Fingerprints and T5
Author
Discussion

streaky

Original Poster:

19,311 posts

280 months

Saturday 15th March 2008
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Following on from discussions in various threads about the taking and keeping of biometric data, I note that WRT taking passengers' fingerprints at T5, BAA insists the data will be destroyed after 24 hours and will not be passed on to the police.

BAA went on to say that "the move is necessary to prevent criminals, terrorists and illegal immigrants trying to bypass border controls."

So how does that work, BAA? How do you tell someone is a criminal without passing the data to the police, or having access to NFIS ... which you don't? How do you tell someone is a terrorist from their fingerprints? And why bother about illegal immigrants when the police give them free train tickets to Croydon ... unaccompanied?

As usual, cosmetic security.

Streaky

Parrot of Doom

23,075 posts

265 months

Sunday 16th March 2008
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Presumably the police give BAA fingerprint scans of anyone they want to know about. The 24 hour limit will be to know where anyone suspicious has gone, say a child abduction, an armed robbery, etc.

At places like airports I don't mind this level of security. When it gets to train stations, then I'll have a problem.

miggy man 3

1,916 posts

227 months

Sunday 16th March 2008
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I assume it will livescan rather than ink?! If so then it makes sense about checking passengers.

streaky

Original Poster:

19,311 posts

280 months

Sunday 16th March 2008
quotequote all
Parrot of Doom said:
Presumably the police give BAA fingerprint scans of anyone they want to know about.
Allegedly not ... hence my question about their value.

However, I wouldn't put anything past this present government. Indeed, I imagine they would easily acquiesce to a request from the US to check every passenger against NAFIS and turf out those whose fingerprints are in the system (probably including police officers smile - because of a UK screw-up).

As the US is now requiring masses of personal data (including financial data, phone numbers and email address - which makes it easy for them to check all undeleted emails held by your ISP) on all travellers overflying the US (e.g. en route to the Carribean islands) as well as landing therein, fingerprints would undoubtedly be requested where available.

Mind you, this is because of the design of T5. A paranoid, conspiracy-theorist might imagine this was deliberate to open up the opportunity to take fingerprints. BAA waited until the 11th hour before announcing it.

Parrot of Doom said:
At places like airports I don't mind this level of security. When it gets to train stations, then I'll have a problem.
Remember Pastor Martin Niemöller! You are demonstrating his classical symptoms.

Streaky

voyds9

8,490 posts

314 months

Sunday 16th March 2008
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Parrot of Doom said:
Presumably the police give BAA fingerprint scans of anyone they want to know about.
Got to be illegal, the police have now stopped issuing leaflets to shop with pictures of known shoplifters on as it infringes their human rights.

AndyRw

740 posts

240 months

Sunday 16th March 2008
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voyds9 said:
...the police have now stopped issuing leaflets to shop with pictures of known shoplifters on as it infringes their human rights.
I guess it varies by area as we still issue photo sheets of our local regulars, though only to those that have SIA security staff. The Railway station gets it too, as well as images from CCTV of jobs where we're trying to find out who people are. Likewise we still issue photographs of those on the Pubwatch list.

Guybrush

4,364 posts

237 months

Sunday 16th March 2008
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I trust the airport's use of this data about as much as I trust the DVLA's selling of data to any clamper etc who will pay for it.

Sheepy

3,164 posts

280 months

Monday 17th March 2008
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I wonder how many on here are aware of the reasons why BAA think that fingerprinting is necessary?

The whole problem with T5 is that there is one large area for all passengers whether their flight is international or domestic.

BAA feel that there is a potential for international arrivals who are catching a connecting international flight (and thus apparently don't pass through uk immigration) swapping boarding cards with someone who is on a domestic flight. This would allow someone potentially "undesirable" to fly into T5, swap to a domestic flight and end up anywhere in the UK without having been through immigration. This could be anyone from a terrorist to a drug-smuggler (if you believe BAA).

The fingerprint plan is that everyone is printed at check-in, and compared at the departure gate so that the same person who checked-in is getting on the flight. There is no need to retain the prints beyond the time the flight leaves, and there is no need to tie in with any external database to check for criminals etc. The whole point (so BAA say) is to prevent anything dodgy happening within T5.

Now I can see how this would stop someone from sneaking into the country, but I can't see how it woudl stop drug-smuggling. Surely all that they now need is an international flight into T5, with an international connection and then they hand the stuff off to someone on a domestic flight. No-one passes customs, so nothing gets stopped (and no fingerprinting will catch that).

streaky

Original Poster:

19,311 posts

280 months

Monday 17th March 2008
quotequote all
And if you thought it would end with T5, read and weep:

Observer said:
Primary school children should be eligible for the DNA database if they exhibit behaviour indicating they may become criminals in later life, according to Britain's most senior police forensics expert.

Gary Pugh, director of forensic sciences at Scotland Yard and the new DNA spokesman for the Association of Chief Police Officers (Acpo), said a debate was needed on how far Britain should go in identifying potential offenders, given that some experts believe it is possible to identify future offending traits in children as young as five.

'If we have a primary means of identifying people before they offend, then in the long-term the benefits of targeting younger people are extremely large,' said Pugh. 'You could argue the younger the better. Criminologists say some people will grow out of crime; others won't. We have to find who are possibly going to be the biggest threat to society.'

Pugh admitted that the deeply controversial suggestion raised issues of parental consent, potential stigmatisation and the role of teachers in identifying future offenders, but said society needed an open, mature discussion on how best to tackle crime before it took place. There are currently 4.5 million genetic samples on the UK database - the largest in Europe - but police believe more are required to reduce crime further. 'The number of unsolved crimes says we are not sampling enough of the right people,' Pugh told The Observer. However, he said the notion of universal sampling - everyone being forced to give their genetic samples to the database - is currently prohibited by cost and logistics.

Civil liberty groups condemned his comments last night by likening them to an excerpt from a 'science fiction novel'. One teaching union warned that it was a step towards a 'police state'.

Pugh's call for the government to consider options such as placing primary school children who have not been arrested on the database is supported by elements of criminological theory. A well-established pattern of offending involves relatively trivial offences escalating to more serious crimes. Senior Scotland Yard criminologists are understood to be confident that techniques are able to identify future offenders.

A recent report from the think-tank Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) called for children to be targeted between the ages of five and 12 with cognitive behavioural therapy, parenting programmes and intensive support. Prevention should start young, it said, because prolific offenders typically began offending between the ages of 10 and 13. Julia Margo, author of the report, entitled 'Make me a Criminal', said: 'You can carry out a risk factor analysis where you look at the characteristics of an individual child aged five to seven and identify risk factors that make it more likely that they would become an offender.' However, she said that placing young children on a database risked stigmatising them by identifying them in a 'negative' way.

Shami Chakrabarti, director of the civil rights group Liberty, denounced any plan to target youngsters. 'Whichever bright spark at Acpo thought this one up should go back to the business of policing or the pastime of science fiction novels,' she said. 'The British public is highly respectful of the police and open even to eccentric debate, but playing politics with our innocent kids is a step too far.'

Chris Davis, of the National Primary Headteachers' Association, said most teachers and parents would find the suggestion an 'anathema' and potentially very dangerous. 'It could be seen as a step towards a police state,' he said. 'It is condemning them at a very young age to something they have not yet done. They may have the potential to do something, but we all have the potential to do things. To label children at that stage and put them on a register is going too far.'

Davis admitted that most teachers could identify children who 'had the potential to have a more challenging adult life', but said it was the job of teachers to support them.

Pugh, though, believes that measures to identify criminals early would save the economy huge sums - violent crime alone costs the UK £13bn a year - and significantly reduce the number of offences committed. However, he said the British public needed to move away from regarding anyone on the DNA database as a criminal and accepted it was an emotional issue.

'Fingerprints, somehow, are far less contentious,' he said. 'We have children giving their fingerprints when they are borrowing books from a library.'

Last week it emerged that the number of 10 to 18-year-olds placed on the DNA database after being arrested will have reached around 1.5 million this time next year. Since 2004 police have had the power to take DNA samples from anyone over the age of 10 who is arrested, regardless of whether they are later charged, convicted, or found to be innocent.

Concern over the issue of civil liberties will be further amplified by news yesterday that commuters using Oyster smart cards could have their movements around cities secretly monitored under new counter-terrorism powers being sought by the security services.
And there's more:

Oserver said:
Millions of commuters could have their private movements around cities secretly monitored under new counter-terrorism powers being sought by the security services.

Records of journeys made by people using smart cards that allow 17 million Britons to travel by underground, bus and train with a single swipe at the ticket barrier are among a welter of private information held by the state to which MI5 and police counter-terrorism officers want access in order to help identify patterns of suspicious behaviour.

The request by the security services, described by shadow Home Secretary David Davis last night as 'extraordinary', forms part of a fierce Whitehall debate over how much access the state should have to people's private lives in its efforts to combat terrorism.

It comes as the Cabinet Office finalises Gordon Brown's new national security strategy, expected to identify a string of new threats to Britain - ranging from future 'water wars' between countries left drought-ridden by climate change to cyber-attacks using computer hacking technology to disrupt vital elements of national infrastructure.

The fear of cyber-warfare has climbed Whitehall's agenda since last year's attack on the Baltic nation of Estonia, in which Russian hackers swamped state servers with millions of electronic messages until they collapsed. The Estonian defence and foreign ministries and major banks were paralysed, while even its emergency services call system was temporarily knocked out: the attack was seen as a warning that battles once fought by invading armies or aerial bombardment could soon be replaced by virtual, but equally deadly, wars in cyberspace.

While such new threats may grab headlines, the critical question for the new security agenda is how far Britain is prepared to go in tackling them. What are the limits of what we want our security services to know? And could they do more to identify suspects before they strike?

One solution being debated in Whitehall is an unprecedented unlocking of data held by public bodies, such as the Oyster card records maintained by Transport for London and smart cards soon to be introduced in other cities in the UK, for use in the war against terror. The Office of the Information Commissioner, the watchdog governing data privacy, confirmed last night that it had discussed the issue with government but declined to give details, citing issues of national security.

Currently the security services can demand the Oyster records of specific individuals under investigation to establish where they have been, but cannot trawl the whole database. But supporters of calls for more sharing of data argue that apparently trivial snippets - like the journeys an individual makes around the capital - could become important pieces of the jigsaw when fitted into a pattern of other publicly held information on an individual's movements, habits, education and other personal details. That could lead, they argue, to the unmasking of otherwise undetected suspects.

Critics, however, fear a shift towards US-style 'data mining', a controversial technique using powerful computers to sift and scan millions of pieces of data, seeking patterns of behaviour which match the known profiles of terrorist suspects. They argue that it is unfair for millions of innocent people to have their privacy invaded on the off-chance of finding a handful of bad apples.

'It's looking for a needle in a haystack, and we all make up the haystack,' said former Labour minister Michael Meacher, who has a close interest in data sharing. 'Whether all our details have to be reviewed because there is one needle among us - I don't think the case is made.'

Jago Russell, policy officer at the campaign group Liberty, said technological advances had made 'mass computerised fishing expeditions' easier to undertake, but they offered no easy answers. 'The problem is what do you do once you identify somebody who has a profile that suggests suspicions,' he said. 'Once the security services have identified somebody who fits a pattern, it creates an inevitable pressure to impose restrictions.'

Individuals wrongly identified as suspicious might lose high-security jobs, or have their immigration status brought into doubt, he said. Ministers are also understood to share concerns over civil liberties, following public opposition to ID cards, and the debate is so sensitive that it may not even form part of Brown's published strategy.

But if there is no consensus yet on the defence, there is an emerging agreement on the mode of attack. The security strategy will argue that in the coming decades Britain faces threats of a new and different order. And its critics argue the government is far from ready.

The cyber-assault on Estonia confirmed that the West now faces a relatively cheap, low-risk means of warfare that can be conducted from anywhere in the world, with the power to plunge developed nations temporarily into the stone age, disabling everything from payroll systems that ensure millions of employees get paid to the sewage treatment processes that make our water safe to drink or the air traffic control systems keeping planes stacked safely above Heathrow.

And it is one of the few weapons which is most effective against more sophisticated western societies, precisely because of their reliance on computers. 'As we become more advanced, we become more vulnerable,' says Alex Neill, head of the Asia Security programme at the defence think-tank RUSI, who is an expert on cyber-attack.

The nightmare scenario now emerging is its use by terrorists as a so-called 'force multiplier' - combining a cyber-attack to paralyse the emergency services with a simultaneous atrocity such as the London Tube bombings.

Victims would literally have nowhere to turn for help, raising the death toll and sowing immeasurable panic. 'Instead of using three or four aircraft as in 9/11, you could do one major event and then screw up the communications network behind the emergency services, or attack the Underground control network so you have one bomb but you lock up the whole network,' says Davis. 'You take the ramifications of the attack further. The other thing to bear in mind is that we are ultimately vulnerable because London is a financial centre.'

In other words, cyber-warfare does not have to kill to bring a state to its knees: hackers could, for example, wipe electronic records detailing our bank accounts, turning millionaires into apparent paupers overnight.

So how easy would it be? Estonia suffered a relatively crude form of attack known as 'denial of service', while paralysing a secure British server would be likely to require more sophisticated 'spy' software which embeds itself quietly in a computer network and scans for secret passwords or useful information - activating itself later to wreak havoc.

Neill said that would require specialist knowledge to target the weakest link in any system: its human user. 'You will get an email, say, that looks like it's from a trusted colleague, but in fact that email has been cloned. There will be an attachment that looks relevant to your work: it's an interesting document, but embedded in it invisibly is "malware" rogue software which implants itself in the operating systems. From that point, the computer is compromised and can be used as a platform to exploit other networks.'

Only governments and highly sophisticated criminal organisations have such a capability now, he argues, but there are strong signs that al-Qaeda is acquiring it: 'It is a hallmark of al-Qaeda anyway that they do simultaneous bombings to try to herd victims into another area of attack.'

The West, of course, may not simply be the victim of cyber-wars: the United States is widely believed to be developing an attack capability, with suspicions that Baghdad's infrastructure was electronically disrupted during the 2003 invasion.

So given its ability to cause as much damage as a traditional bomb, should cyber-attack be treated as an act of war? And what rights under international law does a country have to respond, with military force if necessary? Next month Nato will tackle such questions in a strategy detailing how it would handle a cyber-attack on an alliance member. Suleyman Anil, Nato's leading expert on cyber-attack, hinted at its contents when he told an e-security conference in London last week that cyber-attacks should be taken as seriously as a missile strike - and warned that a determined attack on western infrastructure would be 'practically impossible to stop'.

Tensions are likely to increase in a globalised economy, where no country can afford to shut its borders to foreign labour - an issue graphically highlighted for Gordon Brown weeks into his premiership by the alleged terrorist attack on Glasgow airport, when it emerged that the suspects included overseas doctors who entered Britain to work in the NHS.

A review led by Homeland Security Minister Admiral Sir Alan West into issues raised by the Glasgow attack has been grappling with one key question: could more be done to identify rogue elements who are apparently well integrated with their local communities?

Which is where, some within the intelligence community insist, access to personal data already held by public bodies - from the Oyster register to public sector employment records - could come in. The debate is not over yet.
Will the last free person leaving the country, please turn out the light (and save the world).

Streaky

streaky

Original Poster:

19,311 posts

280 months

Sunday 23rd March 2008
quotequote all
The Information Commissioner's Office steps in:

Mail on Sunday said:
The opening of Heathrow's new Terminal 5 was under threat last night after its management was warned that a plan to fingerprint passengers may be illegal.

The £4.3billion terminal is due to open on Thursday.

But the Information Commissioner has told Spanish-owned airport operator BAA that its plan to fingerprint all passengers may breach the Data Protection Act.

Does the plan infringe our human rights? Tell us your opinion below

The Commissioner's office says passengers ordered to give their prints should do so "under protest" and that such a scheme would normally be considered "intrusive".

It has launched an investigation into whether BAA "took account of the data protection implications of its proposal".

Unless Heathrow provides evidence that the move is necessary, the Commissioner has the power to order it to stop fingerprinting passengers or face legal action.

Last night there were fears that Terminal 5's opening could be delayed, potentially causing flight chaos at Heathrow.

David Smith, the Deputy Information Commissioner, said: "We want to know why Heathrow needs to fingerprint passengers at all.

"Taking photographs is less intrusive. So far we have not heard BAA's case for requesting fingerprints.

"If we find there is a breach of data protection legislation, we would hope to persuade them to put things right.

"If that is not successful we can issue an enforcement notice. If they don't comply, it is then a criminal offence and they can be prosecuted."

The airport claims fingerprinting is necessary so that all passengers - domestic and international - can mix freely in Terminal 5's huge airside shopping mall.

Domestic passengers at Terminal 1 are already being fingerprinted so that they, too, can be routed into its main airside lounges with shops and restaurants, rather than less well-appointed domestic departure areas.

Passengers passing through security place a hand on a scanner which records four fingerprints. They also face a camera and are photographed.

Leaflets issued to domestic passengers at Heathrow say: "To ensure we maintain the highest levels of border security, we are required to introduce additional controls for passengers travelling to UK destinations.

"For this reason, we will capture the photo and fingerprints of passengers. Only passengers who comply with these additional controls will be able to fly to UK destinations."

But critics say the main reason for common departure areas is because BAA wants all passengers to be able to spend money in "duty free" shops.

Its website says: "We're transforming Heathrow to make big improvements for all passengers. Domestic passengers will in future use the same departure lounges as international passengers.

"That means all our passengers will enjoy the same wide choice of shops and restaurants."

The Information Commissioner took action after a complaint from civil liberties group Privacy International.

It said that "compulsory fingerprinting...will substantially violate UK Data Protection law", adding: "To diminish privacy rights in order to achieve greater sales revenue is a disquieting development."

The so-called open terminals have major security risks.

An incoming international passenger could potentially switch tickets with an accomplice booked on a domestic flight.

The international passenger - possibly a terrorist or a criminal - would then be able to fly elsewhere in Britain and enter the country without being checked by the immigration authorities.

However, other airports, including London Gatwick and Manchester, already have open terminals.

Instead of fingerprinting, passengers are photographed as they pass through security and have their identities rechecked at the departure gate.

But BAA says the fingerprinting at Terminal 5 has been installed under orders from the Government.

It says a working group, which included the Home Office's Borders and Immigration Agency, decided it was the "most robust system" to protect Britain's borders.

In a statement, BAA said: "When BAA announced plans for common departure lounges, the BIA was keen on a reliable biometric element to border control.

"Fingerprinting was selected as the most robust method by BAA, the BIA and other government departments.

"The data is encrypted immediately and is destroyed within 24 hours of use, in accordance with the Data Protection Act.

"It does not include personal details nor is it cross-referenced with any other database."

But last night the Home Office denied ordering Heathrow to fingerprint passengers.

A spokesman said: "We required a plan to keep the UK border secure. The design of the scheme is a matter for BAA."
Note the typical "he said, she said". BAA says the government requires it to take fingerprints; the government denies this. I believe the BAA (albeit aggravated by a financial motive). It seems no-one can say whether the forced taking of fingerprints by other than the police is legal (despite several schools doing it to protect library books from theft ... FFS!).

Streaky

Jasandjules

72,686 posts

260 months

Sunday 23rd March 2008
quotequote all
AndyRw said:
I guess it varies by area as we still issue photo sheets of our local regulars, though only to those that have SIA security staff. The Railway station gets it too, as well as images from CCTV of jobs where we're trying to find out who people are. Likewise we still issue photographs of those on the Pubwatch list.
Possible/Probable breach of R v Ellis then....

Chrispy Porker

17,761 posts

259 months

Sunday 23rd March 2008
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Jasandjules said:
AndyRw said:
I guess it varies by area as we still issue photo sheets of our local regulars, though only to those that have SIA security staff. The Railway station gets it too, as well as images from CCTV of jobs where we're trying to find out who people are. Likewise we still issue photographs of those on the Pubwatch list.
Possible/Probable breach of R v Ellis then....
I should have a look at the front page of Bristol Evening Post for yesterday...

Jasandjules

72,686 posts

260 months

Sunday 23rd March 2008
quotequote all
Chrispy Porker said:
I should have a look at the front page of Bristol Evening Post for yesterday...
Should you? Well, off you go then.....biggrin

Oilchange

9,743 posts

291 months

Sunday 23rd March 2008
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FFS just hack it and wipe it.


what could be easier...

mark69sheer

3,906 posts

233 months

Monday 24th March 2008
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If the fingerprints aren't cross referenced then what is the point of recording them?

So you walk in they take a record of your fingerprints and then they can do what exactly without a cross reference?

Someone is telling porky pies..