The Vietnam war BBC4
Discussion
gadgetmac said:
V8 Fettler said:
tharriso said:
Imagine same conflict, todays tech. Does it go any differently?
The US in 2017 could close the Ho Chi Minh trail within days, the darkness of night in 2017 offers no protection for the NVA or the VC. There would be very little close contact between US soldiers and the enemy.Taber, 1965 -
"The choices open to Washington in Viet Nam appear obvious. Unless the dissident Vietnamese population can be persuaded to embrace a solution acceptable to the United States (certainly a forlorn hope), the alternatives are: (1) to wage a relentless, full-scale war of subjugation against the Vietnamese people, with the aid of such Vietnamese allies as remain available; (2) seek a solution acceptable to the Vietnamese people, a step that would clearly entail negotiating with the Viet Cong; (3) quit the field and let the Vietnamese work out their own solution.
A fourth possibility does exist. Essentially it is a monstrous variation of the first. The United States can change the character of the war, or its apparent character, by expanding it; that is, by taking arms against Hanoi and, inevitably, against China. To do so, with the right kind of window dressing, could conceivably be justified in the minds of the American people and perhaps of their allies despite the tremendous expense and risk involved, where a losing war in the limited theater of South Viet Nam cannot be justified. Under cover of a general war, the two Viet Nams could, perhaps, be occupied and put under martial law, and the communist movement suppressed by overwhelmingly superior military force.
But then what? A southeast Asia held by American troops in the overwhelming numbers that would be required (and it would have to be all of Southeast Asia, not merely Viet Nam) would be a burden almost beyond endurance for the American economy and the American electorate, and would be of no conceivable use under such conditions except as a base for the ensuing war against China. War to what end? It staggers the imagination to think of the vast, interminable, and profitless conflict that would ensue, even assuming that it were confined to Asia–and we have no such assurance. The bloody, costly Korean war would appear as a child’s game by comparison.”
I would say this holds true even in a 2017 scenario.
"The choices open to Washington in Viet Nam appear obvious. Unless the dissident Vietnamese population can be persuaded to embrace a solution acceptable to the United States (certainly a forlorn hope), the alternatives are: (1) to wage a relentless, full-scale war of subjugation against the Vietnamese people, with the aid of such Vietnamese allies as remain available; (2) seek a solution acceptable to the Vietnamese people, a step that would clearly entail negotiating with the Viet Cong; (3) quit the field and let the Vietnamese work out their own solution.
A fourth possibility does exist. Essentially it is a monstrous variation of the first. The United States can change the character of the war, or its apparent character, by expanding it; that is, by taking arms against Hanoi and, inevitably, against China. To do so, with the right kind of window dressing, could conceivably be justified in the minds of the American people and perhaps of their allies despite the tremendous expense and risk involved, where a losing war in the limited theater of South Viet Nam cannot be justified. Under cover of a general war, the two Viet Nams could, perhaps, be occupied and put under martial law, and the communist movement suppressed by overwhelmingly superior military force.
But then what? A southeast Asia held by American troops in the overwhelming numbers that would be required (and it would have to be all of Southeast Asia, not merely Viet Nam) would be a burden almost beyond endurance for the American economy and the American electorate, and would be of no conceivable use under such conditions except as a base for the ensuing war against China. War to what end? It staggers the imagination to think of the vast, interminable, and profitless conflict that would ensue, even assuming that it were confined to Asia–and we have no such assurance. The bloody, costly Korean war would appear as a child’s game by comparison.”
I would say this holds true even in a 2017 scenario.
Elroy Blue said:
The US could've ended the North's ability to fight in a matter of months if they'd been allowed to do so.
Allowing attacks on the VNAF airfields, mining the harbours and attacking port installations, full on attacks in NVA military installations in Hanoi.
It wasn't until Linebacker 2 that the gloves came off. The North quickly lost the ability to fight effectively. If it happened 10 years before, the results might have been very different
The US had the technical capability to achieve far more 1972 than it could in 1965, the attack on the Thanh Hoa Bridge being an example of laser guided weapons destroying a bridge that the US had been trying to wreck for seven years with dumb bombs.Allowing attacks on the VNAF airfields, mining the harbours and attacking port installations, full on attacks in NVA military installations in Hanoi.
It wasn't until Linebacker 2 that the gloves came off. The North quickly lost the ability to fight effectively. If it happened 10 years before, the results might have been very different
andy_s said:
Taber, 1965 -
"The choices open to Washington in Viet Nam appear obvious. Unless the dissident Vietnamese population can be persuaded to embrace a solution acceptable to the United States (certainly a forlorn hope), the alternatives are: (1) to wage a relentless, full-scale war of subjugation against the Vietnamese people, with the aid of such Vietnamese allies as remain available; (2) seek a solution acceptable to the Vietnamese people, a step that would clearly entail negotiating with the Viet Cong; (3) quit the field and let the Vietnamese work out their own solution.
A fourth possibility does exist. Essentially it is a monstrous variation of the first. The United States can change the character of the war, or its apparent character, by expanding it; that is, by taking arms against Hanoi and, inevitably, against China. To do so, with the right kind of window dressing, could conceivably be justified in the minds of the American people and perhaps of their allies despite the tremendous expense and risk involved, where a losing war in the limited theater of South Viet Nam cannot be justified. Under cover of a general war, the two Viet Nams could, perhaps, be occupied and put under martial law, and the communist movement suppressed by overwhelmingly superior military force.
But then what? A southeast Asia held by American troops in the overwhelming numbers that would be required (and it would have to be all of Southeast Asia, not merely Viet Nam) would be a burden almost beyond endurance for the American economy and the American electorate, and would be of no conceivable use under such conditions except as a base for the ensuing war against China. War to what end? It staggers the imagination to think of the vast, interminable, and profitless conflict that would ensue, even assuming that it were confined to Asia–and we have no such assurance. The bloody, costly Korean war would appear as a child’s game by comparison.”
I would say this holds true even in a 2017 scenario.
In 2017, option 5: a comparison between living in North Korea (under communist influence) and living in South Korea (under US influence) wins hearts and minds."The choices open to Washington in Viet Nam appear obvious. Unless the dissident Vietnamese population can be persuaded to embrace a solution acceptable to the United States (certainly a forlorn hope), the alternatives are: (1) to wage a relentless, full-scale war of subjugation against the Vietnamese people, with the aid of such Vietnamese allies as remain available; (2) seek a solution acceptable to the Vietnamese people, a step that would clearly entail negotiating with the Viet Cong; (3) quit the field and let the Vietnamese work out their own solution.
A fourth possibility does exist. Essentially it is a monstrous variation of the first. The United States can change the character of the war, or its apparent character, by expanding it; that is, by taking arms against Hanoi and, inevitably, against China. To do so, with the right kind of window dressing, could conceivably be justified in the minds of the American people and perhaps of their allies despite the tremendous expense and risk involved, where a losing war in the limited theater of South Viet Nam cannot be justified. Under cover of a general war, the two Viet Nams could, perhaps, be occupied and put under martial law, and the communist movement suppressed by overwhelmingly superior military force.
But then what? A southeast Asia held by American troops in the overwhelming numbers that would be required (and it would have to be all of Southeast Asia, not merely Viet Nam) would be a burden almost beyond endurance for the American economy and the American electorate, and would be of no conceivable use under such conditions except as a base for the ensuing war against China. War to what end? It staggers the imagination to think of the vast, interminable, and profitless conflict that would ensue, even assuming that it were confined to Asia–and we have no such assurance. The bloody, costly Korean war would appear as a child’s game by comparison.”
I would say this holds true even in a 2017 scenario.
V8 Fettler said:
In 2017, option 5: a comparison between living in North Korea (under communist influence) and living in South Korea (under US influence) wins hearts and minds.
That would be the 'persuaded to embrace a solution acceptable to the United States' one I think - but yes basically the point is, going back to my original comment, that the weaponry is largely irrelevant unless you are prepared to either kill everyone or be entangled in a drawn out low-level conflict to no end unless you can win over the population themselves; something bombing them doesn't do very well.V8 Fettler said:
The US had the technical capability to achieve far more 1972 than it could in 1965, the attack on the Thanh Hoa Bridge being an example of laser guided weapons destroying a bridge that the US had been trying to wreck for seven years with dumb bombs.
It was dumb bombs and mines that made Linebacker 2 a success. Along with being able to stop the import of weaponry and destroy airfields. Targets which had been off limits for years. Due to the mining of harbours and attacks on other prohibited targets, the North couldn't replenish their stocks of SAMs and other ammo. Letting B52s loose over the North sent a very powerful message.
andy_s said:
V8 Fettler said:
In 2017, option 5: a comparison between living in North Korea (under communist influence) and living in South Korea (under US influence) wins hearts and minds.
That would be the 'persuaded to embrace a solution acceptable to the United States' one I think - but yes basically the point is, going back to my original comment, that the weaponry is largely irrelevant unless you are prepared to either kill everyone or be entangled in a drawn out low-level conflict to no end unless you can win over the population themselves; something bombing them doesn't do very well.A survey in 2017 of the South Koreans would be interesting:
">
Would you prefer to live under the influence and protection of the:
a) US
b) North Korea
c) China
d) Russia
?
<"
In 1965, there was a widely held belief that life under communism was better than living in a capitalist society, In 2017, greater awareness of communist famines, liquidations and prison camps has undermined that belief for most.
Elroy Blue said:
V8 Fettler said:
The US had the technical capability to achieve far more 1972 than it could in 1965, the attack on the Thanh Hoa Bridge being an example of laser guided weapons destroying a bridge that the US had been trying to wreck for seven years with dumb bombs.
It was dumb bombs and mines that made Linebacker 2 a success. Along with being able to stop the import of weaponry and destroy airfields. Targets which had been off limits for years. Due to the mining of harbours and attacks on other prohibited targets, the North couldn't replenish their stocks of SAMs and other ammo. Letting B52s loose over the North sent a very powerful message.
coppice said:
You're still all obsessing about bombs and aircraft specifications and predicating different outcomes on that basis . Might be a good idea to watch the series again to get the point about why this was an unwinnable war from the outset
If winning means that the US uses military power to prevail over the NVA and VC then that could certainly have been achieved. The unknown is what happens afterwards.The war was about political ideologues. As such you could not identify your opponent. Imagine you wanted to remove conservative support from the uk population You cannot identify your opponents unless the wish to be identified. The V.C. and their supporters were spread throughout the country. Even amongst families there could be V.C supporters that remained unidentified. The bombs might kill people but it is a very ineffective way of cjanging their beliefs.
You can’t defeat people who don’t wear a uniform and who are fighting for a cause or ideology and are supported by the peasants/workers/majority.
It doesn’t matter what firepower you have, ultimately you will lose, especially if you are an outsider fighting in their homeland.
As has been stated previously, the only way to win that war is through genocide.
It doesn’t matter what firepower you have, ultimately you will lose, especially if you are an outsider fighting in their homeland.
As has been stated previously, the only way to win that war is through genocide.
Marlin45 said:
I finished watching episode 8 last night and I have to say this is the best historical documentary series I have seen in years.
After watching so many episodes I suddenly realised the narrators voice was strangely familiar from some point in my dim and distant past. Texted a knowledgeable friend of mine in RI, USA who said, 'It's Peter!'. 'Eh?'. 'My old college buddy that I used to play in a bluegrass band with!'.
Look up Peter Coyote on Wiki
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Coyote
Also.....After watching so many episodes I suddenly realised the narrators voice was strangely familiar from some point in my dim and distant past. Texted a knowledgeable friend of mine in RI, USA who said, 'It's Peter!'. 'Eh?'. 'My old college buddy that I used to play in a bluegrass band with!'.
Look up Peter Coyote on Wiki
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Coyote
Edited by Marlin45 on Wednesday 18th October 14:32
http://lithub.com/peter-coyote-voice-of-the-vietna...
Eric Mc said:
V8 Fettler said:
tharriso said:
Imagine same conflict, todays tech. Does it go any differently?
The US in 2017 could close the Ho Chi Minh trail within days, the darkness of night in 2017 offers no protection for the NVA or the VC. There would be very little close contact between US soldiers and the enemy.
Edited by Marlin45 on Thursday 26th October 18:21
gadgetmac said:
You can’t defeat people who don’t wear a uniform and who are fighting for a cause or ideology and are supported by the peasants/workers/majority.
It doesn’t matter what firepower you have, ultimately you will lose, especially if you are an outsider fighting in their homeland.
As has been stated previously, the only way to win that war is through genocide.
The West have defeated irregular forces previously e.g. Malaya. The VC were essentially defeated during the Tet offensiveIt doesn’t matter what firepower you have, ultimately you will lose, especially if you are an outsider fighting in their homeland.
As has been stated previously, the only way to win that war is through genocide.
If the VC were supported by the majority of the South Vietnamese civilian population then why didn't the latter rise up against the Americans during the Tet offensive? This being one of the major objectives of the offensive.
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