Theresa May (Vol.2)
Discussion
Mojooo said:
She must surely have to resign if her deal is voted down a second time.
May came out on top of a motion in no confidence in her as leader of the Tory Party put forward by at least 48 of her own MP's.The Tory Party with May as the leader came out on top in a motion of no confidence in her Govt put forward by Corbyn and the Labour Party.
I wouldn't use the words "surely" and "May" in any sentence that also includes the word "resign", I don't see it happening.
Because there is only so long we can go with no progress - if she cannot do it then she will eventually have to move on and pass the buck to someone else.
She could however just revert to a no deal - at least that would be 'progress' - at the moment she seems to be wasting a lot of time not doing anything radical.
She could however just revert to a no deal - at least that would be 'progress' - at the moment she seems to be wasting a lot of time not doing anything radical.
SpeckledJim said:
Elysium said:
powerstroke said:
What worries me is May doesn't seem to care about her deal putting the UK in a straight jacket economically,
and Corbyn monoxide wants the stupid woman to cut our negotiation chances to about zero by ruling out a no deal..
what a pair of
s .....
The no-deal 'threat' is like someone holding a gun to their own head in a hostage situation. Ineffective at best, particularly when both sides know it isn't loaded. and Corbyn monoxide wants the stupid woman to cut our negotiation chances to about zero by ruling out a no deal..
what a pair of
s .....But for the EU, No Deal is basically pure downside, in the short- medium- and long-term.
It is an effective 'threat'.
Just look at the responses from Juncker, Macron and Merkel since the meaningful vote for the evidence.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
Elysium said:
Unfortunately, it’s not an effective threat.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
It's not an effective threat because the EU do not take May seriously and have the likes of Blair telling them what's 'really' going on in the UK. Plus it hasn't been used as a threat at all by our 'good faith' negotiators.It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
I think the spread argument is over-played, though it's hard to say to what extent. Although the whole of the EU is big, most of our trade imbalance is concentrated in Germany, France etc, the economic picture is far less spread than the basic numbers would suggest.
That's obvious when you consider the impact on Ireland, they will be affected far more than the UK and any of the other 26 EU countries, especially if the EU start playing silly buggers as the impact on the UK gets passed on to Ireland on both imports and exports and at two borders. There are no cheap mitigations for Ireland.
Your last point is quite weak too, because we are leaving under UK Law on the 29th of March. Any change to that position is rapidly running out of time to change UK Law. Again the EU may be projecting their approaches to the Law on the UK, but over here the Government sits beneath the Law. While Parliament may change the law, it is bound by the law and cannot change it on a whim. It simply isn't the case that all can agree to extend.
Elysium said:
SpeckledJim said:
Elysium said:
powerstroke said:
What worries me is May doesn't seem to care about her deal putting the UK in a straight jacket economically,
and Corbyn monoxide wants the stupid woman to cut our negotiation chances to about zero by ruling out a no deal..
what a pair ofs .....
The no-deal 'threat' is like someone holding a gun to their own head in a hostage situation. Ineffective at best, particularly when both sides know it isn't loaded. and Corbyn monoxide wants the stupid woman to cut our negotiation chances to about zero by ruling out a no deal..
what a pair of
s .....But for the EU, No Deal is basically pure downside, in the short- medium- and long-term.
It is an effective 'threat'.
Just look at the responses from Juncker, Macron and Merkel since the meaningful vote for the evidence.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
So while the EU project central, as their past performance seems to show couldn’t give a toss, the 27 member states might just be ironing their yellow vests and starting to write misleading things on buses when the reality hits them, rather than Brussels.
And then in the big world of hypotheses, maybe the debt crisis bites on top of that... it ain’t pretty without the UK to share the bill in some way.
Elysium said:
Unfortunately, it’s not an effective threat.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
You might want to read this first from Sir Stephen Laws... https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2...It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
Stephen Laws said:
The Speaker has opened a Pandora’s box that now leaves him with a choice between two very risky courses of action. On the one hand, he could embark on a series of further decisions for which, and for the outcomes from which, respect amongst the uncommitted and those the decisions do not favour will increasingly diminish – as the bias in them becomes increasingly obvious. On the other, he could continue by remaining consistent with his “creative” interpretation of existing rules. The chaos likely to be released by the former approach is obvious. The chaos likely to result from the latter is obvious to anyone who searches the Commons Standing Orders for motions that have to be put “forthwith”, but consistency would now make amendable. Several have their origins in responses to Parnell’s tactics of “systematic obstruction”. The renewed opportunities for that which would be created by the Speaker’s ruling would be more likely, in practice, to favour those who prefer what is still legally the default option.
In other words, Remainers in parliament or the Government, due to their actions of the last week may find the very tactics they are using being used against them to thwart any attempt to delay or stop Brexit by a relatively small group of MPs... paulrockliffe said:
Elysium said:
Unfortunately, it’s not an effective threat.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
It's not an effective threat because the EU do not take May seriously and have the likes of Blair telling them what's 'really' going on in the UK. Plus it hasn't been used as a threat at all by our 'good faith' negotiators.It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
I think the spread argument is over-played, though it's hard to say to what extent. Although the whole of the EU is big, most of our trade imbalance is concentrated in Germany, France etc, the economic picture is far less spread than the basic numbers would suggest.
That's obvious when you consider the impact on Ireland, they will be affected far more than the UK and any of the other 26 EU countries, especially if the EU start playing silly buggers as the impact on the UK gets passed on to Ireland on both imports and exports and at two borders. There are no cheap mitigations for Ireland.
Your last point is quite weak too, because we are leaving under UK Law on the 29th of March. Any change to that position is rapidly running out of time to change UK Law. Again the EU may be projecting their approaches to the Law on the UK, but over here the Government sits beneath the Law. While Parliament may change the law, it is bound by the law and cannot change it on a whim. It simply isn't the case that all can agree to extend.
1. The European Council can decide to extend the article 50 period 'in agreement with the member state'.
Article 50 said:
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
2. The Withdrawal Act includes a simple mechanism to allow 'exit day' to be changed in response:Withdrawl Act said:
A Minister of the Crown may by regulations—
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
Edited by Elysium on Monday 21st January 23:55
Elysium said:
paulrockliffe said:
Elysium said:
Unfortunately, it’s not an effective threat.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
It's not an effective threat because the EU do not take May seriously and have the likes of Blair telling them what's 'really' going on in the UK. Plus it hasn't been used as a threat at all by our 'good faith' negotiators.It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
I think the spread argument is over-played, though it's hard to say to what extent. Although the whole of the EU is big, most of our trade imbalance is concentrated in Germany, France etc, the economic picture is far less spread than the basic numbers would suggest.
That's obvious when you consider the impact on Ireland, they will be affected far more than the UK and any of the other 26 EU countries, especially if the EU start playing silly buggers as the impact on the UK gets passed on to Ireland on both imports and exports and at two borders. There are no cheap mitigations for Ireland.
Your last point is quite weak too, because we are leaving under UK Law on the 29th of March. Any change to that position is rapidly running out of time to change UK Law. Again the EU may be projecting their approaches to the Law on the UK, but over here the Government sits beneath the Law. While Parliament may change the law, it is bound by the law and cannot change it on a whim. It simply isn't the case that all can agree to extend.
1. The European Council can decide to extend the article 50 period 'in agreement with the member state'.
Article 50 said:
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
2. The Withdrawal Act includes a simple mechanism to allow 'exit day' to be changed in response:Withdrawl Act said:
A Minister of the Crown may by regulations—
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
Edited by Elysium on Monday 21st January 23:55
Elysium said:
paulrockliffe said:
Elysium said:
Unfortunately, it’s not an effective threat.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
It's not an effective threat because the EU do not take May seriously and have the likes of Blair telling them what's 'really' going on in the UK. Plus it hasn't been used as a threat at all by our 'good faith' negotiators.It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
I think the spread argument is over-played, though it's hard to say to what extent. Although the whole of the EU is big, most of our trade imbalance is concentrated in Germany, France etc, the economic picture is far less spread than the basic numbers would suggest.
That's obvious when you consider the impact on Ireland, they will be affected far more than the UK and any of the other 26 EU countries, especially if the EU start playing silly buggers as the impact on the UK gets passed on to Ireland on both imports and exports and at two borders. There are no cheap mitigations for Ireland.
Your last point is quite weak too, because we are leaving under UK Law on the 29th of March. Any change to that position is rapidly running out of time to change UK Law. Again the EU may be projecting their approaches to the Law on the UK, but over here the Government sits beneath the Law. While Parliament may change the law, it is bound by the law and cannot change it on a whim. It simply isn't the case that all can agree to extend.
1. The European Council can decide to extend the article 50 period 'in agreement with the member state'.
Article 50 said:
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
2. The Withdrawal Act includes a simple mechanism to allow 'exit day' to be changed in response:Withdrawl Act said:
A Minister of the Crown may by regulations—
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
Edited by Elysium on Monday 21st January 23:55
The whole thing has undergone so many changes though it is difficult to ascertain the current position...
Vanden Saab said:
Elysium said:
paulrockliffe said:
Elysium said:
Unfortunately, it’s not an effective threat.
It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
It's not an effective threat because the EU do not take May seriously and have the likes of Blair telling them what's 'really' going on in the UK. Plus it hasn't been used as a threat at all by our 'good faith' negotiators.It is a matter of some debate if the EU or the U.K. has the most to lose in a ‘no deal’ situation. I personally think it’s likely to be worse for us because any impacts will be spread across several individual member states.
Regardless - the EU know that the threat has no teeth, because if the moment comes they can simply grant an extension to the a50 notification period, which we would almost certainly agree.
I think the spread argument is over-played, though it's hard to say to what extent. Although the whole of the EU is big, most of our trade imbalance is concentrated in Germany, France etc, the economic picture is far less spread than the basic numbers would suggest.
That's obvious when you consider the impact on Ireland, they will be affected far more than the UK and any of the other 26 EU countries, especially if the EU start playing silly buggers as the impact on the UK gets passed on to Ireland on both imports and exports and at two borders. There are no cheap mitigations for Ireland.
Your last point is quite weak too, because we are leaving under UK Law on the 29th of March. Any change to that position is rapidly running out of time to change UK Law. Again the EU may be projecting their approaches to the Law on the UK, but over here the Government sits beneath the Law. While Parliament may change the law, it is bound by the law and cannot change it on a whim. It simply isn't the case that all can agree to extend.
1. The European Council can decide to extend the article 50 period 'in agreement with the member state'.
Article 50 said:
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
2. The Withdrawal Act includes a simple mechanism to allow 'exit day' to be changed in response:Withdrawl Act said:
A Minister of the Crown may by regulations—
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
(a)amend the definition of “exit day” in subsection (1) to ensure that the day and time specified in the definition are the day and time that the Treaties are to cease to apply to the United Kingdom
The whole thing has undergone so many changes though it is difficult to ascertain the current position...
Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly. Parliament does not legislate on international treaties, so no 'secondary legislation' is required.
The international treaties and the Withdrawal Act sit separately, one under international law, the second under UK law. The exit date acts as a trigger point between them.
Elysium said:
The Withdrawal Act is already UK law and it includes a mechanism to allow 'a minister of the crown' to amend the exit date. I don't see anything in the text that makes this conditional on a deal having been reached.
Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly. Parliament does not legislate on international treaties, so no 'secondary legislation' is required.
The international treaties and the Withdrawal Act sit separately, one under international law, the second under UK law. The exit date acts as a trigger point between them.
This seems to suggest otherwise ….. http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/docum...Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly. Parliament does not legislate on international treaties, so no 'secondary legislation' is required.
The international treaties and the Withdrawal Act sit separately, one under international law, the second under UK law. The exit date acts as a trigger point between them.
Elysium said:
Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly.
Really? Extending opens a new can of worms.Some EU countries - unfettered by the nice, simple trade benefits that Germany sees - will want something in return for agreeing to an extension. Something political to help their own popularity. Maybe Spain wants some aspect of Gibraltar back on the negotiating table. Etc.
Vanden Saab said:
Elysium said:
The Withdrawal Act is already UK law and it includes a mechanism to allow 'a minister of the crown' to amend the exit date. I don't see anything in the text that makes this conditional on a deal having been reached.
Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly. Parliament does not legislate on international treaties, so no 'secondary legislation' is required.
The international treaties and the Withdrawal Act sit separately, one under international law, the second under UK law. The exit date acts as a trigger point between them.
This seems to suggest otherwise ….. http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/docum...Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly. Parliament does not legislate on international treaties, so no 'secondary legislation' is required.
The international treaties and the Withdrawal Act sit separately, one under international law, the second under UK law. The exit date acts as a trigger point between them.
Sections 3.5 and 4 note the mechanisms for the extension of a50 and the exit date, almost exactly as I have described.
It could be done very quickly and the secondary legislation in respect of the withdrawal act would not even need to go through parliament.
Escapegoat said:
Elysium said:
Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly.
Really? Extending opens a new can of worms.Some EU countries - unfettered by the nice, simple trade benefits that Germany sees - will want something in return for agreeing to an extension. Something political to help their own popularity. Maybe Spain wants some aspect of Gibraltar back on the negotiating table. Etc.
Elysium said:
Escapegoat said:
Elysium said:
Extension of a50 requires a unanimous decision by the EU council. It is not difficult to see that this might be possible and that it could happen very quickly.
Really? Extending opens a new can of worms.Some EU countries - unfettered by the nice, simple trade benefits that Germany sees - will want something in return for agreeing to an extension. Something political to help their own popularity. Maybe Spain wants some aspect of Gibraltar back on the negotiating table. Etc.
My understanding is that either A50 expiring, or the withdrawl act coming into force, will result in our EU membership ending. A50 by graceful means, Withdrawal act by treaty breach.
How does extending A50 stop our membership being terminated by withdrawal act treaty breach?
Elysium said:
So does it need unanimity or not?Gassing Station | News, Politics & Economics | Top of Page | What's New | My Stuff