Half a world, and half a lifetime away.
Discussion
Great read, huge thank you to all contributors.
I was 17 when it all started and 18 by the time it finished. I was doing my techy training at RAF Locking which I completed in 1983 and was posted to Tactical Communications Wing which was, I believe, the only non flying RAF unit to be on the ground in the Falkland Islands, other than I think the Rapier crews who were RAF Regiment.
One of the TCW members was, I think, credited with the shooting down of an Argentine plane using a GPMG mounted on the hand rail on the deck of the Canberra.
Mick Compton was his name he was still there when I arrived in March 1983.
I was 17 when it all started and 18 by the time it finished. I was doing my techy training at RAF Locking which I completed in 1983 and was posted to Tactical Communications Wing which was, I believe, the only non flying RAF unit to be on the ground in the Falkland Islands, other than I think the Rapier crews who were RAF Regiment.
One of the TCW members was, I think, credited with the shooting down of an Argentine plane using a GPMG mounted on the hand rail on the deck of the Canberra.
Mick Compton was his name he was still there when I arrived in March 1983.
gruffalo said:
Great read, huge thank you to all contributors.
I was 17 when it all started and 18 by the time it finished. I was doing my techy training at RAF Locking which I completed in 1983 and was posted to Tactical Communications Wing which was, I believe, the only non flying RAF unit to be on the ground in the Falkland Islands, other than I think the Rapier crews who were RAF Regiment.
One of the TCW members was, I think, credited with the shooting down of an Argentine plane using a GPMG mounted on the hand rail on the deck of the Canberra.
Mick Compton was his name he was still there when I arrived in March 1983.
Reminds me of my time in recruit training. I joined up in 1987, and our training staff were almost entirely Falklands veterans. A SSgt and several JNCOs from 59 Independent Commando Sqn RE, and a couple from 9 (Parachute) Sqn RE. I don't think it did any of us any harm to have the benefit of their experience back then. Then, by the time of the Gulf War in 1991, it was extremely rare to see a South Atlantic medal on parade. I was 17 when it all started and 18 by the time it finished. I was doing my techy training at RAF Locking which I completed in 1983 and was posted to Tactical Communications Wing which was, I believe, the only non flying RAF unit to be on the ground in the Falkland Islands, other than I think the Rapier crews who were RAF Regiment.
One of the TCW members was, I think, credited with the shooting down of an Argentine plane using a GPMG mounted on the hand rail on the deck of the Canberra.
Mick Compton was his name he was still there when I arrived in March 1983.
yellowjack said:
Reminds me of my time in recruit training. I joined up in 1987, and our training staff were almost entirely Falklands veterans. A SSgt and several JNCOs from 59 Independent Commando Sqn RE, and a couple from 9 (Parachute) Sqn RE. I don't think it did any of us any harm to have the benefit of their experience back then. Then, by the time of the Gulf War in 1991, it was extremely rare to see a South Atlantic medal on parade.
Hay Yellowjack,If you fancy a spin let me know I am just in Marlow so probably not a million miles away and always happy to take a fan of TVR's out for a blast to further brand appreciation.
yellowjack said:
Reminds me of my time in recruit training. I joined up in 1987, and our training staff were almost entirely Falklands veterans. A SSgt and several JNCOs from 59 Independent Commando Sqn RE, and a couple from 9 (Parachute) Sqn RE. I don't think it did any of us any harm to have the benefit of their experience back then. Then, by the time of the Gulf War in 1991, it was extremely rare to see a South Atlantic medal on parade.
When I went to Afghanistan in 2010 attached to 23 Engineers, of which 9 Squadron is a part now, we had an engineer from the associated TA on tour who had been in the Falklands as part of 9 Squadron in 1982alfaspecial said:
This thread is my 'go to' re the Falklands War, so I thought I would post these two Bog entries here - might add some detail re the actual (Argentine) invasion.
https://rickydphillipsauthor.wordpress.com/2016/03...
https://rickydphillipsauthor.wordpress.com/2016/03...
Author Ricky D. Phillips military history Bog
I wondered if Ricky would crop up on this amazing thread.https://rickydphillipsauthor.wordpress.com/2016/03...
https://rickydphillipsauthor.wordpress.com/2016/03...
Author Ricky D. Phillips military history Bog
He's been a mate of mine for 2 decades now and his research and connections in the Falklands are something else.
He finally published his book a couple of years ago and I took great pride in getting an autographed copy for my Dad (who went to FI 3 times, including being on the Saxonia during the war itself.)
Many have said it but I think this is probably the most incredible thread I've read in my 18 years on this site. Thanks to the OP and all the others who have added so much to a period that I only remember with great worry as to whether my Dad was coming home (I was 5 or so at the time)
A while ago someone pointed me to this thread after an off topic comment on another thread. Taken me some time to read it all in instalments so here's my minor input.
We were involved in the production of the Sidewinder missile, including the update to the AIM-9L version where the Falklands was the first use in a large scale major conflict. So you can imagine the calls and efforts to ramp up the output and while attention to quality was always top notch, it certainly focussed minds. Afterwards gratifying to hear of an 80% launch to kill ratio, several times better than previous, 20% ish? Having got that up and running at full welly I was now pulled onto another project with no notice.
Essentially Navy realised it was going to need all the surface/ship to air defence weaponry it could get its hands on. Memory failing on some of the precise details now but there was need to get the new Sea Wolf missile system output increased sharpish, just as for Sidewinder, but some bright spark then had the idea of also getting the obsolete Seacat system back into production and working properly. I think it was to try and cover a capability gap between Sea Wolf and Sea Dart, but don't quote me on that. Christ that was a pain in the rear end given the timeframe, and in the end the system didn't claim a single kill.
Afterwards back to Sidewinder production , at some time after the war ended was in a Royal Ordnance Factory as they still existed then and got on the edge of a real row over a failed Exocet missile. Essentially the failure was in a body weld, missile had got through the defence systems, hit the target at an angle, the weld had failed catastrophically, warhead failed to explode and was later recovered floating in the sea allowing us to examine the reason for the failure.
The complaining party was a posse of Frenchmen arguing that the missile was a complete failure, a somewhat moot point in that the body of the missile with remaining fuel had continued its path, penetrated the target and started a fire. Yes it really was the missile that sunk HMS Sheffield, the French complained it hadn't done the job properly. Meeting atmosphere was a tad charged, shall we say.
We were involved in the production of the Sidewinder missile, including the update to the AIM-9L version where the Falklands was the first use in a large scale major conflict. So you can imagine the calls and efforts to ramp up the output and while attention to quality was always top notch, it certainly focussed minds. Afterwards gratifying to hear of an 80% launch to kill ratio, several times better than previous, 20% ish? Having got that up and running at full welly I was now pulled onto another project with no notice.
Essentially Navy realised it was going to need all the surface/ship to air defence weaponry it could get its hands on. Memory failing on some of the precise details now but there was need to get the new Sea Wolf missile system output increased sharpish, just as for Sidewinder, but some bright spark then had the idea of also getting the obsolete Seacat system back into production and working properly. I think it was to try and cover a capability gap between Sea Wolf and Sea Dart, but don't quote me on that. Christ that was a pain in the rear end given the timeframe, and in the end the system didn't claim a single kill.
Afterwards back to Sidewinder production , at some time after the war ended was in a Royal Ordnance Factory as they still existed then and got on the edge of a real row over a failed Exocet missile. Essentially the failure was in a body weld, missile had got through the defence systems, hit the target at an angle, the weld had failed catastrophically, warhead failed to explode and was later recovered floating in the sea allowing us to examine the reason for the failure.
The complaining party was a posse of Frenchmen arguing that the missile was a complete failure, a somewhat moot point in that the body of the missile with remaining fuel had continued its path, penetrated the target and started a fire. Yes it really was the missile that sunk HMS Sheffield, the French complained it hadn't done the job properly. Meeting atmosphere was a tad charged, shall we say.
Last Visit said:
Programme on this evening at 9pm Channel 4 to mark the 40th anniversary that might be worth watching for those with an interest in the war.
Also now available on Channel 4 catch-up.Last Visit said:
Programme on this evening at 9pm Channel 4 to mark the 40th anniversary that might be worth watching for those with an interest in the war.
The Telegraph reported that the programme said 'inter alia':-"The Task Force was poorly equipped. Overall command was assigned to the Royal Navy, operating from a bunker in Northwood, Middlesex, but the command chain they set up was “utterly dysfunctional”, according to one of the talking heads here.
“We very nearly lost the war because of some extraordinarily bad decisions that were taken by Northwood,” said Rose. He was scathing about the order to attack and capture Goose Green, and the tactical mistakes that led to the bombing of the Sir Galahad. The programme also featured heavy criticism of Brigadier Tony Wilson, commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade: a “bloody idiot” presiding over a “bloody shambles”. Wilson died in 2019, so could not defend himself here."
Oilchange said:
Is that because he didn't offload the troops from the ships in double quick time and thus made them sitting ducks for the bombers?
I seem to remember one of the Para command chain (possibly H's 2ic) going over to his boat and asking why the bloody hell were they still on board.
I missed the last 30 minutes of the show but from what I gather there was no reason for the troops to offload there in the first place - all the supplies could've been given to the troops who yomped across the island and let them get on with attacking Port Stanley without waiting for the troops on the Sir Galahad. Wilson wanted to leap frog the troops already on the island with 'his' troops that had just arrived in the Falklands. Getting the troops to Bluff Cove took 17 hours so had to be done in daylight.I seem to remember one of the Para command chain (possibly H's 2ic) going over to his boat and asking why the bloody hell were they still on board.
I'm a bit hazy on the precise details as there was lots of information in the show, but it's interesting if you get 90 minutes to watch it.
Well, after reading the whole of this extremely interesting thread as it developed at the time it was posted (I had only remembered it initially as a 14 year old watching the news at the time), seeing this documentary put a whole different perspective on it regarding the mess that was the command and control setup, and quite how close we were to losing the whole campaign.
Stuff like the fact the SAS had to sort out their own logistics and only had decent comms due to the guy in charge having a personal connection to a senior officer in the US special forces and getting satellite phones - unbelievable.
As for Brigadeer Tony Wilson, well...
I'd also highly recommend reading (if you can find of a copy of it) "The Red and Green Life Machine" by Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly, who ran the field hospital on the Falklands, and was the only person decorated by both the British and Argentinians after the war. I was lucky enough to get hold of a signed copy of the book after reading this thread some time ago.
Also, thanks to Shed Driver for starting and massively contributing to the thread, and all those who contributed with personal accounts - really appreciated.
Stuff like the fact the SAS had to sort out their own logistics and only had decent comms due to the guy in charge having a personal connection to a senior officer in the US special forces and getting satellite phones - unbelievable.
As for Brigadeer Tony Wilson, well...
I'd also highly recommend reading (if you can find of a copy of it) "The Red and Green Life Machine" by Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly, who ran the field hospital on the Falklands, and was the only person decorated by both the British and Argentinians after the war. I was lucky enough to get hold of a signed copy of the book after reading this thread some time ago.
Also, thanks to Shed Driver for starting and massively contributing to the thread, and all those who contributed with personal accounts - really appreciated.
Edited by C n C on Tuesday 29th March 02:30
C n C said:
Well, after reading the whole of this extremely interesting thread as it developed at the time it was posted (I had only remembered it initially as a 14 year old watching the news at the time), seeing this documentary put a whole different perspective on it regarding the mess that was the command and control setup, and quite how close we were to losing the whole campaign.
Stuff like the fact the SAS had to sort out their own logistics and only had decent comms due to the guy in charge having a personal connection to a senior officer in the US special forces and getting satellite phones - unbelievable.
As for Brigadeer Tony Wilson, well...
I'd also highly recommend reading (if you can find of a copy of it) "The Red and Green Life Machine" by Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly, who ran the field hospital on the Falklands, and was the only person decorated by both the British and Argentinians after the war. I was lucky enough to get hold of a signed copy of the book after reading this thread some time ago.
Also, thanks to Shed Driver for starting and massively contributing to the thread, and all those who contributed with personal accounts - really appreciated.
Having watched the documentary last night, the thing that struck me, was how close we were to losing "Bravo November" when British troops assumed that the Chinook they could see was not British! Stuff like the fact the SAS had to sort out their own logistics and only had decent comms due to the guy in charge having a personal connection to a senior officer in the US special forces and getting satellite phones - unbelievable.
As for Brigadeer Tony Wilson, well...
I'd also highly recommend reading (if you can find of a copy of it) "The Red and Green Life Machine" by Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly, who ran the field hospital on the Falklands, and was the only person decorated by both the British and Argentinians after the war. I was lucky enough to get hold of a signed copy of the book after reading this thread some time ago.
Also, thanks to Shed Driver for starting and massively contributing to the thread, and all those who contributed with personal accounts - really appreciated.
Edited by C n C on Tuesday 29th March 02:30
Best thread on PH in the 18 years I've been on here. Thanks, OP, and everyone else who has contributed.
Interesting documentary last night with Ben Fogle telling the "forgotten" story of Naval Party 8901, a story that clearly needed telling. I don't think it was so much "forgotten" as "never properly told before".
Interesting documentary last night with Ben Fogle telling the "forgotten" story of Naval Party 8901, a story that clearly needed telling. I don't think it was so much "forgotten" as "never properly told before".
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