier has been compromised due to lack of speed, I gave you two examples, now you're moving the goalposts.

Not at all chap - you moved the goalposts in your words below:

'Historical operational issues created by the slow speed of RN carriers? RN escort carriers in WW2, too slow to evade U-boats.'

Carriers are very different beasts to DIY converted Escort Carriers - the devil is in the detail V8 Fettler.

V8 Fettler said:

My view on the importance of speed is as per the Lexington paper, I acknowledge that you have a different view, shall we leave it at that? Otherwise we'll go round in circles of differing sizes.

Probably best that you do. Continually referencing it, despite evidence to the contrary from naval experts makes you look like a plonker.

V8 Fettler said:

Is it the reference material that causes you issues?

No issues my end V8 Fettler, just correcting your ill-informed posts, that's all.

More circles.

For carrier speed, the US requires 30+ knots for existing carriers and carriers under construction, the US has some experience of carriers, the importance of 30+ knots is also my view. Your view varies, this only makes sense if the US carriers will have a different purpose to the UK carriers over the next 50 years. Needs an exceptional crystal ball to determine that, perhaps the same crystal ball that the naval architect has used to determine that higher carrier speed is not a requirement over the next 50 years.

Healey probably used an identically flawed crystal ball in 1966 when the Labour party initiated the reduction in the capability of RN carriers under the mistaken view that allies with carriers would always be available to assist in amphibious assaults several thousand miles away from British land-based aircraft. He was demonstrably and dismally wrong.

For detection, Ellwood and the Lexington paper refer to the importance "areas of uncertainty" and circles of increasing area in which a carrier may be located, that's also my view, your view varies.

I did indeed miss the 1 second of blurred footage of the sub-launched missile as I sped through your video, Ellwood refers to a sense of proportion with regards to the DF-21.

The historical relevance of the development of ASDIC is that the effectiveness of active/passive detection of vessels of sea has been overestimated previously, and it will be overestimated again.

Operational context may change, but the technology generally advances steadily in peacetime. How does a Rear Admiral change that?

The lightly armed Fort Austin would have been probably been overwhelmed by the Argentine carrier or the Belgrano, had the Argentine ships detected her and had they been able to reach her. Similar applies to the Endurance. Does this not suggest that the risk of the unescorted Ford Austin and unescorted Endurance being detected and intercepted wasn't high, due primarily to the capability of the Argentinians and the size of the South Atlantic?

The political and military commitment to the Falklands were and are inextricably intertwined, the military commitment was removed in stages, commencing with the Defence Review in 1966.

The two key signals to Argentina regarding British commitment to the Falklands were the scrapping of the Ark (Buccs) in 1978 - because that degraded our military capability to recapture the Islands in the event of an invasion - and the proposed removal of Endurance, because that would have removed British presence in the area.

The low height of release of the Argentine bombs created the fusing issue, the Argentine error was in failing to recognise this. they developed a workaround later in the conflict.

Sortie rates for aircraft with 6+ hours endurance cannot be directly compared with sortie rates for aircraft with typical endurance of an hour or so.

If single fast ships are vulnerable to submarines then why did the U-boats get nowhere near to the RMS Queen Mary and RMS Queen Elizabeth in WW2? The South Atlantic is a big place, the Argentinians only had one serviceable sub, which is one reason why they couldn't intercept the slower Fort Austin.

Naval strategy has been and is continuing to be influenced by incompetent political decisions and incoherent designs, does that not cause you concern?

The principle method of avoiding detection by a submarine is not to be anywhere near that submarine.

[SWTH]

Only if you know exactly where it is.

Since the likelihood of that is virtually zero, the answer is for the carrier to be quiet and make itself difficult to find.

[Europa1]

Oh for f&^k's sake.

V8fettler, for the good of all mankind, will you just give it a sodding rest.

[GreatGranny]

I've only just looked at this thread BECAUSE I WANTED TO FIND OUT ABOUT A BLOODY AIRCRAFT CARRIER!!!

Not look at some petty will waving contest taking up far too much space.

Will the 2 responsible fk off!

[yellowjack]

Europa1 said:

Oh for f&^k's sake.

V8fettler, for the good of all mankind, will you just give it a sodding rest.

Please. Just leave it. You are going around in circles, getting nowhere fast. I'm not even prepared to get on one side or the other in this debate, but please. Either take this someplace else, or just leave it. Those huge 'block quote' posts are just beyond irritating, and make it nigh on impossible to find any genuine new information in this thread. Enough is enough. Please?