Half a world, and half a lifetime away.
Discussion
shed driver said:
801 Squadron dropped eight 1,000lb bombs on Stanley airfield. 800 Squadron dropped a further two later in the afternoon.
One of Sharky Wards better ideas was to have CAP aircraft fitted with a single bomb to drop on the airfield whilst on-route to their CAP station. Not enough to damage the runway, but enough to keep heads down.Thank you Shed Driver (and other posters) for a very interesting thread.
I was 16 at the time, in the sixth form & I remember following events avidly (read Telegraph/Times/Guardian had time to watch news at lunchtime & evening). As a young adult it was the first time that I was actually watching history unfold in front of my own eyes.
I particularly remember the slow, measured (almost painfully slow....) tones of Ian McDonald - the news seemed to take days to get back to the UK. The media joked about the amazing speed of technical innovation when Margret Thatcher visited the Falkands after the end of the war - media cover was instantaneous! But in hindsight I wish our media now would not report war in real time, for the sake of families of servicemen.
I have two questions, back from the time, that posters might be able to assist me with:
1) Obviously it might have been politically impossible but legally could the UK have involved NATO? (An attack on one member is an attack on all, ie the Invasion of Afghanistan after 11 Sep 2001 was initiated at the USA's insistence). Had NATO formally got involved wouldn't Argentina have backed down saving 1000 plus lives?
2) Perhaps a rehash of the 'lions led by donkeys' notion but I think the UK has very good servicemen unfortunately led by 'politicians' within the services. The Army / RAF / Navy were constantly at one another throats for limited funds. The RAF had a very small roll in the conflict, air defence for ground troops / ground attack harriers etc so was there a (inter-services) political side to the use of the Vulcan bombing raid(s) on Stanley Airport? That is to say the RAF wanted to show their capabilities for inter service reasons.
I'll try & explain:
From what I understand the Vulcan was a state of the art aircraft, for the 1940's (sketched out in 1946) and was due to be retired just months after the Falklands. To me this would mean the aircraft was expendable - not the crews I hasten to add!)
Rather than take a month or so to undertake Black Buck 1 would this have been a possible alternative, conducted within days of the invasion, in order to prevent the Argentines having access to the runway- that they were using to build up supplies.
Vulcan B2s have a range of between 2600 miles & 4600 miles (different internet sources), the Falklands are 3800 miles from Ascention Islands . So strip a Vulcan of all weight eg radar / electrical equipment radar counter measures in order to maximise fuel load. The crew could be restricted to just the pilot(?), ie fly without co-pilot / Nav Radar / Nav Plotter / Engineer.
Arm the bomber with anti-runway penetrating bombs (first used by Israel in 1967) rather than lob dumb bombs and do a high speed, low altitude single pass raid. After dropping the bombs the pilot (not having fuel to return) would eject and accept that he would be captured.
The reason I suggest restricting the crew to one (or possibly two) is that there were only two ejector seats and that other crew members would have to bail out manually - probably with fatal consequences at low level (eg 1 October 1956 Vulcan B.1 XA897 @ Heathrow), whereas a pilot / co-pilot would have realistic survival chances.
The roles of the Nav Radar / Plotter / Engineer could have been conducted remotely, over a radio link, from a Victor Tanker (which would have the range to fly from Ascension/Falklands/Ascension).
This is how I would have envisaged the raid.
Victor tanker & Vulcan take off from Ascension. The Vulcan would follow the Victor (which would be navigating for both), flight engineer info could be relayed between Vulcan pilot & an engineer on Victor (or engineer could be in co-pilots seat). They could obtain additional navigation fixes from (say) a submarine or HMS Endurance. 100 or so miles from Stanley the Vulcan would drop to sea level, the Victor would fly some distance behind the Vulcan at greater altitude (but out of range of Argentine ground defences) to provide navigation. The attack could be at dawn plus 10 mins, from the East, so the Argentine defenders would have the sun in their eyes. I doubt there would have been patrolling Argentine aircraft 10 mins after dawn in the middle of April.
Such an attack, if successful, might have convinced the Argentines we meant business and could have made the runway inoperable - with the sea exclusion zone this might have prevented an Argentine military build up. Just my thoughts at the time (I was 16).
With Servicemans humour the raid could have been named 'Operation Kamikaze'!)
edited just to clarify
I was 16 at the time, in the sixth form & I remember following events avidly (read Telegraph/Times/Guardian had time to watch news at lunchtime & evening). As a young adult it was the first time that I was actually watching history unfold in front of my own eyes.
I particularly remember the slow, measured (almost painfully slow....) tones of Ian McDonald - the news seemed to take days to get back to the UK. The media joked about the amazing speed of technical innovation when Margret Thatcher visited the Falkands after the end of the war - media cover was instantaneous! But in hindsight I wish our media now would not report war in real time, for the sake of families of servicemen.
I have two questions, back from the time, that posters might be able to assist me with:
1) Obviously it might have been politically impossible but legally could the UK have involved NATO? (An attack on one member is an attack on all, ie the Invasion of Afghanistan after 11 Sep 2001 was initiated at the USA's insistence). Had NATO formally got involved wouldn't Argentina have backed down saving 1000 plus lives?
2) Perhaps a rehash of the 'lions led by donkeys' notion but I think the UK has very good servicemen unfortunately led by 'politicians' within the services. The Army / RAF / Navy were constantly at one another throats for limited funds. The RAF had a very small roll in the conflict, air defence for ground troops / ground attack harriers etc so was there a (inter-services) political side to the use of the Vulcan bombing raid(s) on Stanley Airport? That is to say the RAF wanted to show their capabilities for inter service reasons.
I'll try & explain:
From what I understand the Vulcan was a state of the art aircraft, for the 1940's (sketched out in 1946) and was due to be retired just months after the Falklands. To me this would mean the aircraft was expendable - not the crews I hasten to add!)
Rather than take a month or so to undertake Black Buck 1 would this have been a possible alternative, conducted within days of the invasion, in order to prevent the Argentines having access to the runway- that they were using to build up supplies.
Vulcan B2s have a range of between 2600 miles & 4600 miles (different internet sources), the Falklands are 3800 miles from Ascention Islands . So strip a Vulcan of all weight eg radar / electrical equipment radar counter measures in order to maximise fuel load. The crew could be restricted to just the pilot(?), ie fly without co-pilot / Nav Radar / Nav Plotter / Engineer.
Arm the bomber with anti-runway penetrating bombs (first used by Israel in 1967) rather than lob dumb bombs and do a high speed, low altitude single pass raid. After dropping the bombs the pilot (not having fuel to return) would eject and accept that he would be captured.
The reason I suggest restricting the crew to one (or possibly two) is that there were only two ejector seats and that other crew members would have to bail out manually - probably with fatal consequences at low level (eg 1 October 1956 Vulcan B.1 XA897 @ Heathrow), whereas a pilot / co-pilot would have realistic survival chances.
The roles of the Nav Radar / Plotter / Engineer could have been conducted remotely, over a radio link, from a Victor Tanker (which would have the range to fly from Ascension/Falklands/Ascension).
This is how I would have envisaged the raid.
Victor tanker & Vulcan take off from Ascension. The Vulcan would follow the Victor (which would be navigating for both), flight engineer info could be relayed between Vulcan pilot & an engineer on Victor (or engineer could be in co-pilots seat). They could obtain additional navigation fixes from (say) a submarine or HMS Endurance. 100 or so miles from Stanley the Vulcan would drop to sea level, the Victor would fly some distance behind the Vulcan at greater altitude (but out of range of Argentine ground defences) to provide navigation. The attack could be at dawn plus 10 mins, from the East, so the Argentine defenders would have the sun in their eyes. I doubt there would have been patrolling Argentine aircraft 10 mins after dawn in the middle of April.
Such an attack, if successful, might have convinced the Argentines we meant business and could have made the runway inoperable - with the sea exclusion zone this might have prevented an Argentine military build up. Just my thoughts at the time (I was 16).
With Servicemans humour the raid could have been named 'Operation Kamikaze'!)
edited just to clarify
Edited by alfaspecial on Monday 15th May 16:11
Edited by alfaspecial on Monday 15th May 16:12
DMN said:
One of Sharky Wards better ideas was to have CAP aircraft fitted with a single bomb to drop on the airfield whilst on-route to their CAP station. Not enough to damage the runway, but enough to keep heads down.
Given Woodward's desire to keep the Carriers out of harm's way, which meant longish CAP transits with concommitant reduced CAP endurance (something which Lt Cdr Ward repetedly b
hed about iin his book), carrying a 1000lb bomb (with the additional drag it caused) was probably not such a good idea.Putting the Sea Harriers (ie limited assets for the Air Defence of the Task Force) within the Stanley MEZ was probably not such a good idea neither.
alfaspecial said:
Vulcan B2s have a range of between 2600 miles & 4600 miles (different internet sources), the Falklands are 3800 miles from Ascention Islands . So strip a Vulcan of all weight eg radar / electrical equipment radar counter measures in order to maximise fuel load. The crew could be restricted to just the pilot(?), ie fly without co-pilot / Nav Radar / Nav Plotter / Engineer.
I shouldn't imagine it's possible to fly a Vulcan with a single pilot. Who's going to do the fuel management?alfaspecial said:
Arm the bomber with anti-runway penetrating bombs (first used by Israel in 1967) rather than lob dumb bombs and do a high speed, low altitude single pass raid. After dropping the bombs the pilot (not having fuel to return) would eject and accept that he would be captured.
In 1982 the RAF was not in possession of such penetrators (the French Durandal) plus such weapons couldn't be employed as you suggest in a FRA (First Run Attack), but required to be tossed (or lofted) onto the target. Aside from the fact that that sort of a manoeuvre may well not have been possible in a Vulcan, if you've stripped out all the kit how are you going to aim the weapon and maintain accuracy?alfaspecial said:
After dropping the bombs the pilot (not having fuel to return) would eject and accept that he would be captured.
I'm not sure anyone would volunteer for that given the weather in the South Atlantic and the very small chance of sea survival!alfaspecial said:
The roles of the Nav Radar / Plotter / Engineer could have been conducted remotely, over a radio link, from a Victor Tanker (which would have the range to fly from Ascension/Falklands/Ascension).
The V Force didn't carry Flight Engineers.You are also suggesting that the Vulcan rely upon navigational data from the Victor. For EMCON (Emissions Control) silent ops this means visual contact ie relatively close formation flying for several hours, thus requiring visual meteorological conditions and daylight. Not very tactically sound for an un-armed aircraft with no countermeasures. Alternatively it requires the use of electronic transmissions between the aircraft. Again not very tactically sound I'm afraid.
Edited by Ginetta G15 Girl on Monday 15th May 16:53
alfaspecial said:
Thank you Shed Driver (and other posters) for a very interesting thread.
I have two questions, back from the time, that posters might be able to assist me with:
1) Obviously it might have been politically impossible but legally could the UK have involved NATO? (An attack on one member is an attack on all, ie the Invasion of Afghanistan after 11 Sep 2001 was initiated at the USA's insistence). Had NATO formally got involved wouldn't Argentina have backed down saving 1000 plus lives?
Article 5 of the NATO treaty gives the Casus foederis, or Case for the Alliance. It commits each member state to consider an armed attack against one member state, in Europe or North America, to be an armed attack against them all.I have two questions, back from the time, that posters might be able to assist me with:
1) Obviously it might have been politically impossible but legally could the UK have involved NATO? (An attack on one member is an attack on all, ie the Invasion of Afghanistan after 11 Sep 2001 was initiated at the USA's insistence). Had NATO formally got involved wouldn't Argentina have backed down saving 1000 plus lives?
SD.
Thank you for your input.
Alfaspecial:
This is only from the internet, but I read Vulcans had automatic fuel management based on clockwork timers. If necessary could a video link have been establised between Vulcan or Victor?
Alfaspecial
I remember just months after the war the RAF had access to such weapons & tv reports showed them being dropped from low level from a fighter / bomber (Skyhawk?). A video camera mounted in the front with a tv screen in the cockpit could have given a bomb aimers view?
The Vulcan was an incredibly agile aircraft & had been used in a low level bombing role.
Quote wikipedia "One system available from 1977 diverging from the French/Israeli runway piercing bomb development used in 1967 was the Matra Durandal, a single 450 lb bomb with parachute braking, rocket booster, and two warheads. The device worked after being dropped by an aircraft flying at low level braking by parachute, then when at the correct angle firing a rocket to impact the runway, first igniting a large warhead to create a crater and then subsequently using a smaller charge that had penetrated the crater to displace adjacent concrete slabs. The slabs, once displaced, are far harder to deal with than a simple hole that could be patched with asphalt. The Durandal has been widely exported."
See also British Version: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JP233
Hence my suggestion for the name; Operation Kamikaze (or Operation One-Way or Operation Boy's Own!) The pilot would have ejected over the Falklands to avoid a sea landing. The RAF: Never Have So Many etc etc
Wikipedia says they (Vulcans) did have AEO's But I'm happy to be corrected
You are also suggesting that the Vulcan rely upon Navigational data from the Victor. For EMCON Emissions Control) silent Ops this means visual contact ie relatively close formation flying for several hours, thus requiring visual meteorological conditions and daylight. Not very tactically sound for an un-armed aircraft with no countermeasures. Alternatively it requires the use of electronic transmissions between the aircraft. Again not very tactically sound I'm afraid.
Alfaspecial:
A Victor could transmit (at low power directed away from the Falklands) a Lorenz landing type system that the Vulcan would 'follow.'
The V-force were able to meet up at refueling points for Black Buck so did 'follow' one another for over 8000 miles (there & back) through the night.Sorry, messed up my post. My replies are contained within the quote
Shed Driver thank you for point re NATO Article 5
Ginetta G15 Girl said:
alfaspecial said:
Vulcan B2s have a range of between 2600 miles & 4600 miles (different internet sources), the Falklands are 3800 miles from Ascention Islands . So strip a Vulcan of all weight eg radar / electrical equipment radar counter measures in order to maximise fuel load. The crew could be restricted to just the pilot(?), ie fly without co-pilot / Nav Radar / Nav Plotter / Engineer.
I shouldn't imagine it's possible to fly a Vulcan with a single pilot. Who's going to do the fuel management?Alfaspecial:
This is only from the internet, but I read Vulcans had automatic fuel management based on clockwork timers. If necessary could a video link have been establised between Vulcan or Victor?
alfaspecial said:
Arm the bomber with anti-runway penetrating bombs (first used by Israel in 1967) rather than lob dumb bombs and do a high speed, low altitude single pass raid. After dropping the bombs the pilot (not having fuel to return) would eject and accept that he would be captured.
In 1982 the RAF was not in possession of such penetrators (the French Durandal) plus such weapons couldn't be employed as you suggest in a FRA (First Run Attack), but required to be tossed (or lofted) onto the target. Aside from the fact that that sort of a manoeuvre may well not have been possible in a Vulcan, if you've stripped out all the kit how are you going to aim the weapon and maintain accuracy?Alfaspecial
I remember just months after the war the RAF had access to such weapons & tv reports showed them being dropped from low level from a fighter / bomber (Skyhawk?). A video camera mounted in the front with a tv screen in the cockpit could have given a bomb aimers view?
The Vulcan was an incredibly agile aircraft & had been used in a low level bombing role.
Quote wikipedia "One system available from 1977 diverging from the French/Israeli runway piercing bomb development used in 1967 was the Matra Durandal, a single 450 lb bomb with parachute braking, rocket booster, and two warheads. The device worked after being dropped by an aircraft flying at low level braking by parachute, then when at the correct angle firing a rocket to impact the runway, first igniting a large warhead to create a crater and then subsequently using a smaller charge that had penetrated the crater to displace adjacent concrete slabs. The slabs, once displaced, are far harder to deal with than a simple hole that could be patched with asphalt. The Durandal has been widely exported."
See also British Version: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JP233
alfaspecial said:
After dropping the bombs the pilot (not having fuel to return) would eject and accept that he would be captured.
I'm not sure anyone would volunteer for that given the weather in the South Atlantic and the very small chance of sea survival!Hence my suggestion for the name; Operation Kamikaze (or Operation One-Way or Operation Boy's Own!) The pilot would have ejected over the Falklands to avoid a sea landing. The RAF: Never Have So Many etc etc
alfaspecial said:
The roles of the Nav Radar / Plotter / Engineer could have been conducted remotely, over a radio link, from a Victor Tanker (which would have the range to fly from Ascension/Falklands/Ascension).
The V Force didn't carry Flight Engineers.Wikipedia says they (Vulcans) did have AEO's But I'm happy to be corrected
You are also suggesting that the Vulcan rely upon Navigational data from the Victor. For EMCON Emissions Control) silent Ops this means visual contact ie relatively close formation flying for several hours, thus requiring visual meteorological conditions and daylight. Not very tactically sound for an un-armed aircraft with no countermeasures. Alternatively it requires the use of electronic transmissions between the aircraft. Again not very tactically sound I'm afraid.
Alfaspecial:
A Victor could transmit (at low power directed away from the Falklands) a Lorenz landing type system that the Vulcan would 'follow.'
The V-force were able to meet up at refueling points for Black Buck so did 'follow' one another for over 8000 miles (there & back) through the night.
Shed Driver thank you for point re NATO Article 5
Edited by alfaspecial on Monday 15th May 17:30
Alfa,
In no particular order.
In 1982 JP233 wasn't in service, indeed Tornado wasn't in front line service - I saw my first pair of Tornado GR1s (as opposed to MRCAs) at RAF Binbrook that summer and they were from the OEU (Operational Evaluation Unit) rather than a front line Sqn.
I don't believe JP233 (had it been available) could have been carried by Vulcan. Essentially the system comprised 2x large canisters, carried beneath the a/c on pylons, that would eject sub-munitions (both runway penetrators as well as anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines) as the aircraft overflew the airfield at 200 ft. That is to say you couldn't put the canisters in a Vulcan bomb bay because you wouldn't get a clean release of the munitions (the a/c would likely as not blow itself out of the sky). I'm also not sure I would want to overfly a defended airfield in a relatively large (and relatively slow) a/c!
Fuel management on Vulcan may well have been based around clockwork timers, but someone has to operate them whilst the flying pilot does the flying (I don't recall whether Vulcan had an autopilot). WRT a video link I'm not sure the technolgy in 1982 was that good and again we are back to not being EMCON silent (data link on Nimrod for eg did not arrive until Gulf War 1).
An AEO is not a Flight Engineer but an Air Electronics Officer. Ie He deals with the ECM (electronic counter measures) and ESM (electronic support measures).
WRT to the Victor transmitting a Lorenz type signal, all well and good but who is going to interpret the received data (you've already got the Pilot doing both the flying and the fuel system management
). Again you are not EMCON silent and, despite the fact you might be transmitting in a direction away from Stanley you still have to consider side-lobe propagation. Furthermore you are now relying upon navigational data derived from what were (effectively) WW2 navigational systems (Gee and H2S [H2S being worth the square root of F all over the sea]) to attempt to deliver a precision munition. I just sense the CEP (Circular Error Probability ie miss distance) expanding at an exponential rate!
WRT Durandal it required a toss or loft attack ie a steep pitch up from low level. Again, aside from whether Vulcan was stressed for such a delivery, it would rely upon having a clean release from the bomb bay (otherwise accuracy would be off). additionally Vulcan crews were not trained for such a mission. I would suggest that such training would have taken longer than the AAR (air to air refuelling) training took for the Black Buck raids.
Overall a nice idea, but IMHO not really viable with the kit that we had available to us in 1982.
In no particular order.
In 1982 JP233 wasn't in service, indeed Tornado wasn't in front line service - I saw my first pair of Tornado GR1s (as opposed to MRCAs) at RAF Binbrook that summer and they were from the OEU (Operational Evaluation Unit) rather than a front line Sqn.
I don't believe JP233 (had it been available) could have been carried by Vulcan. Essentially the system comprised 2x large canisters, carried beneath the a/c on pylons, that would eject sub-munitions (both runway penetrators as well as anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines) as the aircraft overflew the airfield at 200 ft. That is to say you couldn't put the canisters in a Vulcan bomb bay because you wouldn't get a clean release of the munitions (the a/c would likely as not blow itself out of the sky). I'm also not sure I would want to overfly a defended airfield in a relatively large (and relatively slow) a/c!
Fuel management on Vulcan may well have been based around clockwork timers, but someone has to operate them whilst the flying pilot does the flying (I don't recall whether Vulcan had an autopilot). WRT a video link I'm not sure the technolgy in 1982 was that good and again we are back to not being EMCON silent (data link on Nimrod for eg did not arrive until Gulf War 1).
An AEO is not a Flight Engineer but an Air Electronics Officer. Ie He deals with the ECM (electronic counter measures) and ESM (electronic support measures).
WRT to the Victor transmitting a Lorenz type signal, all well and good but who is going to interpret the received data (you've already got the Pilot doing both the flying and the fuel system management
). Again you are not EMCON silent and, despite the fact you might be transmitting in a direction away from Stanley you still have to consider side-lobe propagation. Furthermore you are now relying upon navigational data derived from what were (effectively) WW2 navigational systems (Gee and H2S [H2S being worth the square root of F all over the sea]) to attempt to deliver a precision munition. I just sense the CEP (Circular Error Probability ie miss distance) expanding at an exponential rate!WRT Durandal it required a toss or loft attack ie a steep pitch up from low level. Again, aside from whether Vulcan was stressed for such a delivery, it would rely upon having a clean release from the bomb bay (otherwise accuracy would be off). additionally Vulcan crews were not trained for such a mission. I would suggest that such training would have taken longer than the AAR (air to air refuelling) training took for the Black Buck raids.
Overall a nice idea, but IMHO not really viable with the kit that we had available to us in 1982.
Edited by Ginetta G15 Girl on Monday 15th May 18:19
The raid on Pebble Island was legendary and was what made me want to join the SAS, obviously I never did but it made me want to....
Re the JP233, iirc the horrible wee bomblets were specifically designed to sit in the ground & muller anyone trying to clean up, I recall seeing a vid of one punching through a bulldozer blade, not really the sort of thing they'd want to be leaving lying around (even if they had them) if the intention was to retake & use the airfield in the near future. The same argument could be made about all the a/p mines sown.
This thread is great by the way.....
Re the JP233, iirc the horrible wee bomblets were specifically designed to sit in the ground & muller anyone trying to clean up, I recall seeing a vid of one punching through a bulldozer blade, not really the sort of thing they'd want to be leaving lying around (even if they had them) if the intention was to retake & use the airfield in the near future. The same argument could be made about all the a/p mines sown.
This thread is great by the way.....
JP233 had basically 2 sub munitions:
The runway penetrators and the anti-personnel mines. Some of both types were on immediate fuses (ie explode on contact), some on trip fuses, and some were on delayed action fuses so as to deny the runway from repair for some time. After a given period all would have detonated.
It was a 'clever' system - if the mines did not land in the correct orientation then they would 'stand up' into the correct orientation via sprung 'feet'.
If you tried to bulldoze them off the runway then the penetrators were designed to 'fall over' and fire their shaped charge warhead into the bulldozer (with obvious effect!).
The runway penetrators and the anti-personnel mines. Some of both types were on immediate fuses (ie explode on contact), some on trip fuses, and some were on delayed action fuses so as to deny the runway from repair for some time. After a given period all would have detonated.
It was a 'clever' system - if the mines did not land in the correct orientation then they would 'stand up' into the correct orientation via sprung 'feet'.
If you tried to bulldoze them off the runway then the penetrators were designed to 'fall over' and fire their shaped charge warhead into the bulldozer (with obvious effect!).
alfaspecial said:
1) Obviously it might have been politically impossible but legally could the UK have involved NATO? (An attack on one member is an attack on all, ie the Invasion of Afghanistan after 11 Sep 2001 was initiated at the USA's insistence). Had NATO formally got involved wouldn't Argentina have backed down saving 1000 plus lives?
The Nato treaty only applies if the attack is in Europe (or North America obviously).There are rumours of an attempt to sabotage Royal Navy ships in Gibraltar that the Spanish foiled then proceeded to hush up because it would arguably have brought NATO into the war.
Dr Jekyll said:
alfaspecial said:
1) Obviously it might have been politically impossible but legally could the UK have involved NATO? (An attack on one member is an attack on all, ie the Invasion of Afghanistan after 11 Sep 2001 was initiated at the USA's insistence). Had NATO formally got involved wouldn't Argentina have backed down saving 1000 plus lives?
The Nato treaty only applies if the attack is in Europe (or North America obviously).There are rumours of an attempt to sabotage Royal Navy ships in Gibraltar that the Spanish foiled then proceeded to hush up because it would arguably have brought NATO into the war.
Wiki: "The key section of the treaty is Article 5. Its commitment clause defines the casus foederis. It commits each member state to consider an armed attack against one member state, in Europe or North America, to be an armed attack against them all."
Ginetta G15 Girl,
I have checked this out. The co-pilot was in charge of fuel matters. So presumably would need crew of 2 (unless the pilot was named Angelo masquerading as François Derval *). Could the second crew member navigate and then transfer to the co-pilots seat (when in target area)?
But I do think a mission would have has a good chance of success if carried out within (say) 2 or 3 weeks of the invasion simply because the Argentines would not have been expecting an attack - I doubt that a fully functioning air defence system was in operation.
Pure speculation but did the RAF bomb from altitude for reasons of crew survival should the plane have been hit? (As I posted previously the pilot/co-pilot could eject but the other 3 or 4 crew members would have gone down with the plane (at low altitude)
Obviously a Vulcan is a far bigger target than a Harrier but low level raids were carried out by Harriers without the benefit of surprise.
'My' raid would have been carried out just after dawn with hopefully good weather to aid accuracy. The actual Black Buck was a highly hit & miss affair (20 out of 21 bombs missed!) and I speculate that more damage to the runway would have resulted from runway denial weapons. But obviously if they weren't available in April 1982 then 'my' raid is mere fantasy!
Dr Jekyll & Vaud. Thanks re article 5. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/...
Interestingly the only time Article 5 has been invoked (9/11) is in response to a country (Afghanistan) harbouring terrorists (Bin Laden) rather than a direct attack from a sovereign nation. And even more interestingly was that bumping of Bin Laden was nothing to do with NATO. A fair few (100's 000) lives would have been solved if, instead of using NATO the USA used intelligence / SEALS to take him out. But thats an entirely different issue.
I have checked this out. The co-pilot was in charge of fuel matters. So presumably would need crew of 2 (unless the pilot was named Angelo masquerading as François Derval *). Could the second crew member navigate and then transfer to the co-pilots seat (when in target area)?
But I do think a mission would have has a good chance of success if carried out within (say) 2 or 3 weeks of the invasion simply because the Argentines would not have been expecting an attack - I doubt that a fully functioning air defence system was in operation.
Pure speculation but did the RAF bomb from altitude for reasons of crew survival should the plane have been hit? (As I posted previously the pilot/co-pilot could eject but the other 3 or 4 crew members would have gone down with the plane (at low altitude)
Obviously a Vulcan is a far bigger target than a Harrier but low level raids were carried out by Harriers without the benefit of surprise.
'My' raid would have been carried out just after dawn with hopefully good weather to aid accuracy. The actual Black Buck was a highly hit & miss affair (20 out of 21 bombs missed!) and I speculate that more damage to the runway would have resulted from runway denial weapons. But obviously if they weren't available in April 1982 then 'my' raid is mere fantasy!
Dr Jekyll & Vaud. Thanks re article 5. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/...
Interestingly the only time Article 5 has been invoked (9/11) is in response to a country (Afghanistan) harbouring terrorists (Bin Laden) rather than a direct attack from a sovereign nation. And even more interestingly was that bumping of Bin Laden was nothing to do with NATO. A fair few (100's 000) lives would have been solved if, instead of using NATO the USA used intelligence / SEALS to take him out. But thats an entirely different issue.
- Angelo / François Derval was the name of the Bond Baddie who hijacked the Vulcan in Thunderball: he had no problems with navigation / fuel management issues!
Listening to the audi clips a few pages back, I find it surreal.
The calmness of the voice coming over the tannoy, and the fact that they seemed quite pleased having just destroyed 2 out of 3 aircraft.
Yes rather them than us, but 2 men dead who were just following orders. What a waste.
The calmness of the voice coming over the tannoy, and the fact that they seemed quite pleased having just destroyed 2 out of 3 aircraft.
Yes rather them than us, but 2 men dead who were just following orders. What a waste.
Gerber1 said:
Listening to the audi clips a few pages back, I find it surreal.
The calmness of the voice coming over the tannoy, and the fact that they seemed quite pleased having just destroyed 2 out of 3 aircraft.
Yes rather them than us, but 2 men dead who were just following orders. What a waste.
There are many times to consider the waste of life during war - shortly after destroying two planes that could've (and would have given the chance) downed the ship you are sailing on is probably not one of them.The calmness of the voice coming over the tannoy, and the fact that they seemed quite pleased having just destroyed 2 out of 3 aircraft.
Yes rather them than us, but 2 men dead who were just following orders. What a waste.
menguin said:
Gerber1 said:
Listening to the audi clips a few pages back, I find it surreal.
The calmness of the voice coming over the tannoy, and the fact that they seemed quite pleased having just destroyed 2 out of 3 aircraft.
Yes rather them than us, but 2 men dead who were just following orders. What a waste.
There are many times to consider the waste of life during war - shortly after destroying two planes that could've (and would have given the chance) downed the ship you are sailing on is probably not one of them.The calmness of the voice coming over the tannoy, and the fact that they seemed quite pleased having just destroyed 2 out of 3 aircraft.
Yes rather them than us, but 2 men dead who were just following orders. What a waste.
I served in the 1991 Gulf War, and clearly recall trundling forward behind our armour, and punching the air in celebration when yet another smoking hulk of a T55 appeared out of the gloom. Obsolescent or not, these tanks packed a punch (more so than pre-deployment intelligence had suggested), and would have happily punched a 100mm HEAT or SABOT round into my vehicle given the chance, so celebrating their defeat was an entirely natural expression of relief on our part.
Then later in the afternoon, we were waiting for tasking on a vacated Iraqi trench system that had been "vigorously flushed" by elements of 3RRF. I was sat in the hatch of my APC, with my personal weapon (9mm SMG) stripped for cleaning. Half the crew were 'suited and booted' with weapons loaded, half were cleaning weapons and brewing up. Then I spotted movement from a trench. "Stand To!" shouts I. Orders then??? shouts my section commander from the ground below me. "Movement in the trench to our 2 o'clock, 150 metres!" I see more movement, but not enough to aim at. Not seen comes the reply from the ground, and then I realise that my elevated position (I'm now IN the commander's cupola, ready on the Light Machine Gun) means I can see things my mates down on their faces cannot. "Watch my tracer" says I, and at the next hint of movement I pop off a three round burst. Tracer isn't much use at that short a range, but the dust from the striking rounds (they went long, falling behind the trench) gives the position for the section to look for targets.
It's at this point that I discover that I can, indeed take another mans life, because I've taken up first pressure on the trigger, and the next thing that appears over the top of the trench is taking a burst of 7.62mm fire. Thankfully, my resolve isn't tested, as the next thing up in front of me is a very gingerly raised improvised white flag. Long story short, half the section flanks the trench, and out come five Iraqis. After robustly searching them, their 'elder statesman' turns out to be a paymaster, with very good English. They'd hidden from our infantry in a stores dump, and wanted to surrender. Two of them were in their late 40s, three in their teens. Some wearing brogues, some sandals. Not one wore boots. We fed them, and gave them water, and stood guard over them until we were relieved, whereupon they were processed back through to the PW cages.
What's the point of my (irrelevant to the Falklands War) tale? That celebrating a victory over an enemy combatant does not need to strip you of your humanity. I had gone from celebrating the certain death of multiple enemy tank crews, to treating enemy prisoners humanely, and even feeling sorry for them. None of those five we captured wanted to be there, and they were ill-equipped to take on a modern (well, mostly modern, 'cept for us Engineers) first world armoured battle group operating within an umbrella of 100% air superiority. I could happily take their lives from them all day long in defence of my own, and more importantly the lives of my friends and wider colleagues. But I had no personal quarrel with these individuals, so there was nothing to drive me to treat them badly when the fight was over. I was glad of that moment, from the point of view that I now knew that I was ready to pull the trigger when needed, but that I had made the correct judgement and not needlessly killed men who were no longer a threat.
I can delete this if anyone thinks it's inappropriate to the thread...
16th May
Britain sends its last negotiating offer via the UN in New York. It consisted of a mutual withdrawal of forces. Read the text of the proposal. A UN administrator and staff instead of the British Governor. The Falklands would for the interim be governed 'In accordance with the laws and practices traditionally obtaining' (i.e. British). There would be three observers from the UK and three from Argentina. Further negotiations would be 'without prejudice' and undertaken with the goal of completion by the end of the year. South Georgia was excluded from this deal. It was also delivered with a note asking for a rapid response.
801 Squadron dropped more bombs on Port Stanley airfield.
Two armed reconnaissance missions were flown off HMS Hermes.
M/V ELMA Río Carcarañá
At 1000hrs, the Río Carcarañá was overflown by a British Recon plane, but continued to make her 17 knot top speed for the protection of Puerto Rey, hoping to outrun any forthcoming attack.
At 1330hrs on the 16th two British Harriers appeared on the horizon and initiated a attack on the Río Carcarañá, repeatedly strafing the ship with canon fire and dropping two bombs into her hull.
The ship quickly caught fire and her Captain was quick to order the crew over the side, fearing his ship's volatile cargo could explode at any moment.
The crew of the Río Carcarañá were rescued by another Argentine Merchantman steaming in the same convoy and the ship was left to her fate, her superstructure burning furiously.
The explosion many feared would sink the ship never came and by May 19th the fires onboard had burned themselves out. The Río Carcarañá was towed into Fox Bay where she was boarded and inspected by Argentine Naval Forces. Both the ship and cargo were found to be damaged beyond repair or usefulness, so after all valuable and sensitive material was removed she was left to her fate once again, this time anchored in Fox Bay.
The naval auxiliary Bahia Buen Suceso, moored near the civilian settlement at Fox Bay was strafed by the Harriers.
ARA Bahia Buen Suceso,
Anti aircraft fire was heavy and one of the fighters returned with a bullet hole in its fin.
Late afternoon an 800 squadron sortie was flown off to photograph the damaged ships, Port Darwin, Moody Brook and Port Stanley airfield. The photographs showed another bomb crater on Port Stanley airfield runway. This had been created by the Argentine Air Force unit who had begun to simulate bomb craters using bulldozers to build piles of mud which could be removed at night allowing aircraft to land.
The Amphibious Group came together. Fifteen RFAs and STUFT, HMS Fearless, Intrepid, Antrim, Plymouth, Argonaut and Ardent.
HMS Glamorgan sent inshore to continue bombardment. 130 rounds fired at targets in Port Stanley, Darwin and Fitzroy. The object of this was to convince the Argentineans that landings were to take place to the south of Stanley.
SD.
Britain sends its last negotiating offer via the UN in New York. It consisted of a mutual withdrawal of forces. Read the text of the proposal. A UN administrator and staff instead of the British Governor. The Falklands would for the interim be governed 'In accordance with the laws and practices traditionally obtaining' (i.e. British). There would be three observers from the UK and three from Argentina. Further negotiations would be 'without prejudice' and undertaken with the goal of completion by the end of the year. South Georgia was excluded from this deal. It was also delivered with a note asking for a rapid response.
801 Squadron dropped more bombs on Port Stanley airfield.
Two armed reconnaissance missions were flown off HMS Hermes.
M/V ELMA Río Carcarañá
At 1000hrs, the Río Carcarañá was overflown by a British Recon plane, but continued to make her 17 knot top speed for the protection of Puerto Rey, hoping to outrun any forthcoming attack.
At 1330hrs on the 16th two British Harriers appeared on the horizon and initiated a attack on the Río Carcarañá, repeatedly strafing the ship with canon fire and dropping two bombs into her hull.
The ship quickly caught fire and her Captain was quick to order the crew over the side, fearing his ship's volatile cargo could explode at any moment.
The crew of the Río Carcarañá were rescued by another Argentine Merchantman steaming in the same convoy and the ship was left to her fate, her superstructure burning furiously.
The explosion many feared would sink the ship never came and by May 19th the fires onboard had burned themselves out. The Río Carcarañá was towed into Fox Bay where she was boarded and inspected by Argentine Naval Forces. Both the ship and cargo were found to be damaged beyond repair or usefulness, so after all valuable and sensitive material was removed she was left to her fate once again, this time anchored in Fox Bay.
The naval auxiliary Bahia Buen Suceso, moored near the civilian settlement at Fox Bay was strafed by the Harriers.
ARA Bahia Buen Suceso,
Anti aircraft fire was heavy and one of the fighters returned with a bullet hole in its fin.
Late afternoon an 800 squadron sortie was flown off to photograph the damaged ships, Port Darwin, Moody Brook and Port Stanley airfield. The photographs showed another bomb crater on Port Stanley airfield runway. This had been created by the Argentine Air Force unit who had begun to simulate bomb craters using bulldozers to build piles of mud which could be removed at night allowing aircraft to land.
The Amphibious Group came together. Fifteen RFAs and STUFT, HMS Fearless, Intrepid, Antrim, Plymouth, Argonaut and Ardent.
HMS Glamorgan sent inshore to continue bombardment. 130 rounds fired at targets in Port Stanley, Darwin and Fitzroy. The object of this was to convince the Argentineans that landings were to take place to the south of Stanley.
SD.
Ginetta G15 Girl said:
JP233 had basically 2 sub munitions:
The runway penetrators and the anti-personnel mines. Some of both types were on immediate fuses (ie explode on contact), some on trip fuses, and some were on delayed action fuses so as to deny the runway from repair for some time. After a given period all would have detonated.
It was a 'clever' system - if the mines did not land in the correct orientation then they would 'stand up' into the correct orientation via sprung 'feet'.
If you tried to bulldoze them off the runway then the penetrators were designed to 'fall over' and fire their shaped charge warhead into the bulldozer (with obvious effect!).
JP233 was deployed (along with other area denial sub-munition systems) during the '91 Gulf War. Quite often it was deployed not as an anti-runway weapon, but out on the hard, gravelly desert (it was like bloody concrete in places) on defensive positions and enemy formations.The runway penetrators and the anti-personnel mines. Some of both types were on immediate fuses (ie explode on contact), some on trip fuses, and some were on delayed action fuses so as to deny the runway from repair for some time. After a given period all would have detonated.
It was a 'clever' system - if the mines did not land in the correct orientation then they would 'stand up' into the correct orientation via sprung 'feet'.
If you tried to bulldoze them off the runway then the penetrators were designed to 'fall over' and fire their shaped charge warhead into the bulldozer (with obvious effect!).
Pearson Engineering provided us with a means to clear these surface bomblets with reduced risk to crews...
...notice the sprung chains out front, to try to give some stand-off distance from the plough itself, and the main body of the plough which is highly articulated in order that it follows terrain closely to prevent the sub-munitions from passing under it and damaging the vehicle carrying the system. This device appeared quite swiftly in operational units, despite the fact that no-one seemed to have heard of it before the war kicked off.
[spotter alert] Note also the raised rear roadwheel (No 5) on the FV432 APC in the photo? It's got a broken torsion bar...
[/spotter alert] (That vehicle is (well was) parked outside the Land Warfare Hall at IWM Duxford, in place of the Centurion AVRE that used to be there).
Fascinating thread, one of the best I've read and it's encouraged me to read up more on the conflict. Thanks SD
Yellowjack - your post above is (in my opinion) definitely relevant as it gave some perspective in response to an earlier comment. Thanks to you and others for your contributions.
Yellowjack - your post above is (in my opinion) definitely relevant as it gave some perspective in response to an earlier comment. Thanks to you and others for your contributions.
Zetec-S said:
...Yellowjack - your post above is (in my opinion) definitely relevant as it gave some perspective in response to an earlier comment. Thanks to you and others for your contributions.
Thanks. I get a lot of crap on some threads because I apparently "never shut up" about having been in the army. The trouble is, because I was 'in' for a smidgin over 25 years, it WAS my life for more than half of my life, so I've not got much else to waffle on about. It's not a tale I've shared before, but this thread seemed to be an appropriate place for it, given the earlier comment. I was 19 and quite fresh from the factory when I was warned off for Op Granby, and I 'celebrated' my 20th birthday in Canada (live firing exercises) shortly before I deployed on Op Granby 1.5 (the 1.5 bit was our "in joke" at the time). It was a rude awakening for a young soldier who'd been told, on first joining up, by a crusty old Quartermaster that "you boys will go to Germany and get fat drinking beer. We've had our war (referring to the Falklands), you'll not likely see another before you leave the service". He was an Op Corporate veteran, as was my troop Staff Sergeant, a particularly 'robust' Cornishman (and BEM holder), ex of 59 Independent Commando Squadron, RE.
I wonder if that old QM is still around, and if he realises just how wrong he was about military operations in the years ahead of us recruits in 1987...
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