"There is no heaven; it's a fairy story"
Discussion
IainT said:
mattnunn said:
IainT said:
mattnunn said:
Kant died 100 years before Godel was born. I do hope this helps. I'll happily discuss his Critique of pure Reason if you wish to invoke a particular line of enquiry, although I doubt you do, he was very big on the idea of time and space being materially unreal. Either way it's not relevant here.
Gödel's OA suffers from the same basic flaws that Anselm's does. Sorry if that concept passed you by, I'll type slower next time.Let's look at Axiom 1, it stands on Gödel's definition of "positive properties" which, he goes on to define, according to wiki, as "positive in the moral aesthetic sense".
Given, as has been discussed above, it's possible to show properties that are context-dependant the assertion is doubtful at best.
.
I assume we're reading the same wiki page, the example of the shirt and it's colour should make it very clear. The colour of shirt is a property of the object shirt (any softies following this discussion will see now why Godal's work is as important as Von Neumann's in bringing us modern day computing languages), the value assigned that property of the object is not known but the property of colour is applied to all shirts, unless the shirt doesn't exist in which case the entire conversation in negated as nonsense.
Do you suggest shirts don't exist? That would be a position of predjudice and opinion. Not logic.
Godel's OA is very clear in not making the assumption that Shirts exist.
mattnunn said:
Again this is a failure of language, or more correctly a failure of modal logic to operate outside of language and still be acceptable in everyday conversation.
Your essentially misunderstanding the term necessary in the context of modal logic or as it's used in philosophy, it's essentially a reciprocal of contingency, i.e a truth that comes before rather than as a result of something. i.e there is a truth that is necessary for existence (be it whatever) rather than existence creating a truth. The later being far more circular than the former because is truth is contingent than you have to ask yourself what is it the result of?
All axiom 5 is saying is that there must be, modally, something necessary rather than something that was simply possible.
But I'm glad the philosophy, science and religion are holding fast their bonds.
No, I don't think I am. What NE is equivalent to is "It must exist because it is impossible for it not to exist". And you haven't explained why that is a positive property?Your essentially misunderstanding the term necessary in the context of modal logic or as it's used in philosophy, it's essentially a reciprocal of contingency, i.e a truth that comes before rather than as a result of something. i.e there is a truth that is necessary for existence (be it whatever) rather than existence creating a truth. The later being far more circular than the former because is truth is contingent than you have to ask yourself what is it the result of?
All axiom 5 is saying is that there must be, modally, something necessary rather than something that was simply possible.
But I'm glad the philosophy, science and religion are holding fast their bonds.
Either way, all the mental masturbation you can muster does not alter one iota the fact you can substitute 'god' for 'FSM'. All it does is argue in favour based entirely on an unfounded notion. A notion without evidence, without a solid base, or even a solid definition. The weakness is not all the crap in the middle. It is the notion of 'God'. What is that? You say it is something maximally positive. Why? Why not the maximally invisible, or the maximally infinitesimal? They are just meaningless descriptions of something that has no foundation.
Jabbah said:
No, I don't think I am. What NE is equivalent to is "It must exist because it is impossible for it not to exist". And you haven't explained why that is a positive property?
And as Kant pointed out the only way to prove the it is impossible not to exist is to have something of that type that does exist. There isn't one such thing so the argument falls down and we are back to "I believe X exists because I know it and feel it therefore it exists" vs "There is no proof of X in the real world therefore I have no reason to believe or think it exists"Jabbah said:
mattnunn said:
Again this is a failure of language, or more correctly a failure of modal logic to operate outside of language and still be acceptable in everyday conversation.
Your essentially misunderstanding the term necessary in the context of modal logic or as it's used in philosophy, it's essentially a reciprocal of contingency, i.e a truth that comes before rather than as a result of something. i.e there is a truth that is necessary for existence (be it whatever) rather than existence creating a truth. The later being far more circular than the former because is truth is contingent than you have to ask yourself what is it the result of?
All axiom 5 is saying is that there must be, modally, something necessary rather than something that was simply possible.
But I'm glad the philosophy, science and religion are holding fast their bonds.
No, I don't think I am. What NE is equivalent to is "It must exist because it is impossible for it not to exist". And you haven't explained why that is a positive property?Your essentially misunderstanding the term necessary in the context of modal logic or as it's used in philosophy, it's essentially a reciprocal of contingency, i.e a truth that comes before rather than as a result of something. i.e there is a truth that is necessary for existence (be it whatever) rather than existence creating a truth. The later being far more circular than the former because is truth is contingent than you have to ask yourself what is it the result of?
All axiom 5 is saying is that there must be, modally, something necessary rather than something that was simply possible.
But I'm glad the philosophy, science and religion are holding fast their bonds.
I have before me a bacon butty
"It must exist because it is impossible for it not to exist".
Existence is, I understand, a positive property - simple as that. Existence positive, nonexistence negative - that makes sense, no?
I understand this is backed up by my posteriori knowledge via observing the bacon butty and most likely tasting it but had I not observed it the reality of the bacon butty would not have been effected would it?
Or would it?
Until I smelt, saw and tasted the bacon butty was it's existence necessary of simply possible? By my sensation of it did I change the possibility of it existing into a reality. Perhaps I did, it's a nice idea, the universe is in my concious, I like it, I create all through my experience of it. But that's not widly accepted around these parts either.
RE: Mental Masturbation - I'd hope we're getting some kind of kink out of this because it's a heck of a waste of time when it descends into my opinion is better than your nonsense.
mattnunn said:
RE: Mental Masturbation - I'd hope we're getting some kind of kink out of this because it's a heck of a waste of time when it descends into my opinion is better than your nonsense.
Odd that, considering these things are designed to convince others that your opinion is real or true, or logical, despite trying to convince us of this unknowable God, using unknowable properties for this unknowable God, then trying to put it all in a proof show us how to know about this unknowable god. You are right, it is all about us trying to tell you our opinion is better than yours.
Opinion is not the issue. proofs based on nonsense is. mattnunn said:
Timsta said:
Blimey, many of those are wrong:
Axiom 1: Properties of properties. let's take legs. Legs are a good thing to have. Sprinter's legs are fast (good), but will buckle under weight (bad). Weightlifter's legs are strong (good), but not quick(bad.) So, it depends on your definition of good.
Fail- no need to continue, read the Axiom again, no mention of "good" - he very clearly defines "positive" Axiom 1: Properties of properties. let's take legs. Legs are a good thing to have. Sprinter's legs are fast (good), but will buckle under weight (bad). Weightlifter's legs are strong (good), but not quick(bad.) So, it depends on your definition of good.
Substitute the long and tiresome to type "positive" and "negative" for the quick 'n durrrty "good" and "bad" and Timsta's refutation stands.
All versions of the ontological pretty much reduce to:
If:
God
then:
God
All the flowery guff trying to dress assertion up as "proof" is just that, flowery guff.
It is somewhere between amusing and distressing to see the otherwise sane and smart people foundering about as they try to prove the unsupportable.
fluffnik said:
Not fail.
Substitute the long and tiresome to type "positive" and "negative" for the quick 'n durrrty "good" and "bad" and Timsta's refutation stands.
All versions of the ontological pretty much reduce to:
All the flowery guff trying to dress assertion up as "proof" is just that, flowery guff.
It is somewhere between amusing and distressing to see the otherwise sane and smart people foundering about as they try to prove the unsupportable.
Substitute the long and tiresome to type "positive" and "negative" for the quick 'n durrrty "good" and "bad" and Timsta's refutation stands.
All versions of the ontological pretty much reduce to:
If:
God
then:
God
All the flowery guff trying to dress assertion up as "proof" is just that, flowery guff.
It is somewhere between amusing and distressing to see the otherwise sane and smart people foundering about as they try to prove the unsupportable.
fluffnik said:
Not fail.
Substitute the long and tiresome to type "positive" and "negative" for the quick 'n durrrty "good" and "bad" and Timsta's refutation stands.
All versions of the ontological pretty much reduce to:
All the flowery guff trying to dress assertion up as "proof" is just that, flowery guff.
It is somewhere between amusing and distressing to see the otherwise sane and smart people foundering about as they try to prove the unsupportable.
Godel clarifies that he means positive to be moral aethestic or pure attribution, not good or bad, they are judgments not properties.Substitute the long and tiresome to type "positive" and "negative" for the quick 'n durrrty "good" and "bad" and Timsta's refutation stands.
All versions of the ontological pretty much reduce to:
If:
God
then:
God
All the flowery guff trying to dress assertion up as "proof" is just that, flowery guff.
It is somewhere between amusing and distressing to see the otherwise sane and smart people foundering about as they try to prove the unsupportable.
Your existence is positive, i.e it is by the nature of it pure attribution (I assume), it doesn't mean it's good, it may well not be good, good will come and go, and attribute is a matter of fact.
Taking alone the moral aethestic, it's clarified that it is independant of the structure of the world, i.e without reference. Good and bad are real world judgments based on real world morality, we're not talking about the real world here, this is theory - mathematics.
mattnunn said:
fluffnik said:
Substitute the long and tiresome to type "positive" and "negative" for the quick 'n durrrty "good" and "bad" and Timsta's refutation stands.
Godel clarifies that he means positive to be moral aethestic or pure attribution, not good or bad, they are judgments not properties.mattnunn said:
Your existence is positive, i.e it is by the nature of it pure attribution (I assume), it doesn't mean it's good, it may well not be good, good will come and go, and attribute is a matter of fact.
Taking alone the moral aethestic, it's clarified that it is independant of the structure of the world, i.e without reference. Good and bad are real world judgments based on real world morality, we're not talking about the real world here, this is theory - mathematics.
It's not really clarification and it's not really maths...Taking alone the moral aethestic, it's clarified that it is independant of the structure of the world, i.e without reference. Good and bad are real world judgments based on real world morality, we're not talking about the real world here, this is theory - mathematics.
Gödel it seems uses attribution and privation as synonymous with positive and negative.
So again:
If:
God
then:
God
I'm with local lad made good Davie H...
David Hume said:
There is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable.
TheHeretic said:
When I think of the FSM, I think of something simple, spiritual, eternal, not contingent, etc, but with an undetectable whiff of marinara sauce. Either way, your logical proof can apply to the very same things that 'philosophers' have been using to rubbish these 'proofs'. As has been said, it can apply to any fanciful and ambiguous notion.
If you read what I write before rejecting it instantly you would see the answer to this I think. As I said, if your FSM shares every property one would ascribe to the answer to the How come? Question, then there is little point calling it FSM and little point insisting on its silliness.Belief in a "beyond nature" origin of everything is much less silly than a belief either that there is nothing to explain ( a la Fluffers) or that nature explains / creates itself. These are both obviously at the very least incomplete, a less charitable poster might call them delusions.
And if you are reading this far rather than typing already, then consider my small selection of arguments for god's existence posted a few days ago, of which only mistaken conflation of argument from degrees of perfection with refined OA has been taken up. Where are the replies out there to the books that trash Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris and Dennett such as Peter Williams' A sceptic's guide to atheism or Edward Feser's The last superstition: a refutation of the new atheism..?
ChrisGB said:
If you read what I write before rejecting it instantly you would see the answer to this I think. As I said, if your FSM shares every property one would ascribe to the answer to the How come? Question, then there is little point calling it FSM and little point insisting on its silliness.
Belief in a "beyond nature" origin of everything is much less silly than a belief either that there is nothing to explain ( a la Fluffers) or that nature explains / creates itself. These are both obviously at the very least incomplete, a less charitable poster might call them delusions.
And if you are reading this far rather than typing already, then consider my small selection of arguments for god's existence posted a few days ago, of which only mistaken conflation of argument from degrees of perfection with refined OA has been taken up. Where are the replies out there to the books that trash Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris and Dennett such as Peter Williams' A sceptic's guide to atheism or Edward Feser's The last superstition: a refutation of the new atheism..?
Don't fret, Chris, I read everything on these threads. Belief in a "beyond nature" origin of everything is much less silly than a belief either that there is nothing to explain ( a la Fluffers) or that nature explains / creates itself. These are both obviously at the very least incomplete, a less charitable poster might call them delusions.
And if you are reading this far rather than typing already, then consider my small selection of arguments for god's existence posted a few days ago, of which only mistaken conflation of argument from degrees of perfection with refined OA has been taken up. Where are the replies out there to the books that trash Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris and Dennett such as Peter Williams' A sceptic's guide to atheism or Edward Feser's The last superstition: a refutation of the new atheism..?
Do me a favour, using simpleton language, explain what you mean by "your FSM shares every property one would ascribe to the answer to the How come? Question, then there is little point calling it FSM and little point insisting on its silliness" because to me it is one of those really rather vague, meaningless sentences simply put on paper/screen to divert the attention away from the first nonsensical proposition. So much so, that you have to divert with something equally preposterous, and vague. There is every point in using FSM, (or anything else you feel you can make up in your mind), as it goes some way to try to show people that the premise of the OA is simply absurd, and unfounded. I have tried to show this several times, but it seems yourself, and Matt just are not interested. You feel that simply asserting 'god' then it must be true, and wheeling out these rather pointless 'proofs' goes some way to argue your side. They do not, as the FSM mirror shows.
Why is belief in a beyond nature origin of everything much less silly? One relies on the evidence free to explain origin, and the other states 'we do not know'. One of these is intellectually honest, and the other is an evidence free fantasy, held aloft by blinkered proofs, and hammered in beliefs. Taking your idea, we can assign anything the hell we want as an 'origin' and hold it as more valid than 'we don't know', which to me seems like the thinking of a child, who merely wants an answer, and any answer will do, as long as it isn't "I don't know". Asserting anything about the unknowable seems a little weak, don't you think?
I'm not sure how there can be a 'skeptics guide to atheism', or a 'refutation of new atheism', as to refute atheism would require proof of a deity. You can be skeptical of atheism of you want, although it would appear to ke that to be skeptical pf a non-belief seems a very odd position to take. presumably the skeptic here believes n every conceivable God? If not, then he is atheistic about that God with which he does not believe. They do seem to be the only books you seem to point to, constantly.
Gaspode said:
ChrisGB said:
By definition means that the word God implies various things - simple, spiritual, eternal, not contingent etc. being a necessary being is just what people mean when they say god in this tradition.
You would need to show that people are wrong to get to this idea of god for the syllogism not to work, wouldn't you?
Anselm (and Descartes, and all the others who conflate existence and perfection):You would need to show that people are wrong to get to this idea of god for the syllogism not to work, wouldn't you?
1. It is possible for people to conceive of a being that has various characteristics, one of which is that it is perfect (or maximally good)
2. It is possible for such a being to exist
3. Therefore it exists, because otherwise it wouldn't be perfect
Aquinas:
1. Anselm is clearly talking b
ks here, but I'm a believer2. Therefore there must be some other reason that god exists
3. But god is perfect and I'm not, so I can't possibly understand him
4. Therefore god exists
What the f
k?If people want to believe in god, then fine, fill your boots, it's no skin off my nose, but please don't insult my intelligence (and your own) by trying to concoct ludicrous 'proofs' like this to justify it.
Aquinas's point was that we can know THAT God is, we can't grasp precisely WHAT he is. His five ways, which are not proofs of God's existence but arguments to show the validity of rationally defending beliefs, were written against a backdrop of 13th century claims that God's existence was self-evident and that therefore no argument was needed. Aquinas's rejected this view and showed that there were indeed ways to show reasonable arguments favoring existence of God.
Personally I think there is no greater (;)) than Aquinas, and while we ( those interested in the future of theology) need a new unifying or basic system to replace his, we won't get that until we have at least recovered some of what the enlightenment jettisoned, for example a more complete vocabulary for talking about causes.
In any case, the OA hangs on whether a necessary being is possible. For a believer it would make no sense to speak of God as not necessary, and I am sure a non- believer not stubbornly or ideologically committed to naturalism it would be obvious too that whatever answers How come? can't be something contingent.
fluffnik said:
ChrisGB said:
Fluffnik, I think I am not clear on points raised in OA. It seriously impresses many serious thinkers, I have to appeal to you to read them rather than me!
I've read a few, I still regard the OA as utterly broken...ChrisGB said:
On How come? I find your answers evasive. It just seems a cop out to say:
Me: how come anything at all exists?
Fluffers: it just does
Me: how come anything at all exists?
Fluffers: it just does
Chris: How come not nothing?
fluff: We know there is not nothing but we have no reason to ascribe purpose to the lack of nothing.
ChrisGB said:
As I was trying to suggest, you wpuldn't let me get away with that as an answer to any other How come? Question, so why do you get away with it for the big one?
Where there is something palpably doing the being "'coz it is" is a correct, if potentially partial, answer to "How come?"Chris: How come gorges?
fluff: 'coz there are...
...due to erosion
Chris: How come dogs?
fluff: 'coz there are...
...due to evolution
Chris: How come not nothing?
fluff: 'coz there ain't
...due to processes we don't fully understand
However:
Chris: Why not nothing?
fluff: We have no reason to ascribe purpose to the Universe.
ChrisGB said:
On design, I think fine tuning, us as the observers of the universe, us as discoverers of the order of the universe etc are important in defense of theism, but I am not at all interested in ID versus evolution, I am sure both will be out of date pretty soon.
Evolution has legs(!), its applications go beyond tuning genomes...ChrisGB said:
On fine tuning and so on, you think "chance" as you say, chance of course not being any sort of agent or cause, is a simpler explanation than something transcending / beyond the singularity? If you look at the odds, which is the more elegant solution - holding on ideologically to naturalism at all costs, or going with the scale of the improbability and seeking a simpler explanation aka a supremely simple X "beyond".
I don't hold ideologically to naturalism but I don't see any simplification in adding anything supernatural; I see no reason to reject the null hypothesis regarding the supernatural.You have just argued yourself to exactly my position, then denied my position. It is astonishing. You are doing exactly what I was saying was evasive and inconsistent. The only reason you are saying the universe has no purpose where you are presumably saying erosion and evolution do have a purpose (what is it?) is because you have presupposed naturalism, and therefore have to treat it as a different sort of question, which is evasive and inconsistent.
You either have to say "it is just so" because of a presupposition of naturalism, or you allow the simplest answer, a perfectly simple being. Supernatural can't be null if it explains everything and is itself totally simple.
An extra-natural source / origin of the conditions / laws that allow the beginning of everything is more reasonable than "it just is so".
Nick M said:
ChrisGB, I'm curious as to why you've ignored my previous posts regarding the place philosophy holds in my view of things, and how it cannot be relied upon to establish 'proof' or 'truth'.
No amount of words will prove something which fundamentally 'isn't'. Equally, mere words cannot unprove something which clearly 'is'.
As a bit of local colour...
I currently live in Malaysia, which is a muslim country. Ethnic Malays are muslims whether they like it or not - it's illegal for them to give up islam. A colleague of mine was asked a while back whether he was religious, to which he replied that no he wasn't and that he was an atheist. He was greeted with the response "Ah, you mean a 'free thinker'".
In the context of these discussions, I found that quite pertinent.
Nick, I really haven't ignored it, but need to think about it - like I do about Aquinas on perfection for Huff. It is just a question of time, honest!No amount of words will prove something which fundamentally 'isn't'. Equally, mere words cannot unprove something which clearly 'is'.
As a bit of local colour...
I currently live in Malaysia, which is a muslim country. Ethnic Malays are muslims whether they like it or not - it's illegal for them to give up islam. A colleague of mine was asked a while back whether he was religious, to which he replied that no he wasn't and that he was an atheist. He was greeted with the response "Ah, you mean a 'free thinker'".
In the context of these discussions, I found that quite pertinent.
As for free thinker, I work with a few Malaysians and enjoy their gently mocking use of English too!
Nick M said:
And another thing...
If, as ChrisGB keeps claiming, you cannot know what god is because that is unknowable, how do you establish, and then 'prove', whether they are maximally good and hence exist ? Because you cannot know.
Or am I missing something obvious along the way ?
I have said above that you need to make a distinction between knowing that something exists and knowing its nature / essence / what it's really like. I think this is an obvious distinction when applied to a person, even more so when applied to God who we don't see and observe as closely as we can a person. I think this renders the problem of theists believing in unknowable god entirely a pseudo- problemIf, as ChrisGB keeps claiming, you cannot know what god is because that is unknowable, how do you establish, and then 'prove', whether they are maximally good and hence exist ? Because you cannot know.
Or am I missing something obvious along the way ?
. Plus of course what ever we deduce from God's existence is supplemented by revelation, God communicating something of what he is to us, but there too, that doesn't mean we understand what he is like, we still only speak in metaphors and analogies.
ChrisGB said:
I have said above that you need to make a distinction between knowing that something exists and knowing its nature / essence / what it's really like. I think this is an obvious distinction when applied to a person, even more so when applied to God who we don't see and observe as closely as we can a person. I think this renders the problem of theists believing in unknowable god entirely a pseudo- problem
. Plus of course what ever we deduce from God's existence is supplemented by revelation, God communicating something of what he is to us, but there too, that doesn't mean we understand what he is like, we still only speak in metaphors and analogies.
Do you know god exists?. Plus of course what ever we deduce from God's existence is supplemented by revelation, God communicating something of what he is to us, but there too, that doesn't mean we understand what he is like, we still only speak in metaphors and analogies.
Do you know its nature, essence, or what it is really like?
Gaspode said:
mattnunn said:
have a go at kurt godel's ontological proof...
go on try it... you might like it. he's the greatest logician in history, do your atheist texts not teach you these things?
I'm with Russell on this. For me, the weakness in such arguments is that they start with an underlying intent "I must find a way to prove that god exists", and they do so by conflating ideas of perfection / 'goodness' with existence.go on try it... you might like it. he's the greatest logician in history, do your atheist texts not teach you these things?
The fundamental argument is that 'good' exists because we can observe it, therefore something that is maximally good must exist, this is a necessary truth, so therefore god (who is maximally good) exists.
Godel dresses it up very cleverly, and it's beyond me to attempt a formal disproof. All I can do, like Russell, is to be dissatisfied with it. My dissatisfaction is that actually Godel is
still basing his proof on an assumption - that necessary being is positive. He's taking a formal logical logical construct (that of necessary existence) and conflating it with with notion of positive qualities, which to my mind is a subjective artefact of consciousness.
If he does assume being is positive, well, how could he form any argument about anything, except possibly suicide, if he isn't assuming that?
As I said, the refined OA probably needs some sense that moral relativism is wrong for it to be accepted, and to think moral relativism is right, you may well (though case by case) be thinking that because you are within the intellectual straitjacket of naturalism.
On OA, a maximally great being would possess every inherent good to its logical maximum. is this something Godel would support?
Just on Kant and Hume and OA:
Kant rejected OA calling being not a property, but since Kant, contingent being and necessary being are happily used as properties.
Hume is not highly regarded in philosophy faculties because he has been improved on, his only followers are the atheist amateurs who find a superficial support for their arguments (eg on a method for accepting a miraculous account of an event).
On OA, Fluffers is right that a definition doesn't conjure the thing defined (very nice turn of phrase there Mr. F), but claiming Plantinga's more modest goal for the OA, to show reasonableness of belief, we can say that a non-necessary being would not be God, a necessary being is possible, therefore God. To refute, concept of God needs to be shown as incoherent, but even if coherent, people will still not be happy with an apparent word game, hence more modest goal. For the believer, it is no mere word game, because necessary existence is about as concrete / ontologically secure as it gets. Oh wait! Hang on!
Kant rejected OA calling being not a property, but since Kant, contingent being and necessary being are happily used as properties.
Hume is not highly regarded in philosophy faculties because he has been improved on, his only followers are the atheist amateurs who find a superficial support for their arguments (eg on a method for accepting a miraculous account of an event).
On OA, Fluffers is right that a definition doesn't conjure the thing defined (very nice turn of phrase there Mr. F), but claiming Plantinga's more modest goal for the OA, to show reasonableness of belief, we can say that a non-necessary being would not be God, a necessary being is possible, therefore God. To refute, concept of God needs to be shown as incoherent, but even if coherent, people will still not be happy with an apparent word game, hence more modest goal. For the believer, it is no mere word game, because necessary existence is about as concrete / ontologically secure as it gets. Oh wait! Hang on!
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