Interesting read about Air France 447
Discussion
For some reason this whole event totally passed me by, but after finding about it yesterday, I was really intrigued to learn how 3 trained pilots, could fail to recognise they were stalling their plane.
After trying to find out, I found this article, which explains things very well. I've always been wary of the Airbus cockpit design, I know some people rate it highly, but I just don't like the way the system will sometimes take control over the pilots. As of such, I've always preferred the traditional Boeing cockpits.
Anyway sorry if this has been discussed before but I found the article so interesting, I thought I'd share it.
ETA the link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-...
After trying to find out, I found this article, which explains things very well. I've always been wary of the Airbus cockpit design, I know some people rate it highly, but I just don't like the way the system will sometimes take control over the pilots. As of such, I've always preferred the traditional Boeing cockpits.
Anyway sorry if this has been discussed before but I found the article so interesting, I thought I'd share it.
ETA the link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-...
Edited by TheTurbonator on Thursday 5th September 12:58
TheTurbonator said:
For some reason this whole event totally passed me by, but after finding about it yesterday, I was really intrigued to learn how 3 trained pilots, could fail to recognise they were stalling their plane.
After trying to find out, I found this article, which explains things very well. I've always been wary of the Airbus cockpit design, I know some people rate it highly, but I just don't like the way the system will sometimes take control over the pilots. As of such, I've always preferred the traditional Boeing cockpits.
Anyway sorry if this has been discussed before but I found the article so interesting, I thought I'd share it.
ETA the link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-...
I'm confused. in 447 the system did not take control, rather it gave up and gave control back to the pilots who binned it under pressure. The Captain when he made it back understood the scenario and was trying to get the nose down and recover the stall, but sadly too late.After trying to find out, I found this article, which explains things very well. I've always been wary of the Airbus cockpit design, I know some people rate it highly, but I just don't like the way the system will sometimes take control over the pilots. As of such, I've always preferred the traditional Boeing cockpits.
Anyway sorry if this has been discussed before but I found the article so interesting, I thought I'd share it.
ETA the link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-...
Edited by TheTurbonator on Thursday 5th September 12:58
What the agency's are saying is that there is a culture of using the automation to such an extent that some pilots skills are regressing, and that operators should consider relaxing some of their operating restrictions so that pilots get more handling experience.
I know that's not the reason for the accident, I was just merely stating my own reasons for not liking the Airbus cockpits. I'm sorry if it sounded like I was implying that was the cause.
On a totally unrelated design though, the fact that the controls don't mimic each other, has been questioned as maybe a contributing factor. If the pilot in the other seat had known his colleague was pulling back on the stick, he might have understood sooner what was happening.
On a totally unrelated design though, the fact that the controls don't mimic each other, has been questioned as maybe a contributing factor. If the pilot in the other seat had known his colleague was pulling back on the stick, he might have understood sooner what was happening.
Edited by TheTurbonator on Thursday 5th September 13:34
Edited by TheTurbonator on Thursday 5th September 13:37
An operator control and feedback system that relies entirely on the visual sense (as in this case) is perhaps unwise as in a panic situation that sense becomes quickly overloaded. Tactile control feedback in this instance may very well have provided the information needed to the pilots to rectify the situation in short order. For both sticks to mirror each other's movements as well as the Autopilot commands would eliminate this issue all together and not be terribly difficult to implement (force feedback joysticks anyone?)
To put it another way, imagine a car which had a fully automated self drive cruise control that disconnected the steering wheel from the rack when enabled, and instead conveyed the steering angle via a gauge on the dash. I don't fancy trying to regain control mid corner if for some "computer says no" reason the system decides to disengage itself, and the steering wheel stays where it is but now directly controls the direction of travel. Good luck trying to figure out the steering wheel angle reading in relation to your input into the steering wheel before it's too late.
I think Airbus should consider a rethink on their policy of totally disconnected flight controls from a tactile standpoint. Purely for the purpose of involving an extra sense that the pilot can receive critical information from immediately and without having to look at one of the many instruments that would be screaming at you in an emergency.
To put it another way, imagine a car which had a fully automated self drive cruise control that disconnected the steering wheel from the rack when enabled, and instead conveyed the steering angle via a gauge on the dash. I don't fancy trying to regain control mid corner if for some "computer says no" reason the system decides to disengage itself, and the steering wheel stays where it is but now directly controls the direction of travel. Good luck trying to figure out the steering wheel angle reading in relation to your input into the steering wheel before it's too late.
I think Airbus should consider a rethink on their policy of totally disconnected flight controls from a tactile standpoint. Purely for the purpose of involving an extra sense that the pilot can receive critical information from immediately and without having to look at one of the many instruments that would be screaming at you in an emergency.
Tony2or4 said:
MitchT said:
The last big passenger jet to be binned by an incompetent crew was a Boeing 777.
Do you mean the British Airways 777 crash-landing at Heathrow? I thought that one had been established as due to fuel flow problems rather than pilot error.Chuck328 said:
I think he meant the Asiana @ SFO....
Damn, how could I have forgotten about that one? It was only 2 months ago.
Simpo Two said:
Seems obvious to me.
This subject has, however, been covered very well before on PH, maybe last year.
Yes someone posted This subject has, however, been covered very well before on PH, maybe last year.
the sidestick mechanical installation diagrams...
Whilst on the subject, does anyone have information on the steps AF have taken to both improve pilot training in the deficient areas AND advance their perceived corporate cultural failings????
Mojocvh said:
Whilst on the subject, does anyone have information on the steps AF have taken to both improve pilot training in the deficient areas AND advance their perceived corporate cultural failings????
Indeed and the steps Airbus have taken to produce better aircraft alerting systems which don't produce conflicting information resulting in a crash. Root Causes of AF 447 crash
1. Weather
2. Poor design pitot system
3. Poor design alerting system
4. Poor crew training.
el stovey said:
Mojocvh said:
Whilst on the subject, does anyone have information on the steps AF have taken to both improve pilot training in the deficient areas AND advance their perceived corporate cultural failings????
Indeed and the steps Airbus have taken to produce better aircraft alerting systems which don't produce conflicting information resulting in a crash. Root Causes of AF 447 crash
1. Weather
2. Poor design pitot system
3. Poor design alerting system
4. Poor crew training.
...nope, you're getting desperate, besides not being worth the effort
el stovey said:
Mojocvh said:
Whilst on the subject, does anyone have information on the steps AF have taken to both improve pilot training in the deficient areas AND advance their perceived corporate cultural failings????
Indeed and the steps Airbus have taken to produce better aircraft alerting systems which don't produce conflicting information resulting in a crash. Root Causes of AF 447 crash
1. Weather
2. Poor design pitot system
3. Poor design alerting system
4. Poor crew training.
What have Air France done about the accident? Nothing. As far as they are concerned, its not their fault. Just like Concorde, just like AF296, and just like AF358.
They have a major training issue, but they will not face up to it.
You could also add flight control design to that list.
Having flown both Boeing and Airbus types, it's probably safe to say (IMO) that this accident was less likely to happen on a Boeing.
On the Boeing, Pilot, and Autopilot control inputs are linked to the other pilot's control wheel, so it's glaringly obvious to the non-flying pilot what the handling pilot is doing.
One problem with the Airbus sidestick is that it is tucked away in a corner and not duplicated, which is a common complaint for trainers who would, for example, follow the controls movements of a trainee to get a feel as to how they're handling the aircraft. From reading the report, it took the more experienced First Officer, a long time to realise that the less experienced, flying pilot was worsening the situation by continually commanding a nose high attitude and deepening the stall.
Easy to make comments now, and I've been there myself in gash weather and turbulence. Combined with multiple failures of air data systems and manual flying at high altitude, these guys were up against it from the start and I feel they were let down by aircraft's design.....
Having flown both Boeing and Airbus types, it's probably safe to say (IMO) that this accident was less likely to happen on a Boeing.
On the Boeing, Pilot, and Autopilot control inputs are linked to the other pilot's control wheel, so it's glaringly obvious to the non-flying pilot what the handling pilot is doing.
One problem with the Airbus sidestick is that it is tucked away in a corner and not duplicated, which is a common complaint for trainers who would, for example, follow the controls movements of a trainee to get a feel as to how they're handling the aircraft. From reading the report, it took the more experienced First Officer, a long time to realise that the less experienced, flying pilot was worsening the situation by continually commanding a nose high attitude and deepening the stall.
Easy to make comments now, and I've been there myself in gash weather and turbulence. Combined with multiple failures of air data systems and manual flying at high altitude, these guys were up against it from the start and I feel they were let down by aircraft's design.....
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