HMS Queen Elizabeth

[V8 Fettler]

wildcat45 said:

V8 Fettler said:

You refer to cost savings and economies, there were substantial cost savings when the Ark (Buccs) wasn't replaced in 1978 with a faster class of carrier with more aircraft with greater range and greater capability; that cost saving should be balanced against the lives of British servicemen in the Falklands. In my view there is no balance: the bean counters failed dismally. The deterrent of the Ark (Buccs) or similar in service = no Falklands conflict.

See Lexington paper re: ability to avoid detection by manoeuvring an aircraft carrier at maximum speed for weeks.

It's worrying when your RN acquaintance states that the QE class is not really what the RN needs.

I'm not quite sure I follow your argument. Sadly economics, cost or whatever have to be a factor. I wish it wasn't so, but decisions like the one to retire the big carriers, or not have AEW, under arm certain frigates or whatever does put a price on the heads of British service personnel. Note that I am not saying that is right. I'm just saying that it is they way it is.

I don't think any of the economies made with CVF actually compromise the safety of the ships or the crew. On the contrary, STOVL and all the stuff associated with it is I think cheaper and safer than the alternative.

The real "crime" in all this looking into history is three fold. First the decision in 1966 by Denis Healey to cancel the big conventional CVA-01 and 02 . That's where the problem lies. Second, the decision not to convert Eagle for Phantom use. She was the better ship and would easily have been around in 1982 indeed she'd have steamed on until the 1990s. Let's not forget about the huge manpower drain Eagle or Ark would have been on the RN. Also this was the Cold War and the RN at the time was investing in its NATO role as sub hunters in some future Battle of the Atlantic. With defence budgets being squeezed a big carrier would have meant fewer frigates.

Neither of the above is guaranteed to have headded off the Falklands War especially if Argentina had waited for our one carrier to go into a long refit which Ark would have been due in the early 1980s. Hermes or Bulwark would not have been Bucc/Phantom capable as they were commando carriers by 1982 and had been for some time. A

The third "crime" had it not happened would have I feel saved lives. This was the retirement of Gannet and its AEW capability. This was put into Sea Kings at short order and should have been something planned for when the decision was taken to get out of fixed-wing Cvs.

Invincible and Hermes I think did as good a job (apart from AEW) as Ark would have. First, two hulls are much better than one. SHAR with Blue Fox and AIM 9L was a pretty formidable fighter. Not one was lost in Air to Air combat. The GR3 was a flexible and capable ground attack aircraft. Most of the time the task force operated in sea state 8 or worse the simple STOVL configuration of the two carriers made for greater resilience to the weather, fewer obstacles to launching and recovery. Don't forget too Invince's sensor fit - especially her 1022 radar was pretty good. Her modular gas turbine plant allowed her to overcome machinery defects that would have potentially rendered a conventional carrier useless. Oh and she fired Sea Dart in anger.....something Ark with or without Buccs or super fantasy Buccs couldn't do.

I'm not suggesting SHAR or GR3 Harriers were better than Phantoms or Buccs in a back to back test, but given all the variables, weather, ship serviceability etc above, I think they were about as good as each other in the context of a Falklands style war.

That's why the decision to make the QEC STOVL rather than CATOBAR is the right one when you take into account all the pros and cons.

I wouldn't be too concerned by the "worried" comment. QEC will be well equipped and capable ship. A huge amount of future proofing so gone into them. I just hope we continue to find the money to run them.

Edited by wildcat45 on Saturday 2nd January 17:14

You need to consider cost/benefit, not just costs in isolation. This does involve an element of crystal ball gazing, but also learning from history. Argentina had indicated an intention to invade the Falklands in the late 1970s, this was dealt with at the time by the (potential) threat of a UK submarine. Perhaps the continuing threat of invasion was lost in the political and economic maelstrom of the UK in the late 1970s.

The failure of politicos and the MOD to procure coherently and logically over several decades was certainly a primary factor in failing to deter the invasion of the Falklands in 1982. It was also a primary factor in failing to keep Argentine aircraft away from the task force.

One key issue with the QE that compromises effectiveness and thus - potentially - the safety of the ship and the crew is the lack of fixed wing AEW.

Again, there are many "what-ifs"; substitute Eagle for the Ark (Buccs) by all means, the important factor being the ability to project airpower over an extended range, which the Sea Harrier cannot do but Buccs/Phantoms certainly could. With a wider view, the UK has always needed at least three carriers since the end of WW2 to reduce the risk of scenario you describe whereby an enemy can take advantage of a planned refit of one carrier.

The Sea Harrier may well be a formidable fighter at close quarters, but - in the Falklands - it lacked the crucial ability to deal with the Argentine aircraft at a distance from the task force, hence ship losses. The Phantom deals with that problem (see circles).

[V8 Fettler]

donutsina911 said:

Yes. It's the smilie equivalent to the faces of a former RN carrier CO, a current SSN CO and a current MCMV CO as we laughed at your posts yesterday over a few too many new years drinks. Life's too short to argue the toss with armchair naval experts, so I'm bowing out with a smile.

As previously, I'm not aware of any naval experts on this forum. I can't begin to imagine any scenario where a drinks party involving senior naval personnel (retired and serving) would involve close scrutiny of thread on Pistonheads; have things really got that bad?

[V8 Fettler]

MBBlat said:

V8 Fettler said:

I don't think there are any experts in the field of naval warfare on this forum.

Well its fairly obvious you aren't one, I just wouldn't be sure about some of the others arguing against you.
As for escorting a carrier with just a SSN

If the level of threat is low then why not? Belize shows that the RN were prepared to do this.

[V8 Fettler]

IanMorewood said:

Let's go to fantasy land for a moment, it's 1981 and HMS Ark Royal (r09) has just been through a major refit and is undergoing sea trials again, HMS Hermes (r12) is operating a small fixed wing catobar airgroup having been the UK's only carrier for the past three years, including upto 6 Phantoms and 8 Buccaneers, No Invincible class carriers have been ordered, the Harrier concept was still born due to a lack of firm orders. CVA01 is also off the cards due to cost and half the RN Phantoms are on duty in Germany having been de navalised.

What outcome would have happened in the case of a conflict in 1982 in the South Atlantic? Also what state would the RN have been in by 1983?

I doubt if the Argentina would have invaded the Falklands in your scenario.

There are many "what ifs", perhaps the most extreme and unlikely of all is the "what if" politicians and the MOD have a coherent, long term view on procurement for the military.

[V8 Fettler]

ninja-lewis said:

VE Fettler said:

Belize demonstrates that aircraft carriers can operate without layered defence. You've stated that Ark (Buccs) would have required an escort in 1982, I've suggested Conqueror to meet your requirements for an escort, you've provided no reason why Conqueror couldn't have been used in that role. I've also suggested Antrim and Plymouth to meet your requirements for an escort, and likewise you've provided no reason why Antrim and Plymouth couldn't have been used in that role.

Just to be clear, you think Guatemala with a single 45 foot patrol boat and a handful of F-51 Mustangs is comparable to a Argentine navy with modern carrier aviation, Type 42s, submarines, Exocets and a Cruiser with 6" guns and a similarly modern air force?

My post was in response to donut's claim that in his view all carriers require a layered defence in place. Belize demonstrates that it's not an absolute requirement. I'll have read through the rest of your post.

[MBBlat]

V8 Fettler said:

If the level of threat is low then why not? Belize shows that the RN were prepared to do this.

Because you don't know the threat will remain low.
Also you don't design a carrier for a on off op against a very low grade opponent.
If as you think crossing the Atlantic at high speed unescorted to play gunboat diplomacy was a primary requirement then QEC would have a higher top speed.
Its not, never has been, never will be.

Now do some research - look up the top speed of T23, is it 35 knots? No, then a 35 knot carrier would just outrun its escort.
The USN never even got close to 35 knots with its CVN's, and the later ones are slower, so obviously they don't think a high top speed is a priority.

PS - what makes you think that naval experts, or even serving officers, have no interest in cars, and thus unlikely to be members of pistonheads?

[oj113]

An interesting and brief article re top speeds of Carriers:

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-028.htm

Apologies that it's from way back in the days of 1999 but still very interesting, especially when dealing with Top Speed v Transit Speed.

[Phud]

A small point is the amount of noise you put out at high speed, makes it so easy to track and follow, fine if you are on transit without a worry, however if you get into a conflict area then other reasons to be quiet and not alert anything to you become obvious.

So max speed is all about covering empty areas not charging around war zones, once on scene the threats migh cause you to be careful.

Layering is set against threat. Different for surface threat and sub surface threat

[wildcat45]

V8 Fettler said:

You need to consider cost/benefit, not just costs in isolation. This does involve an element of crystal ball gazing, but also learning from history. Argentina had indicated an intention to invade the Falklands in the late 1970s, this was dealt with at the time by the (potential) threat of a UK submarine. Perhaps the continuing threat of invasion was lost in the political and economic maelstrom of the UK in the late 1970s.

The failure of politicos and the MOD to procure coherently and logically over several decades was certainly a primary factor in failing to deter the invasion of the Falklands in 1982. It was also a primary factor in failing to keep Argentine aircraft away from the task force.

One key issue with the QE that compromises effectiveness and thus - potentially - the safety of the ship and the crew is the lack of fixed wing AEW.

Again, there are many "what-ifs"; substitute Eagle for the Ark (Buccs) by all means, the important factor being the ability to project airpower over an extended range, which the Sea Harrier cannot do but Buccs/Phantoms certainly could. With a wider view, the UK has always needed at least three carriers since the end of WW2 to reduce the risk of scenario you describe whereby an enemy can take advantage of a planned refit of one carrier.

The Sea Harrier may well be a formidable fighter at close quarters, but - in the Falklands - it lacked the crucial ability to deal with the Argentine aircraft at a distance from the task force, hence ship losses. The Phantom deals with that problem (see circles).

Don't get too hung up on the range of the jets. It really doesn't diminish the effectiveness of the ships.

I agree that fixed wing AEW would be best. It is one of those compromises costs and benefits that have to be accepted. Crowsnest in Merlin will be good. Not brilliant but good. It is to a certain extent proven and nature technology. Putting AEW in an Osprey - great potentially but they don't fly that high. Unproven systems, integration, training, new aircraft, support etc. All outweghs the benefit.

I don't think Crowdnest will be around for that long. UCAV technology is emerging. No human element, long loiter time, high flying. Far better to invest in a flexible and affordable AEW solution based on Merlin right now. Time is of the essence. The Sea King ASaC fleet is very very old and fast running out of spares. Crowsnest - should - avoid a dangerous capability gap.

[Mojocvh]

How would you calculate the extra AEW/surveillance radar range and coverage say a change from 15,000 to 20.000ft would give?

http://www.tscm.com/rdr-hori.pdf

very ballpark figures??

15k=150 miles

20k=174 miles..

@15k gives what, approx 4 [quite busy] minutes warning of a BrahMos ...

Edited by Mojocvh on Monday 4th January 11:11

[V8 Fettler]

ninja-lewis said:

Escorts
As explained by others Plymouth and Antrim were hardly suitable to acting as the sole escorts to Ark Royal, even if they were available to do so. The Counties were in particular demand on the gunline due to their dual 4.5" guns.

Submarine C2
The War Cabinet would not have got involved in a tactical decision like this. We know that because Admiral Woodward strongly contested the control of submarines through Northwood throughout the war, not least because Northwood favoured the standard tactic of allocating each boat its own patrol area to avoid the risk of them running into each other. Woodward argued, however, that there were no other nuclear submarines in the area so any SSN could be assumed to be friendly (although it was never entirely clear to what extent the Russians were in the area). Yet Flag Officer Submarines remained in control of task group. Both he and Woodward (who was only in command of the carrier task group) were subservient to Admiral Fieldhouse, who was Commander Task Force from Northwood.

Ark Royal
Both Hermes and Invincible had just returned to Portsmouth from exercises and their crews were about to go on Easter leave. All probability that is exactly where Ark Royal would have been too. If she wasn't, then it is likely her response time would be even slower as she would need to return to Portsmouth to Store for War and take on a full air group (Almost every available Sea Harrier and Helicopter were crammed onto Hermes and Invincible, well in excess of their normal peace time air groups.

Standing off 1,000 miles is useless. You can't maintain a Combat Air Patrol at that range - the small air group aboard Ark Royal will minimal time at their CAP position before they have to return and will struggle to keep that up 24/7 for more than a couple of days. Ascension is 3,800 miles from the Falklands. As soon as you sail down towards the Falklands, she'd have to turn around and head back to Ascension if she is going to have the fuel to get back! You need RFAs with the carrier battle group and STUFT shuttling back and forth with more fuel.

Hermes had to do a full boiler clean while on station during the war due to the amount of steaming she undertook.

And hang on, where's the speed advantage you talk about if Ark Royal cruises down at only 25 knots?

South Georgia
Op Paraquat was politically important because it was early victory that was preceived to be relatively low risk (as it happended, the whole thing came very close to disaster. Crucially, there was a recognition that no landing would take place until mid-May at the earliest so it was though vital that we keep morale at home high during the long wait, lest anyone start asking awkward questions about whether we were actually going to do anything. It was also important diplomatically as it gave us a foothold in the South Atlantic again should a ceasefire be declared before we could establish a presence in the Falklands. Lastly, it was military important because it offered a more sheltered option to the main Tug, Repair And Logistics Area (TRALA) during the conflict. It was extensively used by RFA vessels an STUFT to transfer stores and troops to the the main task force or San Carlos.

Ark Royal would have been of very limited assistance in South Georgia. It was Naval Gunfire Support and the landing of a scratch group of marines and special forces that forced the Argentine surrender. Likewise it was ASW helicopters from Antrim, Plymouth, Endurance and Tidespring that caught and disabled ARA Santa Fe.

Reconnaissance was already provided by RAF Victors and Nimrods flying from Ascension and Chile, as well as Satellite imagery and communications interception by Endurance and the Chileans.

Urgency
Getting the rest of the task force down south was urgent regardless of whether it was Hermes/Invincible or Ark Royal. The task force was operating to a deadline of the on-set of the Southern winter (mid-late June). It was ultimately the land forces that forced the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falklands. And Ark Royal could not have fulfilled all the tasks required of the carrier task group by herself. There were the nightly SF insertions, escorts on the gunline at Stanley, capturing a spy trawler and engaging patrol boats. HMS Alacrity was even sent into the Falkland Sound to check for mines.

Harriers
As someone else mentioned, Harrier with the ramp and VSTOL can operate in sea conditions that prevent conventional carrier operations. On one occasion, the fog was so thick a Harrier had to be guided down by pointing a light up through the fog for the Harrier to descend vertically to the carrier.

More critically, VSTOL carrier operations is an easier skill to learn compared to CATOBAR operations. Not only did this enable FAA Sea Harrier pilots serving on the OCU (899 NAS) to form a third squadron (809 NAS) to augment 800 and 801 but also allowed RAF Harriers to be seconded to Sea Harrier and the use of RAF GR3 Harriers with comparatively limited training. This simply would not have been possible with the RAF's Phantoms and Buccaneers given the specialised CATOBAR experience required.

As well as Harriers and Chinooks, Atlantic Conveyor also carried a complete Harrier Forward Operating Base kit - the intention being to establish a FOB at San Carlos after the landings. This links back to the concerns about a ceasefire being agreed before we could forced the Argentine surrender. It was linked to concerns about losing one of the carriers. Although the Harrier FOB kit was lost with Atlantic Conveyor, enough matting was still available to establish a small runway onshore from which Harriers and helicopters could refuel, which proved very useful during the final push to Stanley.

At the end of the war, a temporary strip was created at Stanley airfield while Royal Engineers worked on repairing damage and clearing mines and other war litter. Harrier GR3s armed with sidewinders were based there in the air defence role from 4 July. This allowed Hermes and her Sea Harriers to depart for the UK while HMS Invincible hung around until HMS Illustrious' arrival (rushed into service and completing her sea trials on the journey south) - one of the advantages of having three carriers vs one. It wasn't until October 1982 that Stanley was extended sufficiently to base RAF Phantoms there.

So if your Ark Royal had won the conflict, how would you have secured the peace afterwards? There was always the concern that the forces on the Falkands may have surrendered but the mainland hadn't. You can't keep Ark Royal down south indefinitely given the winter conditions in the South Atlantic.

Diplomacy
Diplomacy cannot be ignored. We needed the support of our allies. France were particularly helpful in marshalling support for EU sanctions, working with SIS to prevent Argentine acquiring more Exocets and conducting Dissimilar Air Combat exercises with our carriers as they sailed through the Bay of Biscay. Chile provided plenty of intelligence (including the location of the Belgrano), basing for Nimrods and permitting a quick extraction of the Special Forces recce team that was sent to recce the Argentine Exocet airfield. Even New Zealand assisted by covering a Royal Navy task to allow another escort to be sent south.

And of course, there was the Americans. Not only did the Pentagon arrange extensive material support (and even the offer of one of their carriers) but Al Haig ran the shuttle negotiations initially. Remember there was significant Latin American faction in the State Department who thought the US should side with the Argentines as their allies against left wingers in South America. It was through careful work at the UN Security Council and ensuring that Al Haig put his final proposals to Argentina first so we weren't seen to be ones rejecting them that helped cement our case. Don't forget, the widely held view (even with MOD Main Building) was that we wouldn't be able to do it.

In the event, negotiations continued right up until the landings in Mid-May with both Peru and the UN Secretary General picking up the baton from Al Haig.

The importance of diplomacy during the conflict cannot be understated. After all, the Junta's original plan (before they cocked everything up with South Georgia) was to do a soft-invasion later in the year and win the support of the UN General Assembly. Thatcher was not a warmonger in 1982.

Air Supply Route
How early would you have shot down an unarmed Argentine C-130, Fokker, BAC 1-11, Boeing 707/737 or Learjet? As the carrier task group approached the Falklands on 21 April, it was shadowed by an Argentine Boeing 707 reconnaissance jet. It was chased away by an unarmed Sea Harrier. This was well outside the defined MEZ and therefore the Rules of Engagement did not permit it to be shot down. Indeed, a new ROE was rapidly put in place by London that Sea Harriers were to 'visibly escort the aircraft and dissuade it from overlying the force'. Woordward misunderstood verbal advice he had been given by Northwood and came very close to shooting down a Brazilian airliner flying to Durban.

It was only later in the war that a Sea Harrier shot down a C-130 resupply (after C-130s had already been used in crude bombing role) and HMS Exeter shot down a Learjet with her Sea Dart.

By contrast, the 1 April was clearly the start of a full blown war. We attacked Stanley with Black Buck 1 supported by Harriers while Argentina launched multiple waves of aircraft and thought they had successfully hit a number of our warships. In other words, neither side could be portrayed as the aggressor or victim, both were now on the same footing.

The close approach of Hermes and Invincible has nothing to do with deterring daylight air raids and everything to do with the all other missions they needed to carry out in advance of the landings.

Assuming that Plymouth and Antrim had some form of anti-submarine warfare capability and that they could keep up with the Ark (Buccs) then they would certainly be able to provide protection for the Ark, if protection was required. Additionally, Plymouth and Antrim were heading south irrespective of the existence and capability of Ark (Buccs).

If the Ark (Buccs) doesn't sail because of internal squabbling within the the RN command structure then the war cabinet should certainly intervene.

We don't know where the Ark (Buccs) would have been at the start of April 1982, it's an unknown. Does the RN still reduce its capability during holiday periods? If so, another reason to have three carriers.

No intention to fly Phantoms off at a range of 1,000 miles, the intention is to fly Buccs within the vicinity of the Falklands at the earliest opportunity. If there is no existing RFA at Ascension early April 1982 then bring one down from Operation Springtrain (underway off the coast of Portugal at that time).

Average speed of 27 knots for Ark (Buccs) was achieved during the Belize operation, another 10 years of neglect would probably reduce the average speed to 25 knots. On the other hand, perhaps 27 knots would be achievable, it's an unknown.

How would the landing on South Georgia have fared if Argentine aircraft had appeared on the horizon? Ark (Buccs) restricts that possibility. What if the British landing on South Georgia had failed? As you state, success was in the balance.

Speed certainly was of the essence, part of which could have been Buccs speedily appearing in the Falklands area, with the threat of Phantoms to follow.

I don't think anyone is expecting the Ark (Buccs) to replace the Task Force, but the risks faced the latter would have been substantially reduced with the availability of Phantoms and Buccs.

There may well have been times when the Harrier could have flown but Phantoms/Buccs could not. Balance that against the advantages that Phantoms/Bucss would bring. The Ark (Buccs) provides sufficient airpower to plan for essentially unopposed landings on the Falklands.

Catapult operations may be more technically demanding than vertical takeoff operation, but - again - balance that against the advantages that Phantoms/Bucss would bring.

The Ark (Buccs) can act as a deterrent in the South Atlantic irrespective of where she is in the world. The deterrent comprising of two parts: ability and determination, this was a successful deterrent prior to 1982 irrespective of the presence of land-based aircraft on the Falklands.

By no means ignore diplomacy, but extended diplomacy becomes dangerously close to appeasement, also the risk that the diplomacy extends into the southern winter. On another thread, it would be interesting to see how restrained the US or the USSR would have been in a similar situation involving a remote sovereign territory.

Argentina was the aggressor throughout, how else do you describe one country landing armed troops onto the sovereign territory of another country with no meaningful justification?

If an enemy aircraft or enemy ship is carrying military supplies inside a declared exclusion zone then it needs to be dealt with, the primary aims being (obviously) to prevent supplies reaching the occupying force, but also to demoralise.

1 April? You mean 1st May(?).

I posted this image of circles to describe the comparative operational ranges of Harriers, Buccs and Phantoms, particularly with regards to Phantoms combating Argentine aircraft west of the Falklands, thereby reducing the risk of air attack on the Task Force:



You then posted about the Hermes/Invincible moving closer to the Falklands during the night. I then asked " how does the close approach of the Hermes and Invincible at night deter the Argentine strike aircraft during daylight?"

[hidetheelephants]

Mojocvh said:

How would you calculate the extra AEW/surveillance radar range and coverage say a change from 15,000 to 20.000ft would give?

ballpark figures?

Using this handy calculator gives a distance to the horizon of 150 miles at FL150 and 173 miles at FL200; that means at the higher altitude you're observing an extra 23338 square miles.

[V8 Fettler]

MBBlat said:

V8 Fettler said:

If the level of threat is low then why not? Belize shows that the RN were prepared to do this.

Because you don't know the threat will remain low.
Also you don't design a carrier for a on off op against a very low grade opponent.
If as you think crossing the Atlantic at high speed unescorted to play gunboat diplomacy was a primary requirement then QEC would have a higher top speed.
Its not, never has been, never will be.

Now do some research - look up the top speed of T23, is it 35 knots? No, then a 35 knot carrier would just outrun its escort.
The USN never even got close to 35 knots with its CVN's, and the later ones are slower, so obviously they don't think a high top speed is a priority.

PS - what makes you think that naval experts, or even serving officers, have no interest in cars, and thus unlikely to be members of pistonheads?

If the threat to the Ark (Buccs) sailing unescorted to within a 1000 nautical miles of the Falklands increases then withdraw. My view is that the risk would remain low at 1000 miles, the Argentinians had no credible means to reach her, any surface vessel is detected by the Ark long before the Ark's position is known, one diesel submarine under a possibly incompetent commander is unlikely to find the Ark in the South Atlantic.

Gunboat diplomacy is not a primary function of speed. Reduced transit time and the enhanced ability to avoid detection/interception are primary functions of speed.

The QE is supposed to have a 50 year design life, are you stating that there will be no period within the next 50 years where the QE will be required to operate without an escort? You have a very good crystal ball if you can state that.

Are you also stating that the speed of escorts will not also increase over the next 50 years?

My understanding is that - to a certain extent - carriers operate away from the escort when launching/retrieving fixed wing aircraft.

Enterprise is close to 35 knots. Design the QE for 35 knots, performance may degrade after several years service but 30+ should still be attainable.

[donutsina911]

hidetheelephants said:

Mojocvh said:

How would you calculate the extra AEW/surveillance radar range and coverage say a change from 15,000 to 20.000ft would give?

ballpark figures?

Using this handy calculator gives a distance to the horizon of 150 miles at FL150 and 173 miles at FL200; that means at the higher altitude you're observing an extra 23338 square miles.

Back of the fag packet calcs based on a target similar to Queen Elizabeth, at 15,000ft you'd have a radar horizon of just under 170 nautical miles. Increase altitude to 20,000 ft and you'd have a radar horizon of around 190 nautical miles. Not insignificant.

[V8 Fettler]

wildcat45 said:

V8 Fettler said:

You need to consider cost/benefit, not just costs in isolation. This does involve an element of crystal ball gazing, but also learning from history. Argentina had indicated an intention to invade the Falklands in the late 1970s, this was dealt with at the time by the (potential) threat of a UK submarine. Perhaps the continuing threat of invasion was lost in the political and economic maelstrom of the UK in the late 1970s.

The failure of politicos and the MOD to procure coherently and logically over several decades was certainly a primary factor in failing to deter the invasion of the Falklands in 1982. It was also a primary factor in failing to keep Argentine aircraft away from the task force.

One key issue with the QE that compromises effectiveness and thus - potentially - the safety of the ship and the crew is the lack of fixed wing AEW.

Again, there are many "what-ifs"; substitute Eagle for the Ark (Buccs) by all means, the important factor being the ability to project airpower over an extended range, which the Sea Harrier cannot do but Buccs/Phantoms certainly could. With a wider view, the UK has always needed at least three carriers since the end of WW2 to reduce the risk of scenario you describe whereby an enemy can take advantage of a planned refit of one carrier.

The Sea Harrier may well be a formidable fighter at close quarters, but - in the Falklands - it lacked the crucial ability to deal with the Argentine aircraft at a distance from the task force, hence ship losses. The Phantom deals with that problem (see circles).

Don't get too hung up on the range of the jets. It really doesn't diminish the effectiveness of the ships.

I agree that fixed wing AEW would be best. It is one of those compromises costs and benefits that have to be accepted. Crowsnest in Merlin will be good. Not brilliant but good. It is to a certain extent proven and nature technology. Putting AEW in an Osprey - great potentially but they don't fly that high. Unproven systems, integration, training, new aircraft, support etc. All outweghs the benefit.

I don't think Crowdnest will be around for that long. UCAV technology is emerging. No human element, long loiter time, high flying. Far better to invest in a flexible and affordable AEW solution based on Merlin right now. Time is of the essence. The Sea King ASaC fleet is very very old and fast running out of spares. Crowsnest - should - avoid a dangerous capability gap.

The restricted range of the F35s only becomes irrelevant when the QE can operate in an environment of complete air and sea superiority. I don't think that can be regarded as a certainty over the 50 year design life of the carrier.

Again you mention compromise. The lack of fixed wing AEW in the Falklands conflict was a cost compromise, a compromise that created very real risks for the task force.

[AstonZagato]

Given the E-3D Sentry's air-to-air refuelling capability, could it theoretically provide AEW cover for the carriers in the South Atlantic from Ascension? The RAF has six.

[mph1977]

AstonZagato said:

Given the E-3D Sentry's air-to-air refuelling capability, could it theoretically provide AEW cover for the carriers in the South Atlantic from Ascension? The RAF has six.

assuming a silent TTW phase on behalf of the Argentinians and the loss of MPA you mean ...

realistically if tensions rose to the point of a TTW situation in the falklands there would be an increased number of Typhoons, some tornados, some RW assets as well as the possibility of sentry and an extra voyager down there


last time there were no air assets at all down there ...

[wildcat45]

V8 Fettler said:

The restricted range of the F35s only becomes irrelevant when the QE can operate in an environment of complete air and sea superiority. I don't think that can be regarded as a certainty over the 50 year design life of the carrier.

Again you mention compromise. The lack of fixed wing AEW in the Falklands conflict was a cost compromise, a compromise that created very real risks for the task force.

It was. But Crowsnest AEW is better than no AEW. It is far from being rubbish and not fit for the job.

I can't argue with what you want. It's just not possible in the financially constrained real world.

[Mojocvh]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V10H6l9Rr3c

First NATO global hawk flew in Dec. ^^^^

Nope, don't think it could operate them either

[badgers_back]

mph1977 said:

AstonZagato said:

Given the E-3D Sentry's air-to-air refuelling capability, could it theoretically provide AEW cover for the carriers in the South Atlantic from Ascension? The RAF has six.

assuming a silent TTW phase on behalf of the Argentinians and the loss of MPA you mean ...

realistically if tensions rose to the point of a TTW situation in the falklands there would be an increased number of Typhoons, some tornados, some RW assets as well as the possibility of sentry and an extra voyager down there


last time there were no air assets at all down there ...

UK subs would tomahawk the Argentinian air force in situ.