Piper Alpha: Fire in the night
Discussion
petop said:
GTIR said:
(Just read the Wiki)
So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
you would like to think so.......So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil...
Forgot about that debacle.
GTIR said:
petop said:
GTIR said:
(Just read the Wiki)
So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
you would like to think so.......So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil...
Forgot about that debacle.
I started to watch the documentary and was ok till the part where there was film of inside the rig, then a special effect where the screen went to snow and white noise, like the explosion had happened right there.
I had that "someone walking over your grave" feeling and had to turn it off after that. Very strange.
I worked on the Piper 3 weeks before the accident. I've seen film of the incident 100's of times.
Every time you see it burning, there's people dying in there. I can't watch them get killed again and again anymore.
GTIR said:
jshell said:
Otispunkmeyer said:
The other rig, tartan, was supplying piper alpha with a 120 bar gas line!!!! When that burst it was funnelling 30 tons of gas into the fire per second!!! f
king hell!
A gas line of a few miles long can't just be depressurised from 120 to 0 bar in a short time though, so I'm not sure it would have made that much difference. What was different was that in the wake of Piper, it was made mandatory to install seabed located shut-off valves to interfield gas pipelines.king hell!So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
Had the oil export to Piper been shutdown that night, it 'may' have prevented the cooking of the gas riser and the final destructive explosion when it failed.
While doing all my QHSE training and NEBOSH stuff, being based in Aberdeen Piper comes up a lot.
A lot of lessons were learned from PA, the permit to work system came about because of it, communication changes were made a lot more noticeable, OIM's were given a lot more autonomy over safety shutdowns.
This is why I laugh at the deepwater horizon thing and the americans going mental that the 'British' have caused this explosion. It was a BP owned field but the rig and most on it were Halliburton and a couple of smaller US firms based people.
Also a HUGE amount fo practices carried out in the US to this day have been banned in the north sea for some 15 years, its a miracle more don't die daily in US fields.
The Cullen report is an interesting read, and it is good to see that changes were effected, however my fear now is that a lot of these installations are over 30 years old, and they are literally coming apart, but they keep trying to squeeze every last penny out of them with no investment.
A lot of lessons were learned from PA, the permit to work system came about because of it, communication changes were made a lot more noticeable, OIM's were given a lot more autonomy over safety shutdowns.
This is why I laugh at the deepwater horizon thing and the americans going mental that the 'British' have caused this explosion. It was a BP owned field but the rig and most on it were Halliburton and a couple of smaller US firms based people.
Also a HUGE amount fo practices carried out in the US to this day have been banned in the north sea for some 15 years, its a miracle more don't die daily in US fields.
The Cullen report is an interesting read, and it is good to see that changes were effected, however my fear now is that a lot of these installations are over 30 years old, and they are literally coming apart, but they keep trying to squeeze every last penny out of them with no investment.
rumple said:
I remember this, prior to this an accommodation platform fell over as well, called the Alexander kieland (I think), Piper Alpha struck a chord because my Dad worked on it in the seventies, he also worked on Claymore.
The AK was a drilling rig, a five-legged design. It was found that there had been a crack in one of the main cross-spars for years so when they hit horrendous weather, one leg fell off.Jesus!
Rick_1138 said:
however my fear now is that a lot of these installations are over 30 years old, and they are literally coming apart, but they keep trying to squeeze every last penny out of them with no investment.
I work in upgrades for offshore installations in Aberdeen, the investment on old installations is massive.ShyTallKnight said:
Rick_1138 said:
the permit to work system came about because of it
Erm not strictly true the PTW system has been in use a long time before the PA incident.It was the communication issue via the PTW system that caused the initial incident.
GTIR said:
Otispunkmeyer said:
Just reading that occidental top brass wouldn't let the sister rig claymore turn off its oil supply to piper alpha. Only doing so after the second explosion, because it would cost a lot of money for such a shut down. If I was the guy on that rig I wouldn't have listened I don't think.
The other rig, tartan, was supplying piper alpha with a 120 bar gas line!!!! When that burst it was funnelling 30 tons of gas into the fire per second!!! fking hell!
Glad my dad decide to work in the Middle East on das island. Though he did eventually go work for occidental on PS-1.
Hang on. The other rig, tartan, was supplying piper alpha with a 120 bar gas line!!!! When that burst it was funnelling 30 tons of gas into the fire per second!!! f
king hell!Glad my dad decide to work in the Middle East on das island. Though he did eventually go work for occidental on PS-1.
So the fire was in full swing and the gas was still being pumped "through" Piper Alpha?
s. GTIR said:
petop said:
GTIR said:
(Just read the Wiki)
So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
you would like to think so.......So basically it was a bad/flawed design (Ok for oil not for gas) coupled with human error and lack of procedures topped off with greed and arrogance from the owners, whoever "they" are I'd imagine it's not one person but a collective of spineless managers.
I imagine it's all very different now.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil...
Forgot about that debacle.
jshell said:
rumple said:
I remember this, prior to this an accommodation platform fell over as well, called the Alexander kieland (I think), Piper Alpha struck a chord because my Dad worked on it in the seventies, he also worked on Claymore.
The AK was a drilling rig, a five-legged design. It was found that there had been a crack in one of the main cross-spars for years so when they hit horrendous weather, one leg fell off.Jesus!
oobster said:
Max_Torque said:
A simple, moving and incredibly powerful documentary. Proof that the BBC can still make decent and sympathetic program content where the subject matter and people involved tell the story without embellishment.
Congratulations to the BBC, and RIP to those not so lucky that fateful night.
Not sure the BBC had much of a hand in making Fire In The Night, but it was an excellent documentary. I was only 15 when it happened, it was very moving to see the men's accounts tonight. Congratulations to the BBC, and RIP to those not so lucky that fateful night.
BBC Scotland said:
Piper Alpha: Fire In The Night is an STV Productions film for BBC Scotland
Ok, so it didn't originate with the BBC directly, but it still shows that they can commission thought provoking and mature content if they try!The Black Flash said:
jshell said:
rumple said:
I remember this, prior to this an accommodation platform fell over as well, called the Alexander kieland (I think), Piper Alpha struck a chord because my Dad worked on it in the seventies, he also worked on Claymore.
The AK was a drilling rig, a five-legged design. It was found that there had been a crack in one of the main cross-spars for years so when they hit horrendous weather, one leg fell off.Jesus!
175Ft to mean sea level! That's one heck of a jump.
I thought the inclusion of some of the original radio exchanges helped to set the, frankly horrible, scene. The section where one of the support/rescue vessels realises it has lost contact with the small RIB that had been picking up survivors is particularly poignant.
I thought the inclusion of some of the original radio exchanges helped to set the, frankly horrible, scene. The section where one of the support/rescue vessels realises it has lost contact with the small RIB that had been picking up survivors is particularly poignant.
Very interesting TV and unusual for a disaster around that time to have so much film of it. There was a photo in the programme which showed a small boat right under the rig while the fire had taken hold and it rather poignantly emphasized what a couple of the men said about the intense heat and it being as if they were under a grill.
If anyone is interested in further reading theres a book available by the same name - 'Fire in the night'. Its a gripping, if harrowing, read and obviously goes into much more detail and first hand accounts of the accident.
I work/worked in a Functional Safety role within oil and gas industry both onshore and offshore and like most others on this thread I find the PA disaster difficult to digest each time I look at it. As some of you have already mentioned PA did have a PTW system in place, unfortunately it was not robust enough to prevent the start of the chain of events that eventually resulted in such loss of life.
For those of you that may be of the opinion something like this couldn't happen again. Dont be. The risk of an incident of this magnitude happening again is ever present. There have been several notable accidents I can draw to your attention:
Buncefield Oil Depot Fire - Largest explosion in the UK since World War 2. 20 large hydrocarbon storage tanks destroyed, wide spread damage, luckily no fatalities.
The cause? - multiple reasons including:
Poor maintenance of High Level Safety Switches
Poor transmission of safety critical product bulletins from manufacturers
LIMITED ABILITY FOR THE BUNCEFIELD DEPOT TO STOP INCOMING SUPPLIES FROM UK REFINERIES (ring a bell with PA anyone?)
poor tank monitoring systems (the operators used a manual timer to infer tank capacity)
insufficient bund integrity (holes in the concrete wall)
The list goes on, and there are a few others I have not listed here.
Texas City Refinery Explosion - Large explosion as a distillation column is brought back online following a maintenance outage. Unfortunately several dead following ignition of the vapour cloud from an idling diesel truck in the vicinity.
The cause? - multiple reasons again:
- Failure of the column level gauging system resulting in an overfill of materials into an atmospheric vent header system, subsequent geysering of material from the vent resulting in the formation of a flammable vapour cloud.
- Poor handover during shift operations
- Inoperative Alarms
- Poor Procedures
- Poor Management of Change (MoC) allowing contractor cabins to be sited too close to the hazardous area! (many of the perished workers were inside these cabins)
Other notable incidents include Flixbrough, Hickson and Welsh, Deepwater and Fukushima (although this may be attributed to natural causes, there were failings in plant design, such as geographically siting of redundant back up generators next to each other.
Anyway I guess the point I'm trying to get at is the risk is always there and unfortunately there doesn't seem to be a step change in industry until we experience a Major Accident Hazard.
Final sobering image:
This was the aftermath of an incident in 2006 on the Rough 47/3B platform where I used to work. Coming back online following a maintenance outage the plant experienced a material failure resulting in a hydrocarbon gas release of several tonnes per second. The release was of such magnitude the atmosphere within the confines of the deck space quickly exceeded the Upper Explosive Limit (meaning there was not enough oxygen to combust). It wasnt until the gas cloud permeated over the side of the platform it was then sucked back into the power generation turbines and mixed with oxygen that it exploded.
Luckily nobody died, although there were several injuries, mostly burns.
This one is particularly interesting as it is likely material xray inspection would not of picked it up. The material failure was found to be the result of a previous unknown corrosive interaction between two metals over the course of several (+15) years.
I work/worked in a Functional Safety role within oil and gas industry both onshore and offshore and like most others on this thread I find the PA disaster difficult to digest each time I look at it. As some of you have already mentioned PA did have a PTW system in place, unfortunately it was not robust enough to prevent the start of the chain of events that eventually resulted in such loss of life.
For those of you that may be of the opinion something like this couldn't happen again. Dont be. The risk of an incident of this magnitude happening again is ever present. There have been several notable accidents I can draw to your attention:
Buncefield Oil Depot Fire - Largest explosion in the UK since World War 2. 20 large hydrocarbon storage tanks destroyed, wide spread damage, luckily no fatalities.
The cause? - multiple reasons including:
Poor maintenance of High Level Safety Switches
Poor transmission of safety critical product bulletins from manufacturers
LIMITED ABILITY FOR THE BUNCEFIELD DEPOT TO STOP INCOMING SUPPLIES FROM UK REFINERIES (ring a bell with PA anyone?)
poor tank monitoring systems (the operators used a manual timer to infer tank capacity)
insufficient bund integrity (holes in the concrete wall)
The list goes on, and there are a few others I have not listed here.
Texas City Refinery Explosion - Large explosion as a distillation column is brought back online following a maintenance outage. Unfortunately several dead following ignition of the vapour cloud from an idling diesel truck in the vicinity.
The cause? - multiple reasons again:
- Failure of the column level gauging system resulting in an overfill of materials into an atmospheric vent header system, subsequent geysering of material from the vent resulting in the formation of a flammable vapour cloud.
- Poor handover during shift operations
- Inoperative Alarms
- Poor Procedures
- Poor Management of Change (MoC) allowing contractor cabins to be sited too close to the hazardous area! (many of the perished workers were inside these cabins)
Other notable incidents include Flixbrough, Hickson and Welsh, Deepwater and Fukushima (although this may be attributed to natural causes, there were failings in plant design, such as geographically siting of redundant back up generators next to each other.
Anyway I guess the point I'm trying to get at is the risk is always there and unfortunately there doesn't seem to be a step change in industry until we experience a Major Accident Hazard.
Final sobering image:
This was the aftermath of an incident in 2006 on the Rough 47/3B platform where I used to work. Coming back online following a maintenance outage the plant experienced a material failure resulting in a hydrocarbon gas release of several tonnes per second. The release was of such magnitude the atmosphere within the confines of the deck space quickly exceeded the Upper Explosive Limit (meaning there was not enough oxygen to combust). It wasnt until the gas cloud permeated over the side of the platform it was then sucked back into the power generation turbines and mixed with oxygen that it exploded.
Luckily nobody died, although there were several injuries, mostly burns.
This one is particularly interesting as it is likely material xray inspection would not of picked it up. The material failure was found to be the result of a previous unknown corrosive interaction between two metals over the course of several (+15) years.
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