War with Russia

Author
Discussion

skyrover

12,668 posts

203 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
A gentleman on AARSE posted this today... makes for good reading.

emsav said:
Apologises in advance for a very long, hopefully informative postings, like me I sincerely hope it gives you a very insight into the Chinese way of thinking. Unfortunately it has to be in multiple parts because of system restrictions.

Two of my people have just returned from three months in Nanjing, overseeing the development of the new tramway system on behalf of the city and Jiangsu Regional Government. Much of their time was spent talking with high-ranking Chinese government officials and bureaucrats and it is from my conversations with them that I have been able to produce what follows – the Chinese perspective;

They tell me that Vladimir Putin, in the eyes of the Chinese, has committed a cardinal sin by tearing up the international rule book without a green light from Beijing. Therefore, any hope of recruiting Beijing as an ally to blunt Western sanctions is doomed, and with it the Kremlin's chances of a painless victory or any worthwhile victory at all.

Whilst Putin was careful to thank China's Politburo for its alleged support in his victory speech on Crimea, Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has been claiming with his usual elasticity that “Russia and China have coinciding views on the situation in Ukraine.” This is of course a desperate lie. China did not stand behind Russia in the UN Security Council vote on Crimea, as it had over Syria. It pointedly abstained, to show its displeasure. To begin with, Russia's use of a referendum to break Crimea away from Ukraine contradicts one of the core tenets of Chinese foreign policy: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-aggression and non-interference in another country's internal affairs, including that of Ukraine. China does not support referendums or attempts by domestic groups to seek independence. Similarly, China has never annexed an undisputed territory of a neighbouring country in order to protect the territory's ethnic Chinese majority.

On the surface, one might expect China to support Russia's annexation of Crimea in order to bolster its own claims to Taiwan and disputed territories. But Russia's relationship to Crimea is fundamentally different than any of China's disputed claims. On Taiwan, not only is the military challenge radically different, but Taiwan is an island that China claims authority over, not part of another state.

More fundamentally, the Crimea referendum could be viewed as a protest against the established order and Beijing may well worry that Russian actions will encourage challenges to the Chinese Communist Party's authority at home. Beijing may also be wary that the Crimea or any future referendums in Ukraine could be used as a precedent for similar votes in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet – any of which would amount to a crisis for Beijing. In other words, China likely sees the Crimea referendum more from the perspective of Kiev than Moscow.

The Chinese leadership is probably viewing Russia's policy as overly aggressive. Chinese military strategists have prided themselves on never occupying foreign territory or invading other countries for purposes other than self-defence. China opposes countries that attempt to use force or intimidation to challenge the sovereignty of other independent states. Importantly, China did not support Russia in its invasion of Georgia in 2008.

All this suggests that Russia's claim that it will seek a closer relationship with China in the event the West isolates it is likely to continue to meet with a very cautious response from Beijing. As much as China may wish to lean on Russia should Beijing find itself at odds with the United States, Xi seeks a new type of great power relationship with the United States that calls for mutual respect, no confrontation, and cooperation. China wants – and some even argue needs – to have good relations with the United States and the international community as it continues to grow. The United States and the European Union are also China's largest trade partners. An embrace of Russia at this time could cost China much global goodwill.

Finally, China does have a relationship with Ukraine that is not irrelevant. It had strong ties on trade, agricultural partnerships, and the military, and will want to see those ties endure under the new Ukrainian government. Xi has also made combating corruption a key domestic agenda. Given that cronyism was a key factor in Yanukovych's demise, it would not be easy for Xi to appear to side with him without negative domestic blowback.

If China hesitates to tilt toward Russia on Crimea, this will not, of course, be a sign that it is ready to join the West in a full condemnation of Russian policy, much less support harsh sanctions or military measures. Even if Russia invades Ukraine proper, Beijing may hesitate to publicly denounce Russia and prefer to sit on the side-lines, as it did in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Chinese strategists will question whether Beijing has the leverage needed to convince Putin to change course. In general, China has little appetite for entanglement in conflict far from its borders, especially given multiple challenges in its own neighbourhood.

Allegedly there has been a meeting recently between President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama where Xi Jinping made it abundantly clear that China has nothing in common with the deranged assertions of the Kremlin. Some close to Barak Obama appear delighted by the talks, claiming afterwards that Russia could no longer count on backing from its "traditional ally".

If so, Mr Putin is snookered. He cannot hope to escape financial suffocation by US regulatory muscle as he tries to stir up chaos in the Russian-speaking Donbass by means of agents provocateurs. Nor can he hope to turn the tables on the West by joining forces with China to create a Eurasian bloc, a league of authoritarian powers in control of vast resources. The reality is that China is breaking Russia's control over the gas basins of Central Asia systematically and ruthlessly. Turkmenistan's gas used to flow north, hostage to prices set by Gazprom, it now flows east. President Xi went in person last September to open the new 1,800 km pipeline to China from the Galkynysh Gas field, the world's second largest with 26 trillion cubic meters.

It will ultimately supply 65 BCM, equal to half Gazprom's exports to Europe. Much the same is going on in Kazakhstan, where Chinese companies have taken over much of the energy industry. Many are now describing these moves as the "Chinese commercial colonization" of the region, saying Russia is "painfully" watching its energy domination in Central Asia slip away.

PART 2

Yet more revealing is an e-mail quoting Cheng Guoping, China's ambassador to Kazakhstan, warning that Russia and China are on a collision course, and China will not be the one to yield. "In the future, great power relations in Central Asia will be complicated, delicate. The new oil and gas pipelines are breaking Russia's monopoly in energy exports."

Mr Cheng not only expressed "a positive view of the US role in the region" but also suggested that NATO should take part as a guest at talks on the Shanghai Cooperation group -- allegedly the Sino-Russian answer to EU/NATO -- in order to "break the Russian monopoly in the region." That word "break" again. So there we have it in the raw, what really goes on behind closed doors, so far removed from the pieties of a Moscow-Beijing axis!

The Chinese have never forgiven Russia for seizing East Siberia under the Tsars, the "lost territories". They want their property back, and they are getting it back by ethnic resettlement across the Amur River, Lake Khanka and the frontier regions, posing a significant threat, over time, to the Pacific fleet base in Vladivostok. Add to which the population of far Eastern Siberia has collapsed by some 25% to 6.3m from over 8 million twenty years ago, leaving ghost towns along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Russia has failed to make a go of its Eastern venture. With a national fertility rate of 1.4, chronic alcoholism whereby one in five men between the ages of 16 and 55 die of alcohol related causes, and a population expected to shrink by 30million to barely more than 110million by 2050 -- according to UN demographers, not Mr Putin's officials -- the nation must inexorably recede towards its European bastion of Old Muscovy. The question is how fast, and how peacefully.

There is a faction within China's National Security Council that wishes to "line up with Russia" over Ukraine, hoping to exploit the crisis to gain better terms on gas, food, and raw materials. These voices have been overruled by Xi Jinping. He plays on a more sophisticated strategic stage.

China is likely to walk a tightrope, "hiding its brilliance and biding its time" as the saying goes. This will becomes a harder if the Ukraine crisis escalates. Beijing may have to choose. It is surely unlikely that imperious Xi Jinping will throw away the great prize of G2 Sino-American condominium to rescue a squalid and incompetent regime in Moscow from its own folly.

Mr Putin must realize by now how fatally isolated he has become, and how dangerous it would be to go a step further. Even Germany's ever-forgiving Angela Merkel has lost patience, lamenting an "unbelievable breakdown of trust." Enough of Europe's gas pipelines have been switched to two-way flows since 2009 to help at least some of the vulnerable frontline states, if he tries to pick off the minnows one by one. Eight EU countries have liquefied natural gas terminals. Two more will join the club this year, in Poland and Lithuania.

The EU summit text last week was a call to arms. Officials have been ordered to draft plans within 90 days to break dependence on Gazprom. Even if this crisis blows over, Europe will take radical steps to find other sources of energy. Imports of Russian may be slashed by three-quarters within a decade.

Capital flight from Russia has already reached $70billion this year and we are not at the end of the first quarter 2015. Russia's central bank cannot defend the rouble without tightening monetary policy, driving the economy deeper into recession in the process. Russian banks and companies must roll over $155bn of foreign debts over the next twelve months in a hostile market, at a premium already over 200 basis points.

Mr Putin is discovering that global finance is more frightened of the US Securities and Exchange Commission than Russian T90 tanks. Any sanction against any oligarch linked to any Russian company could shut it out of global capital markets, potentially forcing default. Creditors in the West would be burned. But nobody cares about them once national security is at stake, something markets have been slow to grasp.

Nor has he chosen a good moment for his gamble. Europe's gas tanks are unusually full. The price of oil is poised to fall -- ceteris paribus -- as Iraq's output reaches a 35-year high, the US adds a million barrels b/d a day this year from shale, and Libya cranks up exports again. The International Energy Agency says global supply jumped by 600,000 b/d last month. Deutsche Bank predicts a glut. So does China's Sinopec. Mr Putin needs prices near $110 to fund his budget. He may face $50 for a very long time.

At the end of the day he has condemned Russia to the middle income trap. The windfall from the great oil boom has been wasted. Russia's engineering skills have atrophied. Industry has been hollowed out by the Dutch Disease: the curse of over-valued currency, and reliance on commodities.

He jumped the gun in Ukraine, striking before the interim government had committed any serious abuses or lost global goodwill, a remarkably sloppy and impatient Putsch for a KGB man. He took Germany for a patsy, and took China for granted. He has gained Crimea but turned the Kremlin into a pariah for another decade, if not a generation, and probably lost Ukraine forever. It is a remarkably poor trade.

Thank you all for your time reading this diatribe.


A link to the thread

http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/chronicle...

AreOut

3,658 posts

160 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
1984 nuclear debate, seems nothing has changed (gotta agree with the general about unfolding scenario)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0VcT-XWb7M

raftom

1,196 posts

260 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
skyrover said:
A gentleman on AARSE posted this today... makes for good reading.

emsav said:
(...)
Finally, China does have a relationship with Ukraine that is not irrelevant. It had strong ties on trade, agricultural partnerships, and the military, and will want to see those ties endure under the new Ukrainian government. Xi has also made combating corruption a key domestic agenda. Given that cronyism was a key factor in Yanukovych's demise, it would not be easy for Xi to appear to side with him without negative domestic blowback.
(...)
The reality is that China is breaking Russia's control over the gas basins of Central Asia systematically and ruthlessly. Turkmenistan's gas used to flow north, hostage to prices set by Gazprom, it now flows east. President Xi went in person last September to open the new 1,800 km pipeline to China from the Galkynysh Gas field, the world's second largest with 26 trillion cubic meters.

It will ultimately supply 65 BCM, equal to half Gazprom's exports to Europe. Much the same is going on in Kazakhstan, where Chinese companies have taken over much of the energy industry. Many are now describing these moves as the "Chinese commercial colonization" of the region, saying Russia is "painfully" watching its energy domination in Central Asia slip away.

Yet more revealing is an e-mail quoting Cheng Guoping, China's ambassador to Kazakhstan, warning that Russia and China are on a collision course, and China will not be the one to yield. "In the future, great power relations in Central Asia will be complicated, delicate. The new oil and gas pipelines are breaking Russia's monopoly in energy exports."
(...)


A link to the thread

http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/chronicle...
Well that escalated quickly:

http://info-news.eu/china-to-credit-ukraine-for-3-...

Mr Whippy

28,944 posts

240 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
What plebs see and are exposed to isn't always what is actually going on.

If only it were that easy.

The Wookie

13,909 posts

227 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
JustAnotherLogin said:
Air Traffic Controllers need transponders to determine height. They are not allowed to use primary radar for height. Thus if the Bears turn off their transponders, civilian ATC have to leave a space around that extends all the way down and up. Whereas for most aircraft they can assume that if their transponders indicate a eheight difference of 500ft, then they are fine. IN some areas they might also have to leave a much bigger space laterally .So this really messes up civil ATC and the use of airspace.

It is highly unlikely that Bears have TCAS in any form as they are very old technologically. They probably do have some military radar though. So they would have some warning of civil aircraft. Probably
Ignoring all of the other business and who has done what in the past or present for a moment it does seem pretty bloody irresponsible, particularly given the current tensions. After all mid air incidents have happened in daylight with working transponders, radar and ATC.

It doesn't take a huge amount of imagination to reach a sequence of events where a Bear fails to spot a small aircraft for one reason or another, collides with it without warning and crashes on the edge of British Airspace while a dispatched Typhoon was nearby and heading straight for it...

The consequences would be enormous.

Mr Whippy

28,944 posts

240 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
The Wookie said:
Ignoring all of the other business and who has done what in the past or present for a moment it does seem pretty bloody irresponsible, particularly given the current tensions. After all mid air incidents have happened in daylight with working transponders, radar and ATC.

It doesn't take a huge amount of imagination to reach a sequence of events where a Bear fails to spot a small aircraft for one reason or another, collides with it without warning and crashes on the edge of British Airspace while a dispatched Typhoon was nearby and heading straight for it...

The consequences would be enormous.
So how do the Bears get to the channel?

Transponder on or off all the way?

Just curious if they're flying in 'safe' then turning it off suddenly in the Channel?

Also how come no CAP are detecting between Russia and Channel and escorting 'safely' into busy airspace?!

Dave

citizensm1th

8,371 posts

136 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
skyrover said:
A gentleman on AARSE posted this today... makes for good reading.

emsav said:
Apologises in advance for a very long, hopefully informative postings, like me I sincerely hope it gives you a very insight into the Chinese way of thinking. Unfortunately it has to be in multiple parts because of system restrictions.

Two of my people have just returned from three months in Nanjing, overseeing the development of the new tramway system on behalf of the city and Jiangsu Regional Government. Much of their time was spent talking with high-ranking Chinese government officials and bureaucrats and it is from my conversations with them that I have been able to produce what follows – the Chinese perspective;

They tell me that Vladimir Putin, in the eyes of the Chinese, has committed a cardinal sin by tearing up the international rule book without a green light from Beijing. Therefore, any hope of recruiting Beijing as an ally to blunt Western sanctions is doomed, and with it the Kremlin's chances of a painless victory or any worthwhile victory at all.

Whilst Putin was careful to thank China's Politburo for its alleged support in his victory speech on Crimea, Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has been claiming with his usual elasticity that “Russia and China have coinciding views on the situation in Ukraine.” This is of course a desperate lie. China did not stand behind Russia in the UN Security Council vote on Crimea, as it had over Syria. It pointedly abstained, to show its displeasure. To begin with, Russia's use of a referendum to break Crimea away from Ukraine contradicts one of the core tenets of Chinese foreign policy: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-aggression and non-interference in another country's internal affairs, including that of Ukraine. China does not support referendums or attempts by domestic groups to seek independence. Similarly, China has never annexed an undisputed territory of a neighbouring country in order to protect the territory's ethnic Chinese majority.

On the surface, one might expect China to support Russia's annexation of Crimea in order to bolster its own claims to Taiwan and disputed territories. But Russia's relationship to Crimea is fundamentally different than any of China's disputed claims. On Taiwan, not only is the military challenge radically different, but Taiwan is an island that China claims authority over, not part of another state.

More fundamentally, the Crimea referendum could be viewed as a protest against the established order and Beijing may well worry that Russian actions will encourage challenges to the Chinese Communist Party's authority at home. Beijing may also be wary that the Crimea or any future referendums in Ukraine could be used as a precedent for similar votes in Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet – any of which would amount to a crisis for Beijing. In other words, China likely sees the Crimea referendum more from the perspective of Kiev than Moscow.

The Chinese leadership is probably viewing Russia's policy as overly aggressive. Chinese military strategists have prided themselves on never occupying foreign territory or invading other countries for purposes other than self-defence. China opposes countries that attempt to use force or intimidation to challenge the sovereignty of other independent states. Importantly, China did not support Russia in its invasion of Georgia in 2008.

All this suggests that Russia's claim that it will seek a closer relationship with China in the event the West isolates it is likely to continue to meet with a very cautious response from Beijing. As much as China may wish to lean on Russia should Beijing find itself at odds with the United States, Xi seeks a new type of great power relationship with the United States that calls for mutual respect, no confrontation, and cooperation. China wants – and some even argue needs – to have good relations with the United States and the international community as it continues to grow. The United States and the European Union are also China's largest trade partners. An embrace of Russia at this time could cost China much global goodwill.

Finally, China does have a relationship with Ukraine that is not irrelevant. It had strong ties on trade, agricultural partnerships, and the military, and will want to see those ties endure under the new Ukrainian government. Xi has also made combating corruption a key domestic agenda. Given that cronyism was a key factor in Yanukovych's demise, it would not be easy for Xi to appear to side with him without negative domestic blowback.

If China hesitates to tilt toward Russia on Crimea, this will not, of course, be a sign that it is ready to join the West in a full condemnation of Russian policy, much less support harsh sanctions or military measures. Even if Russia invades Ukraine proper, Beijing may hesitate to publicly denounce Russia and prefer to sit on the side-lines, as it did in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Chinese strategists will question whether Beijing has the leverage needed to convince Putin to change course. In general, China has little appetite for entanglement in conflict far from its borders, especially given multiple challenges in its own neighbourhood.

Allegedly there has been a meeting recently between President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama where Xi Jinping made it abundantly clear that China has nothing in common with the deranged assertions of the Kremlin. Some close to Barak Obama appear delighted by the talks, claiming afterwards that Russia could no longer count on backing from its "traditional ally".

If so, Mr Putin is snookered. He cannot hope to escape financial suffocation by US regulatory muscle as he tries to stir up chaos in the Russian-speaking Donbass by means of agents provocateurs. Nor can he hope to turn the tables on the West by joining forces with China to create a Eurasian bloc, a league of authoritarian powers in control of vast resources. The reality is that China is breaking Russia's control over the gas basins of Central Asia systematically and ruthlessly. Turkmenistan's gas used to flow north, hostage to prices set by Gazprom, it now flows east. President Xi went in person last September to open the new 1,800 km pipeline to China from the Galkynysh Gas field, the world's second largest with 26 trillion cubic meters.

It will ultimately supply 65 BCM, equal to half Gazprom's exports to Europe. Much the same is going on in Kazakhstan, where Chinese companies have taken over much of the energy industry. Many are now describing these moves as the "Chinese commercial colonization" of the region, saying Russia is "painfully" watching its energy domination in Central Asia slip away.

PART 2

Yet more revealing is an e-mail quoting Cheng Guoping, China's ambassador to Kazakhstan, warning that Russia and China are on a collision course, and China will not be the one to yield. "In the future, great power relations in Central Asia will be complicated, delicate. The new oil and gas pipelines are breaking Russia's monopoly in energy exports."

Mr Cheng not only expressed "a positive view of the US role in the region" but also suggested that NATO should take part as a guest at talks on the Shanghai Cooperation group -- allegedly the Sino-Russian answer to EU/NATO -- in order to "break the Russian monopoly in the region." That word "break" again. So there we have it in the raw, what really goes on behind closed doors, so far removed from the pieties of a Moscow-Beijing axis!

The Chinese have never forgiven Russia for seizing East Siberia under the Tsars, the "lost territories". They want their property back, and they are getting it back by ethnic resettlement across the Amur River, Lake Khanka and the frontier regions, posing a significant threat, over time, to the Pacific fleet base in Vladivostok. Add to which the population of far Eastern Siberia has collapsed by some 25% to 6.3m from over 8 million twenty years ago, leaving ghost towns along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Russia has failed to make a go of its Eastern venture. With a national fertility rate of 1.4, chronic alcoholism whereby one in five men between the ages of 16 and 55 die of alcohol related causes, and a population expected to shrink by 30million to barely more than 110million by 2050 -- according to UN demographers, not Mr Putin's officials -- the nation must inexorably recede towards its European bastion of Old Muscovy. The question is how fast, and how peacefully.

There is a faction within China's National Security Council that wishes to "line up with Russia" over Ukraine, hoping to exploit the crisis to gain better terms on gas, food, and raw materials. These voices have been overruled by Xi Jinping. He plays on a more sophisticated strategic stage.

China is likely to walk a tightrope, "hiding its brilliance and biding its time" as the saying goes. This will becomes a harder if the Ukraine crisis escalates. Beijing may have to choose. It is surely unlikely that imperious Xi Jinping will throw away the great prize of G2 Sino-American condominium to rescue a squalid and incompetent regime in Moscow from its own folly.

Mr Putin must realize by now how fatally isolated he has become, and how dangerous it would be to go a step further. Even Germany's ever-forgiving Angela Merkel has lost patience, lamenting an "unbelievable breakdown of trust." Enough of Europe's gas pipelines have been switched to two-way flows since 2009 to help at least some of the vulnerable frontline states, if he tries to pick off the minnows one by one. Eight EU countries have liquefied natural gas terminals. Two more will join the club this year, in Poland and Lithuania.

The EU summit text last week was a call to arms. Officials have been ordered to draft plans within 90 days to break dependence on Gazprom. Even if this crisis blows over, Europe will take radical steps to find other sources of energy. Imports of Russian may be slashed by three-quarters within a decade.

Capital flight from Russia has already reached $70billion this year and we are not at the end of the first quarter 2015. Russia's central bank cannot defend the rouble without tightening monetary policy, driving the economy deeper into recession in the process. Russian banks and companies must roll over $155bn of foreign debts over the next twelve months in a hostile market, at a premium already over 200 basis points.

Mr Putin is discovering that global finance is more frightened of the US Securities and Exchange Commission than Russian T90 tanks. Any sanction against any oligarch linked to any Russian company could shut it out of global capital markets, potentially forcing default. Creditors in the West would be burned. But nobody cares about them once national security is at stake, something markets have been slow to grasp.

Nor has he chosen a good moment for his gamble. Europe's gas tanks are unusually full. The price of oil is poised to fall -- ceteris paribus -- as Iraq's output reaches a 35-year high, the US adds a million barrels b/d a day this year from shale, and Libya cranks up exports again. The International Energy Agency says global supply jumped by 600,000 b/d last month. Deutsche Bank predicts a glut. So does China's Sinopec. Mr Putin needs prices near $110 to fund his budget. He may face $50 for a very long time.

At the end of the day he has condemned Russia to the middle income trap. The windfall from the great oil boom has been wasted. Russia's engineering skills have atrophied. Industry has been hollowed out by the Dutch Disease: the curse of over-valued currency, and reliance on commodities.

He jumped the gun in Ukraine, striking before the interim government had committed any serious abuses or lost global goodwill, a remarkably sloppy and impatient Putsch for a KGB man. He took Germany for a patsy, and took China for granted. He has gained Crimea but turned the Kremlin into a pariah for another decade, if not a generation, and probably lost Ukraine forever. It is a remarkably poor trade.

Thank you all for your time reading this diatribe.


A link to the thread

http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/chronicle...
While this is undoubtedly a very good and valid view of the Chinese strategic stance lets not think that the Chinese are not a duplicitous and cynical nation lets not forget Tibet after all.
The main reason china is happy to see Russia have troubles over the Ukraine is they do not want to see a strong Russia let alone share a boarder with one.
Russia has over the last 10 years over hauled its armed forces the army has a very good professional core with modern weapon systems ,China has noticed this and is quite happy to play Europe and America off against Russia after all it owns a huge chunk of American debt

PRTVR

7,072 posts

220 months

Monday 23rd February 2015
quotequote all
Mr Whippy said:
The Wookie said:
Ignoring all of the other business and who has done what in the past or present for a moment it does seem pretty bloody irresponsible, particularly given the current tensions. After all mid air incidents have happened in daylight with working transponders, radar and ATC.

It doesn't take a huge amount of imagination to reach a sequence of events where a Bear fails to spot a small aircraft for one reason or another, collides with it without warning and crashes on the edge of British Airspace while a dispatched Typhoon was nearby and heading straight for it...

The consequences would be enormous.
So how do the Bears get to the channel?

Transponder on or off all the way?

Just curious if they're flying in 'safe' then turning it off suddenly in the Channel?

Also how come no CAP are detecting between Russia and Channel and escorting 'safely' into busy airspace?!

Dave
From what I have read they came into the channel from the west, the Atlantic using in flight refueling, this lead them not to be picked up till they were in the channel.

Mr Whippy

28,944 posts

240 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
PRTVR said:
From what I have read they came into the channel from the west, the Atlantic using in flight refueling, this lead them not to be picked up till they were in the channel.
Wow, so pretty determined then!

That said, I was certain we had CAP across Scotland to Iceland kinda area?

So we've (NATO) either left gaps into the Atlantic = bad, or they're sneaking a bear and a refueller into the Atlantic and sneaking around.


As much as no transponder is bad, and the Russians are clearly being naughty, if anything it just shows the NATO coverage is pretty poor if a Bear can get so close undetected.
Who needs B2 bombers hehe

hidetheelephants

23,731 posts

192 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
It's not really a gap; given we aren't at war it would be hard to justify a standing AWACS patrol in the GIUK gap and fixed radar at Saxa Vord etc. won't spot them if they are good distance off or at low altitude.

Cheese Mechanic

3,157 posts

168 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
This really is getting scarey

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cam...

A training mision sure enough , but this must be under NATO auspice. If this kicks off, it will go tactical nuclear within days, if nerves do not hold.

Bluebarge

4,519 posts

177 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
Cheese Mechanic said:
This really is getting scarey

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cam...

A training mision sure enough , but this must be under NATO auspice. If this kicks off, it will go tactical nuclear within days, if nerves do not hold.
But this won't kick off, unless Russia invades NATO territory, which is unlikely, unless Putin is seriously unhinged. UK troops will be a long way away from the sharp end and probably very difficult to find unless you happen to be on the same Ukrainian military base.

2013BRM

39,731 posts

283 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
A psychological appraisal would suggest he is far from sane but appeasement would be the wrong way to handle him

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-winner-ef...

he needs a kick in the slats

Maxf

8,402 posts

240 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
An interesting viewpoint is that, aside from The Crimea, Putin doesnt want Ukraine - he simply wants to ensure that the border is unclear and disputed. With an unclear border, Ukraine would find joining The EU or NATO next to impossible, giving Russia a considerable buffer.

Of course, if this is correct, then Belarus might be next in line.

I'm not sure NATO would go to war for anything other than tanks rolling wholesale across the country - not just a border region.

AreOut

3,658 posts

160 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
propaganda just getting more and more silly...

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2967157/Vl...

FourWheelDrift

88,375 posts

283 months

Tuesday 24th February 2015
quotequote all
AreOut said:
propaganda just getting more and more silly...

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2967157/Vl...

scherzkeks

4,460 posts

133 months

Wednesday 25th February 2015
quotequote all
AreOut said:
propaganda just getting more and more silly...

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2967157/Vl...
laugh

Yazar

1,476 posts

119 months

Wednesday 25th February 2015
quotequote all
More news:

UK sending 75 British Troops to Ukraine. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/pmqs/1143...

Uk and USA parading through Estonia- 300 yards from Russian border http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/e...

XM5ER

5,087 posts

247 months

Transmitter Man

4,253 posts

223 months

Wednesday 25th February 2015
quotequote all
XM5ER said:
Do you have a graph for the Ruble?

Phil