AF447 wreckage located...
Discussion
Max_Torque said:
The BEA report clearly states that the "stall warning" sounded for 54sec continuously during the descent. I'm not sure what else the aircraft could have done to alert the pilots to the er, stall........ ;-)
(in reality, situations like this are NOT quite so clear cut, and many factors come together to disorientate the pilots, who then make the wrong descision (like ignoring the stall claxon). So even if you made the plane flash up "HEY YOU TWO! WE ARE IN A STALL YOU KNOW!!" in large red flashing letters in front of both of them, the chances are some situation would occur that would lead to the wrong actions. Fundamentaly, the failure to call the UAS checksheet and fly "pitch and power" whilst clearing that checklist lead to the pilots entering a situation that unravelled before they could get ahead of it ;-(
I'm not a pilot, but my question would be would trying to fly pitch and power have been enough to recover from a deep stall?(in reality, situations like this are NOT quite so clear cut, and many factors come together to disorientate the pilots, who then make the wrong descision (like ignoring the stall claxon). So even if you made the plane flash up "HEY YOU TWO! WE ARE IN A STALL YOU KNOW!!" in large red flashing letters in front of both of them, the chances are some situation would occur that would lead to the wrong actions. Fundamentaly, the failure to call the UAS checksheet and fly "pitch and power" whilst clearing that checklist lead to the pilots entering a situation that unravelled before they could get ahead of it ;-(
el stovey said:
So there were two experienced pilots from a good airline who were unable to understand the condition they were in. Do you think an aircraft which has systems that can give information that leaves crew unable to understand whether the aircraft is stalling is a good design?
Any aircraft should be designed so that even the most gash rubbish pilots with the most basic training can easily understand if it's stalling or not. I would say if two Air France pilots are left in that situation then there is a problem with the design of the systems in the first place.
This is the crux of the problem. Airbus design philosophy seems to be to make the aircraft smart enough to fly itself. This is fine 99.99% of the time, but when the chips are down the crew needs to identify the exact nature of the problem and be able to deal with it, without worrying what changes the computers might be making in the meantime to thrust settings and control surfaces.Any aircraft should be designed so that even the most gash rubbish pilots with the most basic training can easily understand if it's stalling or not. I would say if two Air France pilots are left in that situation then there is a problem with the design of the systems in the first place.
As I suggested earlier, had these same pilots experienced the same problem (a loss of indicated airspeed) in a 707 I very much doubt that they would have lost the aircraft.
Im not a great pilot or very experienced by any stretch of the imagination and these were fully qualified airline pilots so maybe im missing the obvious but I dont understand what happened?
Even without an airspeed indicator the other instruments will tell you whats going on surely.
Look at the AoA indicator and the VSI and the power settings and you should be able to tell what's happening?
Surely even when flying a long boring route, the instruments should be scanned frequently and actually looked at not glanced at?
Even without an airspeed indicator the other instruments will tell you whats going on surely.
Look at the AoA indicator and the VSI and the power settings and you should be able to tell what's happening?
Surely even when flying a long boring route, the instruments should be scanned frequently and actually looked at not glanced at?
el stovey said:
Mojocvh said:
el stovey said:
An aircraft actually designed with a combination of systems and instrumentation that can leave two or even three experienced inadequately trained pilots unable to understand what's going on.
(Actually the captain, when he arrived did have a clue, but by then it was too late..... 10,000 to 4,000 in approx 24 seconds....)Any aircraft should be designed so that even the most gash rubbish pilots with the most basic training can easily understand if it's stalling or not. I would say if two Air France pilots are left in that situation then there is a problem with the design of the systems in the first place.
It's easy to blame the pilots but what's the root cause of this accident? Is it the weather? Is it the airbus architecture which left them in a situation where they were unable to easily interpret and respond to the information they were being given? Is it the Air France's training?
Edited by el stovey on Saturday 30th July 10:48
However the "other" factors that seem to raise their heads when it comes to AF stem from CULTURE and TRAINING.
ANY aircraft can be affected by ice formation, ANY aircraft can be affected by unreliable speed info, there are procedures on how to deal with it.
Why did they fail?
What again appears obvious is lack of training; from pprune,
Soon after 0135,
Quote:
le copilote modifie l’échelle de son ND de 320 NM à 160 NM et constate qu’« il y a un truc droit devant », qui fait sans doute référence à des échos détectés par le radar météo. Le commandant de bord confirme et l’équipage discute à nouveau du fait que la température élevée ne leur permet pas de monter au niveau 370.
The radar was left in CAL mode.
At 0208
Quote:
Vers 2 h 08, le copilote de gauche, sans doute après avoir vu des échos détectés par le radar météo, propose d’« altérer un peu à gauche ». Le mode HDG est activé et le cap sélecté diminue de 12 ° par rapport à la route. Le copilote de gauche passe le réglage de gain du radar météo au maximum, après s’être aperçu qu’il était en mode calibré. La discussion est interrompue par une sensation d’augmentation de température et l’apparition d’une odeur à propos desquels les pilotes échangent pendant plus d’une minute. Le copilote de gauche identifie cette odeur comme étant celle de l’ozone.
Radar changed from CAL to MAX, but no reference to changing the tilt. AF have already touched on this.
However, what does appear lacking, industry wide, is the training of ab-into aircrew in high altitude manual aircraft handling, as can be read from the PNF's comments to the PF
@2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, huh.
Add in training run by AF accountants and we sadly have the outcome before us.
davepoth said:
Any idea what the difference between max airspeed and stall is at that altitude?
Not a lot, but nothing like the coffin corner effect you read about with extreme high altitude flight (U2s and such). Probably about 25 knots or thereabouts, which still doesn't leave much room for the effects of turbulence / load factor pushing you outside the top left of the flight envelope.It's criminal that they don't train new commercial pilots in high speed stall recovery techniques. Even if they'd realised the plane was falling like a brick with its nose in the air, it sounds like only the captain would have had an idea what to do to recover to controlled flight. I know it's difficult to simulate, but it isn't impossible, and in an increasingly FBW world, it's these departures from normal control law where you need a human pilot.
Pete
pete said:
Not a lot, but nothing like the coffin corner effect you read about with extreme high altitude flight (U2s and such). Probably about 25 knots or thereabouts, which still doesn't leave much room for the effects of turbulence / load factor pushing you outside the top left of the flight envelope.
It's criminal that they don't train new commercial pilots in high speed stall recovery techniques. Even if they'd realised the plane was falling like a brick with its nose in the air, it sounds like only the captain would have had an idea what to do to recover to controlled flight. I know it's difficult to simulate, but it isn't impossible, and in an increasingly FBW world, it's these departures from normal control law where you need a human pilot.
Pete
It's been mentioned earlier in this thread. It's criminal that they don't train new commercial pilots in high speed stall recovery techniques. Even if they'd realised the plane was falling like a brick with its nose in the air, it sounds like only the captain would have had an idea what to do to recover to controlled flight. I know it's difficult to simulate, but it isn't impossible, and in an increasingly FBW world, it's these departures from normal control law where you need a human pilot.
Pete
All evidence seems to point to this being an unreliable airspeed situation. The stall is a secondary effect of (possibly) failing to recognise this.
Pete,
I'm not sure what you mean by high speed stall recovery techniques? That doesn't really make sense. All commercial pilots will have been trained to recover from the stall at any altitude. Stall recovery with operating instruments is not difficult given sufficient height. Intermittently failing and then operating/conflicting indications move this away from a traditional stall recovery scenario.
P
pete said:
Not a lot, but nothing like the coffin corner effect you read about with extreme high altitude flight (U2s and such). Probably about 25 knots or thereabouts, which still doesn't leave much room for the effects of turbulence / load factor pushing you outside the top left of the flight envelope.
It's criminal that they don't train new commercial pilots in high speed stall recovery techniques. Even if they'd realised the plane was falling like a brick with its nose in the air, it sounds like only the captain would have had an idea what to do to recover to controlled flight. I know it's difficult to simulate, but it isn't impossible, and in an increasingly FBW world, it's these departures from normal control law where you need a human pilot.
Pete
I was indeed watching the James May thing this week. 25kts is not a hell of a lot in turbulence and without an airspeed indicator though, so I can see how they could have got into the situation. I would have thought that at altitude the automatic thing to do would be to nose down gently and reduce power if they weren't sure what speed they were going at, meaning any stall would be gentle?It's criminal that they don't train new commercial pilots in high speed stall recovery techniques. Even if they'd realised the plane was falling like a brick with its nose in the air, it sounds like only the captain would have had an idea what to do to recover to controlled flight. I know it's difficult to simulate, but it isn't impossible, and in an increasingly FBW world, it's these departures from normal control law where you need a human pilot.
Pete
PTB, a far more eloquent explanation than mine. I mean recognising the confusing and conflicting messages in a high speed stall, as well as taking the appropriate actions in whatever control law the aircraft ended up in. That's why I said hard to simulate, as if it was possible to say with certainty what those messages would be, you wouldn't have designed the flight control systems and instruments so they could fail in that way in the first place.
However compare and contrast the transcripts with the Qantas A380 incident, where a very experienced flight crew did manage to make sense of multiple system failures and erroneous messages. Ok, they had a lot more time and extra hands on the flight deck, but I'd like to think we could go further to train pilots to recognise these situations.
Pete
However compare and contrast the transcripts with the Qantas A380 incident, where a very experienced flight crew did manage to make sense of multiple system failures and erroneous messages. Ok, they had a lot more time and extra hands on the flight deck, but I'd like to think we could go further to train pilots to recognise these situations.
Pete
A lex said:
I work with AF pilots every day (as well as most others in the industry) and I simply refuse to ever fly with them.
This is from direct professional experience.
Make of that what you will.
Very sad for the crew and pax on 447.
Why? what is it that makes AF so bad across the board?This is from direct professional experience.
Make of that what you will.
Very sad for the crew and pax on 447.
I'm beginning to think we are looking at a simple maths equation here, money saved on training versus acceptable litigation costs
Heck of a comment there Alex, raised my eyebrows.
Perhaps justified? I don't know. Mind you they are the only airline I've seen try to call for push and start while door 1 left is still open.
How they can get away with level 6 self certified, well I can only think "It's the French - law unto themselves" I quite enjoy going in and out of CDG though, always keeps you on your toes!
Perhaps justified? I don't know. Mind you they are the only airline I've seen try to call for push and start while door 1 left is still open.
How they can get away with level 6 self certified, well I can only think "It's the French - law unto themselves" I quite enjoy going in and out of CDG though, always keeps you on your toes!
They're an awesome employer as a pilot, great aircraft, great maintenance, but yes, they do 'appear' to have a rather French arrogance (it's a genuine old boys club) and odd culture. They don't mix to create a safety culture, rather one which doesn't fit in on the modern flight deck.
It's a huge aspersion to cast, and it isn't fair on the vast majority of excellent professionals up front in their jets, but I think I know what Alex is getting at. But in the industry, you do hear a disproportionate number of stories about them. Many are nonsense, I'm sure, but as they say; there's no smoke without fire..
It's a huge aspersion to cast, and it isn't fair on the vast majority of excellent professionals up front in their jets, but I think I know what Alex is getting at. But in the industry, you do hear a disproportionate number of stories about them. Many are nonsense, I'm sure, but as they say; there's no smoke without fire..
A lex said:
From dealing with the pilots daily; - the attitude, the lack of understanding, the occasional refusal to follow instructions, the sometimes sheer incompetence. As an example all pilots and controllers operating in the EU airspace recently had to take a new English Standards test. Rated from 1-6 (6 being native and NEVER needing a re-test) - the company I work for decided that nobody would score above a 5, so as an English native I score 5 and will need re-testing after 5 yrs or so. Air France self-certified ALL of its pilots as level 6 without taking the tests!
I have hundreds of examples of poor attitude / incompetence gathered on almost a daily basis but I wont post them here as
1) It wont make sense to anyone not in the industry.
2) It may well land me in hot water should the wrong person read it.
There are of course lots of very very good AF pilots (they usually dont have a French accent though
) - but from observations over a 5yr period and from talking to colleagues who have been at the game for 20+yrs they just seem to have a higher % of 'bad apples'. This, I believe is backed up by their safety record.
There are plenty of other airlines who I wouldnt fly from experience, but they all originate outside of W. Europe.
I have such a strong feeling about it that if AF were the only airline flying to a particular destination I simply wouldnt fly there.
As a very regular PAX with AF (Platinum baby, oh yeah!) I have to say I never had any problem with them flying to my various African destinations (usually BHX - CDG - xxx). Quite often with pilots happy to comment midflight what was going on, what to look out for (the best was a couple of year back telling us to look down for that big thing which was an A380 in testing above Spain) BUT, as a native of the same country than that particular airline, I am ready to belive in what you say regarding their general attitude or how its perceived by other nationalities I have hundreds of examples of poor attitude / incompetence gathered on almost a daily basis but I wont post them here as
1) It wont make sense to anyone not in the industry.
2) It may well land me in hot water should the wrong person read it.
There are of course lots of very very good AF pilots (they usually dont have a French accent though
) - but from observations over a 5yr period and from talking to colleagues who have been at the game for 20+yrs they just seem to have a higher % of 'bad apples'. This, I believe is backed up by their safety record.There are plenty of other airlines who I wouldnt fly from experience, but they all originate outside of W. Europe.
I have such a strong feeling about it that if AF were the only airline flying to a particular destination I simply wouldnt fly there.
Anyway, my point is that these are the kind of info us frequent flyers could use to challenge them, I will not hesitate next time to question them about this new english test and why they have not deemed necessary to undertake it. It could be that they have their own in house test that they judge, rightly or wrongly, superior (this would be a case in point of that well famed "French arrogant attitude"). Although I find it hard to believe when you sometime hear pilot or copilot talk about the destination's weather or something or other
.I would be miffed to find that in a world of increasing and denser air traffic they refuse to improve their skills so they can communicate efficiently with their peers.
A lex said:
Apache said:
A lex said:
I work with AF pilots every day (as well as most others in the industry) and I simply refuse to ever fly with them.
This is from direct professional experience.
Make of that what you will.
Very sad for the crew and pax on 447.
Why? what is it that makes AF so bad across the board?This is from direct professional experience.
Make of that what you will.
Very sad for the crew and pax on 447.
I'm beginning to think we are looking at a simple maths equation here, money saved on training versus acceptable litigation costs
I have hundreds of examples of poor attitude / incompetence gathered on almost a daily basis but I wont post them here as
1) It wont make sense to anyone not in the industry.
2) It may well land me in hot water should the wrong person read it.
There are of course lots of very very good AF pilots (they usually dont have a French accent though
) - but from observations over a 5yr period and from talking to colleagues who have been at the game for 20+yrs they just seem to have a higher % of 'bad apples'. This, I believe is backed up by their safety record.There are plenty of other airlines who I wouldnt fly from experience, but they all originate outside of W. Europe.
I have such a strong feeling about it that if AF were the only airline flying to a particular destination I simply wouldnt fly there.
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