More Argie Bargie
Discussion
Worth bearing in mind that most of the best Argentine troops were deployed near to the Chilean border in anticipation of an attack over the Andes. Most of the troops on the islands were poorly trained and badly led conscripts. The exception being the Argentine 5th Marine Battalion who were professionals, and had to be prised out of Mt Tumbledown with some difficulty.
Ayahuasca said:
Worth bearing in mind that most of the best Argentine troops were deployed near to the Chilean border in anticipation of an attack over the Andes. Most of the troops on the islands were poorly trained and badly led conscripts. The exception being the Argentine 5th Marine Battalion who were professionals, and had to be prised out of Mt Tumbledown with some difficulty.
Agreed, however the 5th weren't that hard to shift. 10 british dead vs 30 Argie? And they were dug in with minefields?Whilst we had 900 men and they 500, normal practice when taking on dug in and prepared enemy positions is to out number them by at least 3-1.
im seems to think that the Falklands were a foregone conclusion and that anyone who disagrees with him wasn't alive at the time.
Well I have news for you, Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward certainly did not think that was the case. Indeed he is on record as stating that the loss of a single carrier and it would have been all over.
Whether the Spams would have given us a deck following the loss of one of ours is irrelevent since the sum total of our serviceable SHARs were embarked on the 2 carriers. If we had lost one we would have had the square root of damn all to put on an American deck!
The fact that the Argentines got Atlantic Conveyer and not one of the carriers was bad luck to them (and relatively) good luck to us, but it proved the capability.
With respect to the air war im is (at best) being disengenuous or (more likely) talking patent bolleaux. The kill ratio of the SHAR vs the Mirage was not 20:1 but 12 : 1 However this doesn't tell the whole story because of that 12, only 1 was a Mirage III, the other 11 were 'Daggers' (ie an Israeli variant of the Mirage V). The Mirage III and V are very different airframes, the former optimised as an interceptor and armed with both semi-active radar (SAR) homing missiles as well as infra red (IR) missiles, the later optimised as a strike/attack a/c with no offensive air to air capability (merely self defence IR missiles if fitted). To say that the SHARs BLUE FOX radar was markedly superior is (again) disengenuos. BLUE FOX was a monopulse radar with no Look-Down/Shoot-Down capability that was, in fact, not significantly superior to the Thomson-CSF Cyrano Ibis radar fitted to the Mirage III. Both were old technology by the start of the war.
So aside from the downing of a single Mirage III, it is a fact that, after the early engagements at the start of the air war (and especially after Black Buck 1), Argentina pulled the Mirage IIIs back for the air defence of the homeland.
Indeed the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (Argentinian Air Force) seemed particularly unwilling to engage the SHARs. Had they dedicated their Mirage IIIs to go after the SHARs in high speed slashing attacks, the air war could have (more likely would have) turned out very differently. If we had lost our air capability it would have been all over before it started. If you don't believe me, then believe Dave Morgan or Sharky Ward who actually were there.
With regards to the Dagger and A4 attack sorties, aside from the problems with the weapons failing to detonate, the Argentines made the mistake of going after the Naval Escorts. Had they gone after the LSLs and troopships it would likely have been a very different outcome (as evidenced by what happened to Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad). Again, you might not believe me, but you might wish to believe Admiral Woodward and General Moore.
You then go on to state that the landings at San Carlos were easy because they were unopposed. In fact it was for precisely this reason that San Carlos was chosen (aside from a handful of Argentine recce troops). Neither Admiral Woodward (commander of the carrier/battle group TG 317.8) and certainly not Commodore Clapp (commander of the amphibious group TG317.0) wanted an opposed landing.
You seem to think that the Argentines were a pushover yet I would be interested to know how you would have garrisoned every possible landing site on East Falkland given the number of bays/inlets and the sheer size of the place. I take it you have never been to the Falkland Islands?
You make light of the fact that San Carlos was chosen and completely ignore the enormity of having to cross the length of East Falkland during a Falklands Winter. So, further from the fact you have never been to the Falklands, you have never been there during the winter. I have, so I know what I am talking about.
WRT the actual ground fighting, you seem to make light of it, especially Goose Green. Yes the latter was an awesome victory as it turned out but came extremely close to being a total disaster. Indeed General Moore was against that battle even being fought. From your glib attitude I take it that you have never talked to any member of II Para who were actually there. Had you done so I would warrant your attitude would be very different.
Finally your dismissal of the Falklands as a foregone conclusion is insulting to the men who fought and died there (including my brother). Had you actually been to the islands and taken a look at the ground fought over you would realise just what a feat of arms it was. In fact I would encourage you to talk to those who fought across Mt Kent, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge (or at least read their stories).
It's very easy to be an armchair General when you have f
k all first hand knowledge of about what you speak.
Oh, and was I alive in 1982? Yes.
Well I have news for you, Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward certainly did not think that was the case. Indeed he is on record as stating that the loss of a single carrier and it would have been all over.
Whether the Spams would have given us a deck following the loss of one of ours is irrelevent since the sum total of our serviceable SHARs were embarked on the 2 carriers. If we had lost one we would have had the square root of damn all to put on an American deck!
The fact that the Argentines got Atlantic Conveyer and not one of the carriers was bad luck to them (and relatively) good luck to us, but it proved the capability.
With respect to the air war im is (at best) being disengenuous or (more likely) talking patent bolleaux. The kill ratio of the SHAR vs the Mirage was not 20:1 but 12 : 1 However this doesn't tell the whole story because of that 12, only 1 was a Mirage III, the other 11 were 'Daggers' (ie an Israeli variant of the Mirage V). The Mirage III and V are very different airframes, the former optimised as an interceptor and armed with both semi-active radar (SAR) homing missiles as well as infra red (IR) missiles, the later optimised as a strike/attack a/c with no offensive air to air capability (merely self defence IR missiles if fitted). To say that the SHARs BLUE FOX radar was markedly superior is (again) disengenuos. BLUE FOX was a monopulse radar with no Look-Down/Shoot-Down capability that was, in fact, not significantly superior to the Thomson-CSF Cyrano Ibis radar fitted to the Mirage III. Both were old technology by the start of the war.
So aside from the downing of a single Mirage III, it is a fact that, after the early engagements at the start of the air war (and especially after Black Buck 1), Argentina pulled the Mirage IIIs back for the air defence of the homeland.
Indeed the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (Argentinian Air Force) seemed particularly unwilling to engage the SHARs. Had they dedicated their Mirage IIIs to go after the SHARs in high speed slashing attacks, the air war could have (more likely would have) turned out very differently. If we had lost our air capability it would have been all over before it started. If you don't believe me, then believe Dave Morgan or Sharky Ward who actually were there.
With regards to the Dagger and A4 attack sorties, aside from the problems with the weapons failing to detonate, the Argentines made the mistake of going after the Naval Escorts. Had they gone after the LSLs and troopships it would likely have been a very different outcome (as evidenced by what happened to Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad). Again, you might not believe me, but you might wish to believe Admiral Woodward and General Moore.
You then go on to state that the landings at San Carlos were easy because they were unopposed. In fact it was for precisely this reason that San Carlos was chosen (aside from a handful of Argentine recce troops). Neither Admiral Woodward (commander of the carrier/battle group TG 317.8) and certainly not Commodore Clapp (commander of the amphibious group TG317.0) wanted an opposed landing.
You seem to think that the Argentines were a pushover yet I would be interested to know how you would have garrisoned every possible landing site on East Falkland given the number of bays/inlets and the sheer size of the place. I take it you have never been to the Falkland Islands?
You make light of the fact that San Carlos was chosen and completely ignore the enormity of having to cross the length of East Falkland during a Falklands Winter. So, further from the fact you have never been to the Falklands, you have never been there during the winter. I have, so I know what I am talking about.
WRT the actual ground fighting, you seem to make light of it, especially Goose Green. Yes the latter was an awesome victory as it turned out but came extremely close to being a total disaster. Indeed General Moore was against that battle even being fought. From your glib attitude I take it that you have never talked to any member of II Para who were actually there. Had you done so I would warrant your attitude would be very different.
Finally your dismissal of the Falklands as a foregone conclusion is insulting to the men who fought and died there (including my brother). Had you actually been to the islands and taken a look at the ground fought over you would realise just what a feat of arms it was. In fact I would encourage you to talk to those who fought across Mt Kent, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge (or at least read their stories).
It's very easy to be an armchair General when you have f
k all first hand knowledge of about what you speak.Oh, and was I alive in 1982? Yes.
Edited by Ginetta G15 Girl on Thursday 17th April 17:05
Grumfutock said:
V8 Fettler said:
You're missing the key issue, which is that even with overwhelming superiority an amphibious attack against a prepared enemy is always a risk. The usual comparison is with D-Day: the Allies had overwhelming air superiority, overwhelming superiority at sea, permanent air reconnaissance, short distance to the invasion site, years to prepare. The list of factors in favour of the Allies was endless. And yet it was still touch and go on day 1, particularly at Omaha. The British in 1982 had none of the overwhelming advantages enjoyed by the Allies in 1944.
Sorry bad that is a bad comparison. On D-Day the landing was in front of and against well built concrete bunkers/trench lines/sited guns/mortars/mined beaches and a dug in enemy. None of the landings in the Falklands faced any of this so whilst we may not of had any of the overwhelming advantages we also didn't have any of the crippling disadvantages.You're looking at the final landings, there is a much bigger picture. The 1982 task force was in jeopardy before it reached the Falklands eg Atlantic Conveyor; the Germans had nothing to even mildly irritate the D-Day force as it sailed to Normandy. The 1982 task force was in jeopardy at anchor eg Sir Galahad; the biggest risk for the D-Day force at anchor was - probably - other Allied vessels.
The Allied invasion fleet (1944) had strength in depth, the 1982 task force was marginal, only 2 capital ships, lose either Hermes or Invincible and that would have been that.
A 2012 interview with the historian Hugh Bicheno (considered in some quarters a FI specialist).
http://rt.com/news/falklands-interview-bicheno-ivo...
Bicheno: ".. the British government desperately wants to get rid of the islands, but they just can’t get rid of them."
This interview was before drilling for oil began.
http://rt.com/news/falklands-interview-bicheno-ivo...
Bicheno: ".. the British government desperately wants to get rid of the islands, but they just can’t get rid of them."
This interview was before drilling for oil began.
Ginetta G15 Girl said:
...stuff...
After all that - yes, it was still a foregone conclusion once we had set our sights on regaining them."If" they had sunk a carrier...? Well "If" my auntie had b
ks then she'd be my uncle."If" they had sunk a carrier the war would indeed have taken a different turn and clearly the Americans were wasting their time even contemplating for the eventuality of loaning us a ship.
You're clearly ex-military yourself yes? And whilst I'm sorry for your loss you seem to think it was worth it in order to save the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and feel that likewise some other Father/Mother/Sister/Brother should also suffer the same as you should hostilities look like breaking out again in order to again keep the Falklands British.
Just so we're clear - I DISAGREE VEHEMENTLY WITH THAT POINT OF VIEW.
BTW: I've never said that the war "at the coal face" was easy, of course it wasn't, just that the eventual outcome was always going to be a victory.
Edited by im on Thursday 17th April 17:53
Ginetta G15 Girl said:
im seems to think that the Falklands were a foregone conclusion and that anyone who disagrees with him wasn't alive at the time.
Well I have news for you, Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward certainly did not think that was the case. Indeed he is on record as stating that the loss of a single carrier and it would have been all over.
Whether the Spams would have given us a deck following the loss of one of ours is irrelevent since the sum total of our serviceable SHARs were embarked on the 2 carriers. If we had lost one we would have had the square root of damn all to put on an American deck!
The fact that the Argentines got Atlantic Conveyer and not one of the carriers was bad luck to them (and relatively) good luck to us, but it proved the capability.
With respect to the air war im is (at best) being disengenuous or (more likely) talking patent bolleaux. The kill ratio of the SHAR vs the Mirage was not 20:1 but 12 : 1 However this doesn't tell the whole story because of that 12, only 1 was a Mirage III, the other 11 were 'Daggers' (ie an Israeli variant of the Mirage V). The Mirage III and V are very different airframes, the former optimised as an interceptor and armed with both semi-active radar (SAR) homing missiles as well as infra red (IR) missiles, the later optimised as a strike/attack a/c with no offensive air to air capability (merely self defence IR missiles if fitted). To say that the SHARs BLUE FOX radar was markedly superior is (again) disengenuos. BLUE FOX was a monopulse radar with no Look-Down/Shoot-Down capability that was, in fact, not significantly superior to the Thomson-CSF Cyrano Ibis radar fitted to the Mirage III. Both were old technology by the start of the war.
So aside from the downing of a single Mirage III, it is a fact that, after the early engagements at the start of the air war (and especially after Black Buck 1), Argentina pulled the Mirage IIIs back for the air defence of the homeland.
Indeed the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (Argentinian Air Force) seemed particularly unwilling to engage the SHARs. Had they dedicated their Mirage IIIs to go after the SHARs in high speed slashing attacks, the air war could have (more likely would have) turned out very differently. If we had lost our air capability it would have been all over before it started. If you don't believe me, then believe Dave Morgan or Sharky Ward who actually were there.
With regards to the Dagger and A4 attack sorties, aside from the problems with the weapons failing to detonate, the Argentines made the mistake of going after the Naval Escorts. Had they gone after the LSLs and troopships it would likely have been a very different outcome (as evidenced by what happened to Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad). Again, you might not believe me, but you might wish to believe Admiral Woodward and General Moore.
You then go on to state that the landings at San Carlos were easy because they were unopposed. In fact it was for precisely this reason that San Carlos was chosen (aside from a handful of Argentine recce troops). Neither Admiral Woodward (commander of the carrier/battle group TG 317.8) and certainly not Commodore Clapp (commander of the amphibious group TG317.0) wanted an opposed landing.
You seem to think that the Argentines were a pushover yet I would be interested to know how you would have garrisoned every possible landing site on East Falkland given the number of bays/inlets and the sheer size of the place. I take it you have never been to the Falkland Islands?
You make light of the fact that San Carlos was chosen and completely ignore the enormity of having to cross the length of East Falkland during a Falklands Winter. So, further from the fact you have never been to the Falklands, you have never been there during the winter. I have, so I know what I am talking about.
WRT the actual ground fighting, you seem to make light of it, especially Goose Green. Yes the latter was an awesome victory as it turned out but came extremely close to being a total disaster. Indeed General Moore was against that battle even being fought. From your glib attitude I take it that you have never talked to any member of II Para who were actually there. Had you done so I would warrant your attitude would be very different.
Finally your dismissal of the Falklands as a foregone conclusion is insulting to the men who fought and died there (including my brother). Had you actually been to the islands and taken a look at the ground fought over you would realise just what a feat of arms it was. In fact I would encourage you to talk to those who fought across Mt Kent, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge (or at least read their stories).
It's very easy to be an armchair General when you have fk all first hand knowledge of about what you speak.
Oh, and was I alive in 1982? Yes.
Very interesting and informative post, I was down South in 82 with 2 Para. I cannot believe some of the drivel that has been posted about this, from people who are clearly utterly clueless as to what being involved in a conflict is about. From my own point of view being sent to to re capture the Falklands, was a great military achievment, involving luck, fortitude, and courage by the bucket load. This confilct was won with boots on the ground, without real airpower, virtully no ground attack took place throughout the battle of Goose Green, save for one sortie cluster bombing the airfield late on the first day. The lack of Naval gunfire preceeding the attack and the lack of any artillery during, save for the 2 para morter crews was an unusual concept. Had H been told that we were basically on our todds, I think he may have thought again about staging the attack. Well I have news for you, Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward certainly did not think that was the case. Indeed he is on record as stating that the loss of a single carrier and it would have been all over.
Whether the Spams would have given us a deck following the loss of one of ours is irrelevent since the sum total of our serviceable SHARs were embarked on the 2 carriers. If we had lost one we would have had the square root of damn all to put on an American deck!
The fact that the Argentines got Atlantic Conveyer and not one of the carriers was bad luck to them (and relatively) good luck to us, but it proved the capability.
With respect to the air war im is (at best) being disengenuous or (more likely) talking patent bolleaux. The kill ratio of the SHAR vs the Mirage was not 20:1 but 12 : 1 However this doesn't tell the whole story because of that 12, only 1 was a Mirage III, the other 11 were 'Daggers' (ie an Israeli variant of the Mirage V). The Mirage III and V are very different airframes, the former optimised as an interceptor and armed with both semi-active radar (SAR) homing missiles as well as infra red (IR) missiles, the later optimised as a strike/attack a/c with no offensive air to air capability (merely self defence IR missiles if fitted). To say that the SHARs BLUE FOX radar was markedly superior is (again) disengenuos. BLUE FOX was a monopulse radar with no Look-Down/Shoot-Down capability that was, in fact, not significantly superior to the Thomson-CSF Cyrano Ibis radar fitted to the Mirage III. Both were old technology by the start of the war.
So aside from the downing of a single Mirage III, it is a fact that, after the early engagements at the start of the air war (and especially after Black Buck 1), Argentina pulled the Mirage IIIs back for the air defence of the homeland.
Indeed the Fuerza Aerea Argentina (Argentinian Air Force) seemed particularly unwilling to engage the SHARs. Had they dedicated their Mirage IIIs to go after the SHARs in high speed slashing attacks, the air war could have (more likely would have) turned out very differently. If we had lost our air capability it would have been all over before it started. If you don't believe me, then believe Dave Morgan or Sharky Ward who actually were there.
With regards to the Dagger and A4 attack sorties, aside from the problems with the weapons failing to detonate, the Argentines made the mistake of going after the Naval Escorts. Had they gone after the LSLs and troopships it would likely have been a very different outcome (as evidenced by what happened to Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad). Again, you might not believe me, but you might wish to believe Admiral Woodward and General Moore.
You then go on to state that the landings at San Carlos were easy because they were unopposed. In fact it was for precisely this reason that San Carlos was chosen (aside from a handful of Argentine recce troops). Neither Admiral Woodward (commander of the carrier/battle group TG 317.8) and certainly not Commodore Clapp (commander of the amphibious group TG317.0) wanted an opposed landing.
You seem to think that the Argentines were a pushover yet I would be interested to know how you would have garrisoned every possible landing site on East Falkland given the number of bays/inlets and the sheer size of the place. I take it you have never been to the Falkland Islands?
You make light of the fact that San Carlos was chosen and completely ignore the enormity of having to cross the length of East Falkland during a Falklands Winter. So, further from the fact you have never been to the Falklands, you have never been there during the winter. I have, so I know what I am talking about.
WRT the actual ground fighting, you seem to make light of it, especially Goose Green. Yes the latter was an awesome victory as it turned out but came extremely close to being a total disaster. Indeed General Moore was against that battle even being fought. From your glib attitude I take it that you have never talked to any member of II Para who were actually there. Had you done so I would warrant your attitude would be very different.
Finally your dismissal of the Falklands as a foregone conclusion is insulting to the men who fought and died there (including my brother). Had you actually been to the islands and taken a look at the ground fought over you would realise just what a feat of arms it was. In fact I would encourage you to talk to those who fought across Mt Kent, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge (or at least read their stories).
It's very easy to be an armchair General when you have f
k all first hand knowledge of about what you speak.Oh, and was I alive in 1982? Yes.
Edited by Ginetta G15 Girl on Thursday 17th April 17:05
The later attack on Wireless ridge conducted by 2 para, took place after a pretty effective bombardment of 105 guns as well as the Blue's and Royal's giving large with their 30mm cannon. Weedling out a well entrenched enemy is a truly difficult task both on the ridge and at Goode Green. The Argentines had fantastic artillery support and the 105's at Goose Green targetted us for most of the day. Of course luck plays its part, and I'm sure the Argentines would not do the things the same way again.
However the problem for the Argentines is that they are mainly a conscript army, who were poorly treated and had low moral, and jacked quite quickly when fired upon, we had training and belief in our side, that we would win. The Argentines may believe the Islands are theirs (We have a bigger flag) but at the end of the day, lack the military know how to take it and keep it. We lost some exceedingly brave young men, I lost some really good friends who were brilliant soldiers, I cannot ever imagine that any Prime Minister will negotiate the Islands away. It would be Political suicide. Utrinque Paratus.
Oakey said:
Hey, General Argumentative, did you ever consider that the people who signed up to be in the armed forces perhaps don't give a st what you feel they should or shouldn't die for? It's their choice, not yours. Hence why they signed up.
And did it ever occur to you that I don't give a st what you feel they should or shouldn't die for? It's their choice, not yours. Hence why they signed up.t what's said on the internet 
Have a nice bank holiday.
im said:
After all that - yes, it was still a foregone conclusion once we had set our sights on regaining them.
You really are blinkered aren't you? If the Commanders who fought the battle didn't think it was a foregone conclusion (and are on record as such) why do you? Indeed, Admiral Woodward himself used the Iron Duke's quote: 'A close run thing'.im said:
You're clearly ex-military yourself yes?
By the time the Falklands crisis broke out I had been a Commissioned Officer in Her Majesty's Royal Air Force for almost a year. Furthermore, my late Father was Sqn Ldr Ops at Northwood during the conflict, so aside from my having in excess of 2 decades service in the RAF (with all the Air Combat study that entails), much of the knowledge I have comes from first hand sources.im said:
And whilst I'm sorry for your loss you seem to think it was worth it in order to save the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and feel that likewise some other Father/Mother/Sister/Brother should also suffer the same as you should hostilities look like breaking out again in order to again keep the Falklands British.
Having done 3 tours in the Falklands, having spoken to the people who live there, having been shown what the Argentines did to the local population during the occupation (and presumably would do again), having seen at first hand the mess the Argentines left behind (eg the unregulated minefields) yes I do.im said:
Just so we're clear - I DISAGREE VEHEMENTLY WITH THAT POINT OF VIEW.
You're entitled to your opinion. Personally I disagree with cowardice, but there you go.Edited by Ginetta G15 Girl on Thursday 17th April 18:36
I was 19 at the time.
I recall there were several talking heads saying that we were on a fools errand and that we would be defeated. I remember the fear that surrounded the campaign - the broadcasts outlining British losses and victories. I remember vividly Brian Hanrahan's "I counted them all out and I counted them all back again".
I have met and talked to Major Chris Keeble who took command of II Para after the death of Col H Jones and rallied his troops to victory at Goose Green. His account of that crucial battle is as far from a pushover as one can get. I have friends that fought on Tumbledown, advancing with fixed bayonets to clear trenches and had friends killed beside them. It was a brutal battle that teetered near failure for much of the time and was precarious until the Scots Guards finally took the high ground as the sun rose.
I have read a little on the subject since then.
In all, it was far from a foregone conclusion.
The press undoubtedly portrayed it as such at the time. That was propaganda. I think, im, that being alive at the the time has hindered your perspective as you have apparently believed the jingoistic hype that did not match the scale of challenge that faced the forces on the ground/sea.
I recall there were several talking heads saying that we were on a fools errand and that we would be defeated. I remember the fear that surrounded the campaign - the broadcasts outlining British losses and victories. I remember vividly Brian Hanrahan's "I counted them all out and I counted them all back again".
I have met and talked to Major Chris Keeble who took command of II Para after the death of Col H Jones and rallied his troops to victory at Goose Green. His account of that crucial battle is as far from a pushover as one can get. I have friends that fought on Tumbledown, advancing with fixed bayonets to clear trenches and had friends killed beside them. It was a brutal battle that teetered near failure for much of the time and was precarious until the Scots Guards finally took the high ground as the sun rose.
I have read a little on the subject since then.
In all, it was far from a foregone conclusion.
The press undoubtedly portrayed it as such at the time. That was propaganda. I think, im, that being alive at the the time has hindered your perspective as you have apparently believed the jingoistic hype that did not match the scale of challenge that faced the forces on the ground/sea.
im said:
Oakey said:
Hey, General Argumentative, did you ever consider that the people who signed up to be in the armed forces perhaps don't give a st what you feel they should or shouldn't die for? It's their choice, not yours. Hence why they signed up.
And did it ever occur to you that I don't give a st what you feel they should or shouldn't die for? It's their choice, not yours. Hence why they signed up.t what's said on the internet Have a nice bank holiday.
t about what's said on the internet you sure do chat a lot of it. What a troll...Of course it was a foregone conclusion - otherwise it would never have been fought.
Of course the military chiefs are bound to say, "Ooh, that was really difficult and we are very clever and courageous". Blowing their own trumpets.
Of course you are welcome to go and fight to keep far off islands with nobody on them if you want to. I'm not going and I wouldn't send anyone else.
Of course the total death toll of the incident was utterly and completely unacceptable,
Of course UK wouldn't have raised a finger if the "other side" had been Russia or China.
Of course it was a foregone conclusion.....
Of course the military chiefs are bound to say, "Ooh, that was really difficult and we are very clever and courageous". Blowing their own trumpets.
Of course you are welcome to go and fight to keep far off islands with nobody on them if you want to. I'm not going and I wouldn't send anyone else.
Of course the total death toll of the incident was utterly and completely unacceptable,
- 900 people killed
- 2,500 people wounded
- Population of the Falklands in 1982 - just 1,800 people
- An overall death ratio of 50% and more people wounded than actually lived there!
Of course UK wouldn't have raised a finger if the "other side" had been Russia or China.
Of course it was a foregone conclusion.....
Ozzie Osmond said:
Of course it was a foregone conclusion - otherwise it would never have been fought.
Of course the military chiefs are bound to say, "Ooh, that was really difficult and we are very clever and courageous". Blowing their own trumpets.
Of course you are welcome to go and fight to keep far off islands with nobody on them if you want to. I'm not going and I wouldn't send anyone else.
Of course the total death toll of the incident was utterly and completely unacceptable,
Of course UK wouldn't have raised a finger if the "other side" had been Russia or China.
Of course it was a foregone conclusion.....
Feck me but thats an awful post even by your standards Ozzie. Of course the military chiefs are bound to say, "Ooh, that was really difficult and we are very clever and courageous". Blowing their own trumpets.
Of course you are welcome to go and fight to keep far off islands with nobody on them if you want to. I'm not going and I wouldn't send anyone else.
Of course the total death toll of the incident was utterly and completely unacceptable,
- 900 people killed
- 2,500 people wounded
- Population of the Falklands in 1982 - just 1,800 people
- An overall death ratio of 50% and more people wounded than actually lived there!
Of course UK wouldn't have raised a finger if the "other side" had been Russia or China.
Of course it was a foregone conclusion.....
"Had you actually been to the islands and taken a look at the ground fought over you would realise just what a feat of arms it was. In fact I would encourage you to talk to those who fought across Mt Kent, Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge "
Perhaps both the most awe inspiring and terrifying places to visit.
I could not then and still cannot imagine just HOW they took those slopes and cannot either contemplate the sheer raw courage required to go forwards and do so...
Perhaps both the most awe inspiring and terrifying places to visit.
I could not then and still cannot imagine just HOW they took those slopes and cannot either contemplate the sheer raw courage required to go forwards and do so...
Ozzie Osmond said:
Of course it was a foregone conclusion - otherwise it would never have been fought.
Of course the military chiefs are bound to say, "Ooh, that was really difficult and we are very clever and courageous". Blowing their own trumpets.
Of course you are welcome to go and fight to keep far off islands with nobody on them if you want to. I'm not going and I wouldn't send anyone else.
Of course the total death toll of the incident was utterly and completely unacceptable,
Of course UK wouldn't have raised a finger if the "other side" had been Russia or China.
Of course it was a foregone conclusion.....
Well I have read some complete bOf course the military chiefs are bound to say, "Ooh, that was really difficult and we are very clever and courageous". Blowing their own trumpets.
Of course you are welcome to go and fight to keep far off islands with nobody on them if you want to. I'm not going and I wouldn't send anyone else.
Of course the total death toll of the incident was utterly and completely unacceptable,
- 900 people killed
- 2,500 people wounded
- Population of the Falklands in 1982 - just 1,800 people
- An overall death ratio of 50% and more people wounded than actually lived there!
Of course UK wouldn't have raised a finger if the "other side" had been Russia or China.
Of course it was a foregone conclusion.....
ks on PH, I have even written some myself. I also accept that the tinternet is full of weirdo's, racists, morons and trolls. However that is one of the funniest and yet ludicrous post I have ever read on PH. Well done sir.
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