Memorial for Bomber Command
Discussion
More than 60 years after the end of the Second World War, Bomber Command are still yet to receive a special campaign medal.
Despite the fact that of the 125,000 aircrew of Bomber Command 55,573 pilots and crew were killed, one of the highest Casualty rates of any theatre of the war.
The dead included 38,462 Britons, 9,980 Canadians (58 per cent of the Canadians who flew with Bomber Command were killed), 4,050 Australians, 1,703 New Zealanders, 977 Poles, 218 Free French, 68 Americans attached to Bomber Command from the United States Army Air Force, 34 Norwegians and three Indians - as well as 1,479 ground crew.
There is now a campaign to fund a memorial in London for Bomber Command. You can donate through the link below.
https://www.bmycharity.com/bombercommandassociatio...
Despite the fact that of the 125,000 aircrew of Bomber Command 55,573 pilots and crew were killed, one of the highest Casualty rates of any theatre of the war.
The dead included 38,462 Britons, 9,980 Canadians (58 per cent of the Canadians who flew with Bomber Command were killed), 4,050 Australians, 1,703 New Zealanders, 977 Poles, 218 Free French, 68 Americans attached to Bomber Command from the United States Army Air Force, 34 Norwegians and three Indians - as well as 1,479 ground crew.
There is now a campaign to fund a memorial in London for Bomber Command. You can donate through the link below.
https://www.bmycharity.com/bombercommandassociatio...
What happened to the Irish? Are they included with the Brits?
I am totally in favour of a memorial. It's a real shame that they haven't had one yet. This year, nearly all the forgotten "war workers" (Land Girls, Bevan Boys etc) have received belated "campaign medals". And yet Bomber Command personnel remain unrecognised. It's a national disgrace, to be honest.
I am totally in favour of a memorial. It's a real shame that they haven't had one yet. This year, nearly all the forgotten "war workers" (Land Girls, Bevan Boys etc) have received belated "campaign medals". And yet Bomber Command personnel remain unrecognised. It's a national disgrace, to be honest.
M@H said:
That is sadly because Bomber Command were villified by the "general public" for the bombing of many of thier targets, despite only following the direct orders from the War office - naturally the Govt let them take the blame too 
Cheers,
Matt
But this is a relatively recent thing is it not? They were not vilified at the time and immediately afterwards. It is mainly those who were not alive to live through that period that are being critical with hindsight. Opinion should not diminish the bravery and sacrifice of those who flew bombers because the consequences were distasteful to modern perception.Cheers,
Matt
They weren't vilified by the general public at all - especially during the war. Of course, there were reservations about their area bombing campaign - even during the war and even from some politicians. Some politicians supported the bombing offensive at first but changed their minds as the war progressed.
Reluctance to issue a memorial or a campaign medal is more to do with avoiding other nations' sensitivities.
Reluctance to issue a memorial or a campaign medal is more to do with avoiding other nations' sensitivities.
M@H said:
That is sadly because Bomber Command were villified by the "general public" for the bombing of many of thier targets, despite only following the direct orders from the War office - naturally the Govt let them take the blame too
Cheers,
Matt
Madness that. Following orders and being villified for it. Also, how did the public think the War would be one, dropping tonnes of strongly worded letters of dissaproval of the Nazi reigeme over Germany?Cheers,
Matt
tank slapper said:
M@H said:
That is sadly because Bomber Command were villified by the "general public" for the bombing of many of thier targets, despite only following the direct orders from the War office - naturally the Govt let them take the blame too
Cheers,
Matt
But this is a relatively recent thing is it not? They were not vilified at the time and immediately afterwards.Cheers,
Matt
Edited to add and as Eric says above this was more widespread among the politicians than the general public.
Edited by JagLover on Friday 31st October 14:02
By the last stages of the war we were just using area bombing and several politicians and churchmen did speak out against it. It's debatable just how necessary or effective such bombing tactics were by late 44 and 45. More bombs were dropped after mid 1944 than in the entire preceding period.
On the flip side, before D Day it was our only way of striking back and showing we were still in the war. It shouldn't be forgotten that the Germans reaped what they had sown as well; they did the same to London, Warsaw, Amsterdam and so on
On the flip side, before D Day it was our only way of striking back and showing we were still in the war. It shouldn't be forgotten that the Germans reaped what they had sown as well; they did the same to London, Warsaw, Amsterdam and so on
MK4 Slowride said:
Madness that. Following orders and being villified for it. Also, how did the public think the War would be one, dropping tonnes of strongly worded letters of dissaproval of the Nazi reigeme over Germany?
They tried that immediately after invasion of Poland. The hun got an almighty leafletting but carried on regardless.MK4 Slowride said:
M@H said:
That is sadly because Bomber Command were villified by the "general public" for the bombing of many of thier targets, despite only following the direct orders from the War office - naturally the Govt let them take the blame too
Cheers,
Matt
Madness that. Following orders and being villified for itCheers,
Matt
From what I have read a lot of the aircrews found the bombing of cities to be terrible acts. However, there was a "rather them than us, as long as I get home" approach that is entirely understandable.
Many politicians, including Churchill questioned some of Bomber Command's reasoning for targeting areas.
I think that a memorial would be a good things because it makes people not only remember the fallen but makes them also think of the reasons for that loss.
Many politicians, including Churchill questioned some of Bomber Command's reasoning for targeting areas.
I think that a memorial would be a good things because it makes people not only remember the fallen but makes them also think of the reasons for that loss.
southendpier said:
Many politicians, including Churchill questioned some of Bomber Command's reasoning for targeting areas.
And there lies the misconception - Bomber command were following orders from the War Office - they were not directly in touch with the intelligence that was choosing the targets - Please get this right - the War Office (i.e. Govt) chose the Targets, not Bomber command.Cheers,
Matt.
Edited by M@H on Friday 31st October 14:56
I wouldn't completely exonerate Bomber Command from the responsibility of picking the targets either. The strategic planners who selected targets came from many governmental departments - not just the War Office. Economists, statisticians, aircrew, scientists, engineers etc were all involved in target selection.
The eventual head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, was a huge exponent of area bombing of cities and tried to block any moves to have his bombers diverted to what he considered to be "panacea targets". He vehemently opposed the transfer of his crews to Coastal Command - even when then U-Boat menace was threatening to bring Britain to its knees. He also opposed the diversion of his bombing force to tactical targets in France during the lead up to D-Day. He even tried to block the famous Dambusters Raid on the basis that it waould be too difficult to accomplish (it wasn't) and too costly to the crews (it was).
The logic behind the bomber offensive is complex and it became extremely political and sensitive, even before the war had ended.
Read Max Hastings' book "Bomber Command" for a well written account of what happened.
The eventual head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, was a huge exponent of area bombing of cities and tried to block any moves to have his bombers diverted to what he considered to be "panacea targets". He vehemently opposed the transfer of his crews to Coastal Command - even when then U-Boat menace was threatening to bring Britain to its knees. He also opposed the diversion of his bombing force to tactical targets in France during the lead up to D-Day. He even tried to block the famous Dambusters Raid on the basis that it waould be too difficult to accomplish (it wasn't) and too costly to the crews (it was).
The logic behind the bomber offensive is complex and it became extremely political and sensitive, even before the war had ended.
Read Max Hastings' book "Bomber Command" for a well written account of what happened.
Eric Mc said:
I wouldn't completely exonerate Bomber Command from the responsibility of picking the targets either. The strategic planners who selected targets came from many governmental departments - not just the War Office. Economists, statisticians, aircrew, scientists, engineers etc were all involved in target selection.
The eventual head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, was a huge exponent of area bombing of cities and tried to block any moves to have his bombers diverted to what he considered to be "panacea targets". He vehemently opposed the transfer of his crews to Coastal Command - even when then U-Boat menace was threatening to bring Britain to its knees. He also opposed the diversion of his bombing force to tactical targets in France during the lead up to D-Day. He even tried to block the famous Dambusters Raid on the basis that it waould be too difficult to accomplish (it wasn't) and too costly to the crews (it was).
The logic behind the bomber offensive is complex and it became extremely political and sensitive, even before the war had ended.
Read Max Hastings' book "Bomber Command" for a well written account of what happened.
I would recommend that book as well.The eventual head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, was a huge exponent of area bombing of cities and tried to block any moves to have his bombers diverted to what he considered to be "panacea targets". He vehemently opposed the transfer of his crews to Coastal Command - even when then U-Boat menace was threatening to bring Britain to its knees. He also opposed the diversion of his bombing force to tactical targets in France during the lead up to D-Day. He even tried to block the famous Dambusters Raid on the basis that it waould be too difficult to accomplish (it wasn't) and too costly to the crews (it was).
The logic behind the bomber offensive is complex and it became extremely political and sensitive, even before the war had ended.
Read Max Hastings' book "Bomber Command" for a well written account of what happened.
In regards to Harris dislike of 'diverting' his bomb crews from what he regarded as their prime mission. It is worth bearing in mind that in the early years of the war precision bombing, particularly at night, was extremely difficult. The only target the bombers had much chance of hitting was one the size of a city!
Absolutely. In 1939/40 and 1941 they couldn't even find the cities, let alone individual targets.
Of course, by 1943/44 that had changed completely. Part of the reason why Bomber Command was so effective at burning the heart out of major German cities was their vastly improved ability to find the city centres.
Of course, by 1943/44 that had changed completely. Part of the reason why Bomber Command was so effective at burning the heart out of major German cities was their vastly improved ability to find the city centres.
I was having a conversation with some friends about this last night! So many people don't know there wasn't/isn't a campaign medal for those who served in Bomber command.
My Grandfather was a aircraft mechanic working on Lancs and Sterlings for the majority of the war, however he did spend time working on a squadron of american B17s lent to us by the yanks for a while.
Sadley he died 10 years go, I've always thought it a disgrace that they were denied a medal.
As for public squeamishness about area bombing after the war (and it still gets vilified today) all I can say is that perhaps they would have prefered to let the Germans win the war unopposed. Albert Speer states in his book that in his opinion, 6 more raids like the one on Hamburg would in all probability finished the war. Of course we weren't to know that at the time or, arguably have the capacity even if we were aware of it, but it shows the effectivness of area bombing had.
Killing tens of thousands of civillians is of course terrible, but both sides did with heavy bombing and thats the tragedy of war isn't it.
My Grandfather was a aircraft mechanic working on Lancs and Sterlings for the majority of the war, however he did spend time working on a squadron of american B17s lent to us by the yanks for a while.
Sadley he died 10 years go, I've always thought it a disgrace that they were denied a medal.
As for public squeamishness about area bombing after the war (and it still gets vilified today) all I can say is that perhaps they would have prefered to let the Germans win the war unopposed. Albert Speer states in his book that in his opinion, 6 more raids like the one on Hamburg would in all probability finished the war. Of course we weren't to know that at the time or, arguably have the capacity even if we were aware of it, but it shows the effectivness of area bombing had.
Killing tens of thousands of civillians is of course terrible, but both sides did with heavy bombing and thats the tragedy of war isn't it.
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