Anyone watch a Bridge too far again?
Discussion
Eric Mc said:
Maybe it just shows how badly planned the whole operation was?
The plan might have been achievable. It was the execution of the plan that was poor.Monty's plan was to invade Germany and end the war in 90 days (so they say in the film).
After the war Monty put much effort in winning the written war: that he was always successful, everything was always under control, going according to his plan.
He couldn't do that with Market Garden as it did not take the Armhem bridge and end the war. The next best result is to portray it as almost a victory, just stalling at the last bridge. To talk about yet another bridge would not be in keeping with that theme.
Monty was not just fighting the Bosche: he was engaged in a conflict with Eisenhower and Patton for the resources to carry out Market Garden. That it didn't work had to be justified against halting Patton's army as well. The logistics to support Market Garden came at the expense of Patton's army.
Possibly. But the supply chain was extremely long and thin and that is always a problem in a war. The Luftwaffe wasn't yet on its last legs so keeping the long supply chain running and avoiding air attack would have been a problem - for a month or so at least.
By the end of the year the Luftwaffe was finished - but according to Monty, the war should have been over by then.
By the end of the year the Luftwaffe was finished - but according to Monty, the war should have been over by then.
Agree with the tension within the allies over the allocation of resource between US and UK/Commonwealth forces, but I'd contest that the plan was sound but poorly executed.
One of the main issues that is clear from walking the ground is that advancing an armoured formation down a single track metalled road, impassable to armoured vehicles either side, is difficult enough. Supplying that armoured formation with the fuel, ammunition and over material it requires, in the order of 1000s of tonnes per day, is even more difficult.
Each element of the plan seems to have been sufficient in isolation - a good air transport plan, 1 (BR) AB Div's plan, 101st and 82nd US AB Div's plans, XXX Corps' plan. The drama seems to have been joining them all together into something more coherent.
Pete
One of the main issues that is clear from walking the ground is that advancing an armoured formation down a single track metalled road, impassable to armoured vehicles either side, is difficult enough. Supplying that armoured formation with the fuel, ammunition and over material it requires, in the order of 1000s of tonnes per day, is even more difficult.
Each element of the plan seems to have been sufficient in isolation - a good air transport plan, 1 (BR) AB Div's plan, 101st and 82nd US AB Div's plans, XXX Corps' plan. The drama seems to have been joining them all together into something more coherent.
Pete
Here are some maps of Market Garden with the river ijssel on it.
http://homepage.mac.com/schuffelen/MarketGarden.ht...
http://homepage.mac.com/schuffelen/MarketGarden.ht...
V8_GWA said:
Agree with the tension within the allies over the allocation of resource between US and UK/Commonwealth forces, but I'd contest that the plan was sound but poorly executed.
One of the main issues that is clear from walking the ground is that advancing an armoured formation down a single track metalled road, impassable to armoured vehicles either side, is difficult enough. Supplying that armoured formation with the fuel, ammunition and over material it requires, in the order of 1000s of tonnes per day, is even more difficult.
Each element of the plan seems to have been sufficient in isolation - a good air transport plan, 1 (BR) AB Div's plan, 101st and 82nd US AB Div's plans, XXX Corps' plan. The drama seems to have been joining them all together into something more coherent.
Which indicates to me that the overall plan was flawed. There were too many elements that had to link up on time and on schedule. Any break in the expected chain of events jeopardised the whole exercise - which is indeed what happened.
Pete
One of the main issues that is clear from walking the ground is that advancing an armoured formation down a single track metalled road, impassable to armoured vehicles either side, is difficult enough. Supplying that armoured formation with the fuel, ammunition and over material it requires, in the order of 1000s of tonnes per day, is even more difficult.
Each element of the plan seems to have been sufficient in isolation - a good air transport plan, 1 (BR) AB Div's plan, 101st and 82nd US AB Div's plans, XXX Corps' plan. The drama seems to have been joining them all together into something more coherent.
Which indicates to me that the overall plan was flawed. There were too many elements that had to link up on time and on schedule. Any break in the expected chain of events jeopardised the whole exercise - which is indeed what happened.
Pete
rhinochopig said:
The bit where the German asks to discuss the terms of surrender, and the major tells them that they're sorry but they couldn't possibly take them all prisoner as there are simply too many of them, make me laugh every time I watch it - simply brilliant.
Unfortunately, that never happened. They actually took him under the bridge to discuss the possibility of removing the wounded under a cease-fire (which did happen) and the possibility of passing the German POWs back to help lift the burden on the Airborne troops.Still a good line in the film though.
Eric Mc said:
V8_GWA said:
Agree with the tension within the allies over the allocation of resource between US and UK/Commonwealth forces, but I'd contest that the plan was sound but poorly executed.
One of the main issues that is clear from walking the ground is that advancing an armoured formation down a single track metalled road, impassable to armoured vehicles either side, is difficult enough. Supplying that armoured formation with the fuel, ammunition and over material it requires, in the order of 1000s of tonnes per day, is even more difficult.
Each element of the plan seems to have been sufficient in isolation - a good air transport plan, 1 (BR) AB Div's plan, 101st and 82nd US AB Div's plans, XXX Corps' plan. The drama seems to have been joining them all together into something more coherent.
Which indicates to me that the overall plan was flawed. There were too many elements that had to link up on time and on schedule. Any break in the expected chain of events jeopardised the whole exercise - which is indeed what happened.
Pete
One of the main issues that is clear from walking the ground is that advancing an armoured formation down a single track metalled road, impassable to armoured vehicles either side, is difficult enough. Supplying that armoured formation with the fuel, ammunition and over material it requires, in the order of 1000s of tonnes per day, is even more difficult.
Each element of the plan seems to have been sufficient in isolation - a good air transport plan, 1 (BR) AB Div's plan, 101st and 82nd US AB Div's plans, XXX Corps' plan. The drama seems to have been joining them all together into something more coherent.
Which indicates to me that the overall plan was flawed. There were too many elements that had to link up on time and on schedule. Any break in the expected chain of events jeopardised the whole exercise - which is indeed what happened.
Pete
Edited by V8_GWA on Monday 4th August 10:29
Morning V8 GWA
Interesting to read your comments as you have walked the area.
Agree that using the single road places major stresses on the logistics.
Have to contrast that with the German use of the Ardennes in 1940 and the French view that those roads were "impassable" to mechanised formations.
Had 30 Corps been able to advance quicker the initial bottleneck might have been lessened. (speculation I know).
The Germans were able to use one of the SS Panzer units to slow 30 Corps quite a way from Arnhem. That is probably another area of poor operational control. How were the Germans able to move their forces in daylight when the Allies had air superiority ? I wonder what priorities were given to the allied airforces for those days.
To give you some ideas to consider: contrast the landing of 1st Airborne so far from Arnhem bridge because they could not find drop zones nearer with the German airborne drop to capture the Rotterdam bridge in 1940. This bridge was taken by paras who landed by seaplane on the river. These were reinforced by others who parachuted onto the local football stadium. (by the bye: I cannot find any reference to the Germans trying to take Nijmegen bridge in 1940 as per General Gavin's line in the film.) The Dutch were unable to reinforce their own forces quickly because of German planes attacking them on the march.
The joy of being an armchair (or office chair) general is we don't get anyone killed by being wrong!
It is a very good film.
Interesting to read your comments as you have walked the area.
Agree that using the single road places major stresses on the logistics.
Have to contrast that with the German use of the Ardennes in 1940 and the French view that those roads were "impassable" to mechanised formations.
Had 30 Corps been able to advance quicker the initial bottleneck might have been lessened. (speculation I know).
The Germans were able to use one of the SS Panzer units to slow 30 Corps quite a way from Arnhem. That is probably another area of poor operational control. How were the Germans able to move their forces in daylight when the Allies had air superiority ? I wonder what priorities were given to the allied airforces for those days.
To give you some ideas to consider: contrast the landing of 1st Airborne so far from Arnhem bridge because they could not find drop zones nearer with the German airborne drop to capture the Rotterdam bridge in 1940. This bridge was taken by paras who landed by seaplane on the river. These were reinforced by others who parachuted onto the local football stadium. (by the bye: I cannot find any reference to the Germans trying to take Nijmegen bridge in 1940 as per General Gavin's line in the film.) The Dutch were unable to reinforce their own forces quickly because of German planes attacking them on the march.
The joy of being an armchair (or office chair) general is we don't get anyone killed by being wrong!
It is a very good film.
Air cooled,
You raise two issues regarding the air operations. The selection of the Arnhem DZs by the RAF, was based on a mistaken assessment of the ground and german air defences. In order to release gliders and paratroopers onto DZs closer to Arnhem, and hopefully achieve a coup de main, the transport aircraft would have had to turn round over a German airfield to the North of Arnhem - the name escapes me.
The second, on the issue of the lack of Close Air Support (CAS), seems to have been down in part to procedural issues of keeping CAS aircraft out of the way of supply aircraft dropping container into Arnhem, and the 2nd and 3rd lift of 4 Para Bde and the Polish bde. The other issue was that CAS aircraft were at the limit of their range. Neither of these were insumountable, but the RAF part of the operation seemed to be very seperate from the land element. These days all land formation HQs have RAF liaison officers, but things were much more stove-piped in 44.
You raise two issues regarding the air operations. The selection of the Arnhem DZs by the RAF, was based on a mistaken assessment of the ground and german air defences. In order to release gliders and paratroopers onto DZs closer to Arnhem, and hopefully achieve a coup de main, the transport aircraft would have had to turn round over a German airfield to the North of Arnhem - the name escapes me.
The second, on the issue of the lack of Close Air Support (CAS), seems to have been down in part to procedural issues of keeping CAS aircraft out of the way of supply aircraft dropping container into Arnhem, and the 2nd and 3rd lift of 4 Para Bde and the Polish bde. The other issue was that CAS aircraft were at the limit of their range. Neither of these were insumountable, but the RAF part of the operation seemed to be very seperate from the land element. These days all land formation HQs have RAF liaison officers, but things were much more stove-piped in 44.
V8 GWA you are quite correct with your posts.
The film makes the point about the choice of DZs rather well. The line by the Polish General (no I can't spell Soszibowski properly) "just checking who's side you are on" to the RAF officer says it all.
I guess the "Purple Smoke!" pieces is meant to reflect the difficulty of coordinating the CAS.
I don't often take the role of putting forward the pro Monty side of a debate but I do see some merit in Market Garden as a plan.
Had more effort been put into getting 1st Airborne onto the bridge before the Germans could react, had more effort been put into supporting 30 Corps by interdicting German reinforcements heading for their (30 Corps)line of march, well who knows ? This is the area I refer to when I say the plan had possibilities but it was the operation that let it down. The devil is in the
detail. AS you say the plan was refined in only 6 days.
I am not referring to the troops fighting on the ground and suggesting any slur on their efforts.
The film makes the point about the choice of DZs rather well. The line by the Polish General (no I can't spell Soszibowski properly) "just checking who's side you are on" to the RAF officer says it all.
I guess the "Purple Smoke!" pieces is meant to reflect the difficulty of coordinating the CAS.
I don't often take the role of putting forward the pro Monty side of a debate but I do see some merit in Market Garden as a plan.
Had more effort been put into getting 1st Airborne onto the bridge before the Germans could react, had more effort been put into supporting 30 Corps by interdicting German reinforcements heading for their (30 Corps)line of march, well who knows ? This is the area I refer to when I say the plan had possibilities but it was the operation that let it down. The devil is in the
detail. AS you say the plan was refined in only 6 days.
I am not referring to the troops fighting on the ground and suggesting any slur on their efforts.
I would have imagined that the German's use of airborne forces would have been quite different than what the Allies were attempting in 1944. Doesn't Kurt Student have a line in the film where he says "If only I'd had such resources".
The German paratroop division was quite small and had fewer aircarft and MUCH smaller gliders in 1940. The DFS 230 they used was only as big as the British GAL Hotspur. The Hotspur was deemed too small for operational use and was only used for training. The Allies used the Airspeed Horsa, Airspeed Hamilcar and Waco CA-4 Hadrian gliders. The Hamilcar was big enough to hold a light tank.
It would have been nice to see Hamilcars and Hadrians in the film as well - but that was probably too much to have to construct on top of the Horsa replicas.
The German paratroop division was quite small and had fewer aircarft and MUCH smaller gliders in 1940. The DFS 230 they used was only as big as the British GAL Hotspur. The Hotspur was deemed too small for operational use and was only used for training. The Allies used the Airspeed Horsa, Airspeed Hamilcar and Waco CA-4 Hadrian gliders. The Hamilcar was big enough to hold a light tank.
It would have been nice to see Hamilcars and Hadrians in the film as well - but that was probably too much to have to construct on top of the Horsa replicas.
Edited by Eric Mc on Monday 4th August 11:57
Eric Mc,
my knowledge of german airborne forces is a little patchy, but my understanding is that following the jump into Crete they were not used in the airborne role again. Ultra intercepts had given the allies the location of the DZs and the times they were opening. Despite this the germans were successful, but took huge losses. They airborne troops spent the rest of the war fighting as light role infantry.
There is a view that the creation of the 1 and 6 (BR) AB Divs creamed some of the best officers, NCOs and men from all other british formations. They were very highly trained and resourced, but 1 AB Div weren't used until Market Garden when they were by and large wiped out. Would there have been more utility in employing them as light role infantry as the germans did?
my knowledge of german airborne forces is a little patchy, but my understanding is that following the jump into Crete they were not used in the airborne role again. Ultra intercepts had given the allies the location of the DZs and the times they were opening. Despite this the germans were successful, but took huge losses. They airborne troops spent the rest of the war fighting as light role infantry.
There is a view that the creation of the 1 and 6 (BR) AB Divs creamed some of the best officers, NCOs and men from all other british formations. They were very highly trained and resourced, but 1 AB Div weren't used until Market Garden when they were by and large wiped out. Would there have been more utility in employing them as light role infantry as the germans did?
2 informative books on the German airborne forces are:
Storming Eagles by James Lucas and the Osprey book (German airborne 1941-41??can't remember now.)
The Germans had a plan (Operation Hurcules) for the capture of Malta.
This was to take place after Rommel captured Tobruk as it would require switching the air support from Rommel to the Malta operation. Kesselring met Rommel after the fall of Tobruk and agreed with Rommel that they should concentrate on Egypt rather than Malta. The result is history.
Other German para ops after Crete are the air landing of 1st Falschirmjager Division in front of the 8th Army spearheads in Sicily. (to deny them a bridge).
Two drops in the Dodecanese to recapture islands invaded by the British in 1943.
The small para drop in the Ardennes.
The reinforcement of Breslau after it's encirclement by the Soviets in 1945.
This involved landing a battalion by glider along the main boulevard of the city.
The idea that the Germans stopped using airborne forces after Crete is incorrect. Their restricted use by the Germans has more to do with a lack of air superiority and transport planes than a lack of will to use them.
The Ju52 squadrons were largely lost (not) supporting Stalingrad.
Eric is quite right however the forces available to the Germans were very small in comparison to Arnhem. (Whats the big Messerschmitt Eric the one that started as a glider?)
Storming Eagles by James Lucas and the Osprey book (German airborne 1941-41??can't remember now.)
The Germans had a plan (Operation Hurcules) for the capture of Malta.
This was to take place after Rommel captured Tobruk as it would require switching the air support from Rommel to the Malta operation. Kesselring met Rommel after the fall of Tobruk and agreed with Rommel that they should concentrate on Egypt rather than Malta. The result is history.
Other German para ops after Crete are the air landing of 1st Falschirmjager Division in front of the 8th Army spearheads in Sicily. (to deny them a bridge).
Two drops in the Dodecanese to recapture islands invaded by the British in 1943.
The small para drop in the Ardennes.
The reinforcement of Breslau after it's encirclement by the Soviets in 1945.
This involved landing a battalion by glider along the main boulevard of the city.
The idea that the Germans stopped using airborne forces after Crete is incorrect. Their restricted use by the Germans has more to do with a lack of air superiority and transport planes than a lack of will to use them.
The Ju52 squadrons were largely lost (not) supporting Stalingrad.
Eric is quite right however the forces available to the Germans were very small in comparison to Arnhem. (Whats the big Messerschmitt Eric the one that started as a glider?)
air cooled said:
Eric is quite right however the forces available to the Germans were very small in comparison to Arnhem. (Whats the big Messerschmitt Eric the one that started as a glider?)
Me 323 'Gigant': http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thum...Edited by Simpo Two on Monday 4th August 12:29
The Gigant was one of the biggest aircraft used in WW2 but was used very rarely and not very effectively - mainly due to Allied air superiority.
The biggest Allied glider of the war was the Hamilcar - which was quite a bit smaller than the Gigant. Other gliders were being considered - including an all metal one built by the Chase aircraft company in America. A bit like the case with the Gigant, the glider version was not that useful but a powered version went into production as the Fairchild C-123 Provider.
After WW2 nearly all the glider forces were disbanded and the concept consigned to history. Airborne asault is mainly the preserve of battlefield helicopters these days. I would guess that the last mass combat parachute drop must have been during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
The biggest Allied glider of the war was the Hamilcar - which was quite a bit smaller than the Gigant. Other gliders were being considered - including an all metal one built by the Chase aircraft company in America. A bit like the case with the Gigant, the glider version was not that useful but a powered version went into production as the Fairchild C-123 Provider.
After WW2 nearly all the glider forces were disbanded and the concept consigned to history. Airborne asault is mainly the preserve of battlefield helicopters these days. I would guess that the last mass combat parachute drop must have been during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
air cooled said:
Other German para ops after Crete are the air landing of 1st Falschirmjager Division in front of the 8th Army spearheads in Sicily. (to deny them a bridge).
Two drops in the Dodecanese to recapture islands invaded by the British in 1943.
The small para drop in the Ardennes.
The reinforcement of Breslau after it's encirclement by the Soviets in 1945.
This involved landing a battalion by glider along the main boulevard of the city.
didn't they also rescue Mussolini by landing a glider on top of a rocky outcrop and storming the monastery type place he was being held in?Two drops in the Dodecanese to recapture islands invaded by the British in 1943.
The small para drop in the Ardennes.
The reinforcement of Breslau after it's encirclement by the Soviets in 1945.
This involved landing a battalion by glider along the main boulevard of the city.
great thread BTW
schmokin1 said:
air cooled said:
Other German para ops after Crete are the air landing of 1st Falschirmjager Division in front of the 8th Army spearheads in Sicily. (to deny them a bridge).
Two drops in the Dodecanese to recapture islands invaded by the British in 1943.
The small para drop in the Ardennes.
The reinforcement of Breslau after it's encirclement by the Soviets in 1945.
This involved landing a battalion by glider along the main boulevard of the city.
didn't they also rescue Mussolini by landing a glider on top of a rocky outcrop and storming the monastery type place he was being held in?Two drops in the Dodecanese to recapture islands invaded by the British in 1943.
The small para drop in the Ardennes.
The reinforcement of Breslau after it's encirclement by the Soviets in 1945.
This involved landing a battalion by glider along the main boulevard of the city.
great thread BTW
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