Saturn V anecdote
Discussion
During construction of the S-IVB, at Douglas Aircraft Company’s Huntington Beach facility, pigeons presented such a problem that a hand-picked team was chosen to get rid of the problem. The pigeons roosted, flew around the rafters of the high ceilings and left their droppings not only on the workers, but on the S-IVB stage creating sanitation problems. High-frequency whistles and sealing off openings worked for a time, but the persistent birds eventually found their way in. Indoor shots were taken at the birds which drew activist’s protests and also left holes in the roof. Ornithologists were consulted and suggested treating bird seeds to temporarily affect the pigeons’ nervous system. After eating the seeds the pigeons sat still and eventually left, never to return. Maintenance crews refreshed the seed supply every 60 days to make sure the birds kept away.
From J Harvey leBlanc
Meeting Dr. Wernher von Braun-----
During the early 1960’s I was taken by my Supervisor and Manager to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL. for a major presentation on some of our proposed design concepts for Saturn S-II hardware. I was just a young junior Design Engineer and had a very small part in the presentation, but I was mainly taken along for the experience.
The briefing was to be presented to Dr. Wernher von Braun the Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center and his entire top management team. Dr. von Braun had been the leader of the German Nazis team that developed the V-2 ballistic missiles used to bomb England during World War II. At the end of the war Dr. von Braun and about 500 of his top scientists were brought to the U.S. to lead this country’s missile development. He later became NASA’s chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the super booster that would propel Americans to the Moon.
Those were the days prior to viewgraphs and Power Point presentations. Briefings were hand drawn on flip charts mounted on an easel in front of the room. I was told that we would go into the actual conference room the night before to go thru a dry run and make whatever changes were required to the briefing. We soon found changes that needed to be made to the charts and I was given a bottle of quick drying White Out liquid to erase the areas that needed to be fixed. As was normally the case with this old version of White Out, the white liquid would dry onto the cap and it was very difficult to open. Being a young resourceful engineer I decided the best way to loosen the bottle cap was to hit it against the conference room chair I was sitting on. I was really surprised when the neck of what turned out to be a glass bottle, broke and spilled white liquid all over the chair and bright blue carpet in Dr. von Braun’s conference room! I ran to the nearby restroom for paper towels to clean the mess, but by the time I returned I was horrified to find that the fast drying liquid had turned to a solid!! The entire briefing team tried their best to clean the mess, but it was impossible. The stain was permanent and the chair and carpet were ruined.
I got very little sleep that night and was too upset about my major mishap the night before to eat breakfast in the morning. I just knew I was going to be fired or worse by this ex-Nazis leader!
I was sitting in the conference room, shaking, when Dr. von Braun walked in for the briefing. He immediately spotted the giant stain on his chair and carpet and just looked around the room for what seemed like an hour. He then said in his heavy German accent “Vot is this?” I had such a guilty feeling and red face, that I felt sure he knew I was the culprit.
A couple of years later, Dr. von Braun was visiting our plant in Downey, CA. and made his normal walking tour of the Design Engineering area. He liked to walk around and stop at random engineers and have them explain what they were working on. Our design area was made up of several huge rooms full of engineers and our drawing boards. My drawing board happened to be along the main aisle he was using, and I panicked when I saw he was coming toward me. He looked at me, then stopped at my drawing board, looked at my drawing, and said “Vot is this?” My mind immediately went back to the White Out incident and I will never know if he recognized me and my red face as the culprit that ruined his carpet, or he just picked me at random!
Meeting Dr. Wernher von Braun-----
During the early 1960’s I was taken by my Supervisor and Manager to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, AL. for a major presentation on some of our proposed design concepts for Saturn S-II hardware. I was just a young junior Design Engineer and had a very small part in the presentation, but I was mainly taken along for the experience.
The briefing was to be presented to Dr. Wernher von Braun the Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center and his entire top management team. Dr. von Braun had been the leader of the German Nazis team that developed the V-2 ballistic missiles used to bomb England during World War II. At the end of the war Dr. von Braun and about 500 of his top scientists were brought to the U.S. to lead this country’s missile development. He later became NASA’s chief architect of the Saturn V launch vehicle, the super booster that would propel Americans to the Moon.
Those were the days prior to viewgraphs and Power Point presentations. Briefings were hand drawn on flip charts mounted on an easel in front of the room. I was told that we would go into the actual conference room the night before to go thru a dry run and make whatever changes were required to the briefing. We soon found changes that needed to be made to the charts and I was given a bottle of quick drying White Out liquid to erase the areas that needed to be fixed. As was normally the case with this old version of White Out, the white liquid would dry onto the cap and it was very difficult to open. Being a young resourceful engineer I decided the best way to loosen the bottle cap was to hit it against the conference room chair I was sitting on. I was really surprised when the neck of what turned out to be a glass bottle, broke and spilled white liquid all over the chair and bright blue carpet in Dr. von Braun’s conference room! I ran to the nearby restroom for paper towels to clean the mess, but by the time I returned I was horrified to find that the fast drying liquid had turned to a solid!! The entire briefing team tried their best to clean the mess, but it was impossible. The stain was permanent and the chair and carpet were ruined.
I got very little sleep that night and was too upset about my major mishap the night before to eat breakfast in the morning. I just knew I was going to be fired or worse by this ex-Nazis leader!
I was sitting in the conference room, shaking, when Dr. von Braun walked in for the briefing. He immediately spotted the giant stain on his chair and carpet and just looked around the room for what seemed like an hour. He then said in his heavy German accent “Vot is this?” I had such a guilty feeling and red face, that I felt sure he knew I was the culprit.
A couple of years later, Dr. von Braun was visiting our plant in Downey, CA. and made his normal walking tour of the Design Engineering area. He liked to walk around and stop at random engineers and have them explain what they were working on. Our design area was made up of several huge rooms full of engineers and our drawing boards. My drawing board happened to be along the main aisle he was using, and I panicked when I saw he was coming toward me. He looked at me, then stopped at my drawing board, looked at my drawing, and said “Vot is this?” My mind immediately went back to the White Out incident and I will never know if he recognized me and my red face as the culprit that ruined his carpet, or he just picked me at random!
From Bob Carlson
Another young engineer experience. I was first at Rocketdyne (1956) as a young engineer in the group that developed the influence coefficients that showed the rocket engine operation to be simulated in a computer trajectory program. I was given the task of visiting all the present and future users of Rocketdyne engines to help them understand and use this information. I worked with the Thor, Atlas, Redstone and Jupiter teams, some of the same engineers that later would be involved with the Saturn program and using the J2 and F1 engines. I got to know the Lab heads in the Propulsion Lab and Flight Control Lab at MSFC and later, while at Douglas,
would have offices in both labs to help evolve the final specifications for the attitude control and ullage rocket packages for the SIVB. It was a great challenge to work there as the lone Yankee among all the graduates of Southern universities. Lots of teasing!! I was a fun six month TDY from Douglas in California and a real learning experience. After my return home I was responsible for putting together the specifications that went out for bid on these small rocket packages and helping choose the subcontractor to provide them. This illustrates the teamwork that went on between MSFC and the contractors to make sure the Saturn Program was a success.
Another young engineer experience. I was first at Rocketdyne (1956) as a young engineer in the group that developed the influence coefficients that showed the rocket engine operation to be simulated in a computer trajectory program. I was given the task of visiting all the present and future users of Rocketdyne engines to help them understand and use this information. I worked with the Thor, Atlas, Redstone and Jupiter teams, some of the same engineers that later would be involved with the Saturn program and using the J2 and F1 engines. I got to know the Lab heads in the Propulsion Lab and Flight Control Lab at MSFC and later, while at Douglas,
would have offices in both labs to help evolve the final specifications for the attitude control and ullage rocket packages for the SIVB. It was a great challenge to work there as the lone Yankee among all the graduates of Southern universities. Lots of teasing!! I was a fun six month TDY from Douglas in California and a real learning experience. After my return home I was responsible for putting together the specifications that went out for bid on these small rocket packages and helping choose the subcontractor to provide them. This illustrates the teamwork that went on between MSFC and the contractors to make sure the Saturn Program was a success.
From J Harvey leBlanc
This was part of our North American Aviation shop area in Downey, CA. Since we had the contracts for the Saturn S-II as well as the Apollo this was a very busy place during the 1960s and 70s. Many S-II parts were produced here and the complete stage was assembled at our Seal Beach plant which was about 16 miles away.
This was part of our North American Aviation shop area in Downey, CA. Since we had the contracts for the Saturn S-II as well as the Apollo this was a very busy place during the 1960s and 70s. Many S-II parts were produced here and the complete stage was assembled at our Seal Beach plant which was about 16 miles away.
Another tale from J Harvey LeBlanc
How to Destroy a Rocket-----In an earlier post, I described how I had designed the Pneumatic Servicing Systems for the second stage (S-II) of the Saturn- V rocket. A set of this hardware had been provided to the Kennedy Space Center as well as the Mississippi Test Facility (MTF), now called Stennis. In 1966, we had shipped the S-II-T test stage to MTF for a series of static firing test. During one of the test a fire had developed in one of the J-2 engines. Three days later, checks were underway to determine the cause of a leak that had resulted in the fire.
At the time of the accident, the S-II-T was being pressurized for a leak check by the second shift Complex Coordinator, who was not a Certified Test Conductor. He was authorized to conduct only routine pressurizations up to 8 psig. The purpose of the test was to attempt to pressurize down to one of the J-2 engines at 8 psig, so that a leak check of the engine pre-valve could be performed with a soap solution.
During the first shift, the pressure sensing line had been disconnected from the LH2 tank causing the pressure indicators on the control panel to become inoperative. The second shift Complex Coordinator was not aware of this and started to pressurize the tank for the test. He made five attempts to pressurize the tank, but received no pressure indication on the control panel, because the instrumentation was not connected. Believing that the LH2 tank relief valve was failed open, he then authorized the closing of a facility blocking valve downstream of the tank relief valve. Not a smart thing to do!! In fact, this relief capability had worked on the first four pressurization cycles, protecting the tank. However, he believed the tank pressure to be 0 psig (as that is what his control panel indicated). On the fifth cycle, with the control panel still reading zero, the pressure in the tank actually continued to rise as there was no relief valve allowed to open…….until S-II-T exploded!
This happened on May 28, 1966. I was attending a Memorial Day weekend pool party when I received a panic call saying that the LH2 Tank Pressurization System I designed, had just blown the S-II-T Stage!!!! Panic Time!!!
I was on the next flight from California to Mississippi to determine what had really happened. After a complete review of all the data and the flawed test procedure that had been used it became quite evident that my design was not to blame.
These lessons learned from this accident were utilized to implement the following changes:
• Procedures for test engineers updated to ensure that all operations were completely detailed.
• Special instructions prepared, so that when one shift handed over to another the complete test configuration was fully understood.
• Only trained and authorized test engineers allowed to perform specific tests.
Video showing the remains https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32JyGhW-KwA#Saturn...
How to Destroy a Rocket-----In an earlier post, I described how I had designed the Pneumatic Servicing Systems for the second stage (S-II) of the Saturn- V rocket. A set of this hardware had been provided to the Kennedy Space Center as well as the Mississippi Test Facility (MTF), now called Stennis. In 1966, we had shipped the S-II-T test stage to MTF for a series of static firing test. During one of the test a fire had developed in one of the J-2 engines. Three days later, checks were underway to determine the cause of a leak that had resulted in the fire.
At the time of the accident, the S-II-T was being pressurized for a leak check by the second shift Complex Coordinator, who was not a Certified Test Conductor. He was authorized to conduct only routine pressurizations up to 8 psig. The purpose of the test was to attempt to pressurize down to one of the J-2 engines at 8 psig, so that a leak check of the engine pre-valve could be performed with a soap solution.
During the first shift, the pressure sensing line had been disconnected from the LH2 tank causing the pressure indicators on the control panel to become inoperative. The second shift Complex Coordinator was not aware of this and started to pressurize the tank for the test. He made five attempts to pressurize the tank, but received no pressure indication on the control panel, because the instrumentation was not connected. Believing that the LH2 tank relief valve was failed open, he then authorized the closing of a facility blocking valve downstream of the tank relief valve. Not a smart thing to do!! In fact, this relief capability had worked on the first four pressurization cycles, protecting the tank. However, he believed the tank pressure to be 0 psig (as that is what his control panel indicated). On the fifth cycle, with the control panel still reading zero, the pressure in the tank actually continued to rise as there was no relief valve allowed to open…….until S-II-T exploded!
This happened on May 28, 1966. I was attending a Memorial Day weekend pool party when I received a panic call saying that the LH2 Tank Pressurization System I designed, had just blown the S-II-T Stage!!!! Panic Time!!!
I was on the next flight from California to Mississippi to determine what had really happened. After a complete review of all the data and the flawed test procedure that had been used it became quite evident that my design was not to blame.
These lessons learned from this accident were utilized to implement the following changes:
• Procedures for test engineers updated to ensure that all operations were completely detailed.
• Special instructions prepared, so that when one shift handed over to another the complete test configuration was fully understood.
• Only trained and authorized test engineers allowed to perform specific tests.
Video showing the remains https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32JyGhW-KwA#Saturn...
Edited by MartG on Saturday 21st October 10:11
Another from J Harvey LeBlanc
Dealing With Cryogenic Leaks------- I recently had a post on how we used "Fire Brooms" to detect hydrogen leaks and fires in LH2 systems. This reminded me that back in the early days of Saturn testing, we also discovered that cryogenic (cryo) leaks could be temporarily stopped by putting strips of cloth on the leaking joints and spraying them with a water hose. This formed a block of ice around the joint and usually stopped the leaks. We soon discovered that if we used Kotex pads instead of cloth, we could form a much thicker and stronger ice seal and the leaks always stopped! The fix created a problem in our “Rocket Science” business, since all work had to be documented in the form of official procedures before it could be implemented. It was decided that stating that Kotex should be used in an official NASA document may be offensive or seem unprofessional to some people. From that time on, the procedures were changed to say “use cryo pads” and water to stop leaks in cryogenic systems! Another major problem resolved! Now you may understand that not all “Rocket Science” problems are resolved with the use of a higher level of math!
( for those who don't know, Kotex are manufacturers of 'feminine hygiene' products
)
Installing J-2 Engines on the S-II Stage at our North American Aviation Facility in Seal Beach, CA. 1965 and 1966 photos from my collection.
Dealing With Cryogenic Leaks------- I recently had a post on how we used "Fire Brooms" to detect hydrogen leaks and fires in LH2 systems. This reminded me that back in the early days of Saturn testing, we also discovered that cryogenic (cryo) leaks could be temporarily stopped by putting strips of cloth on the leaking joints and spraying them with a water hose. This formed a block of ice around the joint and usually stopped the leaks. We soon discovered that if we used Kotex pads instead of cloth, we could form a much thicker and stronger ice seal and the leaks always stopped! The fix created a problem in our “Rocket Science” business, since all work had to be documented in the form of official procedures before it could be implemented. It was decided that stating that Kotex should be used in an official NASA document may be offensive or seem unprofessional to some people. From that time on, the procedures were changed to say “use cryo pads” and water to stop leaks in cryogenic systems! Another major problem resolved! Now you may understand that not all “Rocket Science” problems are resolved with the use of a higher level of math!
( for those who don't know, Kotex are manufacturers of 'feminine hygiene' products
)Installing J-2 Engines on the S-II Stage at our North American Aviation Facility in Seal Beach, CA. 1965 and 1966 photos from my collection.
Be careful how you simulate spaceflight.
Superbird-6. A Boeing (ex HUGHES) 601 telecommunications satellite was purchased by Space Communications Corporation (SCC) of Japan.
The launch was on April 15th 2004 and all indications were normal. However, it was soon determined that the orbit insertion was all wrong and the satellite's perigee was way to low. The satellite sustained major thermal damage from atmospheric heating, and nearly all of its propellent would be needed to get it into geosynch orbit, leaving nothing for normal station keeping activities.
Nothing but space junk.
So what happened?
SCC decided to have the transfer orbit be done by using a supersynchronous mission profile. It's infrequently used and nearly all missions are planned using a low earth orbit as a starting place and get the satellite into geosynch orbit using several burns. Supersynchronous sends the satellite way out in space and it's slowly brought down to geosynch using far less fuel.
So the transfer orbit was planned using the orbital simulators and that data was provided to the booster manufacturer, Lockheed.
But there was one detail the orbital analysts forgot to do. When using a low earth orbit transfer flight, the effects of the moon's gravity can be ignored. But on a supersynchronous orbit, the gravitational effects have to be accounted for. It's planned apogee was at 75,000 miles, a significant distance to the moon. And no one caught that variable during the planning phases. And as orbital mechanics dictated during the launch, as the satellite reached apogee, the moon lowered the perigee to a dangerous altitude.
This was a blunder so bad, that no one will be making that mistake again. Nature did indeed, side with the hidden flaw.
Superbird-6. A Boeing (ex HUGHES) 601 telecommunications satellite was purchased by Space Communications Corporation (SCC) of Japan.
The launch was on April 15th 2004 and all indications were normal. However, it was soon determined that the orbit insertion was all wrong and the satellite's perigee was way to low. The satellite sustained major thermal damage from atmospheric heating, and nearly all of its propellent would be needed to get it into geosynch orbit, leaving nothing for normal station keeping activities.
Nothing but space junk.
So what happened?
SCC decided to have the transfer orbit be done by using a supersynchronous mission profile. It's infrequently used and nearly all missions are planned using a low earth orbit as a starting place and get the satellite into geosynch orbit using several burns. Supersynchronous sends the satellite way out in space and it's slowly brought down to geosynch using far less fuel.
So the transfer orbit was planned using the orbital simulators and that data was provided to the booster manufacturer, Lockheed.
But there was one detail the orbital analysts forgot to do. When using a low earth orbit transfer flight, the effects of the moon's gravity can be ignored. But on a supersynchronous orbit, the gravitational effects have to be accounted for. It's planned apogee was at 75,000 miles, a significant distance to the moon. And no one caught that variable during the planning phases. And as orbital mechanics dictated during the launch, as the satellite reached apogee, the moon lowered the perigee to a dangerous altitude.
This was a blunder so bad, that no one will be making that mistake again. Nature did indeed, side with the hidden flaw.
Eric Mc said:
Perkin Elmer have been grinding mirrors for space based telescopes for decades. Most of these mirrors were used in scopes that pointed down towards earth rather than out into space, as Perkin Elmer's main work was in connection with spy satellites.
Yes - they even had some spare ones made:"In 2012 the agency donated two space telescopes to NASA. Despite being stored unused, the instruments are superior to the Hubble Space Telescope. One journalist observed, "If telescopes of this caliber are languishing on shelves, imagine what they're actually using."
No idea what became of them - as they were just the telescope and NASA had no funding to build a satellite around them is suspect they are still in storage somewhere
Nearly right Eric
Liquid hydrogen fuel is circulated through the engine bell to cool it, down as far as the pipe you can see wrapped around it about halfway down - that's the turbopump exhaust manifold. Below the manifold the nozzle extension is cooled by the thin film of relatively cool exhaust gas from the turbopump - which is the dark coloured smoke you can see around the central exhaust flame
Liquid hydrogen fuel is circulated through the engine bell to cool it, down as far as the pipe you can see wrapped around it about halfway down - that's the turbopump exhaust manifold. Below the manifold the nozzle extension is cooled by the thin film of relatively cool exhaust gas from the turbopump - which is the dark coloured smoke you can see around the central exhaust flame
Yup
Regenerative cooling as it is known is quite remarkable - in this video of an RS-25 being tested you can see frost formed on the outside of the nozzle while the engine is firing
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsMfjFg-Zj0
Regenerative cooling as it is known is quite remarkable - in this video of an RS-25 being tested you can see frost formed on the outside of the nozzle while the engine is firing
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsMfjFg-Zj0
First I've heard of this - a proposal for a version of the Apollo spacecraft to rescue astronauts stranded in Lunar orbit
https://www.wired.com/2012/06/apollo-lunar-orbit-r...
https://www.wired.com/2012/06/apollo-lunar-orbit-r...
Nothing like re-inventing an old concept - this idea has been around since the early '60s
https://www.space.com/39024-study-validates-nanora...
https://www.space.com/39024-study-validates-nanora...
Eric Mc said:
MartG said:
Nothing like re-inventing an old concept - this idea has been around since the early '60s
https://www.space.com/39024-study-validates-nanora...
And not proceeded with at the time because it was considered technically too difficult.https://www.space.com/39024-study-validates-nanora...
The difference now is that they seem to think that it would be doable with modern engineering, materials and robotics.
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