Crash at Plymouth Station
Discussion
Negative Creep said:
I was working in the building above the station when it happened. Signalling error maybe? Either way, several dozen whiplash claims incoming!
Pretty sure they run permissive platforms so two trains allowed in the platforms. Really cant see how it happened failing train borne equipment failure or drivers health. RemyMartin said:
Pretty sure they run permissive platforms so two trains allowed in the platforms. Really cant see how it happened failing train borne equipment failure or drivers health.
They do although it appears the platform where this accident occurred is not long enough to take the two units that were on it. RemyMartin said:
Pretty sure they run permissive platforms so two trains allowed in the platforms. Really cant see how it happened failing train borne equipment failure or drivers health.
Could have been greasy rails or any number of other things. Hopefully the initial RAIB findings will appear fairly soon. Nothing on their website yet though - https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/raib-cu...Negative Creep said:
I was working in the building above the station when it happened. Signalling error maybe? Either way, several dozen whiplash claims incoming!
It looks like ithttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-3605752...
From the RAIB:
At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 35 people, including the driver of one of the trains were injured, some seriously.
The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not, because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had one member of staff on board.
Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 60 passengers on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working, and is allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.
Approaching Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 14 mph (22 km/h) approaching signal P15 on the approach to Plymouth station. This signal cleared from red (meaning stop) to an indication meaning that the train may proceed into platform 6, but that the driver must be prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. Signal P15 is located around 333 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood.
The train then accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h) and as train 2E68 approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train’s fixtures and onto the floor.
Our investigation will include examination of:
the actions of staff involved
the signalling and platform working arrangements at Plymouth station
the performance of the train during the collision
any underlying management factors.
Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, the British Transport Police or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.
We will publish our findings, including any safety recommendations at the conclusion of our investigation; these will be available on our website.
At 15:34 hrs on Sunday 3 April 2016, a train entering platform 6 at Plymouth station, collided with a stationary train. Around 35 people, including the driver of one of the trains were injured, some seriously.
The stationary train, 1A91, had arrived in platform 6 around 34 minutes before the collision. This train would normally have used platform 7. On this occasion it could not, because the platform lifts were closed for planned maintenance and the train required its catering supplies to be restocked before its onward journey to London Paddington at 15:41 hrs. At the time of the collision, train 1A91 had one member of staff on board.
Train 2E68 was the 13:39 hrs service from Penzance to Exeter. It was formed of two class 150 diesel multiple units coupled together; a total of four vehicles. There were approximately 60 passengers on the train as it approached Plymouth. This train was booked into platform 8 at Plymouth but the signaller decided to signal the train into platform 6 behind train 1A91 so that passengers intending to catch train 1A91 could do so easily as the lifts were not working on both platforms 7 and 8. Allowing trains to share a platform is known as permissive working, and is allowed for passenger trains using platform 6. The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.
Approaching Plymouth station from the west, the data recorder fitted to train 2E68 showed the train slowed to about 14 mph (22 km/h) approaching signal P15 on the approach to Plymouth station. This signal cleared from red (meaning stop) to an indication meaning that the train may proceed into platform 6, but that the driver must be prepared to stop short of any train, vehicle or obstruction. Signal P15 is located around 333 metres from where the rear of train 1A91 stood.
The train then accelerated to a speed of around 21 mph (34 km/h) and as train 2E68 approached Plymouth station through a relatively tight, left-hand curve, the driver saw train 1A91 in platform 6 ahead. The driver was surprised to see the rear of train 1A91 so close to the west end of the platform. He looked at the tracks to confirm which route the train was taking and, realising a collision was imminent, applied the emergency brake. This was around three seconds before the collision, which occurred at about 15 mph (24 km/h). Many passengers were standing in preparation to leave the train and were thrown into the train’s fixtures and onto the floor.
Our investigation will include examination of:
the actions of staff involved
the signalling and platform working arrangements at Plymouth station
the performance of the train during the collision
any underlying management factors.
Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, the British Transport Police or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.
We will publish our findings, including any safety recommendations at the conclusion of our investigation; these will be available on our website.
Flooble said:
Excuse the ignorant question but would the train driver have normally had a different type of signal if being switching to a totally empty platform? i.e. should he or she have been aware there was a train already in the platform, or was it a surprise?
Better to ask the question 
Yes, the signal would clear to a single yellow if the platform was empty.
ecsrobin said:
It says low speed but it looks like quite a bit of damage.
Kinetic energy is the product of the square of the speed and the mass of the objectMassive object like a train doesn't need to be going very fast to have a lot of energy to dissipate in a collision...
Bit like the rugby, watching the little fast winger stop dead as he runs full tilt into an opposing prop...
daved said:
From the RAIB:
The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.
Bizarre management system that allows a signalman to make such judgements, he might get it wrong.The signaller could see the rear of train 1A91 from the signal box window and estimated that there was enough room for train 2E68 to fit on the platform behind train 1A91, however, there was insufficient room.
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