A400m New strategic and tactical airlifter for the RAF

[Mojocvh]

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Who turns the osprey flight/maint selector to the desired selection?

How on earth can the operation of a selector between modes be a design failure?

Because when you are designing something, you start with the requirements. Some of those requirements relate to safety. Some of those safety requirements relate to human factors. If your design doesn't adequately meet, or trade between those requirements, then it's a design failure.

"An investigation resulted in administrative action against the crew."

I'll just let you ponder that.

Yes, the crew that also included a fatigued new father who operated the switch. This is why you murphy proof things at the design stage - to protect against human error.

I'll leave you to also ponder what was said about the design at the time;

"(The commanding officer) also targeted the design of the aircraft made by a Bell and Boeing joint-project, and oversights by naval air safety officials, saying: “It is inexplicable that an aircraft systems design would allow a crew to take an aircraft flying with a potential degradation in engine power of 20 percent without providing a caution or warning alerting them of the situation. This poor design, and the fact there is no documentation to warn the crew of this design in (naval operating procedures) is a contributing factor to this mishap.”

And if there was no design failure, why was the software redesigned and implemented within 3 months to prevent a recurrence? And why did the report also say "a design flaw in the
tiltrotor aircraft, since corrected, deprived the engines of enough flight power."?

Edited by Mave on Saturday 11th July 17:22

Edited by Mave on Saturday 11th July 17:47

"Yes, the crew that also included a fatigued new father who operated the switch."

Actually, he wasn't part of the operating crew at all.

What happened with the osprey wasn't a "design error" it was a violation.. or rather a series of violations that had become a "Norm"..

As you seem keen to press your point, can I as you how you would design out undercarriage safety pins for example. Or even weapon safety break pins?

Or flying control locks..."check for full and free range of movement"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by7fzs6paic

There is a point when you have to desist with the cotton wool that society seems to want to wrap everything in these days.

Edited by Mojocvh on Sunday 12th July 11:33

[Mave]

Mojocvh said:

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Who turns the osprey flight/maint selector to the desired selection?

How on earth can the operation of a selector between modes be a design failure?

Because when you are designing something, you start with the requirements. Some of those requirements relate to safety. Some of those safety requirements relate to human factors. If your design doesn't adequately meet, or trade between those requirements, then it's a design failure.

"An investigation resulted in administrative action against the crew."

I'll just let you ponder that.

Yes, the crew that also included a fatigued new father who operated the switch. This is why you murphy proof things at the design stage - to protect against human error.

I'll leave you to also ponder what was said about the design at the time;

"(The commanding officer) also targeted the design of the aircraft made by a Bell and Boeing joint-project, and oversights by naval air safety officials, saying: “It is inexplicable that an aircraft systems design would allow a crew to take an aircraft flying with a potential degradation in engine power of 20 percent without providing a caution or warning alerting them of the situation. This poor design, and the fact there is no documentation to warn the crew of this design in (naval operating procedures) is a contributing factor to this mishap.”

And if there was no design failure, why was the software redesigned and implemented within 3 months to prevent a recurrence? And why did the report also say "a design flaw in the
tiltrotor aircraft, since corrected, deprived the engines of enough flight power."?

Edited by Mave on Saturday 11th July 17:22

Edited by Mave on Saturday 11th July 17:47

"Yes, the crew that also included a fatigued new father who operated the switch."

Actually, he wasn't part of the operating crew at all.

You sure about that?
"The senior crew chief assigned to “Choctaw 3” (names are redacted from the public report) woke that afternoon feeling very excited about the mission. The sergeant was also a new father – his wife had given birth to their third child two weeks earlier. After five weeks on the night shift he wasn’t as rejuvenated as usual after the required amount of crew rest, but his anticipation for the important flight masked any fatigue.

As he had done countless times before, the sergeant referred to a pocket checklist from the flight manual to start the aircraft, using his peripheral vision to punch in the mission system setting"

Mojocvh said:

What happened with the osprey wasn't a "design error" it was a violation.. or rather a series of violations that had become a "Norm"..

As you seem keen to press your point, can I as you how you would design out undercarriage safety pins for example. Or even weapon safety break pins?

Or flying control locks..."check for full and free range of movement"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by7fzs6paic

There is a point when you have to desist with the cotton wool that society seems to want to wrap everything in these days.

Edited by Mojocvh on Sunday 12th July 11:33

There's a difference between cotton wool, and a system which allows a pilot to fly an aircraft in a configuration it was not designed for, that the pilot was not trained to fly it in, and which doesn't alert the pilot to that fact.

[G600]

Mave said:

There's a difference between cotton wool, and a system which allows a pilot to fly an aircraft in a configuration it was not designed for, that the pilot was not trained to fly it in, and which doesn't alert the pilot to that fact.

If there's one place "cotton wool" doesn't bother me it's aviation!

[Mojocvh]

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Mave said:

Mojocvh said:

Who turns the osprey flight/maint selector to the desired selection?

How on earth can the operation of a selector between modes be a design failure?

Because when you are designing something, you start with the requirements. Some of those requirements relate to safety. Some of those safety requirements relate to human factors. If your design doesn't adequately meet, or trade between those requirements, then it's a design failure.

"An investigation resulted in administrative action against the crew."

I'll just let you ponder that.

Yes, the crew that also included a fatigued new father who operated the switch. This is why you murphy proof things at the design stage - to protect against human error.

I'll leave you to also ponder what was said about the design at the time;

"(The commanding officer) also targeted the design of the aircraft made by a Bell and Boeing joint-project, and oversights by naval air safety officials, saying: “It is inexplicable that an aircraft systems design would allow a crew to take an aircraft flying with a potential degradation in engine power of 20 percent without providing a caution or warning alerting them of the situation. This poor design, and the fact there is no documentation to warn the crew of this design in (naval operating procedures) is a contributing factor to this mishap.”

And if there was no design failure, why was the software redesigned and implemented within 3 months to prevent a recurrence? And why did the report also say "a design flaw in the
tiltrotor aircraft, since corrected, deprived the engines of enough flight power."?

Edited by Mave on Saturday 11th July 17:22

Edited by Mave on Saturday 11th July 17:47

"Yes, the crew that also included a fatigued new father who operated the switch."

Actually, he wasn't part of the operating crew at all.

You sure about that?
"The senior crew chief assigned to “Choctaw 3” (names are redacted from the public report) woke that afternoon feeling very excited about the mission. The sergeant was also a new father – his wife had given birth to their third child two weeks earlier. After five weeks on the night shift he wasn’t as rejuvenated as usual after the required amount of crew rest, but his anticipation for the important flight masked any fatigue.

As he had done countless times before, the sergeant referred to a pocket checklist from the flight manual to start the aircraft, using his peripheral vision to punch in the mission system setting"

Mojocvh said:

What happened with the osprey wasn't a "design error" it was a violation.. or rather a series of violations that had become a "Norm"..

As you seem keen to press your point, can I as you how you would design out undercarriage safety pins for example. Or even weapon safety break pins?

Or flying control locks..."check for full and free range of movement"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by7fzs6paic

There is a point when you have to desist with the cotton wool that society seems to want to wrap everything in these days.

Edited by Mojocvh on Sunday 12th July 11:33

There's a difference between cotton wool, and a system which allows a pilot to fly an aircraft in a configuration it was not designed for, that the pilot was not trained to fly it in, and which doesn't alert the pilot to that fact.

OK, I wasn't going to bother to reply to your post...BUT...

..the fact that THE PILOTS WERE DISCIPLINED might give you an iota of a clue to the fact that..

..ON NOTICING THAT THE VITAL CONTROL WAS SET TO THE WRONG LOCATION [SWITCH SET TO ON RATHER THAN AUTO, AS PER SOP'S] THEY DECIDED THAT SOME RANDOM "SOFTWARE UPDATE" LED TO THAT SWITCH BEING SET IN THAT CONDITION...
their negligence alone led to this accident...

if you actually do, or have influence, on any control system design, I would urge you to seek a different path..

.. now getting back to the F-35, I would urge you to read and once again internally digest the following, second part, of our ongoing EM "thing"..
..
http://www.ece.rutgers.edu/~orfanidi/ewa/ch09.pdf

[Mave]

Mojocvh said:

OK, I wasn't going to bother to reply to your post...BUT...

So why did you? You disagreed with me and I posted additional information substantiating my position, from the same report you initially referred to, but with the information you chose to ignore.

And now you're back having gone full circle, quoting onlt part of the report, and drawing a conclusion contrary to the report.

Edited by Mave on Tuesday 21st July 16:48

[Mave]

Mojocvh said:

if you actually do, or have influence, on any control system design, I would urge you to seek a different path..

Yes I do, quite a lot. And I'm not going to take career advice from someone who looks at systems through a drinking straw rather than stepping back and seeing the bigger picture. All aspects of aviation should aim to be ALARP, not rely on training and processes alone to avoid catastrophic "gotchas"

Edited by Mave on Tuesday 21st July 16:51

[Mave]

Mojocvh said:

.. now getting back to the F-35, I would urge you to read and once again internally digest the following, second part, of our ongoing EM "thing"..
..
http://www.ece.rutgers.edu/~orfanidi/ewa/ch09.pdf

This isn't the F-35 thread. If you want to continue to dig yourself into an EM hole, I suggest 1) you go and re-read your part 1 which does not support your position, 2) you post your new information on the F35 thread and 3) you refrain from retrospectively changing your posts.

And as an aside, I took a look at the new link you posted. In your original post you implied the phenomena you claimed was true was obvious to anyone who had heard of the doppler effect - and yet you're posting a link to 25 pages of degree level calculus solutions to maxwell's equations. Nothing to do with doppler, and nothing trivial.

And neither this latest link, nor the earlier one, has any content which agrees with your original statement. Adding more and more technical complexity adds nothing to your arguement if it is nothing to do with aircraft velocity relative to the radar

Edited by Mave on Tuesday 28th July 10:36

[tuffer]

Currently sat on the pan at McCarran, maybe hot weather testing. Can't see the tail number from up here to verify who it belongs to.

On closer inspection, it's German.

Edited by tuffer on Friday 7th August 18:49

[V8LM]

Just watching Mission Impossible: Rogue Nation (again) and noticed that props on the A400M, the second built, appear to rotate the opposite direction to what they do on the production model. The props on each wing rotate in opposite directions and on the production they go down between engines (DBE), but on the film when they are seen to start they are going up between engines.

Anyone know whether this is real or weird CGI or something?

ETA:

IMG_1229 by v8lemon, on Flickr

vs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7ZtXcTkEp0

Edited by V8LM on Wednesday 12th June 21:51

[Mave]

I vaguely seem to remember that the direction of rotation was changed some time in the development programme - maybe around 2009 after testing at Marshals?

[eltawater]

Not CGI - He did the stunt for real!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=afS5ks54tms

[V8LM]

Difficult to say, but here at 2:45 it looks like no 1 was rotating the correct way - https://youtu.be/A1DY5f6tak4

[V8LM]

Judging by the curvature of the props at 25 seconds https://youtu.be/4w0u3Tl8MwU they do indeed appear to be rotating DBE, as they should, so the film is backwards. As normally 3 starts before 4 and 3 is checked to be running before 4 started, it looks like they filmed the wind down and ran that backwards.

And makes sense, at least for safety reasons.

Edited by V8LM on Monday 17th June 21:47