I'm on a Virgin Train right now.... Its a disgrace

[2xChevrons]

Tempest_5 said:

Having lived "abroad" on mainland Europe I don't understand how our rail system is so screwed. The German train system I found to not be as perfect as it has been made out to be, but it was still good. The Austrian one was pretty good in my brief experience of it.

Is the problem to do with the situation of private companies, then nationalisation, then private companies again? I have come to conclude the only way to make it work again is to nationalise the system and hopefully remove the need to pay share holders make a profit. My naive assumption being that the money can then go to improving the system which will ultimately be for the better for the UK economically/environment.

P.S. Was I sad for having to stifle a giggle when I was served by a Frau Flick at a Deutsche Bahn station? (you have to be over 45 to get that).

It's not so much the cycle of private/nationalised/private again. It's that ever since 1945 we have never been able to agree, as a nation and a society, what we want our railways to be and that has hamstrung the system's ability to make decent long-term plans in an industry where long-term planning is key.

Skip this bit if you just want the short answer

It goes something like this:

1945: The railways are run ragged by years of over-use and under-maintenance in WW2. Which in turn came on the back of a decade of belt-tightening in the Great Depression. Which came after a decade of losing a lot of passenger traffic to the roads, especially in rural areas to bus and lorry services. Which came after the railways were run ragged by years of over-use and under-maintenance in WW1, for which they were never properly compensated by central government. The railways are still under ultimate government control. They are profitable on a day-to-day basis but the amount of money needed to compensate the private companies for the use of their networks during the war, make the needed repairs and undo 20+ years of penny-pinching and conservatism exceeds the book value of the private companies. So nationalisation makes sense (as well as it being an ideological cornerstone of the Attlee government in any case).

1948-1955: The government buys out the private 'Big Four' and creates British Railways. At this time the railways are profitable in terms of their operating income covering their operating expenses, but in the short term they have £millions shovelled into them by central government to repair and modernise after WW2. Apart from now being a single nationalised operator the system is run on virtually the same lines as it was in private days, providing a wide-ranging and truely national railway service with a profit incentive, only that profit now goes to the Treasury rather than shareholders. While there are parts of the system that don't make money, the system as a whole is profitable so there is little incentive to alter how things are run or what the railways do. It is essentially a Victorian system preserved in aspic.

1955: Two key events. The first is the publication of the Modernisation Plan, which outlines a 10-year scheme to drastically overhaul BR's technical operations. This includes ditching steam traction by 1965 to be replaced by diesel and electric (the latter for all the main trunk lines). This is a sudden and major reversal of policy by BR, which up to then had kept building steam locomotives (and designing new ones) on the basis that they would be in service until about 1980. The Modernisation Plan also calls for large-scale rebuilding and remodelling of the network's major stations (think brutalist Euston) and huge investement in large, semi-automated marshalling yards for all the hundreds of thousands of little low-capacity short-wheelbase wagons and vans trundling around the network. There were other large capital investments in the Modernisation Plan like new coaching stock and rolling out modern centralised colour-light signalling systems, automated level crossings etc. etc. The total cost was to be £1.2 billion...in 1955 money. That's about £30 billion in today's money. All this planning had been done by BR's managers and civil servants in the British Transport Commission, and the Treasury had essentially handed the railways a blank cheque on the basis that large-scale investment in vital national infrastructure is worthwhile in the long term.

The second event is the ASLEF strike over pay and conditions which lasted 17 days - the longest railway strike since the General Strike of 1926. The length of this strike (which was ultimately successful as far as the union members were concerned) forced a lot of BR's industrial customers to find other ways of moving their goods around and they nearly all turned to the roads. And a large portion of them stayed with road transport after the strike was over as it proved more efficient and cost-effective. That started a steady decline in BR's freight traffic for virtually everything that wasn't single-unit bulk freight (like coal). At the same time the mid/late 1950s saw the surge in car ownership which also began a steady decline in passenger numbers on BR.

1955-1963: The Modernisation Plan proved to be a complete failure because all it did was take a railways system still functioning as it did in the Victorian Age and add fancy new technology. It made no attempt to study and redefine what the railways were really best at doing, what the nation required of them, or the challenges they'd face. £millions was spent on marshalling yards, goods wagons and light-duty diesel locomotives for goods business which was being taken wholesale by road transport and lines being modernised with new stations, signalling systems and brand new track were turning from profit to loss which would never see that huge investment repaid. From 1955 British Railways never made a profit. It made ever-increasing losses. By 1962 it was losing £87 million per year (in modern currency), or the equivalent of £300,000 per day.

1963-1970: The Modernisation Plan had not only completely failed to secure BR's future, it had sent it into a financial death-spiral and the railways were losing traffic and trade hand over fist. It had also dealt a crippling blow to the confidence in the central government, the Treasury and, by proxy, the general public over the ability of BR to handle its own affairs. The well-intentioned idea that the Treasury could dole out the money that the 'experts' running the system said they needed to secure the network's long-term future was clearly nonsense as those 'experts' had just spunked £1.2 billion away for no gain whatsoever. The solution was to call in an independent consultant from the private sector. This was the infamous Dr. Richard Beeching. Beeching's report identified (with some errors in the methodology but the terms of his findings were set by central government and were restricted by the impossibility of collecting huge amounts of accurate data in the 1960s) which bits of the network lost money and which bits were still profitable. His plan called for the loss-making bits to be closed down **AND** for large-scale investment and modernisation of the bits that were making money. Central government (the Conservatives under Macmillan) happily did the former, closing over half of BR's stations and nearly a third of its route miles, but essentially refused to do the latter. Those parts of Beeching's recommendations which did make it into reality- the introduction of high-capacity, mechanised 'merry-go-round' trains for coal, high-speed containerised Freightliner long-distance goods services, the Red Star parcels network for transporting small packages and post by passenger train and the introduction of the InterCity brand for fast passenger services - where very successful. In general the aftermath of the Beeching Report was predicated on the idea that if you could hack away the loss-making bits of the network then the remaining bits would, by definition, be profitable. In a complete opposite to the Modernisation Plan's "here's all the money you've asked for, do with it what you want!", the 1960s saw every part of BR have to justify its existence on strict business grounds and budgets across the system were cut.

1970-1982: Both Conservative and Labour governments implement parts of the 'Beeching Axe', despite considerable public opposition in some places and despite Harold Wilson's Labour government of 1964-1970 campaigning on a promise to halt the closures and then actually overseeing the vast majority of them. But the Wilson government did introduce a get-out clause, whereby uneconomic lines that could be shown to have a 'social importance' would be reprieved and given government subsidy to remain open. Under Wilson, it turned out that a lot of these 'socially important' railways lines ran through Labour marginal constituencies and under Heath lots of railways in marginal Conservative seats were saved. None the less, the principle has been established that, in contrast to the hard-nosed methodology of Beeching's Axe, the railways have to serve a social function as well as a strictly practical/business one. By the mid-1970s the Beeching Axe has demonstrably failed to arrest BR's financial decline and the 1973 Oil Crisis and worsening urban congestion has shown that the 1950s vision of an entirely road-based future was equally short-sighted and misjudged. The UK needs its railways to function. If the railways can't make money they will have to be given it from the central tax pool. But in the difficult economic times of the 1970s, and with the failure of the Modernisation Plan still fresh in the civil service's memory, the budgets are stingy. It was practically and politically difficult to get rid of the railways so they were given the bare minimum needed to stay functional. Despite the impact of the Oil Crisis there was still an opinion in the general public, the media and the political class that the railways were 'old hat'. They were only there because we couldn't get rid of them and some people - those who couldn't or wouldn't buy a car - had to use them. They were the transport equivalent of the dole. There was no real thought or incentive to provide a superlative service beyond 'gets people from Point A to Point B'. And in common with the rest of the British economy of the time, BR was wracked by strikes, disputes and low morale at almost every level. In the past 20 years the railways had gone from a source of national pride and the default transport method for the general public (of almost any social status or income level) to a source of general embarrasment that you only used if you couldn't afford anything better.

1982-1994: Reforms under the Thatcher government reverse some of the financial stingyness of the previous decade, but only because the rolling stock procurred under the Modernisation Plan 30 years before was now wearing out. The network got new trains, but they were Pacers and Sprinters. Most of the reforms were in preparation for BR's eventual privatisation, although Mrs. T. herself never sanctioned such a move. There was now the prevailing thought that injecting some competition and self-management into the network would do it some good and that what BR needed was a dose of monetarist capitalism. This was the decade of 'Sectorisation' when the nationalised system was broken up into financially and managerially self-contained sectors based mostly on function rather than geographical area. This also applied to the 'behind the scenes' parts of the BR such as its locomotive/carriage-building arms and it's R&D divisions. These were rather quickly sold off to private firms, as were the peripheral parts like the BR-owned ferry services and hotels. Some of BR's existing urban/suburban passenger services were farmed off to the local Passenger Transport Executives. On the actual railways, the individual Sectors now had to provide business cases to the Treasury for investment. Which was great for the bits that made money, like InterCity or Network SouthEast, but bad for those that didn't, like Regional Railways or the Parcels Sector. So some bits of the network were awash in money for the first time since the 1950s while others had to plod along with minimal handouts and heavy service subsidies from central government. Across the system ticket prices rose - by a total of over 200% (well over the rate of inflation) during the 1980s as the railways were, once again, asked to 'pay their way'.

1994-2019: Privatisation. Not much needs to be said here. This is the unholy mess we're now in where the tracks are nationalised, the trains are owned by banks and are operated by private companies. Said private companies need to turn a profit but also receive subisidies from the government to run the services that aren't profitable. The operating companies post around £3.5 billion total profits a year...while the government puts in over £6 billion per year, which is amounts not seen since the days of the Modernisation Plan.

Rejoin here for the short answer

So since 1948 the national strategy for the railways has changed almost once every 10 years, from 'run it as a business', to 'spent billions to make it the best railway ever' to 'ruthlessly cut everything that doesn't make money' to 'we'll cover the network's losses by subsidy and run it as a social service' to 'run it as a business...but with some subsidy' to 'privatise some of it, let the private firms take a profit from their operations but nationalise some bits and subsidise and invest in bits of it with government money to a degree never seen before in British history.'

Contrast this to how it's worked in other countries.

In America, the chairman of Union Pacific knows that his job is to carry large amounts of freight over long distances at a profit. He runs a private business that owns all its own track and rolling stock. UP has been run that way since the 1860s and will continue to be run that way for as far into the future as anyone can reasonably predict. They can make business and service decisions on that basis. They know where their funding is coming from. They know that if any parts of the business don't make money it is their right and obligation to axe it for the benefit of the shareholders. They can seek out new business against their competitors, which are also run on the same lines and fight on equal terms in the same industry. The specifics may change year-on-year but UP is a private business and is run as such.

In France, the chief executive of SNCF knows that he runs a system that (despite some clever accounting tricks to comply with the EU's competition/state subsidy rules) is entirely owned by the French state. The primary purpose of the SNCF system is to provide a decent transport system for France. If that can't be done profitably the state will pick up the tab. What 'a decent transport system for France is' is defined by government but since the 1960s governments of every colour have held to a consensus that the backbone of such a system is a world-class inter-city high-speed passenger rail system using the TGV. They can plan their system's future on that basis, knowing that they don't have to try and pay their way or be suddenly asked to compete with road freight transport or have to close down a third of the network because it's not profitable. The specifics may change year-on-year but SNCF is a public service and is run as such.

Now put yourself in the shoes of a BR manager in any one of the six periods I've outlined above. How do you make long-term plans when your current 'mission' is different to what it was five years ago and you know that there's every chance that it'll change again in five years' time? Do you run the network as a public service regardless of cost? Do you run it as a profit-making business? Is your job to choose the things that railways are very good at and invest in those or is it to provide every kind of transport service imaginable in a nation-spanning integrated network? Will next year's budget be a blank cheque or a note asking you to hunt down the back of the sofa?

That's why we've got the railways we have at the moment. We, collectively, as a nation, have never been able to decide on what sort of railway we want and are willing to pay for. The same goes for a lot of our infrastructure and public services.

[oyster]

Integroo said:

gazza285 said:

Is someone making a profit out of providing a better service something that annoys you? Everything that is wrong with rail transport today was worse when it was nationalised.

No, but the service they are providing is appalling and not good value.

The money that gets put in Branson's pocket would simply end up in the pension pots of any worker group that decides to threaten strike action if services were nationalised.

If you believe that money would either end up as better services or cheaper fares then you have rocks in your head.

[rs1952]

anonymous said:

[redacted]

I read all of Chevrons post – I hope you all did too

This thread has gone off on a number of tangents recently and this one is to do with the fare review, with a bit of renationalisation thrown in for good measure.

I don’t share tonker’s pessimism because to do what he suggests would lose traffic, and the railways are not in the business of trying to do that. The government isn’t in the business of letting the railways lose traffic either because that would have the double effect of requiring increased subsidies to cover the revenue loss, and potentially increasing pressure and congestion on the roads. In any case, one of the briefs for the review is to make it revenue neutral.

People tend to get animated about fares because they look at the extremes. “Prices are horrifically expensive” scream the critics, often citing the Anytime fare to any London station. They rarely look at the bigger picture that that fare really only applies of you want to go to London in peak hours when no discounted tickets are available. And the reason why no discounted fares are available is a simple case of supply and demand – if the TOC can fill a train with full price ticket holders they’ve got no need to discount it, in exactly the same way that you wouldn’t work for £15 an hour if you knew you could get £20 somewhere else.

The 2nd class Anytime return fare from my local station (Chippenham) to Paddington is £178. An off peak return, valid after 0830 but not useable for the return journey between 1600 and 1900 is £74.60. A “Super Off Peak” return valid after 1000 is £55.90, again not valid for return in the evening peak. If you split the ticket at Didcot the total fare is £86.10 in the peak (saving £92 on the through ticket) and £43.80 off peak (saving £30.80 or £12.10 depending on time of travel as there are no Super Off Peak fares available on these legs).

So how are “they” going to sort that lot out to make it “fairer”? If you reduce the prices of the through tickets you’ll have trains packed to the gunwales even more than they are now with a lot of very unhappy squashed commuters. If you increase the prices to and from Didcot in either direction you’re going to upset the voters in the Thames Valley. If you do as Tonker suggests and try to make people get off at the splitting station, firstly how are you physically going to do it, and secondly what difference would it make anyway if people just got off and got on the next train half an hour later. To save £92 I’d quite happily sit in the waiting room at Didcot for a bit… Nobody would be happy, except perhaps those who sell tea and coffee on Didcot station .

And this is just a microcosm of the full picture. There are, I believe, 2,563 stations on the UK railway network, and at the vast majority you can buy a ticket to any of the others. So that’s a figure of 2,563 times £2,562 different travel options, with Anytime, Off Peak and in many cases Super Off Peak variants, and I haven’t even begun to think about Advance discounted tickets.

And to anyone who still naively believes that renationalisation will bring prices down, I would say the simple word “Treasury.” They are not in the business of putting any more money in your individual pocket – the prices would stay the same and the money would go to them rather than being trousered by shareholders.

Somehow I can’t see that lot being sorted out any time soon to anyone’s satisfaction.

[Carl_Manchester]

CasioPasio said:

wormus said:

You sound like company director material. Trains are meant for single mums and the infirm as you are finding out. You need to be in First class or pounding the M6, dominating lane 3 in an Audi. Your time will come.

Did you get a reserved seat and was there somebody sitting in when you got on?

I take offense

LOL

I travel quite a bit through the main central hub stations. i do first class off-peak (not super off-peak) on the basis that i get luggage space and the free drinks and food usually makes the ticket not much more expensive.

during the week i pay the following average prices for one way, 1st class tickets. I travel from 10.30am on the outbound and usually 17.50-18.50 on the returns depending on ticket availability.

London Euston>Bham New Street: £36
London Euston>Manc: £55
London Euston>Liverpool: £70.

The service is generally very reliable. I know of horror stories regarding costs though, £320 one way 1st class from London to Liverpool being one that stands out on a regular basis, if you are not careful you can get mugged off.

I have travelled the German train system and it feels like it was built in the 1980s.

The new Spanish lines and trains on the other hand, wow. Wonder who paid for all that........check out the Tarrant TV show for details.

Edited by Carl_Manchester on Tuesday 23 April 20:39

[dreamcracker]

HannsG said:

.

Leamington to Wolverhampton. And then back.

Isn't that Cross Country Trains, and a Voyager, as Virgin don't go through Leamington, and neither do Pendolino's ?

[Flying Phil]

Excellent post by 2xChevrons. As a prime example of his analysis, the Midland Main Line from St Pancras to Sheffield was due to be electrified in the 1970's....then the 1990's.......then by 2018 ......and is nearly now electrified.....to Corby! We are still using 40 year old HSTs.

[Nik da Greek]

definitely deserves commemorating, that post from 2xChevrons Epic

On the subject of expensive fares, I often find people offer a very skewed comparison. In my day job I hear a lot of moans about the price of season tickets from Brighton (e.g.) into London... and they are expensive. But the obvious truth many of the complainers choose to ignore is "what's the alternative?" Maybe not working 60 miles from where you live? Maybe not chasing the lure of London money at the expense of quality of life? Maybe comparing like for like instead of apples to oranges; how much would it cost you to procure transport (say, a car) then tax it, insure it, factor in repairs, wear and tear over a years' driving into London, then congestion charge or ULEZ charge or whatever it's called this week, then pay for parking (if you can find parking within any distance of your work) and damn but London parking is expensive.... Every working day?

No, thought not. It's more expensive, isn't it?

I wouldn't presume to question anyone's life choices, but if someone makes the choice to commute for work, accept the bald facts arising from that choice. One of these is that railways are not a charity set up for your benefit, they're there to make money and if you wish to use their services then it's going to cost. If you don't want to share your space with other commuters/scrotes/tramps then hire a cab or drive your own car.

[Turfy]

TwistingMyMelon said:

Dont catch them then

I dont want to catch trains daily

So I Dont....Its that simple

Do you pay income tax?

[Yertis]

rs1952 said:

And to anyone who still naively believes that renationalisation will bring prices down, I would say the simple word “Treasury.” They are not in the business of putting any more money in your individual pocket – the prices would stay the same and the money would go to them rather than being trousered by shareholders.

Somehow I can’t see that lot being sorted out any time soon to anyone’s satisfaction.

Do you think that a model along the lines ( ) of the big four would work better? I can't help but feel that having a single operation run the trains and track makes a huge amount more sense.

[2xChevrons]

Yertis said:

rs1952 said:

And to anyone who still naively believes that renationalisation will bring prices down, I would say the simple word “Treasury.” They are not in the business of putting any more money in your individual pocket – the prices would stay the same and the money would go to them rather than being trousered by shareholders.

Somehow I can’t see that lot being sorted out any time soon to anyone’s satisfaction.

Do you think that a model along the lines ( ) of the big four would work better? I can't help but feel that having a single operation run the trains and track makes a huge amount more sense.

I mean, the form of nationalisation that's on the cards at the moment (i.e. that proposed by the Labour Party) is different from the centralised model of BR (and the other Attlee-gov nationalisations, which were inspired by the achievements of central planning during WW2). If nationalisation of the UK railways does happen in the nearish-future, it'll be a mutualised form where the state becomes the owner but the individual citizens receive dividends from the system's profits. So in that respect the Treasury would literally be putting money in people's pockets. It's really just a tweak to the Deutsche Bahn model, which runs with a profit motive and an obligation to earn a return to its shareholders, but the state is the sole shareholder. Except that DB can enjoy a monopoly and huge economies of scale due, as well as a unified operating environment.

Of course that idea can be easily dismissed as utopian nonsense that'll never work, but let's not pretend that anyone is planning to simply resurrect the zombie corpse of British Railways circa 1970.

[rs1952]

Yertis said:

rs1952 said:

And to anyone who still naively believes that renationalisation will bring prices down, I would say the simple word “Treasury.” They are not in the business of putting any more money in your individual pocket – the prices would stay the same and the money would go to them rather than being trousered by shareholders.

Somehow I can’t see that lot being sorted out any time soon to anyone’s satisfaction.

Do you think that a model along the lines ( ) of the big four would work better? I can't help but feel that having a single operation run the trains and track makes a huge amount more sense.

I understand that that was the model that John Major had in mind when he was PM, but what changed it to what we have today is the need under EU regulations for open access competition.

And before anybody starts a "fking EU interfering again" sub thread, think it through

Part of the reasoning behind the Beeching cuts of the 60s was what was to "eliminate wasteful competition," an oxymoron if ever there was one. But afterwards there was often only one way to get from point A to point B and that could easily lead to a monopolistic situation. Look at the evidence: Marylebone to Sheffield and Manchester - gone. St Pancras to Manchester, Leeds and Bradford - gone. Paddington to Wolverhampton - gone. Kings Cross to Sheffield - gone And so on. Even where there still is competition eg London to Exeter and London to Birmingham, then one route is the accepted fast route and the other is a stopping service.

That we didn't actually end up with truly open access is nothing to do with the EU, but a lot to do with Whitehall trying to micromanage the railways whilst ostensibly insisting that it is a privately-owned venture.

What we really need far more than a "Big Four" setup is an engineering division looking after the traclk signalling and infrastructure that is fot for purpose. We can but live in hope...

[Pwig]

Don't forget the 2% Operating profits for the TOC. All it needs is an efficiency swing of 2% when going nationalised (easily possible if you see how inept the DFT are) then it makes things even worse.

[Yertis]

rs1952 said:

I understand that that was the model that John Major had in mind when he was PM, but what changed it to what we have today is the need under EU regulations for open access competition.

And before anybody starts a "fking EU interfering again" sub thread, think it through

Part of the reasoning behind the Beeching cuts of the 60s was what was to "eliminate wasteful competition," an oxymoron if ever there was one. But afterwards there was often only one way to get from point A to point B and that could easily lead to a monopolistic situation. Look at the evidence: Marylebone to Sheffield and Manchester - gone. St Pancras to Manchester, Leeds and Bradford - gone. Paddington to Wolverhampton - gone. Kings Cross to Sheffield - gone And so on. Even where there still is competition eg London to Exeter and London to Birmingham, then one route is the accepted fast route and the other is a stopping service.

That we didn't actually end up with truly open access is nothing to do with the EU, but a lot to do with Whitehall trying to micromanage the railways whilst ostensibly insisting that it is a privately-owned venture.

What we really need far more than a "Big Four" setup is an engineering division looking after the traclk signalling and infrastructure that is fit for purpose. We can but live in hope...

So a 'big five', with the fifth being a jointly owned, not for profit operation servicing the other four. As we know, joint operations can run quite well

[rs1952]

Yertis said:

rs1952 said:

I understand that that was the model that John Major had in mind when he was PM, but what changed it to what we have today is the need under EU regulations for open access competition.

And before anybody starts a "fking EU interfering again" sub thread, think it through

Part of the reasoning behind the Beeching cuts of the 60s was what was to "eliminate wasteful competition," an oxymoron if ever there was one. But afterwards there was often only one way to get from point A to point B and that could easily lead to a monopolistic situation. Look at the evidence: Marylebone to Sheffield and Manchester - gone. St Pancras to Manchester, Leeds and Bradford - gone. Paddington to Wolverhampton - gone. Kings Cross to Sheffield - gone And so on. Even where there still is competition eg London to Exeter and London to Birmingham, then one route is the accepted fast route and the other is a stopping service.

That we didn't actually end up with truly open access is nothing to do with the EU, but a lot to do with Whitehall trying to micromanage the railways whilst ostensibly insisting that it is a privately-owned venture.

What we really need far more than a "Big Four" setup is an engineering division looking after the traclk signalling and infrastructure that is fit for purpose. We can but live in hope...

So a 'big five', with the fifth being a jointly owned, not for profit operation servicing the other four. As we know, joint operations can run quite well

In reality that is not far short of what we have at the moment,

The "big one" is Network Rail which is a publicly-owned company (ie. nationalised). When you get down to the TOC level, GWR, South Western, Southern , Greater Anglia, Scotrail, Merseyrail and a host of others have a virtually monopoly on their patches, with only a few open access special trains muscling in from time to time. Outfits like Northern Rail, East Midlands, Arriva Wales don't have a lot of competing services running on their patches. It is only really the likes of the East and West Coast main lines that have anywhere near a real choice of TOCs with which to travel, and on the other side of the coin only Cross Country that muscles in to a large number of other people's patches.

That list is not supposed to be comprehensive - just compiled off the top of my head so if you want to add to it or argue with it please do so.

So in direct answer to the question posed, I can't see it making a practical difference to any great extent.

[Yertis]

rs1952 said:

In reality that is not far short of what we have at the moment,

The "big one" is Network Rail which is a publicly-owned company (ie. nationalised). When you get down to the TOC level, GWR, South Western, Southern , Greater Anglia, Scotrail, Merseyrail and a host of others have a virtually monopoly on their patches, with only a few open access special trains muscling in from time to time. Outfits like Northern Rail, East Midlands, Arriva Wales don't have a lot of competing services running on their patches. It is only really the likes of the East and West Coast main lines that have anywhere near a real choice of TOCs with which to travel, and on the other side of the coin only Cross Country that muscles in to a large number of other people's patches.

That list is not supposed to be comprehensive - just compiled off the top of my head so if you want to add to it or argue with it please do so.

So in direct answer to the question posed, I can't see it making a practical difference to any great extent.

So – for fun – if someone handed you a very deep well of money, and the authority to do whatever you felt appropriate, how would you fix the railways? You can do anything – reopen lines, re double them to increase capacity, whatever you like.

[rs1952]

anonymous said:

[redacted]

You don't specify the "it" that you have a bee in your bonnet about, but from what I remember of your previous posts it is cancelled trains, late trains, skip stopping, and services in the former SR third rail area that are no faster, and sometimes slower, than they were 70 years ago. There is no simple answer to any of these issues - if there was, it would have been sorted years ago.

That said, the underlying problem that at least exacerbates the wider issue is that there are more trains running on the network than the network can handle with any ralistic margin for error. This being the case, a single thing that goes wrong can and does have repercussions on other services. A late running train may be late for an operational reason (eg points failure, signal failure, be delayed by another late train and so on), but it may also be late because of dawdling passengers, or an obstruction on the line, or a staffing issue. And much of this has always been the case - my former boss in th early 70s was seconded to the BRB to carry out a review into local agreements that might impact on a national computerised payroll program that was about to be introduced - he found such things as trains stabled "outstation" overnight and, if the driver or the guard went sick early next morning, there was nobody else available to work the train.

That is even more the case today - there is no spare line capacity, there is no spare stock kicking around in sidings any more, and staff levels have been pared to the bone and all TOCs are permanently short of drivers.

Skip stopping is an example of the Law of Unintended Consequences. The general public have had such a bee in their bonnet for so long about late trains (but never feel the same way about late planes or late buses or "late" journeys in their car because of road congestion) that Delay Repay schemes were introduced. As the system has worked so far, compensation kicks in when a train is more than a set number of minutes late at its destination, but no compensation is paid for a train that is cancelled. And given that a train not stopping at a given station is treated as a cancelled service, it is in the company's interest to skip stops to prevent compensation kicking in for those on the train (and, incidentally, keeping those actually on the train happier because they arrive on time)

Trains on he SR third rail network are no faster than they were 70 years ago because of the geographical characteristics of the area - frequent stops and short distances between stations mean that it is not physically possible for the trains to go any faster than they do now before they start to brake for the next stop. Where they are running slower than 70 years ago, it is usually to do with congestion at junctions because we are metaphorically trying to get a quart into a pint pot, and sometimes it ain't physically possible to improve matters without massive expense and knocking people's houses down next to existing lines to provide extra tracks and therefore extra capacity. People get so shirty about having their house knocked down so that some other bugger can have 5 minutes knocked off his commuting time - I can't understand why...

By the way - point of order. I was only a railwayman between 1969 and 1980, but I have maintained what some may think of as an unhealthy interest in the industry over the almost 40 years since I left