Apollo 13 - Any "rescues" even close?
Discussion
The last hubble repair had two Shuttles on the pads.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-400
Very rare sight
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-400#/media/File:...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-400
Very rare sight
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STS-400#/media/File:...
Which you can see in the picture directly underneath.
I couldn't find many decent pictures of the Rescue Balls on the internet but I did have some pictures in a book on the Shuttle that I bought way back in 1980.
You can see better in the picture below how the system would have worked - if they'd ever used it -
I couldn't find many decent pictures of the Rescue Balls on the internet but I did have some pictures in a book on the Shuttle that I bought way back in 1980.
You can see better in the picture below how the system would have worked - if they'd ever used it -
Vitorio said:
Eric Mc said:
I think the loss of the Columbia crew in 2003 could have been prevented if the right attitude had been displayed by the mission controllers and managers.
Reading the wiki-page makes me quite sad about that, The shuttle itself could have only been saved by a (succesfull) improvised bodge in orbit, but due to Atlantis being in an advanced stage of flight preparation, and columbia carrying more consumables then normal, they could have launched a rescue to get the crew home on Atlantis, and ditch Columbia in the ocean.All the rescue plans carried their own risks though, if Atlantis had suffered a similar foam strike on launch, they would have had two shuttles (and two extra crew) stuck in orbit.
Would probably have worked, with the ice boiling off and cooling the area. Hopefully not pressurising the wing with steam and causing gross failure!
Later missions had a reach the international space station option.
Later missions (with the exception of the final Hubble repair flight) were all intended to go to the ISS anyway.
Effectively, NASA decided after the Columbia accident that there would be no more "stand alone" flights for the Space Shuttle. Even the Hubble maintenance flight was cancelled - although it was later re-instated due to pressure from the science community.
Ironically, out of the Shuttle fleet, Columbia was pretty much incapable of reaching the ISS, because it was too heavy. One of the reasons it was too heavy was because Columbia still contained all the development flight instrumentation packages that had been built in at the very beginning. Columbia was effectively the space going prototype.
It also had heavier wing spars and heavier heat shielding than the later orbiters.
It's a bit like BAC/Aerospatiale flying the Concorde prototypes (F-WTSS and G-BSST) on limited commercial operations.
Effectively, NASA decided after the Columbia accident that there would be no more "stand alone" flights for the Space Shuttle. Even the Hubble maintenance flight was cancelled - although it was later re-instated due to pressure from the science community.
Ironically, out of the Shuttle fleet, Columbia was pretty much incapable of reaching the ISS, because it was too heavy. One of the reasons it was too heavy was because Columbia still contained all the development flight instrumentation packages that had been built in at the very beginning. Columbia was effectively the space going prototype.
It also had heavier wing spars and heavier heat shielding than the later orbiters.
It's a bit like BAC/Aerospatiale flying the Concorde prototypes (F-WTSS and G-BSST) on limited commercial operations.
The Royal Marines strapping themselves to Apache Gunships in an attempt to rescue a mortally wounded colleague was a pretty impressive rescue attempt.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6qHcd4imKk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6qHcd4imKk
Jonmx said:
The Royal Marines strapping themselves to Apache Gunships in an attempt to rescue a mortally wounded colleague was a pretty impressive rescue attempt.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6qHcd4imKk
If you want to read a first hand account of this then a book called Apache by Ed Macey is a fantastic read. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6qHcd4imKk
It wasn't a "tile" problem.
They knew that the wing had been hit by a sizeable piece of foam. They had video footage showing the strike. What they ASSUMED was that the strike had been on the tiles on the underside of the wing.
Since the Orbiter had sustained many, many foam strikes over the history of the Shuttle programme, and not been fatally damaged, they made a huge assumption in thinking that this strike was like all the others that had gone before.
It was not. The strike had been on the wing leading edge, which is not protected by anything. Instead, it is made entirely from Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) - which can sustain much higher temperatures than the tiles can.
What they didn't know was how poorly resistant RCC was to foam strikes. They had never tested it for that.
They therefore assumed that the damage was not a problem. When the Air Force offered to use their satellites to image the Shuttle, as they had for STS-1 back in 1981, NASA declined the offer - sealing the fate of the crew.
They knew that the wing had been hit by a sizeable piece of foam. They had video footage showing the strike. What they ASSUMED was that the strike had been on the tiles on the underside of the wing.
Since the Orbiter had sustained many, many foam strikes over the history of the Shuttle programme, and not been fatally damaged, they made a huge assumption in thinking that this strike was like all the others that had gone before.
It was not. The strike had been on the wing leading edge, which is not protected by anything. Instead, it is made entirely from Reinforced Carbon Carbon (RCC) - which can sustain much higher temperatures than the tiles can.
What they didn't know was how poorly resistant RCC was to foam strikes. They had never tested it for that.
They therefore assumed that the damage was not a problem. When the Air Force offered to use their satellites to image the Shuttle, as they had for STS-1 back in 1981, NASA declined the offer - sealing the fate of the crew.
Thanks for that Eric, I am a bit confused though, as I would have thought that Reinforced Carbon Carbon would have been a very tough material and able to withstand a "foam" strike (Was it foam or Ice?) - is it not like the Carbon fibre used in F1 etc?
Also the assumption they made - at the time, was surely reasonable given the previous lack of significant effect?
Also the assumption they made - at the time, was surely reasonable given the previous lack of significant effect?
RCC is extremely brittle. They NEVER tested it for impacts so they had no data on its resilience to strikes.
The material that hit the wing was definitely foam, not ice. On the whole, ice did not normally build up on the tank as they went to a lot of trouble to prevent ice forming in the first place.
The orange insulation material was one method used and, most importantly, the retractable "beanie cap" device which you could see being swung out of the way about two minutes before launch blew warm air down the side of the tank to prevent condensation build up.
The piece of foam that hit the wing came from where the forward attachment strut was located. To improve airflow around the strut, there was a sloped piece of foam material called a "ramp". The tank flexed and vibrated during launch and it is thought that this is what dislodge the foam.
The foam flew back and hit the leading edge at a relative speed of around 500 mph - and punched a sizeable hole in the wing.
AFTER the accident they did carry out the tests they should have done sometime around 1977/78. This was the result - and they were shocked.
And, as you probably know from motor sport, whilst carbon fibre and other composite materials are pretty tough and very light, when they do break, the break spectacularly - in an almost explosive manner as all the energy is dissipated in a very short period of time - unlike metals which tend to deform and absorb an impact before finally breaking.
The material that hit the wing was definitely foam, not ice. On the whole, ice did not normally build up on the tank as they went to a lot of trouble to prevent ice forming in the first place.
The orange insulation material was one method used and, most importantly, the retractable "beanie cap" device which you could see being swung out of the way about two minutes before launch blew warm air down the side of the tank to prevent condensation build up.
The piece of foam that hit the wing came from where the forward attachment strut was located. To improve airflow around the strut, there was a sloped piece of foam material called a "ramp". The tank flexed and vibrated during launch and it is thought that this is what dislodge the foam.
The foam flew back and hit the leading edge at a relative speed of around 500 mph - and punched a sizeable hole in the wing.
AFTER the accident they did carry out the tests they should have done sometime around 1977/78. This was the result - and they were shocked.
And, as you probably know from motor sport, whilst carbon fibre and other composite materials are pretty tough and very light, when they do break, the break spectacularly - in an almost explosive manner as all the energy is dissipated in a very short period of time - unlike metals which tend to deform and absorb an impact before finally breaking.
The film is pretty good - with just the odd concession to dramatic licence.
Here's a clip you might appreciate -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUP5IKyOiio&t=...
Here's a clip you might appreciate -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUP5IKyOiio&t=...
Eric Mc said:
I think the loss of the Columbia crew in 2003 could have been prevented if the right attitude had been displayed by the mission controllers and managers.
Although the movie "Apollo 13" is very good, it does not REALLY get to the bottom of how the controllers and managers in Houston worked REALLY hard and very fast to correctly diagnose what had gone wrong. That bit is skimped in the film as they want to get as quickly as they can to the tale of how they got the crew back.
If you really want a good feel for the actual timeline and problem analysis that happened in the first hour or two after the oxygen tank burst, listen to these Flight Director's Loop recordings.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWfnY9cRXO4&t=...
Amazing, I played this feed in the background while working today (the details are lost on me). What was interesting is how calm they all were, especially the crew. I've also no doubt that massive brain power was exerted when they said statements like "give me two minutes to work that out".Although the movie "Apollo 13" is very good, it does not REALLY get to the bottom of how the controllers and managers in Houston worked REALLY hard and very fast to correctly diagnose what had gone wrong. That bit is skimped in the film as they want to get as quickly as they can to the tale of how they got the crew back.
If you really want a good feel for the actual timeline and problem analysis that happened in the first hour or two after the oxygen tank burst, listen to these Flight Director's Loop recordings.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWfnY9cRXO4&t=...
Again, amazing.
It's a brilliant example of teamwork and concise analysis and thinking. I can listen to it over and over.
Indeed, they had plenty of moments over the ensuing days to do similar things as each problem was recognised and solved.
Gene Kranz always says it was Apollo's finest moment - even more impressive than the first landing.
Indeed, they had plenty of moments over the ensuing days to do similar things as each problem was recognised and solved.
Gene Kranz always says it was Apollo's finest moment - even more impressive than the first landing.
Eric Mc said:
Gene Kranz always says it was Apollo's finest moment - even more impressive than the first landing.
I could agree with that - and the moon landing was planned in advance, rescuing 13 wasn't.If the same thing happened again, would the tech-infested world we live in now allow 13 to get home more easily - or would it provide such a distraction that the reverse would happen? Yes the computers would compute things faster - but has H.sapiens lost the cutting edge of what to put into them? Would it be referred to H&S, who freeze because it's not in their 'policy document', or would they just try to find the answer on Google? I do wonder sometimes if mankind has lost the ability to think properly and concentrate.
In the same way that my car can connect to a mobile phone by bluetooth, neither of which are actually important - but the wires that connect things under the bonnet break...
Eric Mc said:
What saved Apollo 13 was not really down to the technology. It was much more to do with the quality of the people involved.
The loss of Challenger and Columbia in later years indicates that NASA lost its edge and its ability for clear thinking somewhere along the way.
Maybe to do with the quality of NASA recruits?The loss of Challenger and Columbia in later years indicates that NASA lost its edge and its ability for clear thinking somewhere along the way.
In the 60's NASA was cutting edge, very high profile and doing exciting pioneering stuff. Maybe it attracted the best brains?
Now, would a bright young MIT graduate want to work at NASA - doing routine ISS maintenance chores (yes I know it does other stuff, but nothing as headline grabbing as going to the Moon!) - or would they choose to make their careers with Apple or Google or Facebook?
Just musing.
I think the calibre of people working there today are still right up there - the mission to get Curiosity to Mars is a masterpiece of technical work.
The Apollo program recruited a massive number of people into NASA, but to think they haven't carried on recruiting the bright stars isn't true.
The Apollo program recruited a massive number of people into NASA, but to think they haven't carried on recruiting the bright stars isn't true.
I think the problem came with institutional maturity. As an organisation gets older, it loses some of its dynamism and a certain amount of institutional ossification takes place.
By the 1980s, the nature of the top people at NASA had changed. By "top people" I am talking about senior managers, the political appointees etc. Joining NASA as a manager was less about joining to help them achieve a significant and obvious goal, but more a career move and climbing up "corporate ladders".
That in itself caused problems in communications between the different layers of management.
The Apollo era was characterised with a huge degree of openness and willingness to hear "bad news". By the Shuttle era, a lot of that ethos had dried up as people became more concerned about pleasing their bosses or keeping their jobs.
So, it wasn't so much the quality of people that changed, but the culture within the organisation.
By the 1980s, the nature of the top people at NASA had changed. By "top people" I am talking about senior managers, the political appointees etc. Joining NASA as a manager was less about joining to help them achieve a significant and obvious goal, but more a career move and climbing up "corporate ladders".
That in itself caused problems in communications between the different layers of management.
The Apollo era was characterised with a huge degree of openness and willingness to hear "bad news". By the Shuttle era, a lot of that ethos had dried up as people became more concerned about pleasing their bosses or keeping their jobs.
So, it wasn't so much the quality of people that changed, but the culture within the organisation.
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