Incident Croydon tram
Discussion
"Police have apologised for sending letters to the seven people killed in the Croydon tram crash inviting them to a survivors’ event.
At least one grieving family was left “fuming” after receiving the letters that had been hand-addressed and posted by the British Transport Police.
The force blamed “human error” and said officers had contacted each family to give prior notice that the letter had been posted in error."
https://www.google.co.uk/amp/www.standard.co.uk/ne...
At least one grieving family was left “fuming” after receiving the letters that had been hand-addressed and posted by the British Transport Police.
The force blamed “human error” and said officers had contacted each family to give prior notice that the letter had been posted in error."
https://www.google.co.uk/amp/www.standard.co.uk/ne...
BlackLabel said:
"Police have apologised for sending letters to the seven people killed in the Croydon tram crash inviting them to a survivors’ event.
At least one grieving family was left “fuming” after receiving the letters that had been hand-addressed and posted by the British Transport Police.
The force blamed “human error” and said officers had contacted each family to give prior notice that the letter had been posted in error."
https://www.google.co.uk/amp/www.standard.co.uk/ne...
You couldn't make it up could you?At least one grieving family was left “fuming” after receiving the letters that had been hand-addressed and posted by the British Transport Police.
The force blamed “human error” and said officers had contacted each family to give prior notice that the letter had been posted in error."
https://www.google.co.uk/amp/www.standard.co.uk/ne...
Ian Geary said:
30 injuries reported in that article due lacerations, but the deaths were all people who had fallen out, under or half way out of a window.
But the glass composition won't be a problem in itself if the crash / de railing can be avoided.
Ian
That is true, but if you accept that at some point an accident will occur the next phase is containment, keep everyone inside. Next up provide means for breaking the glass once everything's come to a halt an it's time to try to get out.But the glass composition won't be a problem in itself if the crash / de railing can be avoided.
Ian
The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course
with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?saaby93 said:
hat is true, but if you accept that at some point an accident will occur the next phase is containment, keep everyone inside. Next up provide means for breaking the glass once everything's come to a halt an it's time to try to get out.
The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?
I would have thought that the various doors on these trams can be fairly easily opened in an emergency.The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course
with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?Robertj21a said:
saaby93 said:
hat is true, but if you accept that at some point an accident will occur the next phase is containment, keep everyone inside. Next up provide means for breaking the glass once everything's come to a halt an it's time to try to get out.
The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?
I would have thought that the various doors on these trams can be fairly easily opened in an emergency.The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course
with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?Vipers said:
Robertj21a said:
saaby93 said:
hat is true, but if you accept that at some point an accident will occur the next phase is containment, keep everyone inside. Next up provide means for breaking the glass once everything's come to a halt an it's time to try to get out.
The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?
I would have thought that the various doors on these trams can be fairly easily opened in an emergency.The initial reports sounded daft that it relied on driver knowledge to brake in the tunnel. That the report now confirms that the sole 20kph sign is placed way too late for the bend and the unwary - ridiculous?
Coupled with reports that earlier trains were making the same mistake.
It'll come down to driver error of course
with mitigating circumstances of signing and track layout?'Drivers fell asleep'
From the BBC:-
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-394571...
Croydon tram crash: Drivers 'fell asleep' on fatal line
By Ed Thomas and Noel Titheradge
BBC News
5 hours ago
From the section London These are external links and will open in a new window Share this with Facebook Share this with Twitter Share this with Messenger Share this with Email Share
Media captionDrivers say they have fallen asleep in trams
Four drivers have admitted falling asleep while operating trams in Croydon, where seven people were killed after a tram derailed in November 2016.
Drivers said a safety device, known as "a dead man's handle", failed to activate and stop their trams.
Tram Operations Ltd, which runs the line, said driver fatigue was monitored and controls were "fully functional".
An interim report into November's crash suggested the tram was speeding and the driver may have "lost awareness".
It found there was no emergency braking and the tram had been travelling at 46mph before it crashed in a 13mph zone, near the Sandilands Junction area of Croydon.
However, a BBC investigation for the Victoria Derbyshire programme, has found that at least three trams have been recorded speeding on that same line since the derailment.
One was travelling at 40mph in a 25mph zone. Another is understood to have been speeding near the crash site.
'Very fortunate'
Four current and former drivers have also admitted they have fallen asleep while driving a tram.
Konrad Turner, who retired last year after driving trams in Croydon for 16 years, said he woke up 10 metres after passing the line's George Street stop, adding: "A person was very fortunate that I didn't run them over."
Konrad Turner
Image caption
Former driver Konrad Turner admitted falling asleep in the cab
Mr Turner said his tram's driver safety device - which is used on different types of tram across the UK and Europe - failed to work.
Drivers have to apply 1.5lb of pressure on a lever and push it forward for the tram to accelerate.
If pressure is not maintained, a safety device inside the lever should activate - sounding an alarm and then applying an emergency brake.
There is no suggestion a problem with this device was responsible for the derailment at Sandilands.
Cost their jobs
Guidance from the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) safety regulator says the driver safety device should activate "in the event of driver collapse".
Further guidance also states the device should be designed "so that it cannot be kept in the operating position other than by a vigilant tram driver".
But six drivers said the device was not "fit for purpose".
One said drivers were afraid to tell management about safety device failures because they feared being sacked over falling asleep.
"You're asking somebody to come forward and admit to something that could cost them their job," he said, adding that he believed most drivers had fallen asleep at some point in the career.
Tram control
Image caption
The "dead man's handle" is fitted in the tram's driving lever
The BBC has uncovered three incidents in the past decade where drivers were incapacitated.
They include a near head-on collision, a collision with buffers, and a driver failing to slow down at the line's Morden Road stop.
On that occasion, the driver was only woken when he was spotted by ticket inspectors on the platform, who radioed his cab.
In November, footage released by the Sun showed a driver who appeared to be asleep for at least 30 seconds continuing to power a tram on the line.
Transport for London told the BBC the driver safety device failed to work because the driver had not completely lost consciousness.
"If he were to completely pass out and lose consciousness then he would relax his grip," director Leon Daniels said when shown the footage.
BBC
Image caption
More than 90 million journeys are made on trams in the UK every year
Another driver told the BBC of a dead man's handle failure in May 2016.
He said a spring in the device had broken, causing the alarm and emergency braking to be initially delayed, before failing altogether.
The driver told the BBC he reported it immediately. He said he was told it was safe to continue.
"[I said] if I have a heart attack or become unconscious this tram will go through the buffers at Beckenham junction at 50mph and kill more than likely myself, the majority of people on board and around the tram.
"Only when I said that [did they say], 'Take it out of service straightaway.'"
In a statement, Tram Operations Ltd, said there was not "a full failure" of the driver's safety device and passengers "were not at risk".
'Operating safely'
It says the tram was later "examined" and the fault was rectified the next day.
Transport for London said the "tram was still operating safely".
The Office of Rail and Road (ORR) safety regulator said it was not made aware of the incident, but a "failure should be reported".
When questioned on allegations of trams exceeding speed limits in Croydon, Tram Operations said it had increased speed checks across the tram network since the crash.
Apart from the dead mans handle, is it beyond imagination that software could be incorporated to limit the speed of the tram to the speed limit in force for that particular piece of track.
Is falling asleep when driving a tram occurring in trains as well? Very worrying. That needs investigation further.
Is falling asleep when driving a tram occurring in trains as well? Very worrying. That needs investigation further.
Vipers said:
Apart from the dead mans handle, is it beyond imagination that software could be incorporated to limit the speed of the tram to the speed limit in force for that particular piece of track.
Is falling asleep when driving a tram occurring in trains as well? Very worrying. That needs investigation further.
I'm sure it is. People fall asleep all the time, doing all sorts of things. We have to balance the risk of an automated system failing, against the risk of a human system failing. Ideally, a combination of both systems makes for very little likelihood of the holes in the swiss cheese lining up and resulting in a proper disaster.Is falling asleep when driving a tram occurring in trains as well? Very worrying. That needs investigation further.
An automatic speed limiter on that section, in coordination with a driver who can spot if the automation fails and slow down manually, should improve the risks here.
No idea if it is technically feasible with the existing trains and track, and affordable, in comparison between the perceived risks. Clearly there's a problem though.
Edited by SpeckledJim on Monday 24th April 15:50
longer version of his little nap on the ES website too
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/shocking-...
WTF? This is multiple times now. Is there something about the tram's motion, cab heating, or in-cab noise that is sending them all to sleep?
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/shocking-...
WTF? This is multiple times now. Is there something about the tram's motion, cab heating, or in-cab noise that is sending them all to sleep?
kev1974 said:
longer version of his little nap on the ES website too
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/shocking-...
WTF? This is multiple times now. Is there something about the tram's motion, cab heating, or in-cab noise that is sending them all to sleep?
Would be interesting to see their shift patternshttp://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/shocking-...
WTF? This is multiple times now. Is there something about the tram's motion, cab heating, or in-cab noise that is sending them all to sleep?
scenario8 said:
Unless it is a camera that detects the driver is nodding off and wakes them/stops the tram then it seems like a waste of money to be honest.It is a system that will recognise fatigue. There are several recommendations from the RAIB report of which this is one. These systems have been proposed many times before and are always resisted by the unions.
Of note the recommendations made are not compulsory. The are 'best practice'. This puts the onus on the operator ( not the Authority) to demonstrate the system is safe without ( almost impossible to do given the glare of publicity from the Croydon tragedy) or they have to implement at their cost. And the operator will also be responsible for any industrial relations fall out. Very careful wording from the RAIB; and all the Authorities (Manchester, Edinburgh, Sheffield etc) will feel very relieved. The operators meanwhile, who did not budget on having to implement £x m schemes such as these ( which they can't afford), will all be evaluating their positions.
Of note the recommendations made are not compulsory. The are 'best practice'. This puts the onus on the operator ( not the Authority) to demonstrate the system is safe without ( almost impossible to do given the glare of publicity from the Croydon tragedy) or they have to implement at their cost. And the operator will also be responsible for any industrial relations fall out. Very careful wording from the RAIB; and all the Authorities (Manchester, Edinburgh, Sheffield etc) will feel very relieved. The operators meanwhile, who did not budget on having to implement £x m schemes such as these ( which they can't afford), will all be evaluating their positions.
Edited by nc107 on Monday 4th September 08:29
Edited by nc107 on Monday 4th September 08:34
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