The Official Manchester City (World Club Champions)Thread
Discussion
Wombat3 said:
Real & Barca's finances are a bit more murky, who knows what goes on there (except that they have MASSIVE stadiums & TV deals)
In the case of United, there is no problem with running debt in any business (be it as simple as an overdraft or complicated bonds etc) as long as it is sustainable in the context of the size of the business, its revenues and its balance sheet. That said, in the case of a football club if you are borrowing to buy players then that should probably be covered by FFP in some way.
Plainly United's debts are manageable & we all also know that they were NOT caused by expenditure on players etc either, so distinctly a case of "nothing to see here". The only club being disadvantaged by United's debts are United (and they don't seem too bothered!). United makes enough money to service its debt AND buy players. Lucky United - but then again that position has been built over decades.
Spurs are heading down much the same route only their borrowing was to invest in infrastructure. That should start to pay dividends to them & ultimately I would think that they are going to elevate themselves in to the realms of the top clubs financially - so it is possible to do it without massive & gratuitous cash injections from owners.
Spurs is a great example of what the EPL and 4 guaranteed CL places can do. It's a club which is naturally well placed in terms of size and geographic. Besides it's a well lead club and which thanks to EPL TV rights money and the money from transfer fees (Bale for instance) was able to step up.In the case of United, there is no problem with running debt in any business (be it as simple as an overdraft or complicated bonds etc) as long as it is sustainable in the context of the size of the business, its revenues and its balance sheet. That said, in the case of a football club if you are borrowing to buy players then that should probably be covered by FFP in some way.
Plainly United's debts are manageable & we all also know that they were NOT caused by expenditure on players etc either, so distinctly a case of "nothing to see here". The only club being disadvantaged by United's debts are United (and they don't seem too bothered!). United makes enough money to service its debt AND buy players. Lucky United - but then again that position has been built over decades.
Spurs are heading down much the same route only their borrowing was to invest in infrastructure. That should start to pay dividends to them & ultimately I would think that they are going to elevate themselves in to the realms of the top clubs financially - so it is possible to do it without massive & gratuitous cash injections from owners.
If Spurs though was an Italian or French club, no way would they be able to afford their current stadium.
Spurs has taken full advantage of the joys and infrastructure that the EPL has to offer and that clubs like Liverpool, United, Arsenal and later on Chelsea have made possible over these past decades.
DeltonaS said:
Wombat3 said:
Real & Barca's finances are a bit more murky, who knows what goes on there (except that they have MASSIVE stadiums & TV deals)
In the case of United, there is no problem with running debt in any business (be it as simple as an overdraft or complicated bonds etc) as long as it is sustainable in the context of the size of the business, its revenues and its balance sheet. That said, in the case of a football club if you are borrowing to buy players then that should probably be covered by FFP in some way.
Plainly United's debts are manageable & we all also know that they were NOT caused by expenditure on players etc either, so distinctly a case of "nothing to see here". The only club being disadvantaged by United's debts are United (and they don't seem too bothered!). United makes enough money to service its debt AND buy players. Lucky United - but then again that position has been built over decades.
Spurs are heading down much the same route only their borrowing was to invest in infrastructure. That should start to pay dividends to them & ultimately I would think that they are going to elevate themselves in to the realms of the top clubs financially - so it is possible to do it without massive & gratuitous cash injections from owners.
Spurs is a great example of what the EPL and 4 guaranteed CL places can do. It's a club which is naturally well placed in terms of size and geographic. Besides it's a well lead club and which thanks to EPL TV rights money and the money from transfer fees (Bale for instance) was able to step up.In the case of United, there is no problem with running debt in any business (be it as simple as an overdraft or complicated bonds etc) as long as it is sustainable in the context of the size of the business, its revenues and its balance sheet. That said, in the case of a football club if you are borrowing to buy players then that should probably be covered by FFP in some way.
Plainly United's debts are manageable & we all also know that they were NOT caused by expenditure on players etc either, so distinctly a case of "nothing to see here". The only club being disadvantaged by United's debts are United (and they don't seem too bothered!). United makes enough money to service its debt AND buy players. Lucky United - but then again that position has been built over decades.
Spurs are heading down much the same route only their borrowing was to invest in infrastructure. That should start to pay dividends to them & ultimately I would think that they are going to elevate themselves in to the realms of the top clubs financially - so it is possible to do it without massive & gratuitous cash injections from owners.
If Spurs though was an Italian or French club, no way would they be able to afford their current stadium.
Spurs has taken full advantage of the joys and infrastructure that the EPL has to offer and that clubs like Liverpool, United, Arsenal and later on Chelsea have made possible over these past decades.
simir said:
I can understand that FFP was introduced to protect clubs from owners spending huge sums and then leaving the clubs with unmanageable debt however the rule should either allow for all clubs to have the same transfer and wage budget or remove this restriction so clubs can spend how they please as long as their isn't unmanageable debt assigned to the club.
100% This.
Wacky Racer said:
simir said:
I can understand that FFP was introduced to protect clubs from owners spending huge sums and then leaving the clubs with unmanageable debt however the rule should either allow for all clubs to have the same transfer and wage budget or remove this restriction so clubs can spend how they please as long as their isn't unmanageable debt assigned to the club.
100% This.If you do away with FFP then why not do away with restrictions on squad sizes? Whare do you want to stop?
There is no perfect solution given that the start point was not a level playing field in the first place.
Lets be honest, the Sheiks didn't buy City because they were ardent lovers of either football or Manchester City in particular.
Its just a vehicle for self-agrandisement (because surely they don't need it to make money!)
In some respects, this is no different to F1's endless battle with budgets etc. They have managed to level up to some degree in a way that isn't really possible in football - tighter & tighter technical regs, things like standardised ECUs & tyres & reduced testing. But even they are heading towards a budget cap (if they can find a way to implement & police it).The difference there is also that most of the teams have plenty of irons in other fires as well so they could get on without it. Football clubs are one trick ponies in that comparison, what else are they going to do with themselves? So for the survival of all they need to ensure that the whole thing is managed & not rendered utterly pointless by a few.
Nobody could claim that the situation with the likes of Real, Barca, United , Liverpool, Bayern etc is entirely healthy - but the City/PSG model is not the way to fix the thing either.
Exactly. It will never be a level playing field. Barcelona and Real Madrid will nearly always have the prestige of being the top biggest clubs in World football. There is a small selection of clubs in the tier below those. The best players will always want to play for these clubs, regardless of wage caps of FFP.
Then some clubs have a further advantage due to national tax laws, climate, local population, etc, etc.
FFP is designed to stop clubs spending beyond their means, simply and nothing more. It is not the only and final answer to completely level the playing field for all clubs in all countries.
Then some clubs have a further advantage due to national tax laws, climate, local population, etc, etc.
FFP is designed to stop clubs spending beyond their means, simply and nothing more. It is not the only and final answer to completely level the playing field for all clubs in all countries.
jammy-git said:
Exactly. It will never be a level playing field. Barcelona and Real Madrid will nearly always have the prestige of being the top biggest clubs in World football. There is a small selection of clubs in the tier below those. The best players will always want to play for these clubs, regardless of wage caps of FFP.
Then some clubs have a further advantage due to national tax laws, climate, local population, etc, etc.
FFP is designed to stop clubs spending beyond their means, simply and nothing more. It is not the only and final answer to completely level the playing field for all clubs in all countries.
so organic growth only? that's absolutely super if you already have a massive head start (largely in from non-organic means), and that's exactly why the G14 voted for it. keeps the status quo. and round we go againThen some clubs have a further advantage due to national tax laws, climate, local population, etc, etc.
FFP is designed to stop clubs spending beyond their means, simply and nothing more. It is not the only and final answer to completely level the playing field for all clubs in all countries.
Nice article in Dutch football magazine VI today about the role of UEFA:
https://www.vi.nl/pro/zo-houdt-de-uefa-ajax-en-az-...
This is how UEFA keeps Ajax and AZ small
Johan Cruijff had never seen a bag of money score. Nothing to argue with of course. That does not mean that football has evolved from a game to a billion-dollar industry. In the section Coins & Points, VI reporter Tom Knipping discusses issues on the border between commerce, finance and sporting performance. In episode 4 we deal with the gap between the Champions League and Europa League.
When Manchester City was excluded from the Champions League for two years last week, a lot of compliments went to UEFA. The European Football Union finally showed its teeth and now apparently really wanted to fight the established order. What paper tiger? Finally not only the little clubs were being tackled anymore. The opinion was a strong signal from President Aleksander Ceferin.
But is that really so? City is quite a case apart. UEFA had previously investigated alleged financial dope at the Sheikh club in Manchester, but could not prove that fraud had been committed. Only after a hacker shared stolen City emails and City contracts with a few international quality media, did the case start to roll and the UEFA was more or less forced to reopen the investigation. In short, we are talking about an exceptional situation that would not have occurred without the notorious computer break-ins - also known as Football Leaks.
The frequently heard conclusion that UEFA has started the hunt for super clubs therefore seems incorrect. This is not about facts that have emerged thanks to investigations by the huge Financial Fair Play department full of accountants and lawyers from UEFA, but about an exceptional unveiling of a Portuguese hacker who is now in prison. The likelihood that a similar coincidence will occur with - let's say - Paris Saint-Germain is not too great.
Financial Fair Play (FFP) is also not at all the most efficient means for UEFA to influence the financial relationships between super clubs, top clubs and subtop clubs. The regulations are enormously complex. The investigations are extremely time-consuming. FFP has contributed to a healthier industry with fewer debts, but not to an exciting sport with somewhat equal opportunities. Let's face it: in the nine years since its introduction, the number of clubs that can compete for the European title has not increased. It has decreased. If UEFA actually wants to make sure that the underdog can still participate a little, the benefits for European football are the most logical and simple way to arrange that. This season, the organizers of the Champions League and Europa League are paying 2.6 billion euros to the clubs. As the owner of both tournaments, UEFA is also in charge of the distribution key.
To the outside world, UEFA is rather concerned about the increasing income disparities. The union says it is concerned about the erosive fair play in the economic field, because it leads to increasingly predictable results. Whereas at the start of this century three of the four games were won by the favorite, the richest club now wins in four of the five cases. Somewhat dramatically, Ceferin stated in 2019 that the football sector is going in the same direction as the rest of society. "How can we still realize surprises if we live in a world where one percent of the world's population owns fifty percent of all wealth?"
In bobo jargon, the pursuit of more economic equality (with the aim of: more exciting football) is called improving the competitive balance. In recent years, competitive balance has been pretty much the most commonly used term at UEFA meetings, during UEFA conferences and in UEFA interviews. Ceferin in particular. A small selection of this huge arsenal of quotes about the subject:
"We must protect the sport before it is too late. The smaller teams must be able to continue to compete so that the dream remains alive for everyone." (2017)
"Let's put our cards on the table and be honest: the biggest challenge for the coming years is competitive balance." (2017)
"We need to reconsider our system to achieve a better competitive balance." (2018)
"The concentration of wealth with a small group of clubs threatens the competitive balance, which is essential for the attractiveness of football." (2018)
"It is also clear to the big clubs that competition between the big clubs alone will become very boring." (2018)
"We will adjust the Financial Fair Play rules to create a new European balance." (2019)
"How can we expect miracles if we know that the problem of competitive balance has always existed?" (2019)
"We must do something about the competitive balance." (2019)
"Polarization in revenues is a threat to the stability and success of football." (2020)
Let us look at what UEFA has done in practice with regard to this competitive balance about which the top of UEFA apparently worries so much.
Ceferin was elected UEFA president in 2016. De Sloveen presented itself as the Robin Hood of football. With his pamphlet for more equality between clubs, he did not take a new course. His predecessor Michel Platini was also Robin Hood at his election (in 2008). To be fair. The Frenchman actually introduced a policy to somewhat slow down the rapidly increasing dominance of the super clubs. FFP is his brainchild and he also tried to give the Europa League a boost.
He did this as follows: until 2015, it was arranged that clubs were paid out part of the proceeds from the tournament in which they participated. The CL was extremely successful, but that did not apply to the EL. The UEFA did not make the tournament profitable for a long time. Twenty million in losses per year were suffered on the EL. On the other hand, there was the CL, which left UEFA 150 million net a year. It was decided to combine the proceeds in one central pot. UEFA then arranged with the clubs that the money be distributed between the two tournaments via a fixed formula: the 32 participants in the Champions League now received 3.3 times as much money as the 48 clubs in the Europa League. The result was that the EL increased more in percentage terms than the CL. At the launch, UEFA management spoke of the fairest distribution ever. Looking at the relative differences, they were right about that:
CL/EL relative difference
2009/10: € 803 million / € 147 million 5.5 x as much
2010/11: € 831 million / € 158 million 5.3 x as much
2011/12: € 837 million / € 164 million 5.1 x as much
2012/13: € 974 million / € 209 million 4.7 x as much
2013/14: € 905 million / € 225 million 4.0 x as much
2014/15: € 1,033 million / € 240 million 4.3 x as much
2015/16: € 1,349 million / € 411 million 3.3 x as much
2016/17: € 1,396 million / € 423 million 3.3 x as much
2017/18: € 1,413 million / € 428 million 3.3 x as much
Now UEFA did take a run with reality by showing fans based on the relative differences that something had really been done to restore the balance. The group of possible winners did not become larger as a result of the intervention. On the contrary. Suppose someone with the minimum wage receives a ten percent salary increase and someone with a salary of ten million gains one percent. In practice, that amounts to increases of 1980 euros (for those with the minimum wage) and 100 thousand euros (for the millionaire). You can buy an electric bicycle from one amount, and a few new cars from the other amount. Relatively speaking, the lowest salary has grown much faster, but if you set them opposite each other in the same race, the bike will of course never win that race.
That's how it goes at the top of football. During the 2015-2018 period, the differences in benefits grew - despite the measure introduced - from 793 million to 985 million euros. The only thing that was prevented with the fixed ratio of 3.3 was that the differences increased even faster. In other words: the imbalance increased somewhat less rapidly than would have been the case without this agreement. But the competitive balance deteriorated:
Absolute differences in premiums CL (32 clubs) versus EL (48 clubs)
2009/10: € 656 million
2010/11: € 673 million
2011/12: € 673 million
2012/13: € 765 million
2013/14: € 680 million
2014/15: € 793 million
2015/16: € 938 million
2016/17: € 973 million
2017/18: € 985 million
Then the role of Ceferin. The Slovenian Robin Hood started in the fall of 2016. During his first two seasons as UEFA president, he was unable to work on European tournaments due to existing contracts. The TV and sponsorship rights are always sold for three years. When he was appointed, UEFA was in the middle of the last cycle that was arranged by Platini. After two years of traveling around Europe with his competitive balance doctrine, Ceferin was the first to present his own appointments in 2018 for the 2018/19 to 2020/21 cycle. The following happened:
Season 2018/19:
CL/EL: € 1,977 million / € 559 million
Relative difference: 3.5 x as much for CL (was 3.3)
Absolute difference: € 1,413 million (was 985 million)
Ceferin is the man who realized the biggest differences in income since the founding of UEFA 66 years ago. Whereas in all those years Platini limited the gap between the two tournaments to 300 million euros, the first new cycle under Ceferin added half a billion. During the current cycle, the CL teams receive 4.26 billion euros more than the EL participants. Moreover, UEFA started to distribute CL money in such a way that the biggest brands started to receive much more millions than the smaller clubs for participating in the same tournament (see episode 1 of this section). From the point of view of market forces, that makes perfect sense. The CL is after all many times more successful than the EL. And the high income from media rights and sponsoring are of course more thanks to Real and Barca than to PSV and Bate Borisov. But given the ambitions and promises of UEFA, it was an illogical step. It is at odds with the top priority that the union continuously ventilates to increase support among competitions, clubs and fans: a better competitive balance.
Why did UEFA choose to please the established order? Simple: fear. A few super clubs threatened to start their own top competition a few years ago. Outside of UEFA. With such threats, UEFA stood with their backs against the wall, because the CL is - next to the European Championship - the cash cow from which almost everything is financed. Thanks to the flourishing CL, UEFA can spend many millions on solidarity benefits, subsidies and social projects. Heavily loss-making women's competitions and youth tournaments are financed with it. Moreover, there is a large organization in Nyon with more than five hundred employees that must continue to operate. Moreover, we are not talking about a football association with a cheap court. Ceferin is on the payroll for 1 1/2 million euros a year and a UEFA director who is flown in for meetings - such as Michael van Praag - earns 160 thousand euros.
If UEFA were to lose the CL, the entire business model would come under pressure. Ceferin did what the super clubs asked him to do: bow. The reality now is that the EL bonuses that Ajax and AZ can earn in the coming weeks contrast quite sharply with the CL premiums. Substantial amounts can only be won by reaching the final. But should Ajax or AZ survive three rounds and be eliminated in the semi-final, that would only result in five million euros:
Ajax and AZ could in fact better save their best players in the EL so that they can give full throttle in the Eredivisie, in order to maximize the chances of CL participation. Participating in the CL is economically more relevant than winning the EL. Suppose Ajax participates in the CL and loses all matches there. That will yield around forty million euros. And suppose that Ajax first wins all group matches in the EL and then takes the cup. Then that yields around 25 million euros. Yet UEFA keeps talking about restoring the balance, a job that the top of the union would be fully engaged in. Undoubtedly, the mediagenic incident with Manchester City will be regularly cited in the coming period to underline that illusionary policy.
The success of Ajax was also graciously seized last year by Ceferin, who presented himself as a friend of the subtop. "We must protect Ajax," he said. The reason for this was the reaching of the semi-final by the team from Amsterdam, who at that time, however, were still uncertain about CL participation in the new season. UEFA itself has also caused this. Under Ceferin, the admission criteria advanced further in favor of the top competitions (England, Germany, Spain and Italy now each have four guaranteed places). For mega clubs such as Bayern, Liverpool and Juventus, it is therefore almost impossible to miss the CL. They have more or less guaranteed income from the CL and can also conclude higher player contracts on that basis. This does not apply to the top clubs from the subtop countries, such as Ajax and PSV. CL participation is always uncertain for those clubs. They cannot budget and use these premiums to pay higher salaries.
With his statement, Ceferin actually abused Ajax. Because what was his proposed solution? From now on, give the semi-finalists automatic access to the CL group phase in the following season. That sounded sympathetic, but that too was in fact a bow to the established order. The Ajax semi-final was, after all, an incident. Ajax was the first semi-finalist in 14 years that did not come from the 5 top countries. Almost only the mega clubs will benefit in practice from such a rule, because they still have a safety net in the event of poor competition performance. If Ceferin wants to protect Ajax, as he claims, then he can simply give the subtop countries more places. But of course that is not the intention. In fact, in consultation with the super clubs, he already sketched a closed Champions League in which new national champions would hardly be able to participate. Only when the plans leaked and the UEFA headquarters was hit by a hurricane of criticism did he put that intention in the refrigerator.
We will elaborate on the consequences of UEFA policy for national competitions in one of the following episodes, but it is clear that the competitive balance has also been more dramatic there than ever. Due to the European premium system, it is no longer possible for many ambitious subtoppers to compete against the top. Take AZ. That would like to attack the national top. But what do you do if Ajax or PSV with a single CL participation generates more money than the entire annual budget in Alkmaar? UEFA hands out gigantic incentives to a few clubs and then tours the continent to give alarming stories about the competitive balance.
While Ceferin fanatically continues his Iron Money Curtain, there is not a single football director who says: Dear Aleksander, what kind of nonsense are you talking about? That may seem strange, but that's how it works in the gun industry where friendship and loyalty are the weapons to keep the chances of tournaments, finals and personal promotions alive. The UEFA summit will visit Amsterdam in two weeks. The annual congress is on the program on 3 March in the Beurs van Berlage. Naturally, Ceferin will again emphasize the competitive balance in his speech and the Slovenian will undoubtedly turn up in the news to explain that we need to revise the system so that Ajax and PSV have a chance again. With the above in mind you already know the facts.
https://www.vi.nl/pro/zo-houdt-de-uefa-ajax-en-az-...
This is how UEFA keeps Ajax and AZ small
Johan Cruijff had never seen a bag of money score. Nothing to argue with of course. That does not mean that football has evolved from a game to a billion-dollar industry. In the section Coins & Points, VI reporter Tom Knipping discusses issues on the border between commerce, finance and sporting performance. In episode 4 we deal with the gap between the Champions League and Europa League.
When Manchester City was excluded from the Champions League for two years last week, a lot of compliments went to UEFA. The European Football Union finally showed its teeth and now apparently really wanted to fight the established order. What paper tiger? Finally not only the little clubs were being tackled anymore. The opinion was a strong signal from President Aleksander Ceferin.
But is that really so? City is quite a case apart. UEFA had previously investigated alleged financial dope at the Sheikh club in Manchester, but could not prove that fraud had been committed. Only after a hacker shared stolen City emails and City contracts with a few international quality media, did the case start to roll and the UEFA was more or less forced to reopen the investigation. In short, we are talking about an exceptional situation that would not have occurred without the notorious computer break-ins - also known as Football Leaks.
The frequently heard conclusion that UEFA has started the hunt for super clubs therefore seems incorrect. This is not about facts that have emerged thanks to investigations by the huge Financial Fair Play department full of accountants and lawyers from UEFA, but about an exceptional unveiling of a Portuguese hacker who is now in prison. The likelihood that a similar coincidence will occur with - let's say - Paris Saint-Germain is not too great.
Financial Fair Play (FFP) is also not at all the most efficient means for UEFA to influence the financial relationships between super clubs, top clubs and subtop clubs. The regulations are enormously complex. The investigations are extremely time-consuming. FFP has contributed to a healthier industry with fewer debts, but not to an exciting sport with somewhat equal opportunities. Let's face it: in the nine years since its introduction, the number of clubs that can compete for the European title has not increased. It has decreased. If UEFA actually wants to make sure that the underdog can still participate a little, the benefits for European football are the most logical and simple way to arrange that. This season, the organizers of the Champions League and Europa League are paying 2.6 billion euros to the clubs. As the owner of both tournaments, UEFA is also in charge of the distribution key.
To the outside world, UEFA is rather concerned about the increasing income disparities. The union says it is concerned about the erosive fair play in the economic field, because it leads to increasingly predictable results. Whereas at the start of this century three of the four games were won by the favorite, the richest club now wins in four of the five cases. Somewhat dramatically, Ceferin stated in 2019 that the football sector is going in the same direction as the rest of society. "How can we still realize surprises if we live in a world where one percent of the world's population owns fifty percent of all wealth?"
In bobo jargon, the pursuit of more economic equality (with the aim of: more exciting football) is called improving the competitive balance. In recent years, competitive balance has been pretty much the most commonly used term at UEFA meetings, during UEFA conferences and in UEFA interviews. Ceferin in particular. A small selection of this huge arsenal of quotes about the subject:
"We must protect the sport before it is too late. The smaller teams must be able to continue to compete so that the dream remains alive for everyone." (2017)
"Let's put our cards on the table and be honest: the biggest challenge for the coming years is competitive balance." (2017)
"We need to reconsider our system to achieve a better competitive balance." (2018)
"The concentration of wealth with a small group of clubs threatens the competitive balance, which is essential for the attractiveness of football." (2018)
"It is also clear to the big clubs that competition between the big clubs alone will become very boring." (2018)
"We will adjust the Financial Fair Play rules to create a new European balance." (2019)
"How can we expect miracles if we know that the problem of competitive balance has always existed?" (2019)
"We must do something about the competitive balance." (2019)
"Polarization in revenues is a threat to the stability and success of football." (2020)
Let us look at what UEFA has done in practice with regard to this competitive balance about which the top of UEFA apparently worries so much.
Ceferin was elected UEFA president in 2016. De Sloveen presented itself as the Robin Hood of football. With his pamphlet for more equality between clubs, he did not take a new course. His predecessor Michel Platini was also Robin Hood at his election (in 2008). To be fair. The Frenchman actually introduced a policy to somewhat slow down the rapidly increasing dominance of the super clubs. FFP is his brainchild and he also tried to give the Europa League a boost.
He did this as follows: until 2015, it was arranged that clubs were paid out part of the proceeds from the tournament in which they participated. The CL was extremely successful, but that did not apply to the EL. The UEFA did not make the tournament profitable for a long time. Twenty million in losses per year were suffered on the EL. On the other hand, there was the CL, which left UEFA 150 million net a year. It was decided to combine the proceeds in one central pot. UEFA then arranged with the clubs that the money be distributed between the two tournaments via a fixed formula: the 32 participants in the Champions League now received 3.3 times as much money as the 48 clubs in the Europa League. The result was that the EL increased more in percentage terms than the CL. At the launch, UEFA management spoke of the fairest distribution ever. Looking at the relative differences, they were right about that:
CL/EL relative difference
2009/10: € 803 million / € 147 million 5.5 x as much
2010/11: € 831 million / € 158 million 5.3 x as much
2011/12: € 837 million / € 164 million 5.1 x as much
2012/13: € 974 million / € 209 million 4.7 x as much
2013/14: € 905 million / € 225 million 4.0 x as much
2014/15: € 1,033 million / € 240 million 4.3 x as much
2015/16: € 1,349 million / € 411 million 3.3 x as much
2016/17: € 1,396 million / € 423 million 3.3 x as much
2017/18: € 1,413 million / € 428 million 3.3 x as much
Now UEFA did take a run with reality by showing fans based on the relative differences that something had really been done to restore the balance. The group of possible winners did not become larger as a result of the intervention. On the contrary. Suppose someone with the minimum wage receives a ten percent salary increase and someone with a salary of ten million gains one percent. In practice, that amounts to increases of 1980 euros (for those with the minimum wage) and 100 thousand euros (for the millionaire). You can buy an electric bicycle from one amount, and a few new cars from the other amount. Relatively speaking, the lowest salary has grown much faster, but if you set them opposite each other in the same race, the bike will of course never win that race.
That's how it goes at the top of football. During the 2015-2018 period, the differences in benefits grew - despite the measure introduced - from 793 million to 985 million euros. The only thing that was prevented with the fixed ratio of 3.3 was that the differences increased even faster. In other words: the imbalance increased somewhat less rapidly than would have been the case without this agreement. But the competitive balance deteriorated:
Absolute differences in premiums CL (32 clubs) versus EL (48 clubs)
2009/10: € 656 million
2010/11: € 673 million
2011/12: € 673 million
2012/13: € 765 million
2013/14: € 680 million
2014/15: € 793 million
2015/16: € 938 million
2016/17: € 973 million
2017/18: € 985 million
Then the role of Ceferin. The Slovenian Robin Hood started in the fall of 2016. During his first two seasons as UEFA president, he was unable to work on European tournaments due to existing contracts. The TV and sponsorship rights are always sold for three years. When he was appointed, UEFA was in the middle of the last cycle that was arranged by Platini. After two years of traveling around Europe with his competitive balance doctrine, Ceferin was the first to present his own appointments in 2018 for the 2018/19 to 2020/21 cycle. The following happened:
Season 2018/19:
CL/EL: € 1,977 million / € 559 million
Relative difference: 3.5 x as much for CL (was 3.3)
Absolute difference: € 1,413 million (was 985 million)
Ceferin is the man who realized the biggest differences in income since the founding of UEFA 66 years ago. Whereas in all those years Platini limited the gap between the two tournaments to 300 million euros, the first new cycle under Ceferin added half a billion. During the current cycle, the CL teams receive 4.26 billion euros more than the EL participants. Moreover, UEFA started to distribute CL money in such a way that the biggest brands started to receive much more millions than the smaller clubs for participating in the same tournament (see episode 1 of this section). From the point of view of market forces, that makes perfect sense. The CL is after all many times more successful than the EL. And the high income from media rights and sponsoring are of course more thanks to Real and Barca than to PSV and Bate Borisov. But given the ambitions and promises of UEFA, it was an illogical step. It is at odds with the top priority that the union continuously ventilates to increase support among competitions, clubs and fans: a better competitive balance.
Why did UEFA choose to please the established order? Simple: fear. A few super clubs threatened to start their own top competition a few years ago. Outside of UEFA. With such threats, UEFA stood with their backs against the wall, because the CL is - next to the European Championship - the cash cow from which almost everything is financed. Thanks to the flourishing CL, UEFA can spend many millions on solidarity benefits, subsidies and social projects. Heavily loss-making women's competitions and youth tournaments are financed with it. Moreover, there is a large organization in Nyon with more than five hundred employees that must continue to operate. Moreover, we are not talking about a football association with a cheap court. Ceferin is on the payroll for 1 1/2 million euros a year and a UEFA director who is flown in for meetings - such as Michael van Praag - earns 160 thousand euros.
If UEFA were to lose the CL, the entire business model would come under pressure. Ceferin did what the super clubs asked him to do: bow. The reality now is that the EL bonuses that Ajax and AZ can earn in the coming weeks contrast quite sharply with the CL premiums. Substantial amounts can only be won by reaching the final. But should Ajax or AZ survive three rounds and be eliminated in the semi-final, that would only result in five million euros:
Ajax and AZ could in fact better save their best players in the EL so that they can give full throttle in the Eredivisie, in order to maximize the chances of CL participation. Participating in the CL is economically more relevant than winning the EL. Suppose Ajax participates in the CL and loses all matches there. That will yield around forty million euros. And suppose that Ajax first wins all group matches in the EL and then takes the cup. Then that yields around 25 million euros. Yet UEFA keeps talking about restoring the balance, a job that the top of the union would be fully engaged in. Undoubtedly, the mediagenic incident with Manchester City will be regularly cited in the coming period to underline that illusionary policy.
The success of Ajax was also graciously seized last year by Ceferin, who presented himself as a friend of the subtop. "We must protect Ajax," he said. The reason for this was the reaching of the semi-final by the team from Amsterdam, who at that time, however, were still uncertain about CL participation in the new season. UEFA itself has also caused this. Under Ceferin, the admission criteria advanced further in favor of the top competitions (England, Germany, Spain and Italy now each have four guaranteed places). For mega clubs such as Bayern, Liverpool and Juventus, it is therefore almost impossible to miss the CL. They have more or less guaranteed income from the CL and can also conclude higher player contracts on that basis. This does not apply to the top clubs from the subtop countries, such as Ajax and PSV. CL participation is always uncertain for those clubs. They cannot budget and use these premiums to pay higher salaries.
With his statement, Ceferin actually abused Ajax. Because what was his proposed solution? From now on, give the semi-finalists automatic access to the CL group phase in the following season. That sounded sympathetic, but that too was in fact a bow to the established order. The Ajax semi-final was, after all, an incident. Ajax was the first semi-finalist in 14 years that did not come from the 5 top countries. Almost only the mega clubs will benefit in practice from such a rule, because they still have a safety net in the event of poor competition performance. If Ceferin wants to protect Ajax, as he claims, then he can simply give the subtop countries more places. But of course that is not the intention. In fact, in consultation with the super clubs, he already sketched a closed Champions League in which new national champions would hardly be able to participate. Only when the plans leaked and the UEFA headquarters was hit by a hurricane of criticism did he put that intention in the refrigerator.
We will elaborate on the consequences of UEFA policy for national competitions in one of the following episodes, but it is clear that the competitive balance has also been more dramatic there than ever. Due to the European premium system, it is no longer possible for many ambitious subtoppers to compete against the top. Take AZ. That would like to attack the national top. But what do you do if Ajax or PSV with a single CL participation generates more money than the entire annual budget in Alkmaar? UEFA hands out gigantic incentives to a few clubs and then tours the continent to give alarming stories about the competitive balance.
While Ceferin fanatically continues his Iron Money Curtain, there is not a single football director who says: Dear Aleksander, what kind of nonsense are you talking about? That may seem strange, but that's how it works in the gun industry where friendship and loyalty are the weapons to keep the chances of tournaments, finals and personal promotions alive. The UEFA summit will visit Amsterdam in two weeks. The annual congress is on the program on 3 March in the Beurs van Berlage. Naturally, Ceferin will again emphasize the competitive balance in his speech and the Slovenian will undoubtedly turn up in the news to explain that we need to revise the system so that Ajax and PSV have a chance again. With the above in mind you already know the facts.
Edited by DeltonaS on Tuesday 18th February 16:22
tamore said:
jammy-git said:
Exactly. It will never be a level playing field. Barcelona and Real Madrid will nearly always have the prestige of being the top biggest clubs in World football. There is a small selection of clubs in the tier below those. The best players will always want to play for these clubs, regardless of wage caps of FFP.
Then some clubs have a further advantage due to national tax laws, climate, local population, etc, etc.
FFP is designed to stop clubs spending beyond their means, simply and nothing more. It is not the only and final answer to completely level the playing field for all clubs in all countries.
so organic growth only? that's absolutely super if you already have a massive head start (largely in from non-organic means), and that's exactly why the G14 voted for it. keeps the status quo. and round we go againThen some clubs have a further advantage due to national tax laws, climate, local population, etc, etc.
FFP is designed to stop clubs spending beyond their means, simply and nothing more. It is not the only and final answer to completely level the playing field for all clubs in all countries.
If a club is run properly there is no reason why any club in any of the top leagues cannot move themselves into the top three/four with 2-3 years of steady growth and then start challenging for titles. Just see Spurs, Dortmund, Atletico, Leicester, etc, etc.
jammy-git said:
What's wrong with organic growth?
If a club is run properly there is no reason why any club in any of the top leagues cannot move themselves into the top three/four with 2-3 years of steady growth and then start challenging for titles. Just see Spurs, Dortmund, Atletico, Leicester, etc, etc.
You can quite easily include the current European and about to be Prem champions in that too, under FSG we work to budgets just like Spurs, Dortumund, Leicester etc etc (75m net over 5 years spend) If a club is run properly there is no reason why any club in any of the top leagues cannot move themselves into the top three/four with 2-3 years of steady growth and then start challenging for titles. Just see Spurs, Dortmund, Atletico, Leicester, etc, etc.
We have got very lucky getting what I see as the best manager in the world at building a club up with restrictions.
Last year 4 teams in the final 4 of the champions league are teams who all work to budgets
jammy-git said:
What's wrong with organic growth?
If a club is run properly there is no reason why any club in any of the top leagues cannot move themselves into the top three/four with 2-3 years of steady growth and then start challenging for titles. Just see Spurs, Dortmund, Atletico, Leicester, etc, etc.
I already pointed out the flaw to this argument yesterday - I guess you didn’t see it.If a club is run properly there is no reason why any club in any of the top leagues cannot move themselves into the top three/four with 2-3 years of steady growth and then start challenging for titles. Just see Spurs, Dortmund, Atletico, Leicester, etc, etc.
Within 2-3 years of Leicester winning the league their team had been dismantled by the likes of City, United and Chelsea. Despite being owned by a billionaire who is spending on infrastructure, they can’t compete with the big boys as far as wages etc are concerned. At any point this can and will happen.its not fair imo
The big boys don’t get their players poached as other clubs can’t afford the wages. They can keep a settled team and adjust where necessary.
stuartmmcfc said:
I already pointed out the flaw to this argument yesterday - I guess you didn’t see it.
Within 2-3 years of Leicester winning the league their team had been dismantled by the likes of City, United and Chelsea. Despite being owned by a billionaire who is spending on infrastructure, they can’t compete with the big boys as far as wages etc are concerned. At any point this can and will happen.its not fair imo
The big boys don’t get their players poached as other clubs can’t afford the wages. They can keep a settled team and adjust where necessary.
Hang on a minute, my team has been dismantled by clubs who were more of a pull than us, that's football... Within 2-3 years of Leicester winning the league their team had been dismantled by the likes of City, United and Chelsea. Despite being owned by a billionaire who is spending on infrastructure, they can’t compete with the big boys as far as wages etc are concerned. At any point this can and will happen.its not fair imo
The big boys don’t get their players poached as other clubs can’t afford the wages. They can keep a settled team and adjust where necessary.
Unless you pay the big money ie like you Do 350k a week for Kdb any prem club is at risk...
stuartmmcfc said:
Yes but that’s exactly why it’s so difficult with FFP.
Don't agree myself, I think with the money in the game now you don't need a billionaire, you need a good infrastructure, signing process and a good managerThere is plenty of good youth to buy as you said look at Dortmund, spurs etc there is only a handful of stars the top clubs need, if you manage the sale right, selling them can improve your team..
(see Coutinho, replaced by Alisson and VVD) if Leicester for example sell Madisson for 80m, I fully believe Rodgers could still improve their team with that money....
m3sye said:
stuartmmcfc said:
Yes but that’s exactly why it’s so difficult with FFP.
Don't agree myself, I think with the money in the game now you don't need a billionaire, you need a good infrastructure, signing process and a good managerThere is plenty of good youth to buy as you said look at Dortmund, spurs etc there is only a handful of stars the top clubs need, if you manage the sale right, selling them can improve your team..
(see Coutinho, replaced by Alisson and VVD) if Leicester for example sell Madisson for 80m, I fully believe Rodgers could still improve their team with that money....
city could never have become contenders without shinawatra and subsequently mansour. the club was one transfer away from going out of business (SWP to chelsea) and was a shambles from decades of mismanagement. while liverpool was gaining global recognition on the back of Moores family investment, city was lurching from frying pan to fire until the takeovers.
all history, but the playing field can never be level in the current system. as has been said, a standard salary cap across europe unrelated to income or how deep the owner's pockets are would be the truly 'fair' system. even then, different tax rates etc would complicate.
m3sye said:
Don't agree myself, I think with the money in the game now you don't need a billionaire, you need a good infrastructure, signing process and a good manager
City have had all 4 and it’s not easy. It’s taken around 30 years for Liverpool to start winning and be as good as they are despite their huge fan base (revenue) and the start they already hadstuartmmcfc said:
It helps if you hack into rivals transfer policy and targets 
Glass houses and all that. 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/sport/football/10253392/l...
Ol
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