Mr Bates vs The Post Office

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Discussion

Seasonal Hero

7,954 posts

53 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Sadly some have already died without knowing they were blameless and received no compensation. IIRC anyhow.

Eric Mc

122,185 posts

266 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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siremoon said:
Eric Mc said:
HAL 9000 springs to mind
I don't see why. HAL was programmed specifically to undertake and protect a mission that only it knew about and it did precisely that. By contrast the Post Office system was not deliberately designed and programmed to make accounting errors. It did so because of errors in its code. Now that happens all the time in complex software systems but what created this situation was the refusal of the Post Office or the system supplier to admit it.
Yes - but HAL still predicted that the AE35 unit would fail, when it didn't.

So, it did make a mistake, even though it was stated (and HAL himself believed it) that it couldn't make a mistake - just like the Horizon system.

Lucas Ayde

3,586 posts

169 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Seasonal Hero said:
Sadly some have already died without knowing they were blameless and received no compensation. IIRC anyhow.
I think they all knew themselves they were blameless but scandalous that the PO have been keeping the coverup and lies going for so long that people died before they could be officially cleared in court. Many people still have convictions awaiting review.

Still, if you can stretch out things so that some of your many victims die, you can avoid paying them compensation. Ker-ching! OBEs and bonuses all round!

biggbn

23,699 posts

221 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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With this and the Long Shadow, ITV have reqlly been smashing TV dramas out of the park recently. Brilliant.

Digger

14,720 posts

192 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Is there a detailed & in-depth article anywhere that goes some way to explain what the bugs & errors were within the Horizon/Fujitsu software to cause these fk ups?

Also the section where it seemed to have been discovered that Fujitsu staff could gain direct access to any SPM's Horizon terminal was astonishing (Remote Access?) which was then swiftly swept under the carpet via spurious reasoning from Vennells herself!

SydneyBridge

8,693 posts

159 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Have a look at

https://www.postofficescandal.uk/

Also has lots of links to other sources, Computer weekly etc

Seasonal Hero

7,954 posts

53 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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I follow these

https://www.postofficescandal.uk

https://richardmoorhead.substack.com

https://clarotesting.wordpress.com/the-post-office...

Be warned though if you think you're angry now, wait until after you've read these....

Smollet

10,722 posts

191 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Outstanding mini series. How the management of the PO have escaped jail time especially the odious witch who was CEO(later awarded a damehood for her services iirc) is something that should be addressed ASAP.

maniac886

1,215 posts

171 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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This was a really well done series and a great cast as well. Really goes to show what the sub-postmasters have had to deal with over the years. Absolute joke that no one has really been held to account after ruining so many lives.

alangla

4,903 posts

182 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Strongly recommend reading this:

The Great Post Office Scandal: The fight to expose a multimillion pound IT disaster which put innocent people in jail https://amzn.eu/d/73s8C0U

And listening to this:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/series/m000jf7j?partn...

Looking at the podcast, it looks like there’s a November 2023 update that I wasn’t aware of, so will listen to that myself. Don’t bother with the individual parts 1-10, just listen to the 2 compilation episodes. The Nick Read interview is the only one I’ve seen with a senior post office exec on the whole affair.

Lucas Ayde

3,586 posts

169 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Smollet said:
Outstanding mini series. How the management of the PO have escaped jail time especially the odious witch who was CEO(later awarded a damehood for her services iirc) is something that should be addressed ASAP.
Unless that sentiment gains traction with the public, nothing is going to happen.

Given that the so-called 'News media' have played everything down so far, I can't see them suddenly deciding to do their jobs and start reporting properly and thoroughly on the scandal. Hence unlikely that the guilty will face censure.

That's how 'the system' works.

98elise

26,843 posts

162 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Digger said:
Is there a detailed & in-depth article anywhere that goes some way to explain what the bugs & errors were within the Horizon/Fujitsu software to cause these fk ups?

Also the section where it seemed to have been discovered that Fujitsu staff could gain direct access to any SPM's Horizon terminal was astonishing (Remote Access?) which was then swiftly swept under the carpet via spurious reasoning from Vennells herself!
IT departments normally have far greater power to access and change stuff. It's what their job is.

Someone with live database access can alter just about anything on most systems.


Edited by 98elise on Tuesday 2nd January 17:19

Bonefish Blues

27,126 posts

224 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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98elise said:
Digger said:
Is there a detailed & in-depth article anywhere that goes some way to explain what the bugs & errors were within the Horizon/Fujitsu software to cause these fk ups?

Also the section where it seemed to have been discovered that Fujitsu staff could gain direct access to any SPM's Horizon terminal was astonishing (Remote Access?) which was then swiftly swept under the carpet via spurious reasoning from Vennells herself!
IT department normally have far greater power to access and change stuff. It's what their job is.

Someone with live database access can alter just about anything on most systems.
But they always leave an audit trail, of course. Not here though, seemingly (or at least the Defendants were denied access to anything aiui)

Nurburgsingh

5,136 posts

239 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Bonefish Blues said:
But they always leave an audit trail, of course. Not here though, seemingly (or at least the Defendants were denied access to anything aiui)
There is only an audit trail if someone wants there to be.

jameschristie

20 posts

37 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Bonefish Blues said:
But they always leave an audit trail, of course. Not here though, seemingly (or at least the Defendants were denied access to anything aiui)
Exactly. The IT department can always access and update the live data. If they can't do that then they can't manage the service effectively. What matters is how that access is managed, controlled, and logged - with staff knowing that arseing around will cost them their jobs. The claims by the Post Office and Fujitsu that remote access was completely impossible were never credible. And they did indeed compound their sins by lying and refusing defendants access to the relevant documents and data.

In the Horizon Issues trial of 1999 it was revealed that Fujitsu staff routinely held high privileges that allowed them to change live data. The reason given was the it was useful for when they needed to go "off piste". What they did was not logged. I'm serious. Fujitsu were not logging what their people did with these powerul access privileges.

I've worked as an IT auditor and information security manager. We would have gone ballistic if we'd discovered that sort of amateurish, stupid, management. Fujitsu hadn't got the service tied down properly 20 years after they took it over. It was pathetic, lazy, cynical and negligent.

Btw - I'm the guy who runs the Clarotesting blog mentioned above (thanks). I've been taking a keen interest in this for a few years.

Nurburgsingh

5,136 posts

239 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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Gladers01 said:
I'm sure they have too (used to work for them) and remember years ago being brought up in a sub post office/shop business and the main threat then was from attempted robberies so extra security glass was fitted all round, the safe had doors that were inches thick and looked bullet proof

Enthralling viewing all the same and hope they all get the compensation they deserve, you really couldn't make it up smile
Our office was a two counter thing set inside a sweet shop in the middle of a Council Estate. We had one attempted robbery when the Big red truck arrived, however the criminal masterminds targeted the security guard on his way out of the shop so got away with an empty box.
The greatest loss we suffered was when my old GSD decided to chew the 2 packs of £20's under the counter one day.. oops!!

tamore

Original Poster:

7,069 posts

285 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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98elise said:
IT department normally have far greater power to access and change stuff. It's what their job is.

Someone with live database access can alter just about anything on most systems.
From a freedom of information request ……..

In written evidence to the BIS Select Committee Inquiry of 2015, POL gave the following assurance:

‘There is no functionality in Horizon for either a branch, Post Office or Fujitsu (suppliers of the Horizon system) to edit, manipulate or remove transaction data once it has been recorded in a branch’s accounts’ (point 47).

http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidenc...

The stance on remote access of that time is recalled by ex POL CEO Paula Vennells in her letter of response to the BEIS Select Committee’s 2020 Inquiry into POL and Horizon:

‘I raised this question repeatedly, both internally and with Fujitsu, and was always given the same answer: that it was not possible for branch records to be altered remotely without the sub-postmaster’s knowledge’.

Please can you supply communications and/or audit reports from Fujitsu in which Fujitsu gives assurance that branch accounts could not be remotely accessed without an SPM’s knowledge and on which POL’s based the assurances it gave to MPs?

(Below, letter from Paula Vennells to BEIS Select Committee of 24th June 2020, p16, point 54):

https://committees.parliament.uk/publica...

Yours faithfully
Eleanor Shaikh

jameschristie

20 posts

37 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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tamore said:
From a freedom of information request ……..

In written evidence to the BIS Select Committee Inquiry of 2015, POL gave the following assurance:

‘There is no functionality in Horizon for either a branch, Post Office or Fujitsu (suppliers of the Horizon system) to edit, manipulate or remove transaction data once it has been recorded in a branch’s accounts’ (point 47).
....
That was a carefully crafted statement. It might be technically true, but 100% misleading. The ability to change transaction data may not not have been part of Horizon. It could have been done by technical staff who were using separate tools and utilities. Also, note the present tense. Horizon had changed radically over the years. The 2015 statement doesn't rule out remote changes using Horizon itself earlier in its history, when the prosecutions took place.

Eleanor Shaikh is one of the true heroes of this story. One of her friends was a victim. Eleanor has been hounding the Post Office and the government relentlessly with FoI requests which have proved extremely revealing and embarrassing.


Edited by jameschristie on Tuesday 2nd January 22:09

Digger

14,720 posts

192 months

Tuesday 2nd January
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The letter from the last link above . . .

https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/1621...

Seasonal Hero

7,954 posts

53 months

Tuesday 2nd January
quotequote all
98elise said:
IT department normally have far greater power to access and change stuff. It's what their job is.

Someone with live database access can alter just about anything on most systems.
Who is disputing that?

What's at issue here is the unaudited changes, the lies to cover them up afterwards, the impact those changes had on people, and who told them to do it.

Try updating live data in a banking environment without a stack of approvals and audits and find that out fast.