The story of the Rover SD1.
Discussion
Touring442 said:
Crap is a bit too harsh - it's only intended as a guide to the SD1 and outlining why it didn't do that well.
How do you conclude it didn’t do well?Sales figures look inline with their other models considering the market it was pitched at.
https://www.aronline.co.uk/facts-and-figures/histo...
300bhp/ton said:
How do you conclude it didn’t do well?
Sales figures look inline with their other models considering the market it was pitched at.
https://www.aronline.co.uk/facts-and-figures/histo...
303'000? That's tragic. The BMW E28 sold 700'000 in six years and the W123 Merc did about two million. Sales figures look inline with their other models considering the market it was pitched at.
https://www.aronline.co.uk/facts-and-figures/histo...
300bhp/ton said:
Touring442 said:
Crap is a bit too harsh - it's only intended as a guide to the SD1 and outlining why it didn't do that well.
How do you conclude it didn’t do well?Sales figures look inline with their other models considering the market it was pitched at.
https://www.aronline.co.uk/facts-and-figures/histo...
AROnoline article said:
The original target had been to build 1500 SD1s a week, but BLMC Finance Director John Barber managed to convince the company’s board to double this target to 3000 cars a week, equating to 150,000 cars a year.
https://www.aronline.co.uk/cars/rover/sd1/So, they produced 20% of what they promised. That to me isn't doing well.
soxboy said:
https://www.aronline.co.uk/cars/rover/sd1/
So, they produced 20% of what they promised. That to me isn't doing well.
Out landish and stupid projections aren't really a useful insight of success or not though.So, they produced 20% of what they promised. That to me isn't doing well.
300bhp/ton said:
soxboy said:
https://www.aronline.co.uk/cars/rover/sd1/
So, they produced 20% of what they promised. That to me isn't doing well.
Out landish and stupid projections aren't really a useful insight of success or not though.So, they produced 20% of what they promised. That to me isn't doing well.
I like the SD1 as a car, it has a great design and was innovative at the time. Unfortunately it was also a great example of BL failure - the sales figures may well have been 'outlandish and stupid', but these and similar predictions for other BL models were put forward and on these basis millions of pounds were invested in over the top facilities that were never going to be anywhere near capacity. This money could have been invested elsewhere in far more worthy projects but was squandered instead.
soxboy said:
The Mk2 Granada did 3x the SD1's production numbers in a shorter period (918,969). Do you think the SD1 was a sales success?
I don't think I ever said it was a success. I said it looked comparable to sales for their other vehicles on the link I provided. And using this as the rational for the counter argument to the comment "it didn't do too well".Looking here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rover_P6
http://www.ruediger-wicke.de/TestGB/ClassicCarWeek...
The Rover P6 was in production for 14 years (40% longer than the SD1) and sold about the same total, just over 300,000 cars. Therefore the annual sales figures for the SD1, where indeed quite a bit higher than those for the car it directly replaced.
I think in any rational sense that would be deemed a success.
300bhp/ton said:
I don't think I ever said it was a success. I said it looked comparable to sales for their other vehicles on the link I provided. And using this as the rational for the counter argument to the comment "it didn't do too well".
Looking here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rover_P6
http://www.ruediger-wicke.de/TestGB/ClassicCarWeek...
The Rover P6 was in production for 14 years (40% longer than the SD1) and sold about the same total, just over 300,000 cars. Therefore the annual sales figures for the SD1, where indeed quite a bit higher than those for the car it directly replaced.
I think in any rational sense that would be deemed a success.
But the SD1 was also the replacement for the Triumph 2000/2500 range, so you have to allow for that as well. That's another 320,000 boots that the SD1 would supposedly fill. So just to maintain parity, the SD1 would have to sell 620,000 cars in 14 years. It managed 303,000 in ten. Looking here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rover_P6
http://www.ruediger-wicke.de/TestGB/ClassicCarWeek...
The Rover P6 was in production for 14 years (40% longer than the SD1) and sold about the same total, just over 300,000 cars. Therefore the annual sales figures for the SD1, where indeed quite a bit higher than those for the car it directly replaced.
I think in any rational sense that would be deemed a success.
And BL planned on the SD1 doing much more than just taking over Triumph 2000/Rover P6 sales. It was supposed to be one of the firm's big export players, taking decent shares of the European and US markets from the likes of BMW and Mercedes-Benz. At the other end, it was also supposed to muscle into the 'manager's car' segment represented by the likes of the Ford Granada Ghia. Hence those lofty 150,000-cars per year projections. Now, we all know that BL's marketing/forecasting/projection abilities were dire but even the original 75,000 cars per year was predicated on the SD1 almost doubling the sales volumes of its predecessors.
Which wasn't outlandish at the start. After all, the SD1 was phenomenally well-received at its launch. Not just the ECOTY award, but near-universal praise from everyone who drove it, save for some grumbling about how it wasn't as technically advanced as the P6, which barely mattered as it drove much better. In terms of styling and design the SD1 was a worldbeater. It cost around 60-75% of its major rivals, was faster in acceleration than all of them, faster or equal than all of them in terms of top speed and had better fuel economy than most of them as well. At the SD1's direct price-point the competitors were all four-cylinder execs like the Citroen CX and Audi 100. Or the Granada V6 which was a stylistic and engineering dinosaur against the new Rover.
The Autocar quote on AROnline sums it up:
"It is hard to be over-enthusiastic about the new 3500; on every score, its qualities justify any kind of enthusiasm. It would have been hard to predict, especially looking at the bald paper specification, just how well the car would perform, handle and ride.
Add to that the spaciousness and aerodynamic efficiency of the body, and the attention paid to ensuring that the car will last, and it is easy to see why all competitors are casting worried glances, not only at the car but also at its price. If the 3500 will be built in sufficient numbers, if the quality can be maintained along with the price, and if the ground is not cut from under its wheels by ill-advised legislation, the new 3500 should be one of the successes of the decade."
But the expensive new plant at Solihull could never built them properly. Only half of the pre-launch production run were actually built, so dealers were short of SD1s to sell to people flocking to buy them after the glowing reviews and ECOTY win. Huge waiting lists developed but instead of the anticipated 1500 cars a week (later planned to increase to 2000 and then to the installed capacity of 3000) production was stuggling to crack 400 cars per week.
There were endless strikes at both Solihull, both from the new-intake workers who, unused to the car industry, chafed against its working methods and practices and then counter-strikes from the established Rover workforce who felt the 'new boys' were getting a better deal than them. The shop stewards, having agreed to certain production volumes prior the car's launch, now had management over a barrel when it came to agreeing volumes/work rates/manning for increased production post-launch as they knew that demand for the car was high, that there were waiting lists and that they could essentially dictate terms to management. When management rejected ludicrous work/pay deals the inevitable strikes followed and the lines stopped completely. Similar problems affected Rover's suppliers, which struggled to provide parts in the required volumes even for Solihull's restricted production rate. Management caused plenty of problems of its own making - many of the new intake had received little to no training (a one-day instructional course was the norm before going on the line) and Rover's disciplinary procedures, drawn up in the days of low production volumes and highly-trained workers, led to withdrawal of pay and privileges for 'sloppy' work. Which did nothing to improve the attitude of the people on the lines or the intransigence of the trade unionists.
With morale low, bolshiness high, workflow disrupted and a new and badly-trained workforce on the lines, quality was appalling. Paint issues were the main ones, but there were electrical problems, missing/ill-fitting/broken interior trim, badly-sealed windscreens and other various warter leaks, wind noise, badly-fitting doors that didn't close easily, misaligned or out-of-balance propshafts and badly-tuned engines were also common.
When the SD1 went on sale in the EEC many of the continent's dealers had no SD1s to sell. The same year Solihull production ground to a complete halt due to wider BL tool-makers strike and a Solihull-specific one about the introduction of a night shift. Rover had already introduced a second production line for the SD1 but even with two lines running productivity was so bad that total output was less than that planned for a single line working properly. And of course the new line required new workers, who were still largely untrained and often former employees of other manufacturing industries in Birmingham which had just made large lay-offs, ensuring that the new intake would be open to radicalisation by the shop stewards and innately distrustful of the management.
The six-cylinder SD1s were launched in late 1977 and the pattern repeated itself - very positive reviews but a poor and erratic supply of cars to the dealers to meet demand, woeful built quality and low productivity. The reputation of the SD1 had already sagged from its launch-time high and even if people were willing to buy them (which they were) there were long waiting lists and often dealers couldn't even estimate, let alone guarantee, when a customer would take delivery of their new Rover. It was very easy for many customers to go elsewhere and for those crucial would-be newcomers to Rover (needed to make those early sales predictions reality) to stay away.
And so the SD1 was doomed to not only doing no better than its predecessors but doing worse if you take both the Triumph and the Rover combined.
Build quality was improved, especially following the Series 2 and the switch of production to Cowley (which says something!) and it received a late-life image boost with the Vitesse and the race/rally campaigns, but the SD1's fate was sealed by about 1979 when it became clear that it would never reach the lofty ambitions its maker had for it, and which it really deserved as a design in itself. On those grounds it can be seen as nothing but a commercial failure.
A great write up and a sorry tale. My dad was at BL through this period and into BMW ownership.
I did my dissertation at Uni (this was in the early 90s) on this period - interviewed a few management people who were around then, and also got hold of a copy of Micheal Edwardes’ biography.
All in all it was a depressing picture of a company that actually did have a strategy but did everything possible to fail, aided by a complete and utter breakdown of relations between management and the unionised elements of the workforce, rivalries from within the old brands leading to internal competition and silos, as well as political interference.
But a fascinating period to study.
I did my dissertation at Uni (this was in the early 90s) on this period - interviewed a few management people who were around then, and also got hold of a copy of Micheal Edwardes’ biography.
All in all it was a depressing picture of a company that actually did have a strategy but did everything possible to fail, aided by a complete and utter breakdown of relations between management and the unionised elements of the workforce, rivalries from within the old brands leading to internal competition and silos, as well as political interference.
But a fascinating period to study.
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