Crash at Amsterdam airport....

[robbin'b]

I won't be there on Monday, but most of the Bassett Block know me!

perhaps use PM to continue this - to keep the forum clear for the speculations...

Rob

[squirrel2007]

Legend83 said:

squirrel2007 said:

Legend83 said:

I think my comment was a reasonable one given that people will not only wish to understand how the aircraft crashed but also the ultimate cause of the deaths. Only understanding this can anyone go forward and try to work out ways of preventing it in the future.

Fair enough but i do think that details surrounding the death of individuals are best left out at this time. as another poster said, learned speculation (relating to possible technical reasons for an accident) is one thing but incedental details such as whether or not the landing gear entered the cockpit on impact add little to the understanding of the cause of the accident.

If it is proved that the landing gear contributed to the death toll then it should be investigated seperately but my feelings are that you cannot legislate against all possible scenarios that may befall an aircraft. As tragic as it was losing 9 people the fact that so many survived is quite remarkable.

[Legend83]

squirrel2007 said:

Legend83 said:

I think my comment was a reasonable one given that people will not only wish to understand how the aircraft crashed but also the ultimate cause of the deaths. Only understanding this can anyone go forward and try to work out ways of preventing it in the future.

Fair enough but i do think that details surrounding the death of individuals are best left out at this time. as another poster said, learned speculation (relating to possible technical reasons for an accident) is one thing but incedental details such as whether or not the landing gear entered the cockpit on impact add little to the understanding of the cause of the accident.

If it is proved that the landing gear contributed to the death toll then it should be investigated seperately but my feelings are that you cannot legislate against all possible scenarios that may befall an aircraft. As tragic as it was losing 9 people the fact that so many survived is quite remarkable.

Agreed . I would suggest at the end of the day it is a complete lottery as to who would survive and who would not.

But thank god for those people who still get to see their families today.

And obviously prayers for those who don't.

Edited by Legend83 on Thursday 26th February 14:41

[Andy Zarse]

squirrel2007 said:

Legend83 said:

There is also a strong rumour that the pilots were probably killed instantly by the front undercarriage penetrating the cockpit.

RIP to all lost.

I think that's unnecessarily gruesome and not particularly helpful or accurate. a quick image search demonstrates that http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ryanair2.jpg At times like this all the armchair experts come out of the woodwork offering their 'expert' opinions which only serve to cloud the facts. There are lots of possible reasons why the plane crashed but none of us are in posession of the first hand evidence so I'll be waiting for the official report. speculating gives you something to do in the meantime but ultimately adds little to our understanding.

Agreed.

However, one thing struck me as I watched the TV news report last night. It seemed likely the emergency services were unable to access the flighdeck. Did anyone else see the fireman sat atop the cockpit trying to chisel his way in? Presumably they were unable to open the Security door to the flightdeck, and perhaps the window exits were jammed too?

I guess it's possible, in another accident scenario, that the crew might be alive but unable to get out as the security door is jammed by the broken hull/floor, and recuers and medics are unable to force quick access? Imagine being in that situation if a fire breaks out?

Law of unintended consequences again?

[jackal]

Cara Van Man said:

Eric Mc said:

Cara Van Man said:

Eric Mc said:

Far too soon to go any further than just report what people observed.

It looks like all on the flight deck were killed - which is rather surprising given that fact that it was the back end of the aircraft that seemed the most damaged. This indicates to me that the vertical rate of descent must have been pretty high resulting in a big impact. That definitely DOES indicate that the aircraft was coming down with little forward speed and ina stalled condition.

I keep being reminded of the Trident accident at Heathrow in 1972 when the aircraft stalled during climb out and decended in a nose high atitude into a field at Staines. No one survived that one because the stall occured a couple of thousand feet up rather than a few hundred feet.

Edited by Eric Mc on Wednesday 25th February 17:14

IIRC that one was caused because the two junior pilots were scared of the senior Captn and when he was fking up they didn't say anything.

The Trident crashed because someone retracted the leading edge droops in error. No one know why they did this and no one knows what was going on on the flightdeck that day. Back then there was no requirement for British airliners to carry Cockpit Voice Recorders. It was because of this accident that they were made compulsory.
The crew of the Trident was made of of a Captain, First Office (Co-Pilot) and Flight Engineer.

I saw a documentary on it.....the Capt was very senior and a bit of a tyrant with a reputation for ignoring his juniors, the two young lads apprently realised he was making mistake but he bullied them into saying nothing until it was too late.

cross posted:





"I have just been reading the reports of the Trident Crash at Staines.

I flew as a Stewardess on Papa India many times, and also with Captain Key.

There were many crew members with BEA so it was hard to remember them individually, because we generally flew with different people every day.

However, Captain Key was very memorable, as he was not a very pleasant or friendly captain to fly with, he was always the same. Most second officers are very young and probably did not have enough experience of courage to contradict someone like Captain Key, in fact I don't know anyone who contradicted him.

I had the impression he was not a very happy person. Certainly he was not a Captain one would choose to fly with. In fact I cannot think of a more unpleasant person any crew member would wish to fly with. I think it was probably the norm for him to be unfriendly with his own cockpit crew, as well as the cabin crew.

If he did have a medical problem which caused him psychological problems, I would think it probably had it for a long time, or else he had severe problems somewhere else in his life. Most airline crew are very laid back and friendly.

Hope this is of interest to you. [Editor's note: It is. Thank you.]"

--Linda Coyle (BEA 1966 - 1972)

[jackal]

Eric Mc said:

Stick pushers were introduced after a series of earlier deep stall accidents to T-Tail aircraft. The prototype BAC 1-11 was lost on Salisbury Plain in these circumstances (killing well known test pilot Mike Lithgow and his crew) and another Trident (G-ARPY) was lost in a test flight.

The crazy thing was that, in the Staines Trident crash, the stick shaker and pusher alarms activated - but someone on the flightdeck deliberately de-activated the system. No one know why.

yes, deactivated

and the pilot had a heart attack

[S3_Graham]

hman said:

Racingdude009 said:

Rude-boy said:

Slightly off topic, but I think relevant enough not to need a new thread…

I am sure that the feasibility of installing an active fire suppression system to jets has been looked at more than a few times yet I can’t ever recall hearing of a new aircraft being fitted with one. Why is this?

I have a friend who worked on the design of the Airbus A380 for BAE Systems will ask him about fire suppression systems on aircraft when I next see him.

Weight and size are the issue, if its water based it will have to be a watermist system (the most efficient way of fighting both hydrocarbon and deep seated fires) and these will need a pressurised gas supply to increase the water pressure to allow the system to work effectively eac hlitreo f water weighs a kilo so it doesnt take much to become a weight penalty.

If its gas only based (inergen, fm200, etc. - not co2 in the cabin for obvious reasons) then it needs a gas cylinder, these have to be made strong to contain the gas, this adds weight and size.

The aviation industry is interested in fire suppression systems, the airlines are interested in the additional space and weight capacity they can have if they dont fit them.

Fires on board are pretty rare so they dont tend to fit them into the cabin and cockpits, suppression systems are quite routinely fitted to the engines though and the central equipment required for an engine fire is pretty small.

"they dont tend to fit them into the cabin and cockpits"

I find that hard to believe.... Every bin has a built in fire detection system and extinguisher (dependant on type) and there are fire extinguishers of various types strategically placed around the aircraft.... well there are on ours anyway!! they are called up for inspection every month ffs... So annoying having to weigh/inspect them and re-certify!!

[Eric Mc]

jackal said:

Eric Mc said:

Stick pushers were introduced after a series of earlier deep stall accidents to T-Tail aircraft. The prototype BAC 1-11 was lost on Salisbury Plain in these circumstances (killing well known test pilot Mike Lithgow and his crew) and another Trident (G-ARPY) was lost in a test flight.

The crazy thing was that, in the Staines Trident crash, the stick shaker and pusher alarms activated - but someone on the flightdeck deliberately de-activated the system. No one know why.

yes, deactivated

and the pilot had a heart attack

Again, only ever surmised. It was not proven - or even possible to be proven.

[s3fella]

Invisible man said:

s3fella said:

s3fella said:

Just heard from ex colleague whos at Eurocontrol.
Speculation that the third person on the flightdeck was not a pilot...possibly crew, but not a pilot..?
Christ I hope they were not messing about when this happened.

Just seen on Sky News that there were indeed only 2 pilots in the cockpit, the third was not a pilot..

It would not be normal for a steward or Stewardess to be on the flightdeck for landing under current rules an laws, would it?

No, at this stage all would be seated

Thats what I figured. Has it been reported if this was three males in the cockpit as yet..? Have to say on my initial post about this yesterday, when I referred to "messing about" I was thinking maybe "showing off" or worse to someone they were wanting to impress in the cockpit. I bloomin hope not, mind you...

Is there an actual "jump seat" in the cockpit of a 737 800? If so, is it a proper seat that someone would actually go on a full sector in, or just somewhere for the cabin crew to sit when dishing out the sarnies?

I remember that awful accident with the Russian captain who let his son fly.....! And there was some youtueb stuff with some hostie getting her wobs out in the cockpit on a flight not so long ago too..

Although I am sure that windsheer, tech probs etc are more likely, it made me wonder if the 3 people in the cockpit had something to do with this dreadful incident.

Edited by s3fella on Thursday 26th February 18:32

[hman]

S3_Graham said:

hman said:

Racingdude009 said:

Rude-boy said:

Slightly off topic, but I think relevant enough not to need a new thread…

I am sure that the feasibility of installing an active fire suppression system to jets has been looked at more than a few times yet I can’t ever recall hearing of a new aircraft being fitted with one. Why is this?

I have a friend who worked on the design of the Airbus A380 for BAE Systems will ask him about fire suppression systems on aircraft when I next see him.

Weight and size are the issue, if its water based it will have to be a watermist system (the most efficient way of fighting both hydrocarbon and deep seated fires) and these will need a pressurised gas supply to increase the water pressure to allow the system to work effectively eac hlitreo f water weighs a kilo so it doesnt take much to become a weight penalty.

If its gas only based (inergen, fm200, etc. - not co2 in the cabin for obvious reasons) then it needs a gas cylinder, these have to be made strong to contain the gas, this adds weight and size.

The aviation industry is interested in fire suppression systems, the airlines are interested in the additional space and weight capacity they can have if they dont fit them.

Fires on board are pretty rare so they dont tend to fit them into the cabin and cockpits, suppression systems are quite routinely fitted to the engines though and the central equipment required for an engine fire is pretty small.

"they dont tend to fit them into the cabin and cockpits"

I find that hard to believe.... Every bin has a built in fire detection system and extinguisher (dependant on type) and there are fire extinguishers of various types strategically placed around the aircraft.... well there are on ours anyway!! they are called up for inspection every month ffs... So annoying having to weigh/inspect them and re-certify!!

A hand held fire extinguisher and a smoke detection system are leagues away from a fully designed and fire tested fire suppression system.

In the same way as a bicycle and an engine will not a moto gp entrant make.

You dont have to believe me of course however being in the fire industry for 15 years and specialising in fire suppression systems of all types for the past 8 years should probably count for something I suppose.

[hugoagogo]

another, far less serious plane incident the other day
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7916730.stm

made mildly more interesting for me by the fact I've been on the very same flight

[oobster]

Looks like a faulty altimeter was at least partialy to blame:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7923782.st...

[Eric Mc]

Why should that suddenly appear as a problem after all these years.

I would assume they are referring to the radio altimeter which gives the pilot a precise indication of his exact height above the ground on approach - and is obviously linked to the engine management system and auto-throttles.

[bumblebee]

oobster said:

Looks like a faulty altimeter was at least partialy to blame:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7923782.st...

It's not made clear in the article, but from the context of what's written they're talking about the Radio Altimeter, which indicates your height above the ground below 2500' - not the primary barometric altimeters.

[bumblebee]

Eric Mc said:

Why should that suddenly appear as a problem after all these years.

I would assume they are referring to the radio altimeter which gives the pilot a precise indication of his exact height above the ground on approach - and is obviously linked to the engine management system and auto-throttles.

Beaten to it by Eric!

Good question - we have SOPs for dealing with autopilot malfunctions on approach - most of which mandate an immediate go-around. Having said that - a rad alt problem will be only one 'hole in the cheese'. There will be plenty of other contributing factors.

[Eric Mc]

If that's the case, why would the engines wind down without an input from the crew.

I'm not saying you are wrong, but the article does seem to be indicating that the problem was due to something like this happening.
Then again, it's a BBC report and no one at BBC News these days knows a Spitfire from a Cessna.

(The above was a reply to a post which has mysteriously disappeared).

Edited by Eric Mc on Wednesday 4th March 15:05

[anonymous-user]

Is there any link between the autothrottle and rad alt on the 737?

[jonnyb]

From what I can understand (I dont fly the 737 so stand to be corrected) the autopilot and auto thrust were flying the plane then at just under 2000ft the left rad alt thought it was on the ground. This then made an input to the auto thrust system commanding a reduction as it thought the aircraft had landed. The thrust reduced to idle and the aircraft slowed, the crew did not notice or were distracted by something and the aircraft stalled.

[bumblebee]

Eric Mc said:

If that's the case, why would the engines wind down without an input from the crew.

I'm not saying you are wrong, but the article does seem to be indicating that the problem was due to something like this happening.
Then again, it's a BBC report and no one at BBC News these days knows a Spitfire from a Cessna.

When you fly a fully coupled autopilot approach on the 737, (both autopilots selected) you start with the autopilot locked onto both the localiser and the glideslope. The autothrottle will be maintaining whatever speed you have selected on the MCP (Mode Control Panel). At some point around about 2000' Rad Alt, the system self tests then the pitch system of the autopilot arms the Flare mode. It gets annunciated in white on the PFD (primary flight display) to let you know it's armed. At 26'Rad Alt (IIRC) above the runway, the autopilot switches from tracking the glideslope and enters 'Flare' mode, pitching the nose up to reduce the rate of descent until touch down. Simultaneously, the autothrottle retards the thrust levers to idle. The autothrottle remains armed for a further two seconds after weight on wheels, and providing that the reversers haven't been selected you can still abandon the landing and go-around by pressing the TO/GA switches.

The point I was trying to make is that if the autopilot does something it shouldn't, there is an SOP to deal with it. A situation that was precipitated by a faulty Radio altimeter (an early flare and commanded thrust reduction is what is being inferred) ought to be completely recoverable. If it's being monitored properly. Any abnormal action of the autopilot or flight path deviation, or incorrect system annunciation below 1000' would usually mandate an immediate Go-around. It would appear that intervention may not have occurred soon enough to prevent the aeroplane stalling, and at low level, mitigating that scenario successfully is always going to be a challenge.

[bumblebee]

el stovey said:

Is there any link between the autothrottle and rad alt on the 737?

Not sure whether it's triggered to retard by going into 'Flare' or whether the rad-alt has an input into the autothrottle system. Might be worth having a look at Chris Brady's website - I'm about 5000 miles away from a set of 737 Tech manuals at the moment.

IforB might have the answer...