Battle of Britain - Castles in the Sky
Discussion
Worth a bump to remind people this week.
My father worked in the early days of RADAR or Chain Home. He was stationed at Shingle Street and also Orford Ness.
He told me that you were picked up in a bread van in plain clothes but apart from that he NEVER spoke about that location.
To check the transmitter was on there was a lightbulb with a coil of wire as a loop pickup that used to glow if the transmitter was on. Anther thing that you had to do was climb the ladder to check the aerial and at the top was a little book to be signed.
His job during the war (RAF) was to travel overseas to install radar stations.
My father worked in the early days of RADAR or Chain Home. He was stationed at Shingle Street and also Orford Ness.
He told me that you were picked up in a bread van in plain clothes but apart from that he NEVER spoke about that location.
To check the transmitter was on there was a lightbulb with a coil of wire as a loop pickup that used to glow if the transmitter was on. Anther thing that you had to do was climb the ladder to check the aerial and at the top was a little book to be signed.
His job during the war (RAF) was to travel overseas to install radar stations.
There is a lot of info about Bletchley Park and the code crackers, but good resources on Radar seems to be much harder to come by, so this shows some promise. Interesting casting too. I wonder how many people realise that the magnetron in their microwave oven was a crucial WW2 development in Radar!
And that for a large part of the war it wasn't actually called "radar". It was called RDF - for Radio Direction Finding - which was a deliberately misleading title.
The British radar system used in the Battle of Britain was actually rather crude. Part of the reasons why the Germans paid such poor attention to it was because they felt that their own new radar systems were superior to the British.
However, what they failed to understand was that the secret of radar in the Battle of Britain was not just the technology of the radar equipment, but the underlying communications system that lay behind it.
The British radar system used in the Battle of Britain was actually rather crude. Part of the reasons why the Germans paid such poor attention to it was because they felt that their own new radar systems were superior to the British.
However, what they failed to understand was that the secret of radar in the Battle of Britain was not just the technology of the radar equipment, but the underlying communications system that lay behind it.
Eric Mc]... what they [the Germans said:
failed to understand was that the secret of radar in the Battle of Britain was not just the technology of the radar equipment, but the underlying communications system that lay behind it.
Yes, I recently read a very interesting quote, where somebody said that the reason we won the Battle of Britain, was because "we were the Germans" - in other words, as organised as one would expect them to be, rather than in the traditionally British haphazard style.There is always the temptation in engineering to push the spec as far as you can, to innovate to the N'th degree. I'm as guilty as anyone of trying to squeeze more performance out of a design, and of being critical of a hacked together lash-up. The genius of our radar was that they were good enough. When you have dozens of WWII bombers coming at you, if you know their status within 1 mile or so (or even 10 miles I guess) then that is all you need to make much more efficient use of your very restricted air resources. Of course, if you also had information that they were likely to be coming from a particular base at an approximate time, then you have a good start anyway.
The more I learn about the technology of the period, the more fascinating it becomes.
The more I learn about the technology of the period, the more fascinating it becomes.
The range was pretty good. The system could pick up the German aircraft as they formed up over their French airfields. What the screens didn't do was show a separate "blip" (or return) for each individual aircraft.
What they did show was a distortion to a single line display - the bigger the distortion, the greater the number of aircraft. The trained operators could interpret that distortion as (for example) 100 plus or 200 plus aircraft. So they could tell distance, height and approximate numbers of enemy aircraft approaching - which was good enough.
What they did show was a distortion to a single line display - the bigger the distortion, the greater the number of aircraft. The trained operators could interpret that distortion as (for example) 100 plus or 200 plus aircraft. So they could tell distance, height and approximate numbers of enemy aircraft approaching - which was good enough.
Evangelion said:
Eric Mc]... what they [the Germans said:
failed to understand was that the secret of radar in the Battle of Britain was not just the technology of the radar equipment, but the underlying communications system that lay behind it.
Yes, I recently read a very interesting quote, where somebody said that the reason we won the Battle of Britain, was because "we were the Germans" - in other words, as organised as one would expect them to be, rather than in the traditionally British haphazard style.Another example was the navy enigma. Someone thought the Britishers were getting a little too lucky so they investigated the set up and concluded it was too good and they had done such a good job and the overall system of operation was excellent so impossible to break. And reading between the lines no one wanted to bash it as it was the in thing.
jmorgan said:
There were other examples of over estimating their own ability and importance though through the books I have read, some did see the issue but the leadership was a mare with rivalries and incompetence.
Another example was the navy enigma. Someone thought the Britishers were getting a little too lucky so they investigated the set up and concluded it was too good and they had done such a good job and the overall system of operation was excellent so impossible to break. And reading between the lines no one wanted to bash it as it was the in thing.
Stephen Bungay's book Most Dangerous Enemy makes this case really well. Like you say, the RAF was disciplined, thoroughly well organised, brilliantly led by Dowding and Park and it's fighter units worked as a team, not for individual glory. The Luftwaffe had a far more maverick and ad hoc approach with individual aces given precedence at the expense of the whole. Tactically, the fighters were too tied to the bombers and couldn't use their height and speed to the best advantage and of course they were led by one of history's most overblown, short-sighted, pompous and arrogant buffoons.Another example was the navy enigma. Someone thought the Britishers were getting a little too lucky so they investigated the set up and concluded it was too good and they had done such a good job and the overall system of operation was excellent so impossible to break. And reading between the lines no one wanted to bash it as it was the in thing.
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