Half a world, and half a lifetime away.
Discussion
That's because his leadership was found wanting; undoubtedly a brave man, he attempted to rally the attack, which had bogged down because he'd essentially expected his toms to frontally attack a fortified position uphill, by leading it himself. He died as a result. His second in command then took over, ordered a flanking manoeuvre and won the day.
According to the account above he attempted to lead the attack - not what a CO's job should be - but nobody followed him. And far from his example rallying the men and demoralising the enemy - as his citation said - it was Cpl Abols taking out the command bunker with a 66 that broke the deadlock. I met Abols, but didn't know his history at the time and so never asked him about it. Col H was definitely very brave, but not someone you would want commanding you in battle.
I was taken through the final steps H took at Goose Green.
An army officer literally walked me pace by pace up the gully to the point where a cairn marks the spot where he fell.
Facing the cairn,I was then told to look behind me to where the machine gun position that killed H was sited.
It would be very easy for me as an untrained civilian on a bright sunny day twenty odd years after the war, to have an opinion.
All I can say was that the views of the officer regarding leadership and H's conduct during the operation concurs with the opinions above.
An army officer literally walked me pace by pace up the gully to the point where a cairn marks the spot where he fell.
Facing the cairn,I was then told to look behind me to where the machine gun position that killed H was sited.
It would be very easy for me as an untrained civilian on a bright sunny day twenty odd years after the war, to have an opinion.
All I can say was that the views of the officer regarding leadership and H's conduct during the operation concurs with the opinions above.
Edited by Wildcat45 on Saturday 8th September 21:45
The article on H and his VC got me wondering again what proportion of awards are bottom up vs top down.
I was thinking this whilst reading some of the citations in the gallery at the Imperial War museum. Whilst the vast majority just reflect almost incomprehensible levels of bravery and frequently complete selflessness, there are some that just make me wonder whether any edict went out to find a suitable recipient as it was perceived by those at the top that it was time for a little bit of a boost to morale?
Of course it's equally possible that some of the citations were just written with an extra couple of levels of famous British understatement and I'm doing the recipients a great disservice.
I was thinking this whilst reading some of the citations in the gallery at the Imperial War museum. Whilst the vast majority just reflect almost incomprehensible levels of bravery and frequently complete selflessness, there are some that just make me wonder whether any edict went out to find a suitable recipient as it was perceived by those at the top that it was time for a little bit of a boost to morale?
Of course it's equally possible that some of the citations were just written with an extra couple of levels of famous British understatement and I'm doing the recipients a great disservice.
Kermit power said:
Whilst the vast majority just reflect almost incomprehensible levels of bravery and frequently complete selflessness, there are some that just make me wonder whether any edict went out to find a suitable recipient as it was perceived by those at the top that it was time for a little bit of a boost to morale?
Of course it's equally possible that some of the citations were just written with an extra couple of levels of famous British understatement and I'm doing the recipients a great disservice.
The Lancashire Fusiliers famously were awarded "six VCs before breakfast" in the Gallipoli Landings. It could be argued that the ballot held afterwards for the final 3 recipients would reinforce this assumption. Of course it's equally possible that some of the citations were just written with an extra couple of levels of famous British understatement and I'm doing the recipients a great disservice.
SD.
shed driver said:
The Loss of HMS Sheffield
At approximately 10 A.M. on the 4 May, HMS Sheffield was at defence watches, second degree readiness. Sheffield had relieved her sister Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her Type 965 radar. Sheffield and Coventry were chatting over UHF. Communications ceased until an unidentified message was received stating simply "Sheffield is hit!". The flagship, Hermes dispatched the escorts Arrow and Yarmouth to investigate, and a helicopter was launched.
Confusion reigned until Sheffield's Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard Hermes carrying the Air Operations Officer and Operations Officer, confirming the disaster.
Part of a documentary covering the loss of HMS Sheffield and interview with the Commanding Officer.
Sheffield picked up the incoming missile on her ancient Type 965 radar (an interim fitting until the Type 1022 set was available), and the Operations Officer informed the Missile Director, who queried the contact in the ADAWS 4 fire control system. The launch aircraft had not been detected as the British had expected, and it was not until smoke was sighted that the target was confirmed as a sea skimming missile. Five seconds later, the Exocet impacted Sheffield amidships. Such was the lack of warning, there was no time to engage in defensive manoeuvres, leading to a change in policy that all ships believing to be even possibly under missile attack would turn toward the threat, accelerate to maximum speed and fire chaff to prevent a ship being caught defenceless again.
The Exocet was fired from one of two Super Étendards launched from Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, and was piloted by Captain Augusto Bedacarratz, who commanded the mission. It was launched at the point-blank range of six miles; the British had expected it to be launched from long range (45 miles) at medium altitude, hence the difficulty in classifying it and taking effective countermeasures. It struck amidships, approximately 8 feet above the waterline on Deck 2, tearing a gash 4 feet by 10 feet in size in the vicinity of the galley, which occupied the full width of the hull.
The MOD report into the sinking of the Sheffield concluded that; "Evidence indicates that the Warhead did not detonate" . Some of the crew and members of the Task Force believe however that the missile's 363-pound warhead did in fact detonate upon impact. Regardless, the impact of the missile and the burning rocket motor set Sheffield ablaze.
Accounts suggest that the initial impact of the missile immediately crippled the ship's onboard electricity generating systems and fractured the water main, preventing the anti-fire mechanisms from operating effectively, and thereby dooming the ship to be consumed by the raging fire. It is also suggested that the ship's anti-missile radar was incompatible with the satellite communications link which reduced the chance of the Exocet being intercepted, although neither the Type 965 radar nor the Sea Dart missiles carried by Type 42s are particularly well suited to intercepts of low-flying missiles.
Read the Board of Inquiry report into the loss of HMS Sheffield, as well as the covering letter from Captain Salt,, a report into the events prior to missile impact, and finally the initial report into the loss.
After the ship was struck, her crew, waiting to be rescued, sang "Always Look on the Bright Side of Life" from Monty Python's Life of Brian. The burnt-out hulk was taken in tow by the Rothesay class frigate Yarmouth but was scuttled at 53°04'S, 56°56' W on 10 May 1982 because of bad weather turning the ship into a waterlogged hulk, making it the first Royal Navy vessel sunk in action in almost forty years. Twenty of her crew (mainly on duty in the Galley-area) died during the attack. The wreck is a war grave and designated as a controlled site under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986.
Roll of Honour - HMS Sheffield.
Leading Cook Wellstead lived close to where I lived at the time.At approximately 10 A.M. on the 4 May, HMS Sheffield was at defence watches, second degree readiness. Sheffield had relieved her sister Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her Type 965 radar. Sheffield and Coventry were chatting over UHF. Communications ceased until an unidentified message was received stating simply "Sheffield is hit!". The flagship, Hermes dispatched the escorts Arrow and Yarmouth to investigate, and a helicopter was launched.
Confusion reigned until Sheffield's Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard Hermes carrying the Air Operations Officer and Operations Officer, confirming the disaster.
Part of a documentary covering the loss of HMS Sheffield and interview with the Commanding Officer.
Sheffield picked up the incoming missile on her ancient Type 965 radar (an interim fitting until the Type 1022 set was available), and the Operations Officer informed the Missile Director, who queried the contact in the ADAWS 4 fire control system. The launch aircraft had not been detected as the British had expected, and it was not until smoke was sighted that the target was confirmed as a sea skimming missile. Five seconds later, the Exocet impacted Sheffield amidships. Such was the lack of warning, there was no time to engage in defensive manoeuvres, leading to a change in policy that all ships believing to be even possibly under missile attack would turn toward the threat, accelerate to maximum speed and fire chaff to prevent a ship being caught defenceless again.
The Exocet was fired from one of two Super Étendards launched from Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego, and was piloted by Captain Augusto Bedacarratz, who commanded the mission. It was launched at the point-blank range of six miles; the British had expected it to be launched from long range (45 miles) at medium altitude, hence the difficulty in classifying it and taking effective countermeasures. It struck amidships, approximately 8 feet above the waterline on Deck 2, tearing a gash 4 feet by 10 feet in size in the vicinity of the galley, which occupied the full width of the hull.
The MOD report into the sinking of the Sheffield concluded that; "Evidence indicates that the Warhead did not detonate" . Some of the crew and members of the Task Force believe however that the missile's 363-pound warhead did in fact detonate upon impact. Regardless, the impact of the missile and the burning rocket motor set Sheffield ablaze.
Accounts suggest that the initial impact of the missile immediately crippled the ship's onboard electricity generating systems and fractured the water main, preventing the anti-fire mechanisms from operating effectively, and thereby dooming the ship to be consumed by the raging fire. It is also suggested that the ship's anti-missile radar was incompatible with the satellite communications link which reduced the chance of the Exocet being intercepted, although neither the Type 965 radar nor the Sea Dart missiles carried by Type 42s are particularly well suited to intercepts of low-flying missiles.
Read the Board of Inquiry report into the loss of HMS Sheffield, as well as the covering letter from Captain Salt,, a report into the events prior to missile impact, and finally the initial report into the loss.
After the ship was struck, her crew, waiting to be rescued, sang "Always Look on the Bright Side of Life" from Monty Python's Life of Brian. The burnt-out hulk was taken in tow by the Rothesay class frigate Yarmouth but was scuttled at 53°04'S, 56°56' W on 10 May 1982 because of bad weather turning the ship into a waterlogged hulk, making it the first Royal Navy vessel sunk in action in almost forty years. Twenty of her crew (mainly on duty in the Galley-area) died during the attack. The wreck is a war grave and designated as a controlled site under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986.
Roll of Honour - HMS Sheffield.
- Petty Officer David R. Briggs, D.S.M.
- Catering Assistant Darryl M. Cope
- Lieutenant Commander David I. Balfour
- Weapons Engineering Artificer Andrew C. Eggington
- Sub-Lieutenant Richard C. Emly
- Petty Officer Cook Robert Fagan
- Cook Neil A. Goodall
- Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic Allan J. Knowles
- Laundryman Lai Chi Keung
- Leading Cook Tony Marshall
- Petty Officer Anthony R. Norman
- Cook David E. Osborne
- Weapons Engineering Artificer Kevin R. F. Sullivan
- Cook Andrew C. Swallow
- Acting Chief Weapons Mechanic Michael E. G. Till
- Weapons Engineering Mechanic Barry J. Wallis
- Leading Cook Adrian K. Wellstead
- Master-at-Arms Brian Welsh
- WEO Lieutenant Commander John S. Woodhead, D.S.C. Read his citation in the London Gazette.
- Cook Kevin J. Williams
I worked for the MOD at Blandford Camp as the Ration Storeman and when it all kicked off was sent of to collect extra Compo rations from Bulford and then took them to Sutton Scotney or South Cerney (I think) where the Royal Signals lot from Blandford were leaving from was a long old day
I would guess South Cerney (Duke of Gloucester Barracks). At the time it was home to 29 Movement Control Regiment Royal Corps of Transport (now 29 Regiment Royal Logistic Corps) and was the Air Mounting Centre for RAF Lyneham. It is now the Joint Air Mounting Centre for RAF Brize Norton.
Ginetta G15 Girl said:
I would guess South Cerney (Duke of Gloucester Barracks). At the time it was home to 29 Movement Control Regiment Royal Corps of Transport (now 29 Regiment Royal Logistic Corps) and was the Air Mounting Centre for RAF Lyneham. It is now the Joint Air Mounting Centre for RAF Brize Norton.
sounds right . When i was collecting the Compo at Bulford i mentioned how busy it was to the boss bloke who scoffed and said when the turks invaded Cyprus in the 70's he came into the storage shed to find it completly empty. RicksAlfas said:
RizzoTheRat said:
Just looked up his book "The Red and Green Life Machine" on Amazon, sadly a bit expensive for me to try, anyone read it?
I'm just reading it now, thanks to this thread.My local library had a copy!
Brilliant read if you can get your hands on it.
Kermit power said:
Is "Doctor for Friend & Foe" a reissue under a new name, or is it a different book?
Sounds like it is very similar. One of the Amazon reviews says:"I returned this book as I bought The red and green fighting machine in the 90's. This 'new' book is a replica and all the photo's are copied. I was very disappointed and wondered how this affected copywrite. Amazon refunded me soonest, so, thank you, Amazon."
This is a remarkable School of Infantry presentation by a young platoon commander on his Mt Longdon experiences. The strain of the battle seems to be etched on his face as he tells the story:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=eaDR0eTrnfs
He went on to become a major-general and this is an article he wrote 30 years later:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/91...
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=eaDR0eTrnfs
He went on to become a major-general and this is an article he wrote 30 years later:
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/91...
OK a shameless bump from me - 38 years ago the country pulled together and faced a threat together with strength, determination, a can-do spirit and humour. Yes there were set backs along the way but we pulled through it together,
Let's hope we can rekindle some of that spirit and get though our present crisis. Today marks the 38th anniversary of the invasion of the Falklands.
SD.
Let's hope we can rekindle some of that spirit and get though our present crisis. Today marks the 38th anniversary of the invasion of the Falklands.
SD.
shed driver said:
OK a shameless bump from me - 38 years ago the country pulled together and faced a threat together with strength, determination, a can-do spirit and humour. Yes there were set backs along the way but we pulled through it together,
Let's hope we can rekindle some of that spirit and get though our present crisis. Today marks the 38th anniversary of the invasion of the Falklands.
SD.
I would agree with this - if only it was possible and frankly, it was no different back then than it is to today. Let's hope we can rekindle some of that spirit and get though our present crisis. Today marks the 38th anniversary of the invasion of the Falklands.
SD.
This country is so full of self obsessed “I know better” t
ts that it would be close to impossible to pull all that lot together. There was quite a few of them back then too. It was fortunate the we only needed the comparative few military personnel that actually followed strategy, orders and focussed intuition to get the job done all those years ago. If the rest of us had a role in the outcome, we would see the same mixed bag of responses as today. That job was done by a few whilst the rest either watched them on TV from miles away, or even took the Argentinian point of view.Never mind the population, there was dissent in the government back then.
“on the occasion of the vote in the Commons on 20 May, which gave the green light to the counter-invasion of the Falklands: the majority of Labour MPs abstained, but more than thirty dissidents voted against military operations.” ... Source: https://journals.openedition.org/osb/2007
That is just one source showing how united we weren’t back in the day from a government perspective. Corbyn carries it forward even today with his power sharing surrender ideas. The population was similarly split back then, albeit not on a brexit scale
It isn’t a lot different today. Most people are trying to do their bit, showing support for the strategy and the others are making a lot of noise as “they know best”. The difference this time is we all have to act rather than stand clapping on the sidelines, and trust me the action we need to take as a mass is nothing like the few took in the South Atlantic. Staying at home is not quite the same action as on a ship in the cold south Atlantic with b
ds lobbing Exocets and the like at your large grey bathtub.Gassing Station | The Lounge | Top of Page | What's New | My Stuff