Rovers - were they really that bad?
Discussion
I've only had two Rovers.
1st Rover 420 GSI Tourer died after 2000 miles, could not be fixed and was replaced FOC
2nd Rover 420 GSI Tourer died after 20000 miles and was replaced with a different make. It is also of note the second GSI had the headrest from a totally different car when it was delivered (from new) which I never understood how that cold happen?
Absolutely s
t cars.
The end.
1st Rover 420 GSI Tourer died after 2000 miles, could not be fixed and was replaced FOC
2nd Rover 420 GSI Tourer died after 20000 miles and was replaced with a different make. It is also of note the second GSI had the headrest from a totally different car when it was delivered (from new) which I never understood how that cold happen?
Absolutely s
t cars.The end.
P5Nij said:
Meandering through this thread is making me miss my P5s and P6s more than is probably good for me, none were perfect but they were so well put together, great to drive and very comfortable. Four of them were used as daily hacks and the odd duff battery aside they were very reliable - the most recent two, which I wish I still owned...
1970 P5B Coupe...
1972 P6B Auto...
Blimey it's a bit dusty in here, think I've got something in my eye...
They are gorgeous cars...I'm off to the classified ads1970 P5B Coupe...
1972 P6B Auto...
Blimey it's a bit dusty in here, think I've got something in my eye...
NiceCupOfTea said:
blueg33 said:
This was mine (Rover 827 Vitesse) and it was pretty good, fast there and fastback 
. You can also see Mrs B's rover 216se peeking out of the garage
Has it just dropped all its coolant in that pic? . You can also see Mrs B's rover 216se peeking out of the garageIt was pretty reliable. Cruised from South of France to the channel at 115mph for hours on end, carrying 4 people and several cases of wine. It was smooth, comfy, fast and capacious.
Steffan said:
Like the identity names
My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Most cars are. But VAG stuff is nothing special - there are now quite a few Mark 5 Golfs with rotten front arches, ditto Passats. VAG bodies are alright but no better than they need to be. Vauxhalls are rather better tbh.My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Rovers? The 800 was crap, a horrible thing with a Montego quality interior and as a car it was far adrift of the 5 Series and Merc E Class it was laughable. The 75 was a good car and the 600 was better still - probably the best thing they made. The Metro was s
te, the R8 200 and 400 pretty good and the replacements rather less so. The blame lies with BMW who failed to grasp that Rovers were not prestige but cheap trams with some fake wood. Priced right they would have sold well enough and the 75 was definitely on the right track in terms of quality. Not perfect but getting there. But BMW overpriced the 200 and 400, sales bombed and that was that, not helped by the pound/euro exchange rate that slaughtered export sales - Rovers' biggest asset.
But, it died a natural death. The end of the 75 was a pity but the rest of it was crap. The good bits (Range Rover and Mini) live on and does well enough.
iSore said:
Steffan said:
Like the identity names
My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Most cars are. But VAG stuff is nothing special - there are now quite a few Mark 5 Golfs with rotten front arches, ditto Passats. VAG bodies are alright but no better than they need to be. Vauxhalls are rather better tbh.My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Rovers? The 800 was crap, a horrible thing with a Montego quality interior and as a car it was far adrift of the 5 Series and Merc E Class it was laughable. The 75 was a good car and the 600 was better still - probably the best thing they made. The Metro was s
te, the R8 200 and 400 pretty good and the replacements rather less so. The blame lies with BMW who failed to grasp that Rovers were not prestige but cheap trams with some fake wood. Priced right they would have sold well enough and the 75 was definitely on the right track in terms of quality. Not perfect but getting there. But BMW overpriced the 200 and 400, sales bombed and that was that, not helped by the pound/euro exchange rate that slaughtered export sales - Rovers' biggest asset.
But, it died a natural death. The end of the 75 was a pity but the rest of it was crap. The good bits (Range Rover and Mini) live on and does well enough.
As usual a Rover thread decends into the usual, head gasket failure, or BMW nearly saved them, have a read of this bit of info that "AndyMadMack" came up with, it gives you an insight into just how much BMW took the piss.....
The Great Rock and Rover Swindle
In the mid 1990s, the BMW board was looking hard at its product range.
There were concerns that the company was over reliant on sales of the 3 series.
The 7 was not a big seller (relatively speaking) and barely covered the cost of its development. The 5 was profitable, but under increasing attack from the E class Mercedes and whilst it enjoyed top dog status technically, even the 5 could not support BMW alone.
No, the real bread and butter was the 3 series, and concern was being expressed that BMW had already rung as many changes on this theme as was available to them - compact, saloon, coupe, cabrio and touring. The M3 halo model worked well too.
It was noted that to compete in the increasingly popular smaller car segment a better solution was going to be required. The 3 Compact was really not very good and was too expensive to make, despite using earlier generation mechanicals. Buyers in this segment were more conscious of space and practicality and the compact simply lost out to rivals from companies such as VW (and yes even Rover) in this regard.
It was felt that BMW needed to expand its ranges and add vehicles in sectors both upwards and downwards. But herein lay the problem. Just how far and wide could the BMW brand be stretched before BMW customers were offered a product that they would not buy because they could not relate it to the brand, or worse, before the core values of the brand were undermined?
The 7 series upper limit had established the ceiling to the BMW brand. The ultra expensive versions simply did not sell in the sorts of numbers necessary to justify their development and the % resale value of these cars was awful, hence BMWs interest in Rolls Royce to provide the ultimate rung on the BMW product ladder.
The lower limit was the 3 compact, but this was not competitive and really only sold because of its badge. Going smaller than this would be tough if BMW was to retain its trademark RWD package.
Clearly, BMW needed FWD for this smaller sector, but this was the antitheses of BMW brand philosophy.
BMW also wanted to broaden the 5 series range with an SUV type vehicle for the lucrative North American Market, but following some work with customer focus groups it was uncertain whether customers would see the BMW brand stretch towards the SUV sector.
The upshot of all this was that in the early 90s, some beancounters in Munich were really concerned that BMWs routes for growth were somewhat restricted, constrained it would seem by the very brand image and core values that had secured the company’s success in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.
BMW, they said, was vulnerable to a concerted attack by a major manufacturer with deeper pockets and greater economies of scale, eager to gain access to BMWs pricing and margins. The Lexus and Infiniti programmes by Toyota and Nissan in the USA caused many a sleepless night in Bavaria.
Expansion was the answer, but expansion through the creation or adoption of new brands that would allow BMW to market products that did not have to adhere to BMW brand values, but which nevertheless could offer BMW the sorts of economies of scale in terms of core components (engines, transmissions, electronics, climate and sub systems) that would ensure it could protect its margins going forward in the event of a successful attack on their tradition sectors by Toyota, Nissan et al.
BMW began to cast around to look for an acquisition target. Through their (excellent) working relationship with BAe (through the BMW aero engine division) Rover Group became the focus of their attentions. The marriage looked perfect. Rover had an iconic small car brand – Mini, that could easily sit below the BMW brand without detracting from the latters brand message. Rover also had one of the two global Iconic SUV brands – Land Rover/Range Rover (the other being Jeep) and this potentially could allow BMW to grow their US market share via SUV sales in the event that the then mooted X5 failed to find favour with buyers.
BAe was happy to sell Rover. It had looked at the costs of redeveloping Longbridge and the fact that several cars in the range were in need of replacement. Fling in the fact that BAe had been largely forced to take Rover off the Govts hands and was in an industry with very little synergy or opportunities for savings from joint engineering and BMW represented to best deal in town. So the company was sold with much fanfare.
At this point the BMW strategy was simple. “Keep what we need, get as much money as we can whilst we have the assets (Govt loans and subsidies, sales of land etc) spend as little as possible on product development, without being seen to do so, (hence lots of press announcements about design projects that mostly never took place) and bail out with as big a damaging (to Rover) fanfare as possible thereby ensuring the likely death of a (albeit minor) competitor.
Remember too that at the time of the acquisition BMW and Rover built about the same number of vehicles..
This was plan was enacted very quickly.
1, The 800 replacement that Rover had almost ready to go (based on a revised, widened 800 platform) was canned
2, Changes were made to the K series spec - the selection of plastic dowels for the head location, etc – thereby leading to greatly exacerbated problems with the HGF issue – in other words a minor problem was made much worse and the legend of K series HGF began to gather momentum
3, The R100 production line was closed with no replacement. Now, the 100 sold more than 100,000 cars annually, (it was in effect Rovers 3 series in terms of cash generation) and the effect on Rover cash flow was huge.
The official reason given was the “horrendous” Euro NCAP crash test results of 97, which ranked to R100 as only 1 star. In fact the report, which is still available on line makes it clear that with only a little work the R100 could easily have got more stars..
Yet, BMW felt that such a low score merited the immediate cessation of production.
Go have a look at the 3 series NCAP test for the same year – it scored 1.5 stars……
No replacement for the R100 was ever started.
4, The new Mini project was started. Rover paid for the entire engineering on this from its own cash flow. Bizarrely, the K series (at the time, still the lightest and most compact engine in its class) was dropped from the line up in favour of a Chrysler engine, built at a plant in Brazil… This only makes sense if you consider that the plan to sell off the dregs of Rover once it had been asset stripped could only work if Rover retained its own engine building capability. The K was Rovers mainstream and thus had to stay with Rover. Also, since BMW had deliberately sabotaged the K reputation through the use of the plastic dowels and the refusal to update tooling which was worn out, it was not going to be possible to use the K in the Mini
5, A new mid range Rover was started.. to replace the 400/45. Rover paid for all of this. This was vital, given the significant license costs that Rover had to pay to Honda each year on the older chassis. Drawings and CAD renderings of this vehicle were published by several major UK car magazines, BMW was absolutely furious at the leak – with good reason as it turns out since it very nearly exposed their scam.
This new car, paid for by Rover in large measure would eventually see the light of day as the BMW 1 series…..
6, The new Range Rover was started, and BMW charged this to Rovers accounts also. (by now the Rover books, which had been profitable under BAe looked horrendous with the company spending on R+D for BMW at an unprecedented rate, but with sales chopped by a third or more following the closure of the R100 line)
BMW also managed to get all the 4wd expertise it needed for the X5 and X3, and as these vehicles were launched, it became clear that the BMW brand could be stretched and so the Land Rover brand would not be required. BMW dressed this up for sale to Ford (but made sure in the process that for the time being at least, Ford would have to pay BMW for the completion of the dev work and the subsequent supply of key components (engines etc)
7, The anticipated launch of the MGF in the USA was cancelled. The MG brand still had massive following in the USA and had once been valued as one of the 3 most valuable brands in the USA. The MGF was a thorn in BMWs side. Dynamically superior to the Z3 and arguably much better looking, the little F consistently trounced the Z3 in road tests by motor magazines and TV shows. The engineering work to take the F to the USA was never signed off and the F was allowed to sit undeveloped.
8, The Rover engineers were not entirely helpless though. Their 800 replacement had been merely a stopgap for what was to become the R75
This car, with its Rover designed floorpan had a better torsional rigidity than the 5 series BMW and potentially offered a real threat.
Yet, here BMW saw a real opportunity. They allowed Rover to finish the development of this car and even allowed Rover engineers to use several major components to speed development (Z axle rear end, aircon and electrics systems etc)
But it was a con. Whilst Rover engineers twittered excitedly about being allowed finally to have two mouldings for the handbrake surround/centre console for LHD and RHD markets, BMW now had their exit strategy in place. The R75 would be launched to massive public and press praise - “ looks like a baby Bentley, class leading ride and refinement, better than the S type Jaguar (launched at the similar time) a real small limo experience” were some of the comments …… yet at the launch Bernd Pisch effectively warned that Rovers days were nearly over. The result was that the leasing companies wouldn’t touch the 75 at competitive rates.
This severely restricted sales….
The red ink on the Rover balance sheet grew worse.. and of course, all the while BMW claimed in the media that it was doing its best with its English patient.
It pocketed a nice Government subsidy to develop the Hams Hall site for engines. The NG range of engines was supposed to power both future BMW and Rover ranges. Odd then that the NG is not designed for transverse fitment, witness the use of Peugeot engines in later MINIs…….
BMWs “good work” on the K series was also bearing fruit with warranty claims for HGF rising and the little engines reputation sinking like a stone.
Rover paid for Cowley works to be completely refettled. (it cost tens of millions) but never saw the benefit of its investment… This is the current MINI factory owned by BMW…..
When the end came, BMW looked like heros for having tried so hard with their English Patient. “So much money lost” was the cry, but a quick perusal of the actual balance sheet of the deal shows that BMW lost almost nothing, once IP, dev costs of new models (which Rover paid for but BMW retained), land sales and the sale of Land Rover to Ford are taken into account. What they gained though was a couple of effectively brand new factories. A new range of cars in an iconic sub brand ( MINI) , a new engine range paid for by Rover and HMG (the British taxpayer) and all the IP they needed for the 4wd and Fwd technologies they might need in the future.
The much ballyhooed “dowry” of thousands of Rover cars on airfields (and cited on many a previous MGR bashing thread on PH) was another con. Rover had begged BMW to slow production lines to prevent a build up of unsold stock. Such stock undermines used car values, undermines the brand and also costs money to build. Rover had to build these cars, lose money on them. Instead of keeping quiet about the stock pile, BMW circulated a list of sites where these cars could be photographed….
Now, there’s lots more I could go into, and for everything I’ve written here there are another 5 points that should be made. But there is no point.
Most of you have swallowed the story that BMW put out hook line and sinker.
MGR deserved all it got in the eyes on most haters. Goebbels would be proud.
It’s easy to blame the Phoenix 4. After all they were in charge when it all finally collapsed. But that’s another story that is far from being as simple as the media have portrayed it. And the end, when it came, was bizarre, with Patricia Hewitt waiting till John Towers had boarded his plane in China before marching into Longbridge at nine o’clock in the evening to close what was at that time a PRIVATE limited company…
By the time Towers landed at Heathrow, his company was no more…
For the record, it cost the British Government more in terms support for MGR workers made redundant than it would have done for them to underwrite the MGR pension fund deficit (the only outstanding point of negotiation between SAIC and MGR) SAIC had asked the government to underwrite the deficit because they (SAIC) felt (not unreasonably) that Gordon Browns “windfall tax” on private pension funds had largely created the problem in the first place.
Now you might want to ask why BMW was making urgent calls to Whitehall at this time, but hey, whats the point, you haters know best. HGF every five minutes wasn’t it?
I Must Add that this statement isn't my work
credit must go to Andymadmak from another "let's knock MGR PH thread"
I love my Beemers, but after 2 e34s that fell apart, I bought an old 75CDTi and after a couple of little niggles, proved totally reliable, i've done over 40k in nearly 3 years and it hasn't missed a beat, it has no rust anywere.
NB and I know that it has a BMW diesel lump under the bonnet.
The Great Rock and Rover Swindle
In the mid 1990s, the BMW board was looking hard at its product range.
There were concerns that the company was over reliant on sales of the 3 series.
The 7 was not a big seller (relatively speaking) and barely covered the cost of its development. The 5 was profitable, but under increasing attack from the E class Mercedes and whilst it enjoyed top dog status technically, even the 5 could not support BMW alone.
No, the real bread and butter was the 3 series, and concern was being expressed that BMW had already rung as many changes on this theme as was available to them - compact, saloon, coupe, cabrio and touring. The M3 halo model worked well too.
It was noted that to compete in the increasingly popular smaller car segment a better solution was going to be required. The 3 Compact was really not very good and was too expensive to make, despite using earlier generation mechanicals. Buyers in this segment were more conscious of space and practicality and the compact simply lost out to rivals from companies such as VW (and yes even Rover) in this regard.
It was felt that BMW needed to expand its ranges and add vehicles in sectors both upwards and downwards. But herein lay the problem. Just how far and wide could the BMW brand be stretched before BMW customers were offered a product that they would not buy because they could not relate it to the brand, or worse, before the core values of the brand were undermined?
The 7 series upper limit had established the ceiling to the BMW brand. The ultra expensive versions simply did not sell in the sorts of numbers necessary to justify their development and the % resale value of these cars was awful, hence BMWs interest in Rolls Royce to provide the ultimate rung on the BMW product ladder.
The lower limit was the 3 compact, but this was not competitive and really only sold because of its badge. Going smaller than this would be tough if BMW was to retain its trademark RWD package.
Clearly, BMW needed FWD for this smaller sector, but this was the antitheses of BMW brand philosophy.
BMW also wanted to broaden the 5 series range with an SUV type vehicle for the lucrative North American Market, but following some work with customer focus groups it was uncertain whether customers would see the BMW brand stretch towards the SUV sector.
The upshot of all this was that in the early 90s, some beancounters in Munich were really concerned that BMWs routes for growth were somewhat restricted, constrained it would seem by the very brand image and core values that had secured the company’s success in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.
BMW, they said, was vulnerable to a concerted attack by a major manufacturer with deeper pockets and greater economies of scale, eager to gain access to BMWs pricing and margins. The Lexus and Infiniti programmes by Toyota and Nissan in the USA caused many a sleepless night in Bavaria.
Expansion was the answer, but expansion through the creation or adoption of new brands that would allow BMW to market products that did not have to adhere to BMW brand values, but which nevertheless could offer BMW the sorts of economies of scale in terms of core components (engines, transmissions, electronics, climate and sub systems) that would ensure it could protect its margins going forward in the event of a successful attack on their tradition sectors by Toyota, Nissan et al.
BMW began to cast around to look for an acquisition target. Through their (excellent) working relationship with BAe (through the BMW aero engine division) Rover Group became the focus of their attentions. The marriage looked perfect. Rover had an iconic small car brand – Mini, that could easily sit below the BMW brand without detracting from the latters brand message. Rover also had one of the two global Iconic SUV brands – Land Rover/Range Rover (the other being Jeep) and this potentially could allow BMW to grow their US market share via SUV sales in the event that the then mooted X5 failed to find favour with buyers.
BAe was happy to sell Rover. It had looked at the costs of redeveloping Longbridge and the fact that several cars in the range were in need of replacement. Fling in the fact that BAe had been largely forced to take Rover off the Govts hands and was in an industry with very little synergy or opportunities for savings from joint engineering and BMW represented to best deal in town. So the company was sold with much fanfare.
At this point the BMW strategy was simple. “Keep what we need, get as much money as we can whilst we have the assets (Govt loans and subsidies, sales of land etc) spend as little as possible on product development, without being seen to do so, (hence lots of press announcements about design projects that mostly never took place) and bail out with as big a damaging (to Rover) fanfare as possible thereby ensuring the likely death of a (albeit minor) competitor.
Remember too that at the time of the acquisition BMW and Rover built about the same number of vehicles..
This was plan was enacted very quickly.
1, The 800 replacement that Rover had almost ready to go (based on a revised, widened 800 platform) was canned
2, Changes were made to the K series spec - the selection of plastic dowels for the head location, etc – thereby leading to greatly exacerbated problems with the HGF issue – in other words a minor problem was made much worse and the legend of K series HGF began to gather momentum
3, The R100 production line was closed with no replacement. Now, the 100 sold more than 100,000 cars annually, (it was in effect Rovers 3 series in terms of cash generation) and the effect on Rover cash flow was huge.
The official reason given was the “horrendous” Euro NCAP crash test results of 97, which ranked to R100 as only 1 star. In fact the report, which is still available on line makes it clear that with only a little work the R100 could easily have got more stars..
Yet, BMW felt that such a low score merited the immediate cessation of production.
Go have a look at the 3 series NCAP test for the same year – it scored 1.5 stars……
No replacement for the R100 was ever started.
4, The new Mini project was started. Rover paid for the entire engineering on this from its own cash flow. Bizarrely, the K series (at the time, still the lightest and most compact engine in its class) was dropped from the line up in favour of a Chrysler engine, built at a plant in Brazil… This only makes sense if you consider that the plan to sell off the dregs of Rover once it had been asset stripped could only work if Rover retained its own engine building capability. The K was Rovers mainstream and thus had to stay with Rover. Also, since BMW had deliberately sabotaged the K reputation through the use of the plastic dowels and the refusal to update tooling which was worn out, it was not going to be possible to use the K in the Mini
5, A new mid range Rover was started.. to replace the 400/45. Rover paid for all of this. This was vital, given the significant license costs that Rover had to pay to Honda each year on the older chassis. Drawings and CAD renderings of this vehicle were published by several major UK car magazines, BMW was absolutely furious at the leak – with good reason as it turns out since it very nearly exposed their scam.
This new car, paid for by Rover in large measure would eventually see the light of day as the BMW 1 series…..
6, The new Range Rover was started, and BMW charged this to Rovers accounts also. (by now the Rover books, which had been profitable under BAe looked horrendous with the company spending on R+D for BMW at an unprecedented rate, but with sales chopped by a third or more following the closure of the R100 line)
BMW also managed to get all the 4wd expertise it needed for the X5 and X3, and as these vehicles were launched, it became clear that the BMW brand could be stretched and so the Land Rover brand would not be required. BMW dressed this up for sale to Ford (but made sure in the process that for the time being at least, Ford would have to pay BMW for the completion of the dev work and the subsequent supply of key components (engines etc)
7, The anticipated launch of the MGF in the USA was cancelled. The MG brand still had massive following in the USA and had once been valued as one of the 3 most valuable brands in the USA. The MGF was a thorn in BMWs side. Dynamically superior to the Z3 and arguably much better looking, the little F consistently trounced the Z3 in road tests by motor magazines and TV shows. The engineering work to take the F to the USA was never signed off and the F was allowed to sit undeveloped.
8, The Rover engineers were not entirely helpless though. Their 800 replacement had been merely a stopgap for what was to become the R75
This car, with its Rover designed floorpan had a better torsional rigidity than the 5 series BMW and potentially offered a real threat.
Yet, here BMW saw a real opportunity. They allowed Rover to finish the development of this car and even allowed Rover engineers to use several major components to speed development (Z axle rear end, aircon and electrics systems etc)
But it was a con. Whilst Rover engineers twittered excitedly about being allowed finally to have two mouldings for the handbrake surround/centre console for LHD and RHD markets, BMW now had their exit strategy in place. The R75 would be launched to massive public and press praise - “ looks like a baby Bentley, class leading ride and refinement, better than the S type Jaguar (launched at the similar time) a real small limo experience” were some of the comments …… yet at the launch Bernd Pisch effectively warned that Rovers days were nearly over. The result was that the leasing companies wouldn’t touch the 75 at competitive rates.
This severely restricted sales….
The red ink on the Rover balance sheet grew worse.. and of course, all the while BMW claimed in the media that it was doing its best with its English patient.
It pocketed a nice Government subsidy to develop the Hams Hall site for engines. The NG range of engines was supposed to power both future BMW and Rover ranges. Odd then that the NG is not designed for transverse fitment, witness the use of Peugeot engines in later MINIs…….
BMWs “good work” on the K series was also bearing fruit with warranty claims for HGF rising and the little engines reputation sinking like a stone.
Rover paid for Cowley works to be completely refettled. (it cost tens of millions) but never saw the benefit of its investment… This is the current MINI factory owned by BMW…..
When the end came, BMW looked like heros for having tried so hard with their English Patient. “So much money lost” was the cry, but a quick perusal of the actual balance sheet of the deal shows that BMW lost almost nothing, once IP, dev costs of new models (which Rover paid for but BMW retained), land sales and the sale of Land Rover to Ford are taken into account. What they gained though was a couple of effectively brand new factories. A new range of cars in an iconic sub brand ( MINI) , a new engine range paid for by Rover and HMG (the British taxpayer) and all the IP they needed for the 4wd and Fwd technologies they might need in the future.
The much ballyhooed “dowry” of thousands of Rover cars on airfields (and cited on many a previous MGR bashing thread on PH) was another con. Rover had begged BMW to slow production lines to prevent a build up of unsold stock. Such stock undermines used car values, undermines the brand and also costs money to build. Rover had to build these cars, lose money on them. Instead of keeping quiet about the stock pile, BMW circulated a list of sites where these cars could be photographed….
Now, there’s lots more I could go into, and for everything I’ve written here there are another 5 points that should be made. But there is no point.
Most of you have swallowed the story that BMW put out hook line and sinker.
MGR deserved all it got in the eyes on most haters. Goebbels would be proud.
It’s easy to blame the Phoenix 4. After all they were in charge when it all finally collapsed. But that’s another story that is far from being as simple as the media have portrayed it. And the end, when it came, was bizarre, with Patricia Hewitt waiting till John Towers had boarded his plane in China before marching into Longbridge at nine o’clock in the evening to close what was at that time a PRIVATE limited company…
By the time Towers landed at Heathrow, his company was no more…
For the record, it cost the British Government more in terms support for MGR workers made redundant than it would have done for them to underwrite the MGR pension fund deficit (the only outstanding point of negotiation between SAIC and MGR) SAIC had asked the government to underwrite the deficit because they (SAIC) felt (not unreasonably) that Gordon Browns “windfall tax” on private pension funds had largely created the problem in the first place.
Now you might want to ask why BMW was making urgent calls to Whitehall at this time, but hey, whats the point, you haters know best. HGF every five minutes wasn’t it?
I Must Add that this statement isn't my work
credit must go to Andymadmak from another "let's knock MGR PH thread"
I love my Beemers, but after 2 e34s that fell apart, I bought an old 75CDTi and after a couple of little niggles, proved totally reliable, i've done over 40k in nearly 3 years and it hasn't missed a beat, it has no rust anywere.
NB and I know that it has a BMW diesel lump under the bonnet.
blueg33 said:
iSore said:
Steffan said:
Like the identity names
My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Most cars are. But VAG stuff is nothing special - there are now quite a few Mark 5 Golfs with rotten front arches, ditto Passats. VAG bodies are alright but no better than they need to be. Vauxhalls are rather better tbh.My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Rovers? The 800 was crap, a horrible thing with a Montego quality interior and as a car it was far adrift of the 5 Series and Merc E Class it was laughable. The 75 was a good car and the 600 was better still - probably the best thing they made. The Metro was s
te, the R8 200 and 400 pretty good and the replacements rather less so. The blame lies with BMW who failed to grasp that Rovers were not prestige but cheap trams with some fake wood. Priced right they would have sold well enough and the 75 was definitely on the right track in terms of quality. Not perfect but getting there. But BMW overpriced the 200 and 400, sales bombed and that was that, not helped by the pound/euro exchange rate that slaughtered export sales - Rovers' biggest asset.
But, it died a natural death. The end of the 75 was a pity but the rest of it was crap. The good bits (Range Rover and Mini) live on and does well enough.
tdm34 said:
As usual a Rover thread decends into the usual, head gasket failure, or BMW nearly saved them, have a read of this bit of info that "AndyMadMack" came up with, it gives you an insight into just how much BMW took the piss.....
The Great Rock and Rover Swindle
In the mid 1990s, the BMW board was looking hard at its product range.
There were concerns that the company was over reliant on sales of the 3 series.
The 7 was not a big seller (relatively speaking) and barely covered the cost of its development. The 5 was profitable, but under increasing attack from the E class Mercedes and whilst it enjoyed top dog status technically, even the 5 could not support BMW alone.
No, the real bread and butter was the 3 series, and concern was being expressed that BMW had already rung as many changes on this theme as was available to them - compact, saloon, coupe, cabrio and touring. The M3 halo model worked well too.
It was noted that to compete in the increasingly popular smaller car segment a better solution was going to be required. The 3 Compact was really not very good and was too expensive to make, despite using earlier generation mechanicals. Buyers in this segment were more conscious of space and practicality and the compact simply lost out to rivals from companies such as VW (and yes even Rover) in this regard.
It was felt that BMW needed to expand its ranges and add vehicles in sectors both upwards and downwards. But herein lay the problem. Just how far and wide could the BMW brand be stretched before BMW customers were offered a product that they would not buy because they could not relate it to the brand, or worse, before the core values of the brand were undermined?
The 7 series upper limit had established the ceiling to the BMW brand. The ultra expensive versions simply did not sell in the sorts of numbers necessary to justify their development and the % resale value of these cars was awful, hence BMWs interest in Rolls Royce to provide the ultimate rung on the BMW product ladder.
The lower limit was the 3 compact, but this was not competitive and really only sold because of its badge. Going smaller than this would be tough if BMW was to retain its trademark RWD package.
Clearly, BMW needed FWD for this smaller sector, but this was the antitheses of BMW brand philosophy.
BMW also wanted to broaden the 5 series range with an SUV type vehicle for the lucrative North American Market, but following some work with customer focus groups it was uncertain whether customers would see the BMW brand stretch towards the SUV sector.
The upshot of all this was that in the early 90s, some beancounters in Munich were really concerned that BMWs routes for growth were somewhat restricted, constrained it would seem by the very brand image and core values that had secured the company’s success in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.
BMW, they said, was vulnerable to a concerted attack by a major manufacturer with deeper pockets and greater economies of scale, eager to gain access to BMWs pricing and margins. The Lexus and Infiniti programmes by Toyota and Nissan in the USA caused many a sleepless night in Bavaria.
Expansion was the answer, but expansion through the creation or adoption of new brands that would allow BMW to market products that did not have to adhere to BMW brand values, but which nevertheless could offer BMW the sorts of economies of scale in terms of core components (engines, transmissions, electronics, climate and sub systems) that would ensure it could protect its margins going forward in the event of a successful attack on their tradition sectors by Toyota, Nissan et al.
BMW began to cast around to look for an acquisition target. Through their (excellent) working relationship with BAe (through the BMW aero engine division) Rover Group became the focus of their attentions. The marriage looked perfect. Rover had an iconic small car brand – Mini, that could easily sit below the BMW brand without detracting from the latters brand message. Rover also had one of the two global Iconic SUV brands – Land Rover/Range Rover (the other being Jeep) and this potentially could allow BMW to grow their US market share via SUV sales in the event that the then mooted X5 failed to find favour with buyers.
BAe was happy to sell Rover. It had looked at the costs of redeveloping Longbridge and the fact that several cars in the range were in need of replacement. Fling in the fact that BAe had been largely forced to take Rover off the Govts hands and was in an industry with very little synergy or opportunities for savings from joint engineering and BMW represented to best deal in town. So the company was sold with much fanfare.
At this point the BMW strategy was simple. “Keep what we need, get as much money as we can whilst we have the assets (Govt loans and subsidies, sales of land etc) spend as little as possible on product development, without being seen to do so, (hence lots of press announcements about design projects that mostly never took place) and bail out with as big a damaging (to Rover) fanfare as possible thereby ensuring the likely death of a (albeit minor) competitor.
Remember too that at the time of the acquisition BMW and Rover built about the same number of vehicles..
This was plan was enacted very quickly.
1, The 800 replacement that Rover had almost ready to go (based on a revised, widened 800 platform) was canned
2, Changes were made to the K series spec - the selection of plastic dowels for the head location, etc – thereby leading to greatly exacerbated problems with the HGF issue – in other words a minor problem was made much worse and the legend of K series HGF began to gather momentum
3, The R100 production line was closed with no replacement. Now, the 100 sold more than 100,000 cars annually, (it was in effect Rovers 3 series in terms of cash generation) and the effect on Rover cash flow was huge.
The official reason given was the “horrendous” Euro NCAP crash test results of 97, which ranked to R100 as only 1 star. In fact the report, which is still available on line makes it clear that with only a little work the R100 could easily have got more stars..
Yet, BMW felt that such a low score merited the immediate cessation of production.
Go have a look at the 3 series NCAP test for the same year – it scored 1.5 stars……
No replacement for the R100 was ever started.
4, The new Mini project was started. Rover paid for the entire engineering on this from its own cash flow. Bizarrely, the K series (at the time, still the lightest and most compact engine in its class) was dropped from the line up in favour of a Chrysler engine, built at a plant in Brazil… This only makes sense if you consider that the plan to sell off the dregs of Rover once it had been asset stripped could only work if Rover retained its own engine building capability. The K was Rovers mainstream and thus had to stay with Rover. Also, since BMW had deliberately sabotaged the K reputation through the use of the plastic dowels and the refusal to update tooling which was worn out, it was not going to be possible to use the K in the Mini
5, A new mid range Rover was started.. to replace the 400/45. Rover paid for all of this. This was vital, given the significant license costs that Rover had to pay to Honda each year on the older chassis. Drawings and CAD renderings of this vehicle were published by several major UK car magazines, BMW was absolutely furious at the leak – with good reason as it turns out since it very nearly exposed their scam.
This new car, paid for by Rover in large measure would eventually see the light of day as the BMW 1 series…..
6, The new Range Rover was started, and BMW charged this to Rovers accounts also. (by now the Rover books, which had been profitable under BAe looked horrendous with the company spending on R+D for BMW at an unprecedented rate, but with sales chopped by a third or more following the closure of the R100 line)
BMW also managed to get all the 4wd expertise it needed for the X5 and X3, and as these vehicles were launched, it became clear that the BMW brand could be stretched and so the Land Rover brand would not be required. BMW dressed this up for sale to Ford (but made sure in the process that for the time being at least, Ford would have to pay BMW for the completion of the dev work and the subsequent supply of key components (engines etc)
7, The anticipated launch of the MGF in the USA was cancelled. The MG brand still had massive following in the USA and had once been valued as one of the 3 most valuable brands in the USA. The MGF was a thorn in BMWs side. Dynamically superior to the Z3 and arguably much better looking, the little F consistently trounced the Z3 in road tests by motor magazines and TV shows. The engineering work to take the F to the USA was never signed off and the F was allowed to sit undeveloped.
8, The Rover engineers were not entirely helpless though. Their 800 replacement had been merely a stopgap for what was to become the R75
This car, with its Rover designed floorpan had a better torsional rigidity than the 5 series BMW and potentially offered a real threat.
Yet, here BMW saw a real opportunity. They allowed Rover to finish the development of this car and even allowed Rover engineers to use several major components to speed development (Z axle rear end, aircon and electrics systems etc)
But it was a con. Whilst Rover engineers twittered excitedly about being allowed finally to have two mouldings for the handbrake surround/centre console for LHD and RHD markets, BMW now had their exit strategy in place. The R75 would be launched to massive public and press praise - “ looks like a baby Bentley, class leading ride and refinement, better than the S type Jaguar (launched at the similar time) a real small limo experience” were some of the comments …… yet at the launch Bernd Pisch effectively warned that Rovers days were nearly over. The result was that the leasing companies wouldn’t touch the 75 at competitive rates.
This severely restricted sales….
The red ink on the Rover balance sheet grew worse.. and of course, all the while BMW claimed in the media that it was doing its best with its English patient.
It pocketed a nice Government subsidy to develop the Hams Hall site for engines. The NG range of engines was supposed to power both future BMW and Rover ranges. Odd then that the NG is not designed for transverse fitment, witness the use of Peugeot engines in later MINIs…….
BMWs “good work” on the K series was also bearing fruit with warranty claims for HGF rising and the little engines reputation sinking like a stone.
Rover paid for Cowley works to be completely refettled. (it cost tens of millions) but never saw the benefit of its investment… This is the current MINI factory owned by BMW…..
When the end came, BMW looked like heros for having tried so hard with their English Patient. “So much money lost” was the cry, but a quick perusal of the actual balance sheet of the deal shows that BMW lost almost nothing, once IP, dev costs of new models (which Rover paid for but BMW retained), land sales and the sale of Land Rover to Ford are taken into account. What they gained though was a couple of effectively brand new factories. A new range of cars in an iconic sub brand ( MINI) , a new engine range paid for by Rover and HMG (the British taxpayer) and all the IP they needed for the 4wd and Fwd technologies they might need in the future.
The much ballyhooed “dowry” of thousands of Rover cars on airfields (and cited on many a previous MGR bashing thread on PH) was another con. Rover had begged BMW to slow production lines to prevent a build up of unsold stock. Such stock undermines used car values, undermines the brand and also costs money to build. Rover had to build these cars, lose money on them. Instead of keeping quiet about the stock pile, BMW circulated a list of sites where these cars could be photographed….
Now, there’s lots more I could go into, and for everything I’ve written here there are another 5 points that should be made. But there is no point.
Most of you have swallowed the story that BMW put out hook line and sinker.
MGR deserved all it got in the eyes on most haters. Goebbels would be proud.
It’s easy to blame the Phoenix 4. After all they were in charge when it all finally collapsed. But that’s another story that is far from being as simple as the media have portrayed it. And the end, when it came, was bizarre, with Patricia Hewitt waiting till John Towers had boarded his plane in China before marching into Longbridge at nine o’clock in the evening to close what was at that time a PRIVATE limited company…
By the time Towers landed at Heathrow, his company was no more…
For the record, it cost the British Government more in terms support for MGR workers made redundant than it would have done for them to underwrite the MGR pension fund deficit (the only outstanding point of negotiation between SAIC and MGR) SAIC had asked the government to underwrite the deficit because they (SAIC) felt (not unreasonably) that Gordon Browns “windfall tax” on private pension funds had largely created the problem in the first place.
Now you might want to ask why BMW was making urgent calls to Whitehall at this time, but hey, whats the point, you haters know best. HGF every five minutes wasn’t it?
I Must Add that this statement isn't my work
credit must go to Andymadmak from another "let's knock MGR PH thread"
I love my Beemers, but after 2 e34s that fell apart, I bought an old 75CDTi and after a couple of little niggles, proved totally reliable, i've done over 40k in nearly 3 years and it hasn't missed a beat, it has no rust anywere.
NB and I know that it has a BMW diesel lump under the bonnet.
Interesting and certainly challenging. I have always thought BMW got what they wanted out of Rover. The Mini and several factories for not a great deal on money. I understand that the final debacle of Rover was not the fault of the Directors alone, which is why the DTI investigation gave up I suspect. Interesting perspective. I still believe that no company manufacturing cars with the fauts that the Stag had (under BL) and the Marina demonstrated (under BL) and the Allegro offered in profusion under (BL) could reasonably expect to survive.The Great Rock and Rover Swindle
In the mid 1990s, the BMW board was looking hard at its product range.
There were concerns that the company was over reliant on sales of the 3 series.
The 7 was not a big seller (relatively speaking) and barely covered the cost of its development. The 5 was profitable, but under increasing attack from the E class Mercedes and whilst it enjoyed top dog status technically, even the 5 could not support BMW alone.
No, the real bread and butter was the 3 series, and concern was being expressed that BMW had already rung as many changes on this theme as was available to them - compact, saloon, coupe, cabrio and touring. The M3 halo model worked well too.
It was noted that to compete in the increasingly popular smaller car segment a better solution was going to be required. The 3 Compact was really not very good and was too expensive to make, despite using earlier generation mechanicals. Buyers in this segment were more conscious of space and practicality and the compact simply lost out to rivals from companies such as VW (and yes even Rover) in this regard.
It was felt that BMW needed to expand its ranges and add vehicles in sectors both upwards and downwards. But herein lay the problem. Just how far and wide could the BMW brand be stretched before BMW customers were offered a product that they would not buy because they could not relate it to the brand, or worse, before the core values of the brand were undermined?
The 7 series upper limit had established the ceiling to the BMW brand. The ultra expensive versions simply did not sell in the sorts of numbers necessary to justify their development and the % resale value of these cars was awful, hence BMWs interest in Rolls Royce to provide the ultimate rung on the BMW product ladder.
The lower limit was the 3 compact, but this was not competitive and really only sold because of its badge. Going smaller than this would be tough if BMW was to retain its trademark RWD package.
Clearly, BMW needed FWD for this smaller sector, but this was the antitheses of BMW brand philosophy.
BMW also wanted to broaden the 5 series range with an SUV type vehicle for the lucrative North American Market, but following some work with customer focus groups it was uncertain whether customers would see the BMW brand stretch towards the SUV sector.
The upshot of all this was that in the early 90s, some beancounters in Munich were really concerned that BMWs routes for growth were somewhat restricted, constrained it would seem by the very brand image and core values that had secured the company’s success in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.
BMW, they said, was vulnerable to a concerted attack by a major manufacturer with deeper pockets and greater economies of scale, eager to gain access to BMWs pricing and margins. The Lexus and Infiniti programmes by Toyota and Nissan in the USA caused many a sleepless night in Bavaria.
Expansion was the answer, but expansion through the creation or adoption of new brands that would allow BMW to market products that did not have to adhere to BMW brand values, but which nevertheless could offer BMW the sorts of economies of scale in terms of core components (engines, transmissions, electronics, climate and sub systems) that would ensure it could protect its margins going forward in the event of a successful attack on their tradition sectors by Toyota, Nissan et al.
BMW began to cast around to look for an acquisition target. Through their (excellent) working relationship with BAe (through the BMW aero engine division) Rover Group became the focus of their attentions. The marriage looked perfect. Rover had an iconic small car brand – Mini, that could easily sit below the BMW brand without detracting from the latters brand message. Rover also had one of the two global Iconic SUV brands – Land Rover/Range Rover (the other being Jeep) and this potentially could allow BMW to grow their US market share via SUV sales in the event that the then mooted X5 failed to find favour with buyers.
BAe was happy to sell Rover. It had looked at the costs of redeveloping Longbridge and the fact that several cars in the range were in need of replacement. Fling in the fact that BAe had been largely forced to take Rover off the Govts hands and was in an industry with very little synergy or opportunities for savings from joint engineering and BMW represented to best deal in town. So the company was sold with much fanfare.
At this point the BMW strategy was simple. “Keep what we need, get as much money as we can whilst we have the assets (Govt loans and subsidies, sales of land etc) spend as little as possible on product development, without being seen to do so, (hence lots of press announcements about design projects that mostly never took place) and bail out with as big a damaging (to Rover) fanfare as possible thereby ensuring the likely death of a (albeit minor) competitor.
Remember too that at the time of the acquisition BMW and Rover built about the same number of vehicles..
This was plan was enacted very quickly.
1, The 800 replacement that Rover had almost ready to go (based on a revised, widened 800 platform) was canned
2, Changes were made to the K series spec - the selection of plastic dowels for the head location, etc – thereby leading to greatly exacerbated problems with the HGF issue – in other words a minor problem was made much worse and the legend of K series HGF began to gather momentum
3, The R100 production line was closed with no replacement. Now, the 100 sold more than 100,000 cars annually, (it was in effect Rovers 3 series in terms of cash generation) and the effect on Rover cash flow was huge.
The official reason given was the “horrendous” Euro NCAP crash test results of 97, which ranked to R100 as only 1 star. In fact the report, which is still available on line makes it clear that with only a little work the R100 could easily have got more stars..
Yet, BMW felt that such a low score merited the immediate cessation of production.
Go have a look at the 3 series NCAP test for the same year – it scored 1.5 stars……
No replacement for the R100 was ever started.
4, The new Mini project was started. Rover paid for the entire engineering on this from its own cash flow. Bizarrely, the K series (at the time, still the lightest and most compact engine in its class) was dropped from the line up in favour of a Chrysler engine, built at a plant in Brazil… This only makes sense if you consider that the plan to sell off the dregs of Rover once it had been asset stripped could only work if Rover retained its own engine building capability. The K was Rovers mainstream and thus had to stay with Rover. Also, since BMW had deliberately sabotaged the K reputation through the use of the plastic dowels and the refusal to update tooling which was worn out, it was not going to be possible to use the K in the Mini
5, A new mid range Rover was started.. to replace the 400/45. Rover paid for all of this. This was vital, given the significant license costs that Rover had to pay to Honda each year on the older chassis. Drawings and CAD renderings of this vehicle were published by several major UK car magazines, BMW was absolutely furious at the leak – with good reason as it turns out since it very nearly exposed their scam.
This new car, paid for by Rover in large measure would eventually see the light of day as the BMW 1 series…..
6, The new Range Rover was started, and BMW charged this to Rovers accounts also. (by now the Rover books, which had been profitable under BAe looked horrendous with the company spending on R+D for BMW at an unprecedented rate, but with sales chopped by a third or more following the closure of the R100 line)
BMW also managed to get all the 4wd expertise it needed for the X5 and X3, and as these vehicles were launched, it became clear that the BMW brand could be stretched and so the Land Rover brand would not be required. BMW dressed this up for sale to Ford (but made sure in the process that for the time being at least, Ford would have to pay BMW for the completion of the dev work and the subsequent supply of key components (engines etc)
7, The anticipated launch of the MGF in the USA was cancelled. The MG brand still had massive following in the USA and had once been valued as one of the 3 most valuable brands in the USA. The MGF was a thorn in BMWs side. Dynamically superior to the Z3 and arguably much better looking, the little F consistently trounced the Z3 in road tests by motor magazines and TV shows. The engineering work to take the F to the USA was never signed off and the F was allowed to sit undeveloped.
8, The Rover engineers were not entirely helpless though. Their 800 replacement had been merely a stopgap for what was to become the R75
This car, with its Rover designed floorpan had a better torsional rigidity than the 5 series BMW and potentially offered a real threat.
Yet, here BMW saw a real opportunity. They allowed Rover to finish the development of this car and even allowed Rover engineers to use several major components to speed development (Z axle rear end, aircon and electrics systems etc)
But it was a con. Whilst Rover engineers twittered excitedly about being allowed finally to have two mouldings for the handbrake surround/centre console for LHD and RHD markets, BMW now had their exit strategy in place. The R75 would be launched to massive public and press praise - “ looks like a baby Bentley, class leading ride and refinement, better than the S type Jaguar (launched at the similar time) a real small limo experience” were some of the comments …… yet at the launch Bernd Pisch effectively warned that Rovers days were nearly over. The result was that the leasing companies wouldn’t touch the 75 at competitive rates.
This severely restricted sales….
The red ink on the Rover balance sheet grew worse.. and of course, all the while BMW claimed in the media that it was doing its best with its English patient.
It pocketed a nice Government subsidy to develop the Hams Hall site for engines. The NG range of engines was supposed to power both future BMW and Rover ranges. Odd then that the NG is not designed for transverse fitment, witness the use of Peugeot engines in later MINIs…….
BMWs “good work” on the K series was also bearing fruit with warranty claims for HGF rising and the little engines reputation sinking like a stone.
Rover paid for Cowley works to be completely refettled. (it cost tens of millions) but never saw the benefit of its investment… This is the current MINI factory owned by BMW…..
When the end came, BMW looked like heros for having tried so hard with their English Patient. “So much money lost” was the cry, but a quick perusal of the actual balance sheet of the deal shows that BMW lost almost nothing, once IP, dev costs of new models (which Rover paid for but BMW retained), land sales and the sale of Land Rover to Ford are taken into account. What they gained though was a couple of effectively brand new factories. A new range of cars in an iconic sub brand ( MINI) , a new engine range paid for by Rover and HMG (the British taxpayer) and all the IP they needed for the 4wd and Fwd technologies they might need in the future.
The much ballyhooed “dowry” of thousands of Rover cars on airfields (and cited on many a previous MGR bashing thread on PH) was another con. Rover had begged BMW to slow production lines to prevent a build up of unsold stock. Such stock undermines used car values, undermines the brand and also costs money to build. Rover had to build these cars, lose money on them. Instead of keeping quiet about the stock pile, BMW circulated a list of sites where these cars could be photographed….
Now, there’s lots more I could go into, and for everything I’ve written here there are another 5 points that should be made. But there is no point.
Most of you have swallowed the story that BMW put out hook line and sinker.
MGR deserved all it got in the eyes on most haters. Goebbels would be proud.
It’s easy to blame the Phoenix 4. After all they were in charge when it all finally collapsed. But that’s another story that is far from being as simple as the media have portrayed it. And the end, when it came, was bizarre, with Patricia Hewitt waiting till John Towers had boarded his plane in China before marching into Longbridge at nine o’clock in the evening to close what was at that time a PRIVATE limited company…
By the time Towers landed at Heathrow, his company was no more…
For the record, it cost the British Government more in terms support for MGR workers made redundant than it would have done for them to underwrite the MGR pension fund deficit (the only outstanding point of negotiation between SAIC and MGR) SAIC had asked the government to underwrite the deficit because they (SAIC) felt (not unreasonably) that Gordon Browns “windfall tax” on private pension funds had largely created the problem in the first place.
Now you might want to ask why BMW was making urgent calls to Whitehall at this time, but hey, whats the point, you haters know best. HGF every five minutes wasn’t it?
I Must Add that this statement isn't my work
credit must go to Andymadmak from another "let's knock MGR PH thread"
I love my Beemers, but after 2 e34s that fell apart, I bought an old 75CDTi and after a couple of little niggles, proved totally reliable, i've done over 40k in nearly 3 years and it hasn't missed a beat, it has no rust anywere.
NB and I know that it has a BMW diesel lump under the bonnet.
I was on the audit of BMC when Coopers and Lybrand qualified the audit report on a going concern basis, many years ago, because of the huge unsold stock held, which rightly caused most serious concern as to whether the company could actually afford to continue trading. That was absolutely right but the result was the gradual fall into self serving management and dark allley projects that eventually came to nothing.
The group simply never really recovered from that point but being a huge employer was subsidised for decades in an effort to save the jobs. Understandable but never going to happen in real world business. Successful products made without excessive costs and delivered on time with long term reliability is the way to make businesses profitable.
Sadly Rover in the later guises simply never achieved that aim. The K series being a textbook example. The daft idea of putting a K series engine into a rear engined car?? Of all the daft ideas, using an engine in such a vulnerable postion, that was already known to be a very fragile engine and known to be liable to overheat? Suicidal madness. Which is why those cars are so unpopular out of warranty. Shunned by the trade.
It is not possible to make reliable products with that sort of thinking. Suicidal madness is not generally profitable in business. Reliability is essential to successful products. I personally deeply regret the massive loss of jobs to South Birmingham and the dreadful waste that was made of a number of fine old companies. I personally thought a number of the Rover products were very good cars. But the number of disasters were just too great. Much too great.
That is the reality of the failure of Rover. I would accept that BMW and others did very well out of this. I would accept that there was a great deal of self service not for the benefit of the company. But no business can survive that many fundamental errors.
MarshPhantom said:
blueg33 said:
iSore said:
Steffan said:
Like the identity names
My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Most cars are. But VAG stuff is nothing special - there are now quite a few Mark 5 Golfs with rotten front arches, ditto Passats. VAG bodies are alright but no better than they need to be. Vauxhalls are rather better tbh.My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Rovers? The 800 was crap, a horrible thing with a Montego quality interior and as a car it was far adrift of the 5 Series and Merc E Class it was laughable. The 75 was a good car and the 600 was better still - probably the best thing they made. The Metro was s
te, the R8 200 and 400 pretty good and the replacements rather less so. The blame lies with BMW who failed to grasp that Rovers were not prestige but cheap trams with some fake wood. Priced right they would have sold well enough and the 75 was definitely on the right track in terms of quality. Not perfect but getting there. But BMW overpriced the 200 and 400, sales bombed and that was that, not helped by the pound/euro exchange rate that slaughtered export sales - Rovers' biggest asset.
But, it died a natural death. The end of the 75 was a pity but the rest of it was crap. The good bits (Range Rover and Mini) live on and does well enough.
blueg33 said:
MarshPhantom said:
blueg33 said:
iSore said:
Steffan said:
Like the identity names
My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Most cars are. But VAG stuff is nothing special - there are now quite a few Mark 5 Golfs with rotten front arches, ditto Passats. VAG bodies are alright but no better than they need to be. Vauxhalls are rather better tbh.My comments are a reflection of the fact that modern VW group cars seem to be very resistant to serious body rot.
Rovers? The 800 was crap, a horrible thing with a Montego quality interior and as a car it was far adrift of the 5 Series and Merc E Class it was laughable. The 75 was a good car and the 600 was better still - probably the best thing they made. The Metro was s
te, the R8 200 and 400 pretty good and the replacements rather less so. The blame lies with BMW who failed to grasp that Rovers were not prestige but cheap trams with some fake wood. Priced right they would have sold well enough and the 75 was definitely on the right track in terms of quality. Not perfect but getting there. But BMW overpriced the 200 and 400, sales bombed and that was that, not helped by the pound/euro exchange rate that slaughtered export sales - Rovers' biggest asset.
But, it died a natural death. The end of the 75 was a pity but the rest of it was crap. The good bits (Range Rover and Mini) live on and does well enough.
An entertaining conspiracy theory, but not much more. Buying Rover, asset stripping and selling the bits they didn't want would have been rather quicker and more profitable.
Rover as a fully functioning company turning out a million cars a year would have made BMW a great deal of money and a serious player. But they made a balls of it, not helped by the likes of Stephen Byers. What they ended up with - after selling everything to recoup the huge losses - was the Cowley factory and an engine factory near Birmingham that is a thousand miles from the main assembly plants. That was well worth the aggro.
Rover as a fully functioning company turning out a million cars a year would have made BMW a great deal of money and a serious player. But they made a balls of it, not helped by the likes of Stephen Byers. What they ended up with - after selling everything to recoup the huge losses - was the Cowley factory and an engine factory near Birmingham that is a thousand miles from the main assembly plants. That was well worth the aggro.
tdm34 said:
As usual a Rover thread decends into the usual, head gasket failure, or BMW nearly saved them, have a read of this bit of info that "AndyMadMack" came up with, it gives you an insight into just how much BMW took the piss.....
Most of that is complete rubbish. The X5 is an E39 four wheel drive (BMW have been making 4wd 5-Series for ages - just not selling them in UK) on stilts and was developed in the early 90's and contains no Land Rover technology. The 1-Series seems to share some odd styling cues with the "leaked" photos but is a rear wheel drive car based on a slightly altered 3-Series platform not a front wheel drive platform Rover were developing.
BMW messed up all sorts of things with Rover but you don't need to make things up to demonstrate it.
blueg33 said:
The 827 was quicker and more spacious than the equivalent 5 series. The interior was good too, luxurious and reasonably well put together. Every thing in an 827 bites se was an extra on the 5 series.
We had an ancient 827 in SLI spec years ago. It was actually fairly ok - a bit flaky around the edges but decent. Comfortable in a early 90's Rover sort of way and although the Honda engine had a bag of miles, it went far better than the figures suggested. Pretty much zero steering feedback though.It was kept as a daily smoker for a couple of years and about 40K, aside from slightly grotty rear arches and needing 2 rear dampers and a back box it really did provide sterling service, pun probably intended, until the big end bearings went on the engine. I think it expired at around 170K. I always thought the switchable sport mode was a bit silly, 3 speed back on the lever and 4 speed via a button.
My brother in law had the last 'Rover' in the family, a MG ZR 1.4. Peppy little thing but really atrociously put together and although the engine surprisingly held together he sold it for buttons.
Considering the dominance of the main German brands on the market now, I hardly think Rover will ever make a comeback and its previous reputation means that few will mourn it.
Fattyfat said:
blueg33 said:
The 827 was quicker and more spacious than the equivalent 5 series. The interior was good too, luxurious and reasonably well put together. Every thing in an 827 bites se was an extra on the 5 series.
We had an ancient 827 in SLI spec years ago. It was actually fairly ok - a bit flaky around the edges but decent. Comfortable in a early 90's Rover sort of way and although the Honda engine had a bag of miles, it went far better than the figures suggested. Pretty much zero steering feedback though.It was kept as a daily smoker for a couple of years and about 40K, aside from slightly grotty rear arches and needing 2 rear dampers and a back box it really did provide sterling service, pun probably intended, until the big end bearings went on the engine. I think it expired at around 170K. I always thought the switchable sport mode was a bit silly, 3 speed back on the lever and 4 speed via a button.
My brother in law had the last 'Rover' in the family, a MG ZR 1.4. Peppy little thing but really atrociously put together and although the engine surprisingly held together he sold it for buttons.
Considering the dominance of the main German brands on the market now, I hardly think Rover will ever make a comeback and its previous reputation means that few will mourn it.
Nor were the cars ever properly developed by the shower supposedly running the show for the benefit of the taxpayers but actually feathering their own nests very nicely. I have seen many business failures when working in insolvency over the years. The saddest have been companies folding because the markets have disappeared and diversification was addressed too late. Often good businesses but not quick enough to see the changing demand.
The appalling mess that became the Rover group via the BL nonsense and all the other transmogrifications that arrived in due course made gross errors of judgement which no business can hope to survive. The Marina was totally unsafe when first launched on the unsuspecting motoring journalists. But for their concern and intervention, these cars would have killed a number of the customers through utterly incompetent suspension design, there is simply no excuse in business for that kind of deadly error producing a fundamentally unsafe vehicle OTR.
Equally the Allegro was an absolute disaster of a car, launched with a square, yes SQUARE steering wheel. Absolute madness and unsurpriingly the car never achieved the popularity of the modlel it was supposed to replace. Absolutely ridiculous way to run a car business.
Then there was the Stag which should have had the good old reliable Ex Buick lightweight alloy engine in it which the group already owned. Instead ego trips by the idiots in charge designed a new v8 with all the development sits involved. Which proved to be totally unreliable OTR. Inadequte drvelopment once agin prducing a product hat t totally destryed all confidence in the car from the start. Absolutely finished all hope of that car ever being a financial success.
Dreadful business decisions and self serving money grabbing is what ruined this business. Which I personally regret but if you read the reality of the absolutely hopeless product development that did not go on effectively hardly suprising. Thow it to the customer and see what he can do became the approach of this crowd. Quite unequalled by any other car manufacturer thankfully. Although some have come close!
That is why Rover failed. Businesses cannt be run like this and survive. Reality of business.
My FIL had an 827 Sterling new back in 1987 (ish).
I seem to remember he did many trouble free miles in that, and I particularly liked the electric rear seats - a novelty back in those days (don't think many cars have them even now?)
Looked superb in BRG.
I had a year old 214SLi in 1994, kept for 2 years and didn't let me down.
MIL had a 416Si which was also faultless.
I seem to remember he did many trouble free miles in that, and I particularly liked the electric rear seats - a novelty back in those days (don't think many cars have them even now?)
Looked superb in BRG.
I had a year old 214SLi in 1994, kept for 2 years and didn't let me down.
MIL had a 416Si which was also faultless.
I bought a Rover from my brother to leave in the UK as my car when I came back home (was living in the US) for about 6 weeks a year.
He'd had it from about 12 months old and had been fine.
My Mum used it occasionally and it was fine.
Known as Buzzy (416 SLi with the higher revving Honda engine) I liked it. Eventually I moved home, drove for a few more months by which point to the paint on the roof had started to go, but PX'd at a garage who couldn't believe it came with every piece of paperwork and was bought by one of their mechanics.......completely reliable the whole time in the family ownership.
On the other hand my Dad bought a 45 Auto and the CVT gearbox was replaced 3 times under warranty and was sold as soon as it was outof warranty........
So I guess you get good and bad....................
He'd had it from about 12 months old and had been fine.
My Mum used it occasionally and it was fine.
Known as Buzzy (416 SLi with the higher revving Honda engine) I liked it. Eventually I moved home, drove for a few more months by which point to the paint on the roof had started to go, but PX'd at a garage who couldn't believe it came with every piece of paperwork and was bought by one of their mechanics.......completely reliable the whole time in the family ownership.
On the other hand my Dad bought a 45 Auto and the CVT gearbox was replaced 3 times under warranty and was sold as soon as it was outof warranty........
So I guess you get good and bad....................
![](http://thumbsnap.com/sc/pXOBwPyk.jpg[/img]</a> <a href="http://thumbsnap.com/OFEfi76q" Target="_blank">[img]http://thumbsnap.com/sc/OFEfi76q.jpg)
When Rovers were Rovers,they were in the top bracket,as were MG's,Austins and Morris's.
When they amalgamated and became BMC,they still held their standards.
As soon as they amalgamated with Leyland and became BLMC,they were on the road to ruin.
No investment in "Jigging up" No modernisation,they were no longer reliable,and were cheapened for profit.
If we take the massive step forward the transverse engine Mini brought to motoring,then note the way the advantage was let slip away,it broke my heart.
The British motoring industry was sold down the river,and along with it many brilliant engineers.
If we take the Range Rover as an example,until recently it was a rattling box on spongy suspension..The years of it's potential were wasted. If we look at the present 4X4 market and it's popularity,how many years of top sales have been wasted?
Then British car industry was sold down the river by bad management and greed.
When they amalgamated and became BMC,they still held their standards.
As soon as they amalgamated with Leyland and became BLMC,they were on the road to ruin.
No investment in "Jigging up" No modernisation,they were no longer reliable,and were cheapened for profit.
If we take the massive step forward the transverse engine Mini brought to motoring,then note the way the advantage was let slip away,it broke my heart.
The British motoring industry was sold down the river,and along with it many brilliant engineers.
If we take the Range Rover as an example,until recently it was a rattling box on spongy suspension..The years of it's potential were wasted. If we look at the present 4X4 market and it's popularity,how many years of top sales have been wasted?
Then British car industry was sold down the river by bad management and greed.
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