Light aircraft disappears with two people on board...
Discussion
alfaman said:
Pan Pan Pan said:
The sad problem for Sala is that it would be unlikely for him to be able to know or judge that the plane or indeed the pilot were (to use your words shonky) if indeed they were. Unless an experienced aviator himself he would just have no way of telling.
In any case a Piper Malibu is a still a substantial light aircraft. If people climb on an airliner, what way do they have of knowing whether it, or its pilots are not in fact shonky? As many hundreds of passengers have found out to their ultimate cost, Some aircraft and pilots can be shonky, even big airliners.
Risk of flying in big commercial airliners is several orders of magnitude less than small single or twin engined planes.... even more so comparing the actual risks given the weather.In any case a Piper Malibu is a still a substantial light aircraft. If people climb on an airliner, what way do they have of knowing whether it, or its pilots are not in fact shonky? As many hundreds of passengers have found out to their ultimate cost, Some aircraft and pilots can be shonky, even big airliners.
A friend who worked in the CAA has said the risks of flying in small aircraft are 100s or 1000s of times higher (can’t recall exactly)..
ecsrobin said:
And to aviators as Swiss cheese (as references above).
The ultimate cause of this though wether technical or not is his planning phase and electing to depart with the forecast weather.
Yep - and add in : at night, over water, in winter .... the risks ramp up massively .. eg: a flight during daytime over land in the summer would likely not have had the same outcome even with awful weather The ultimate cause of this though wether technical or not is his planning phase and electing to depart with the forecast weather.
alfaman said:
ecsrobin said:
And to aviators as Swiss cheese (as references above).
The ultimate cause of this though wether technical or not is his planning phase and electing to depart with the forecast weather.
Yep - and add in : at night, over water, in winter .... the risks ramp up massively .. eg: a flight during daytime over land in the summer would likely not have had the same outcome even with awful weather The ultimate cause of this though wether technical or not is his planning phase and electing to depart with the forecast weather.
Eric Mc said:
If an aircraft stalls, it is common for one wing to stall before the other - which puts the aircraft into a spiral descent.
Yes, if there was a spiral decent then maybe a case of an unrecoverable spin. Usually starts from 1 wing stalling, yawing in that direction, slowing that wing even more, speeding up the other wing and you end up with a spin. At low altitude the decent time would be a matter of a seconds.This was on Air Crash Investigation last night: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comair_Flight_3272
Comair pilots had been trained to wait for a certain amount of ice to build up (over 12 mm thickness in their case) before operating the de-icing system.
This was an outdated procedure to avoid bridging that the newer de-icing systems didn't suffer from.
In the case of Flight 3272 the finding was that they waited too long and enough ice had built up to cause an unrecoverable spin.
Total loss of lift on a wing has been shown to occur with as little as a couple of millimetres thickness.
It could very easily have happened to Sala's plane if icing conditions were present.
Ice is the silent killer of the air and of course it melts away before anyone can identify it in the aftermath.
Comair pilots had been trained to wait for a certain amount of ice to build up (over 12 mm thickness in their case) before operating the de-icing system.
This was an outdated procedure to avoid bridging that the newer de-icing systems didn't suffer from.
In the case of Flight 3272 the finding was that they waited too long and enough ice had built up to cause an unrecoverable spin.
Total loss of lift on a wing has been shown to occur with as little as a couple of millimetres thickness.
It could very easily have happened to Sala's plane if icing conditions were present.
Ice is the silent killer of the air and of course it melts away before anyone can identify it in the aftermath.
GT119 said:
This was on Air Crash Investigation last night: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comair_Flight_3272
Comair pilots had been trained to wait for a certain amount of ice to build up (over 12 mm thickness in their case) before operating the de-icing system.
This was an outdated procedure to avoid bridging that the newer de-icing systems didn't suffer from.
In the case of Flight 3272 the finding was that they waited too long and enough ice had built up to cause an unrecoverable spin.
Total loss of lift on a wing has been shown to occur with as little as a couple of millimetres thickness.
It could very easily have happened to Sala's plane if icing conditions were present.
Ice is the silent killer of the air and of course it melts away before anyone can identify it in the aftermath.
Indeed however the fatal mistake for sala’s flight was not what may or may not have happened during flight but in the acceptance and planning phases of the flight. Comair pilots had been trained to wait for a certain amount of ice to build up (over 12 mm thickness in their case) before operating the de-icing system.
This was an outdated procedure to avoid bridging that the newer de-icing systems didn't suffer from.
In the case of Flight 3272 the finding was that they waited too long and enough ice had built up to cause an unrecoverable spin.
Total loss of lift on a wing has been shown to occur with as little as a couple of millimetres thickness.
It could very easily have happened to Sala's plane if icing conditions were present.
Ice is the silent killer of the air and of course it melts away before anyone can identify it in the aftermath.
Fundoreen said:
Remember watching novice May doing his pre flight checks on top gear years ago. I guess its people that have years behind them and know it all that screw up.
No it’s the people that push on when it’s not safe to do so (pushonitus the technical term 
) When bad weathers involved I’d say the odds in my experience are far higher that flight in to terrain has occurred vs mechanical failure.
Some reading from the CAA on flying in poor weather: http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/20130121SSL23....
Extract from CAA said:
1 INTRODUCTION
A CAA study examined 166 fatal accidents to UK light aircraft. That review was published as CAP 667 ‘Review of General Aviation Fatal Accidents 1985–1994’, and this highlights some of the points made. Most accidents are the result of the pilot’s actions. This includes their skill level and, most important of all, the decisions that they make. This leaflet details some of the factors that can affect how the pilot’s decisions do – or don’t – keep the aircraft in one piece and the occupants safe.
2 TO GO OR NOT TO GO
a) Weather
Probably the single most important factor in General Aviation flight safety is the decision of a pilot to begin, or continue, a flight in unsuitable weather conditions. As one might expect, weather was a major factor in fatal accidents: over 80% of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents happened when the pilot either continued flying into adverse weather, or did not appreciate the actual effects of the weather conditions. Of those pilots who lost control in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), only one had an Instrument Rating.
Crosswind landings seldom result in fatalities, but they still feature in many accidents resulting in broken aircraft and painful injuries.
Weather does not stay constant, it doesn’t always do what the forecast predicts, and it can deteriorate very fast. Respect the weather, and the implications for flight safety. That doesn’t just mean other less experienced people who can’t fly so well are the ones who should respect the weather; it means you.
The European GA Safety Team has published a useful ‘Weather Anticipation’ leaflet on their website: www.easa.europa.eu/essi/egast.
b) I Can’t Turn Back Now!
Weather can, and will, change en-route. It is essential that the pilot is prepared and willing to divert or turn back if conditions deteriorate. It does not reflect badly on your ability as a pilot if you turn back in poor weather. In fact, it reflects good judgement and realistic assessment of the situation. It is also important that diverting is feasible in practical terms. Have you got enough fuel, money to get home, or pay for a hotel? Have you promised to be somewhere important? Never put yourself in a position where you would not feel able and willing to turn back if necessary. No Monday job is worth dying for on a Sunday, so carry your driving licence and credit card.
The decision to turn back will be made easier if you have decided in advance what your minimum VFR flying altitude should be. It also helps if you have practised flying the relevant manoeuvres on instruments, for example: a 180° turn and if necessary climb to a higher Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA).
c) Chain of Events
In aviation accidents, it is common to find a chain of events where one shortcut or poor judgement leads to another. For example, the apparent ‘cause’ of an accident may be that the pilot has attempted a landing in marginal weather conditions, has not diverted or turned back despite reducing visibility, or has descended below MSA to try to establish their position. Consider why they chose to do this – was it really an isolated bad judgement, or could they have been short of fuel due to poor planning and lack of contingency time?
A simple way to calculate MSA is to add 1,000 feet to the Maximum Elevation Figure (MEF) in the relevant chart lat/long square. Remember that good planning, proper use of forecasts, awareness of terrain features en route and relevant safety altitudes are not just good practice – they save lives.
A CAA study examined 166 fatal accidents to UK light aircraft. That review was published as CAP 667 ‘Review of General Aviation Fatal Accidents 1985–1994’, and this highlights some of the points made. Most accidents are the result of the pilot’s actions. This includes their skill level and, most important of all, the decisions that they make. This leaflet details some of the factors that can affect how the pilot’s decisions do – or don’t – keep the aircraft in one piece and the occupants safe.
2 TO GO OR NOT TO GO
a) Weather
Probably the single most important factor in General Aviation flight safety is the decision of a pilot to begin, or continue, a flight in unsuitable weather conditions. As one might expect, weather was a major factor in fatal accidents: over 80% of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents happened when the pilot either continued flying into adverse weather, or did not appreciate the actual effects of the weather conditions. Of those pilots who lost control in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), only one had an Instrument Rating.
Crosswind landings seldom result in fatalities, but they still feature in many accidents resulting in broken aircraft and painful injuries.
Weather does not stay constant, it doesn’t always do what the forecast predicts, and it can deteriorate very fast. Respect the weather, and the implications for flight safety. That doesn’t just mean other less experienced people who can’t fly so well are the ones who should respect the weather; it means you.
The European GA Safety Team has published a useful ‘Weather Anticipation’ leaflet on their website: www.easa.europa.eu/essi/egast.
b) I Can’t Turn Back Now!
Weather can, and will, change en-route. It is essential that the pilot is prepared and willing to divert or turn back if conditions deteriorate. It does not reflect badly on your ability as a pilot if you turn back in poor weather. In fact, it reflects good judgement and realistic assessment of the situation. It is also important that diverting is feasible in practical terms. Have you got enough fuel, money to get home, or pay for a hotel? Have you promised to be somewhere important? Never put yourself in a position where you would not feel able and willing to turn back if necessary. No Monday job is worth dying for on a Sunday, so carry your driving licence and credit card.
The decision to turn back will be made easier if you have decided in advance what your minimum VFR flying altitude should be. It also helps if you have practised flying the relevant manoeuvres on instruments, for example: a 180° turn and if necessary climb to a higher Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA).
c) Chain of Events
In aviation accidents, it is common to find a chain of events where one shortcut or poor judgement leads to another. For example, the apparent ‘cause’ of an accident may be that the pilot has attempted a landing in marginal weather conditions, has not diverted or turned back despite reducing visibility, or has descended below MSA to try to establish their position. Consider why they chose to do this – was it really an isolated bad judgement, or could they have been short of fuel due to poor planning and lack of contingency time?
A simple way to calculate MSA is to add 1,000 feet to the Maximum Elevation Figure (MEF) in the relevant chart lat/long square. Remember that good planning, proper use of forecasts, awareness of terrain features en route and relevant safety altitudes are not just good practice – they save lives.
alfaman said:
Pan Pan Pan said:
I am sure all the thousands upon thousands of people who have died in commercial airliner crashes will be relieved to know that.
What a ridiculous comment FFS. Flying in a commercial airliner is way way safer than flying in small planes and also traveling by car. All means of getting about carry risk, all that has to be done is that individuals decide for themselves what level of risk they are prepared to accept whilst getting themselves about.
Cardiff scraping the bottom of the barrel here by trying to get out of paying for the player.
“Emiliano Sala: Cardiff set to claim transfer deal 'not legally binding'”
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/47696561
“Emiliano Sala: Cardiff set to claim transfer deal 'not legally binding'”
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/47696561
Edited by BlackLabel on Monday 25th March 22:56
BlackLabel said:
Cardiff scraping the bottom of the barrel here by trying to get out of paying for the player.
“Emiliano Sala: Cardiff set to claim transfer deal 'not legally binding'”
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/47696561
Unfortunately it's a legal debate over an asset. Who is scraping the barrel will, ultimately, depend on whose side the law is on. “Emiliano Sala: Cardiff set to claim transfer deal 'not legally binding'”
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/47696561
Edited by BlackLabel on Monday 25th March 22:56
Ultimately a debate between two companies, and not much of a surprise with the sums of money involved.
Murph7355 said:
Unfortunately it's a legal debate over an asset. Who is scraping the barrel will, ultimately, depend on whose side the law is on.
Ultimately a debate between two companies, and not much of a surprise with the sums of money involved.
I don't think law has any role in issues where FIFA is concerned.Ultimately a debate between two companies, and not much of a surprise with the sums of money involved.
Cardiff claiming he was not their player but Colin w
ker still flew half way round the world to his funeral and gave lengthy interviews to the press whilst out there. :eyeroll:
I'm a football fan, but the amount of money in the game and greed and dodgy morals associated with it properly boils my piss at times.
ker still flew half way round the world to his funeral and gave lengthy interviews to the press whilst out there. :eyeroll: I'm a football fan, but the amount of money in the game and greed and dodgy morals associated with it properly boils my piss at times.
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