S172 / Broomfield | New Case Law - Jones v DPP
Discussion
O.K. peeps,
1) No requirement to use the form.
2) Unfortunately Mr. Jones signed the letter, however, there's at least something to use against Broomfield; if only to muddy the waters.
(about 1/2 way down)
Although it might be that a person in receipt of a s 172 notice who phoned and gave oral information might not be in compliance with the section, a person who answered in writing without completing the form provided would be acting in substance in accordance with the statutory requirement.
So,
1) No mention of signature
2) It does make the distinction between oral and written when referring to Broomfield.
3) The powers of the CC to specify how the information is submitted are not absolute.
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[2004] All ER (D) 319 (Jan)
Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions
Divisional Court
May LJ and Nelson J
30 January 2004
Road traffic Driving offence Speeding Owner of vehicle's obligation to give information Compliance Road Traffic Act 1998, s 172(2), (4)
The appellant's vehicle was caught in a speed camera trap travelling at 42 mph in a 30 mph area in Cardiff. A form was dispatched from the central ticket office in Cardiff requesting information. The appellant returned the notice. He had not completed or signed the form but in the space provided for information as to who was the driver at the time the offence was
committed, the appellant wrote 'please see letter enclosed'. The letter, which was signed, confirmed that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle
and that it was one of six vehicles in his fleet. He stated that he had not been in Cardiff on that day and did not know which of the authorised drivers was driving it on that occasion. The appellant was charged with failing to give such information as to the identity of the driver as he was required to do contrary to s 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
At trial a question arose as to the admissibility of the letter in evidence. The deputy district judge in the magistrates' court ruled that there was authority for the proposition that if the notice required
information to be given in a particular form, then that form had to be used. He decided therefore that the letter was not admissible in evidence and that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the defence set out in s 172(4) of the Act because the appellant's reluctance to fill in the form had severely damaged his credibility and the court had had no independent evidence as to the veracity of his evidence that he was investigating who the driver had been. The appellant was convicted and appealed by way of case stated.
An issue arose as to whether the deputy district judge was correct in law in holding that the defendant had not met the statutory test in s 172(4).
The appeal would be allowed.
The deputy district judge had been wrong to find that the appellant had not brought himself within the statutory defence in s 172(4).
Although it might be that a person in receipt of a s 172 notice who phoned and gave oral information might not be in compliance with the section, a person who answered in writing without completing the form provided would be acting in substance in accordance with the statutory requirement. In the instant case, the letter which was signed by the appellant contained all the information the form required save it did not identify the driver. As the decision of the deputy district judge as to whether the defence had
been made out was based on an erroneous premise that the appellant had failed to complete the form as required which he felt damaged the appellant's credibility, it would be quashed. The case would be remitted with a direction to acquit.
DPP v Broomfield [2002] All ER (D) 38 (Aug) distinguished.
Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, so far as material, provides:
'(2) Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which this section applies(a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or on behalf of a chief officer of police, and … (3) Subject to the following provisions, a person who fails to comply with a requirement under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence. (4) A person shall not be guilty of an offence by virtue of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) above if he shows that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained who the driver of the vehicle was.'
Jonathan Hall (instructed by Jonathan Brierley, Cardiff) for the appellant.
Ieuan Bennett (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Cardiff) for the prosecution.
Dilys Tausz Barrister.
1) No requirement to use the form.
2) Unfortunately Mr. Jones signed the letter, however, there's at least something to use against Broomfield; if only to muddy the waters.
(about 1/2 way down)
Although it might be that a person in receipt of a s 172 notice who phoned and gave oral information might not be in compliance with the section, a person who answered in writing without completing the form provided would be acting in substance in accordance with the statutory requirement.
So,
1) No mention of signature
2) It does make the distinction between oral and written when referring to Broomfield.
3) The powers of the CC to specify how the information is submitted are not absolute.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
[2004] All ER (D) 319 (Jan)
Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions
Divisional Court
May LJ and Nelson J
30 January 2004
Road traffic Driving offence Speeding Owner of vehicle's obligation to give information Compliance Road Traffic Act 1998, s 172(2), (4)
The appellant's vehicle was caught in a speed camera trap travelling at 42 mph in a 30 mph area in Cardiff. A form was dispatched from the central ticket office in Cardiff requesting information. The appellant returned the notice. He had not completed or signed the form but in the space provided for information as to who was the driver at the time the offence was
committed, the appellant wrote 'please see letter enclosed'. The letter, which was signed, confirmed that the appellant was the owner of the vehicle
and that it was one of six vehicles in his fleet. He stated that he had not been in Cardiff on that day and did not know which of the authorised drivers was driving it on that occasion. The appellant was charged with failing to give such information as to the identity of the driver as he was required to do contrary to s 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
At trial a question arose as to the admissibility of the letter in evidence. The deputy district judge in the magistrates' court ruled that there was authority for the proposition that if the notice required
information to be given in a particular form, then that form had to be used. He decided therefore that the letter was not admissible in evidence and that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the defence set out in s 172(4) of the Act because the appellant's reluctance to fill in the form had severely damaged his credibility and the court had had no independent evidence as to the veracity of his evidence that he was investigating who the driver had been. The appellant was convicted and appealed by way of case stated.
An issue arose as to whether the deputy district judge was correct in law in holding that the defendant had not met the statutory test in s 172(4).
The appeal would be allowed.
The deputy district judge had been wrong to find that the appellant had not brought himself within the statutory defence in s 172(4).
Although it might be that a person in receipt of a s 172 notice who phoned and gave oral information might not be in compliance with the section, a person who answered in writing without completing the form provided would be acting in substance in accordance with the statutory requirement. In the instant case, the letter which was signed by the appellant contained all the information the form required save it did not identify the driver. As the decision of the deputy district judge as to whether the defence had
been made out was based on an erroneous premise that the appellant had failed to complete the form as required which he felt damaged the appellant's credibility, it would be quashed. The case would be remitted with a direction to acquit.
DPP v Broomfield [2002] All ER (D) 38 (Aug) distinguished.
Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, so far as material, provides:
'(2) Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which this section applies(a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or on behalf of a chief officer of police, and … (3) Subject to the following provisions, a person who fails to comply with a requirement under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence. (4) A person shall not be guilty of an offence by virtue of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) above if he shows that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained who the driver of the vehicle was.'
Jonathan Hall (instructed by Jonathan Brierley, Cardiff) for the appellant.
Ieuan Bennett (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, Cardiff) for the prosecution.
Dilys Tausz Barrister.
This is something I've been saying for a while, having used it in my own defence (amongst other defences)and having supplied the 172 info in a letter. Strictly follows Yorke & Mawdesley in that s172 requires you to provide the information requested by the CC (such info cannot possibly be argued to include your signature) but does not specify that it has to be done on the notice sent to you.
Always bear in mind that you will have to show that you used reasonable diligence in ascertaining who the driver was if you are summonsed for a 172.
So "I am the keeper but I don't know who the driver was, send me a picture" may work if it is a company car (although the pros. may suggest that you should have records) but is less likely to succeed if it is a private car.
Broomfield was easily distinguished in this case because the law generally says that if someone asks you for some information pursuant to some legal obligation and they do so in writing, you are generally required to respond in writing. (comes from contract law)
Always bear in mind that you will have to show that you used reasonable diligence in ascertaining who the driver was if you are summonsed for a 172.
So "I am the keeper but I don't know who the driver was, send me a picture" may work if it is a company car (although the pros. may suggest that you should have records) but is less likely to succeed if it is a private car.
Broomfield was easily distinguished in this case because the law generally says that if someone asks you for some information pursuant to some legal obligation and they do so in writing, you are generally required to respond in writing. (comes from contract law)
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